| 2018 | AComparisonofApproachestoAdvertisingMeasurementEvidencefromBigFieldExperimentsatFacebook Gordon, Brett, Florian Zettelmeyer and Dan Chapsky. 2018. A Comparison of Approaches to Advertising Measurement: Evidence from Big Field Experiments at Facebook. Abstract Link
Measuring the causal effects of digital advertising remains challenging despite the availability of granular data. Unobservable factors make exposure endogenous, and advertising's effect on outcomes tends to be small. In principle, these concerns could be addressed using randomized controlled trials (RCTs). In practice, few online ad campaigns rely on RCTs, and instead use observational methods to estimate ad effects. We assess empirically whether the variation in data typically available in the advertising industry enables observational methods to recover the causal effects of online advertising. This analysis is of particular interest because of recent, large improvements in observational methods for causal inference (Imbens & Rubin,2015). Using data from 15 US advertising experiments at Facebook comprising 500 million user-experiment observations and 1.6 billion ad impressions, we contrast the experimental results to those obtained from multiple observational models. The observational methods often fail to produce the same effects as the randomized experiments, even after conditioning on extensive demographic and behavioral variables. We also characterize the incremental explanatory power our data would require to enable observational methods to successfully measure advertising effects. Our findings suggest that commonly used observational approaches based on the data usually available in the industry often fail to accurately measure the true effect of advertising.
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| 2018 | ADoseofManagedCareControllingDrugSpendinginMedicaid Abstract Link
Effectively designed market mechanisms may reduce growth in health care spending. In this paper,
we study the impact of privatizing the delivery of Medicaid benefits on drug prices and utilization.
Exploiting granular data, we find that drug spending would fall by 22.4 percent if the drug benefit was fully administered by Medicaid Managed Care Organizations (MCOs), largely through lower point-of-sale prices and greater generic usage. The effects are driven by MCOs’ ability to design drug benefits and steer consumers toward lower cost drugs and pharmacies. By contrast, MCOs do not appear to skimp on performance by reducing overall drug consumption.
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| 2018 | AmbidextrousDirectorsandTheirOutsizedInfluenceonFirmStrategy Lungeanu, Razvan and Edward Zajac. 2018. Ambidextrous Directors and Their Outsized Influence on Firm Strategy. |
| 2018 | AMeetingoftheMindsCognitiveCongruenceinanAlliancePortfolioforNewProductIntroductionsintheSoftwareIndustry Rhee, Seung-Hyun, William Ocasio and Edward Zajac. 2018. A Meeting of the Minds: Cognitive Congruence in an Alliance Portfolio for New Product Introductions in the Software Industry. |
| 2018 | Atheoryofthemortgageratepass-through Milbradt, Konstantin, David Berger and Fabrice Tourre. 2018. A theory of the mortgage rate pass-through. |
| 2018 | AttachmentsecuritypromotesintergroupnegotiationThemediatingroleofcommoninterest Thompson, Leigh, S J Kwon and S Lee. 2018. Attachment security promotes intergroup negotiation: The mediating role of common interest. |
| 2018 | CausalEcologicalInferences |
| 2018 | ChainsofOpportunityRevisitedEvidencefromAdministrativeData |
| 2018 | CollaborativebyDesignHowMatrixFirmsSeeDoAlliances Stych, Maxim, Franz Wohlgezogen and Edward Zajac. 2018. Collaborative by Design? How Matrix Firms See/Do Alliances. |
| 2018 | CollectiveChoiceinDynamicPublicGoodProvision Bowen, Renee, George Georgiadis and Nicolas S Lambert. 2018. Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision. Abstract Link
Two heterogeneous agents contribute over time to a joint project, and collectively decide its scope. A larger scope requires greater cumulative effort and delivers higher benefits upon completion. We show that the efficient agent prefers a smaller scope, and preferences are time-inconsistent: as the project progresses, the efficient (inefficient) agent's preferred scope shrinks (expands). We characterize the equilibrium outcomes under dictatorship and unanimity, with and without commitment. We find that an agent's degree of efficiency is a key determinant of control over project scopes. From a welfare perspective, it may be desirable to allocate decision rights to the inefficient agent.
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