Conferences

GATE
Games & Theoretical Economics (GATE) Workshop
October 24-29, 2005

We will discuss topics of interest to three groups: economists, game theorists and computer scientists. For this purpose, we have invited scholars to present papers and participate in informal discussions.

All lectures are in the Donald P. Jacobs Center, room 561, unless noted otherwise.

• The Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• The Northwestern Institute on Complex Systems (NICO)
• The Center for Strategic Decision Making

Philippe Jehiel, Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées,
"Reputation, Deception, and Analogy-based expectation" (Oct 24, 12:10pm)
"Analogy Based Equilibrium: The Formal Model" (Oct 26, 10am)

Sham Kakade, Toyota Institute of Technology, "Deterministic Calibration and Nash Equilibrium"

Moshe Tennenholtz, Israel Institute of Technology, "Pre-Bayesian Games"

Matthew O. Jackson, California Institute of Technology, "Games on Networks"

Nicolas Vielle, HEC School of Management, "Social learning in one-arm bandit"

Stanley Reiter, Northwestern University, "Making Nash Implementing Mechanisms Informationally Efficient"
(based on "Designing Economic Mechanisms" jointly authored by L. Hurwicz and S. Reiter)

Alessandro Pavan, Northwestern University, "Efficiency and Welfare under Asymmetric Information"

Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University, "Automated Mechanism Design"

Eddie Dekel , Northwestern University, "Testing experts"
Related Paper 1
Related Paper 2

Lance Fortnow, Northwestern University, "Tuesdays at Kellogg"

Olivier Gossner , Northwestern University, "Optimal Use of Communication Resources"

David Parkes, Harvard University, "Learning, Sequential Decision Making, and Mechanism Design"