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Economic Sociology in the New Millennium

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Economic sociology is now a sociological specialization with a distinct identity (Smelser and Swedberg 1994). In the twentieth century, it focused on the internal workings of organizations-human relations, organization design, and internal labor markets (Baron and Hannan 1994). Using the economist's "black box" metaphor of the firm as a point of departure. economic sociologists formulated theories of how organizations influence individual action and respond to the environment (Swedberg 1991). These theories are now part of the received wisdom. They have been validated, adopted by other disciplines (Arrow 1998), and developed into original subdisciplines-organization theory and strategic management (Selznick 1957; Thompson 1967; Childs 1973; Emerson 1962; Hannan and Freeman 1977; Kogut and Zander 1996; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Granovetter 1985; Mintz and Schwartz 1985; Barney 1991).

After this auspicious focus on internal organization, which originated with Weber. Gouldner, Coleman, Selznick, Coser, Blau, and their students, we see the intellectual focus of the field shifting from firms to markets. Economic sociology must extend its distinctive approach to organizations, states, and markets if it is to widen its understanding of economy and society. What's more, a number of political, economic, technological, and corporate changes have made the boundaries of firms permeable and variable, making markets more consequential because what goes on between firms shapes what goes on within them (Aldrich 1999; Freeland, forthcoming 2000; Haveman 2000). These changes include the "neoliberal" turn in economic policy, the global integration of product and capital markets, transitions from socialist to capitalist economies, widespread privatization, corporate restructuring, and outsourcing.

We anticipate that these changes will trans form the traditional identities, relations, and roles of economic actors, especially firms. New identities will emerge and merge in ways that may alter profoundly how wealth is accumulated and distributed. Consequently, economic sociol ogy is likely to focus on the origins, processes and consequences of this course of social reidentification, something we dub identity brid involves of Identity bricolage decomposition of existing identities into the constituent components, and their recombine tion into a new identity (Lévi-Strauss 19 Because identities engender distinct modes action, identity bricolage opens up new lines of action and behavior previously foreclosed to pr or identities. We see new lines of researching economic sociology revolving around in process by which identity bricolage occurs its consequences for economy and society Identity bricolage will also affect economic soci ology itself, as it converses and trades intellect al capital with other disciplines, altering its own identity and content.

Given our contention that markets will or py center stage in economic sociology, we provide in this essay some selective predictions and projections, recognizing that the future direction of sociological theory, like society, is often driven by unforeseen developments and unintended consequences. 77, "The Role of Cultural Persistence" ew 42: 726–43.

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Conventional wisdom holds that three actors that three identities that make up the fundamental components of economic activity—production, distribution, and consumption. Suppliers make components and sell them to intermediaries who combine components into goods and market them to consumers who buy them. This textbook image of the "circular flow of goods" through the economy is the reigning orthodoxy, and much analytical leverage has been gained dissecting the structure of the marhet in this way. For example, the ratio of sellers buyers provides a simple but powerful measure of the level of competition in a market or a group's bargaining power (Emerson 1962; Blau 1964; Burt 1992).

We believe that these roles are in the process of being deconstructed into their constituent elements and reconfigured into new roles through identity bricolage. To illustrate how identity bricolage works, consider the example of STATA, a software company that has taken a lead in redefining the traditional "circular flow of goods" model by literally turning customers into suppliers! STATA's customers not only buy its software, they write the software code for the product. The consequences are remarkable for how markets and firms can be organized and how other companies, consumers, and suppliers can appropriate this process in industries as "YIK-ish" as autos and aerospace.

STATA used to follow the conventional circular flow model to research and develop (R&D) each new version. It would record users' "wish lists" for new routines and then assign company personnel to program the top requests into the next release, which typically had to meet a brisk two-year development-to-release cycle time or the firm lost clients. With the pressure to apply leading technology in published work, however, thousands of skilled users couldn't afford to wait two years for a new version, so they began programming their own routines in STATA's language and circulating them over the web to other STATA customers. To convert the grassroots process of joining the roles of buyers (i.e., users) and suppliers (i.e., programmers) into a formal strategy, STATA offered programming classes over the Internet (at a modest price) and constructed a web site to facilitate the sharing of user written routines.

Through the bricolage of suppliers and customers, STATA tapped the previously unused

intellectual capabilities of each of its buyers. thereby expanding the firm's capabilities. Resources that were dedicated to programming were freed up for improving the program's internal efficiency (i.e., the meta-language) and customer service. STATA's two-year upgrade cycle is now a real-time continuous upgrade system that has greatly expanded the menu of available statistical, graphical, and data management routines. The time that was spent buying new diskettes, ordering by mail, waiting for mail delivery, paying for mail delivery, dealing with passwords, misplacing diskettes, and many other problems is reduced or eliminated. Finally, by servicing specific niches (e.g., hazard modelers versus random effects modelers), STATA creates a new supply of customer roles that can be reassembled in the future, generating a positive cycle of identity bricolage.

What drives bricolage? Obviously, in this case technology has reduced the cost of collaboration among actors, permitting bricolage among identities that were formerly separated by a division of specialized labor. Perhaps more important, STATA's ability to develop a relationship with its customers—a bilateral flow of information and capabilities—has changed the one-way flow from seller to buyer into a two-way flow.

The idea of a two-way rather than one-way relationship of information exchange between actors is a critical issue for economic sociology. In contrast to Fordist mass production, which was characterized by discrete identities and functional roles, the new century is likely to be distinguished by permeable, assimilated relationships among economic actors that are formed and reformed through identity bricolage. In the twentieth century, print, TV, and radio ads aimed to catch the consumer's attention long enough to differentiate the features of a product. The relationship between supplier and customer was didactic, passive, and unilateral. New techniques enable suppliers and customers to develop a two-way relationship. The basic idea is to allow every client or customer, which for large firms number in the tens of thousands, to interact and exchange information about their individual preferences with the firm. In the past, even though research showed the benefits of niche marketing, this level of mass-scale clientspecific information was unworkable because of data management problems, regulations, and the corporate conviction that roles and identities were stable.

The determinants of identity bricolage—new information technology, specialized consumer tastes, and two-way relationships-suggest that it could happen in older industries. Because today 30 percent of a new car's value is in the computer, Daimler-Chrysler plans to make upgrades of a car's computer as easy as upgrading STATA software. Imagine a world where new models of cars are upgraded via the net. If you don't want an option when the car is purchased you can upgrade later or download finance, fashion, or medical data. Daimler-Chrysler may even entice their "techy" customers to start writing code. These trends suggest that research issues for economic sociology are likely to concern the causes and consequences of bricolage and the ways in which embeddedness influences these processes. If relationships become more rather than less important, how are the capabilities to build relationships, trust, reciprocal obligation, private information transfer, and the other features of embedded ties developed (Uzzi 1997, 1999; DiMaggio and Louch 1998)?

New Markets and Old Identities for Economic Actors

Identity bricolage is not a wholly new social process. It involves elements that are familiar to economic sociologists, making economic sociology an excellent source of theory on how markets might unfold in the new century (Baker and Faulkner 1991; White 1992). For example, eBay, a virtual "auction house," has created new economic identities. Participants put items up for auction on eBay, selling them to the highest bidder. Like Sotheby's, eBay gets a percentage of the selling price. However, unlike Sotheby's, eBay's clients never meet face-to-face. Hence, how do eBay traders know if another trader in the neighboring country or continent is trust-worthy and experienced?

To solve the problem of too much anonymity and uncertainty, eBay created public reputations for each trader in its virtual auction house, adopting a mechanism of social governance found in other financial and commodities markets (Carruthers 1996). An eBay trader must "rate" the trader s/he transacted with, and the rating (called a reputation score) is posted for would-be traders. This creates identities for anonymous traders and encourages trading. Interestingly, while reputation scores solved some problems of uncertainty, they created new ones. With the very tapid rise in the level of eBay trades, traders faced the daunting task of

determining the difference between a reputation score of say, 500 versus 567 or between 1200 and 1301. It wasn't obvious how to gauge reputational metrics. Reputation scores also were based typically on "positive recommendation because traders avoided posting negative comments that made them look spiteful. Consequently, eBay created a new rating system that is based on reputation scores and specially collected trading data that ranks traders with a system of stars similar to Dun and Bradstreet AAA, AA, AA, BBB, etc., rating system.

This process of market creation is familiar to economic sociologists. Ambiguous information about credibility created a demand for socially objectified data—a reputation score. Once repu tation scores were developed, however, the spurred a need for another social device legitimated ranking system—to filter volumes of objectified but unstratified information. If look to how markets developed historically in England and the United States, we find that similar cycle of "demand for information" "need for interpretation of information" occurred systematically in market creation (Carruthers 1996). In the nineteenth century, Dun and Bradstreet created and disseminated reputations of companies much as eBay does today (Cohen 1998). And like eBay they move to a system of rankings that not only simplified the interpretation of reputation scores but all established Dun and Bradstreet as a legitimate and authoritative analyst and critic-historical ly new roles in financial markets. This historical pattern of role emergence to manage problems interpretation suggests that a similar "critic ide tity" will arise as roles and identity assimilated require differentiation.

For example, several independent web sites have been founded to help traders evaluate the reputation scores on eBay and other online tradi ing sites. These critics give qualitative and quant titative interpretations to the eBay-generate reputation scores and/or add their own unique perspective. At some sites, users pay between one to three dollars for a critic's review of a made er (Kollock 1999). Certain critics and analysis are already gaining their own reputations ures like Janet Maslin-who attract a following of loyal traders who share common sensibility and a shared identity. It is easy to image of new identities arising. Perhaps there will some eBay "dealers," like "art dealers," who special in helping would-be eBay traders to value the

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independent web sites elp traders evaluate the y and other online tradve qualitative and quanto the eBay-generated radd their own unique ites, users pay between critic's review of a tradtain critics and analysts ir own reputations-fig--who attract a following ire common sensibilities Itis easy to image other 'erhaps there will soon be t dealers," who specialize 3ay traders to value their auctioned goods. eBay may soon trade for select customers who have access to "special collections" before they go public in much the same way that Sotheby's does for "select clientele." We would also expect eBay to sell virtual chairs" on its exchange, just as stock markets have historically created chairs to ensure credibility in trades, evaluate products, and stabilize the social order of the market.

Bricolage within Economic Sociology

The theoretical identity of the new economk sociology arguably is built around the idea of embeddedness. Since Granovetter's influential 1985 article, "embeddedness" has been used to make sense of the social organization of the conomy. Embeddedness has proven, however, to be more of a programmatic statement than a general theory, leading subsequent research to focus on the how, what, when, and where questions (Dacin, Ventresca, and Beal 1999). We view embeddedness arguments as moving forward in micro and macro directions. Various researchers have documented how economic action is embedded in large-scale social institutions (Carruthers 1996; Fligstein 1996; Guillén, forthcoming), social organizations (Biggart and Guillén 1999), the state and law (Roy 1997; Evans 1995; Schneiberg 1999; Carruthers and Halliday 1998), gender relations (Biggart 1989), abor market institutions (Western 1997), and culture (DiMaggio 1994; Dobbin 1994; Zelizer 1994). We expect future work on "macroembeddedness" to explore the mechanisms that hin markets to social institutions, and to understand their consequences. How will new connections between markets and social institutions Influence the creation and reproduction of economic inequality (Tilly 1998; Conley 1998)?

Economic sociologists witness new connections between markets and social institutions, and their effects on inequality, in the new knowledge-based industries. These have linked Industry with the academy and university, creating through identity bricolage the new role of cientist/entrepreneur. Powell and Owen-Smith (1999) show how resources, rewards, and status traditionally were discributed in biology through scademic networks and the university system. A successful scientific career involved going to the "right" graduate school, having the "right" disentation committee, getting a prestigious postdoc, as well as acquiring other forms of social and cultural capital. In this academic system, a necessful scientist garnered funding and other resources, acted as an influential "gatekeeper," had his or her research valued, got advance (prepublication) notice of cutting-edge research, and could attract the best students.

Powell and Owen-Smith show how bio-tech firms were able to appropriate this system of "invisible colleges" through the use of marketbased mechanisms of access, rather than traditional means. By granting equity interests to research scientists at major universities, they gained access not only to scientists' own labor, but also to the social networks so critical to the creation and distribution of new knowledge. Thus, bio-tech firms were able to build a new connection between industry and the university around a new social role (the scientist/entrepreneur) and so push forward their own commercially oriented research. The bio-tech industry was in effect subsidized by a university-based system of knowledge production and dissemination. Furthermore, universities were affected by this highly selective injection of market-based money and resources. Now, for example, a biotech partnership can make an instant multimillionaire out of a molecular biologist, while an equally distinguished professor of mathematical ecology is excluded from the new and lucrative role of scientist/entrepreneur.

Micro-embeddedness research has looked at how the relationships and networks of persons and firms affect labor, product, and financial markets (Fernandez and Weinberg 1997; Bian 1997; Granovetter 1974; DiMaggio and Louch 1998; Light et al. 1990; Uzzi 1999). As we described above, relationships will remain important in the new century because they are a gateway to new market niches, private information, and bricolage. Valuable work remains to be done on how to categorize and measure relationships (Montgomery 1998). Work also needs to be done on the conditions under which relationships supplant other forms of coordination, how they evolve, and what balance emerges between instrumental and altruistic ends (Powell 1996).

Network analysis is likely to grow in importance even as it sheds its current novelty for the general researcher (Mizruchi 1994). If we are correct about the process of identity bricolage, then economic sociology needs a research technology that allows for the constant shifting of categories. One way to think of the problem is to view it as analogous to the difference between flat data files and relational data bases (Uzzi

1996). Flat files are normally based on static categorical distinctions that are built into the data structure. They are lists of units that can be defined along categories: firms in the same SIC code, or the same region; managers in the same executive education class; or banks that specialize in small business loans. Knowing the categorical boundaries of a flat file is clear: It's a count of the number of units. In contrast, identifying the boundaries of a relational data base is more difficult because the boundaries are never fixed but depend instead on the "sort" criteria selected by the analyst. This suggests that the boundaries of economic networks such as organizational fields cannot be conceived of properly in conventional terms. Rather, they can be defined only by careful industry studies that identify which relations matter (e.g., board interlocks, joint ventures, alliances, contracts), and the relevant dimensions of variation.

The two forms of embeddedness interact because macro-embeddedness sets the context for micro-embeddedness, and micro-embeddedness can prompt change in macro structures (Abolafia 1996; Kraatz and Zajac 1996). That is, the institutional context influences which social relationships and networks shape a person's economic action, and individual actions can change the institutional context. Many prominent sociologists have posed the problem of the micromacro link (e.g., Coleman 1990; Nee 1998) but haven't successfully resolved it. We believe that one of the achievements of economics has been the ability to build macro-models on the basis of consistent micro-foundations. While economists have worked at the two extremes of the micromacro continuum (rational choice psychology and general equilibrium models), we propose that economic sociology start in the middle ground (organizations and networks) and work its way outward. Building on middle-level research, we can move in the micro direction by using notions of bounded rationality, and borrowing from prospect theory and behavioral decision theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1982). These approaches offer a much more robust model of individual action, and one that can be situated easily within a social and organizational context (Murnighan and Bazerman 1990). In the macro direction, we move outward from organizations and networks to the level of organizational fields and social institutions, where the focus shifts from frictionless adjustment of supply and demand between disconnected actors, to conflictual negotiations among interdependent actors. Such an approach looks at the formal and informal mechanisms of governance (power, status, legitimation) that direct resources and allocate rewards.

How micro- and macro-embeddedness affect each other depends both on the structural position of the economic actor and on the social content of networks and relationships. For example, without a developed legal system or contract law, people often follow culturally appropriate heuristics and rely on "high trust" relationships to conduct their economic transactions (Greif 1989). The absence of formal-legal institutions affects the pattern of micro-embeddedness (Lovejoy and Richardson 1999). Because macro-institutions vary cross-national ly, as do their links to micro-embeddedness, we anticipate rather less convergence toward generic form of market society than some of the stronger globalization arguments (Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997).

Bricolage between Economic Sociology and other Specialties

Economic sociology is carving out a distinct tive niche that brings it into consact with other aciological specialties—an example of how dis ciplinary identities are also subject to bricolage Some of the resulting conversations and interchanges, we believe, will sharpen the cutting edge of research. Economic sociology and politi cal sociology, for example, are already enjoying fruitful collaboration. Since many of the precon ditions for markets are supplied politically (e.g. property rights), political processes and structure tures continue to influence markets (Campbell and Lindberg 1990; Carruthers and Halliday 1998; Davis and Thompson 1994; Fligstein 1996; Stark 1996). Here we discuss the connection tions joining economic sociology to the sociological gy of culture, and to stratification research. The first revolves around the fact that markets and industries are not only realms of economic activation ity, but are comprised of cultural distinction and cognitive categories used to make sense of those economic activities (Carruthers and Stinchcombe 1999; Zuckerman 1999). The second derives from the remarkable ability of mare kets to create inequality.

New types of products present something of puzzle to both producers and consumers. The novelty and ambiguity make the assessment product quality problematic, for neither group necessarily sure what the critical dimensions and

key qualities will be. Alte definitions of quality can ly shakedown period. i becomes dominant and what really matters. For it ling automobile industry, it engine size (horsepower), r ty, or comfort should be th for car quality. According automobile clubs "socializ focusing on reliability by st strations with production's this particular aspect. The have staged speed tests the and horsepower the key dis van is now a distinct cate product, but in its origins it the categories of car and true tinctly but rather a bit of bo

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key qualities will be. Alternative and competing definitions of quality can co-exist during an early shakedown period, until one definition becomes dominant and it becomes "obvious" what really matters. For instance, in the fledgling automobile industry, it wasn't clear whether engine size (horsepower), range, speed, reliability, or comfort should be the critical dimensions for car quality. According to Rao (2000), early automobile clubs "socialized" consumers into focusing on reliability by staging public demonstrations with production cars that highlighted this particular aspect. They could just as well have staged speed tests that made acceleration and horsepower the key dimensions. The minivan is now a distinct category of automotive product, but in its origins it sat uneasily between the categories of car and truck, being neither distinctly but rather a bit of both.

Category systems matter because they induce systematic comparisons, not only among products (i.e., which goods are substitutes in the eyes of buyers and which are not?), but also among producers (who is "the competition" for a given firm?). They also foreclose other comparisons (Espeland and Stevens 1998). The fuzziness, ambiguity, and permeability of product boundaries create the kind of cognitive slack that marketers exploit. In the nineteenth century, Listerine was a hair product used to combat dandruff Now the same product is used as a mouthwash (Settle and Alreck 1986: 101). In one product category, it competed with the precursors of Tegrin shampoo; now it combats Scope for market share.

Two research streams focusing on entrepreneurship and market status hierarchies exemplify the potential benefits of collaboration between economic sociology and cultural sociology. As ordinarily conceived, entrepreneurs invent new products for existing markets. In contrast, recent work suggests that industry entrepreneurs (yet another new category of actor) devise new markets. Ventresca and Lacev (2000) show how the market for information services emerged and was institutionalized by entrepreneurs who helped to invent new products and methods of production, but also the cognitive frameworks needed to define the product and circumscribe the industry. Such entrepreneurship is as much cultural as economic. Furthermore, many industries possess a social order that mirrors cultural status rankings and similarly induces patterns of emulation and conformity (Podolny 1993). As Han (1994) explains, low-status firms look upward, emulating their betters. High-status firms, by contrast, differentiate themselves from their peers while basically ignoring their lessors. Status rankings in the market may be an important determinant of inequality and mimesis, but it is easy to overlook these effects without the insights of the sociology of culture.

The study of inequality in markets opens a channel between economic sociology and stratification research, with its long-standing interest in class, race, gender, and power. The tendency for markets to create inequality is apparent at even highly aggregated levels of analysisincome inequality increases as countries undergo the transition from command to market economies (Cornelius and Weder 1996). But while stratification researchers have focused on labor markets, economic sociology can extend the analysis into commodity, housing, and capital markets as well. For instance, Ayres and Siegelman (1995) found substantial price differences between men and women and whites and blacks in the new car market. As compared to whites, African Americans experience discrimination when it comes to getting a mortgage (Massey and Denton 1993), buying a home (Yinger 1995), or obtaining small business loans (Bostic and Lampani 1999: 151; Uzzi 1999). While it is important to assess the magnitude of inequality, the key research question concerns the social processes that create and reproduce inequality. Animus-based theories of discrimination go only so far, and it will be critical to examine the institutional and organizational bases of discrimination. We need to know more about how organizational routines and practices beget discriminatory treatment, and how differential impacts are legitimated through appeals to the market (Nelson and Bridges 1999).

As economic sociology examines the causes of identity bricolage and the consequences for inequality, we may ourselves experience a professional identity "crisis" triggered in part by jurisdictional squabbles over who "owns" what category of issues or empirical phenomenon (Hirsch 1997; Dobbin, forthcoming). Already, a debate is unfolding between traditional Marxists and some of the new economic sociologists over whether or not business organizations remain primarily tools of the capitalist class. The former group urges that sociologists maintain their critical perspective and not be co-opted to serve the

interests of capital. The latter group also recognizes the significance of conflict and inequality, but argues that business and for-profit organizations can be used to increase equality, and that research should distinguish among firms with an eye to promoting positive sum gains. But the fruitfulness of the interchanges with the sociology of culture, political sociology, and stratificarectify research will help misconceptions about economic sociology: first, that its focus on the "hard facts" of the market make it an inhospitable place for research on the cultural and symbolic aspects of the economy; and, second, that it will not contribute to the traditional sociological critique of power and social inequality.

Conclusion

The twentieth century witnessed economic sociology's appearance as a subdiscipline with a focus on how organizations allocate resources and affect stratification. Today, the logic of the marketplace has become disproportionately important in structuring social and economic life. We have stressed one particular property of this market change. Identity bricolage involves the reconfiguration and recombination of economic roles and identities to engender new modes of exchange, allocation, and valuation. Such change necessitates a new conceptual apparatus to understand which market identities remain stable, and which are transformed. Bricolage also affects economic sociology, which evolves as a consequence of internal developments and exchanges both with other sociological subdisciplines and disciplines outside of sociology. The economic sociology of the twentieth century pioneered the analysis of organizations. Building on this foundation, economic sociology in the twenty-first century can lead to a new understanding of markets that is both theoretically and empirically substantive, and that situates the economy in society.

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