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Depth and Efficiency of Large Double Auctions, Econometrica

Abstract

We consider large double auctions with private values. Values need be neither symmetric nor independent. Multiple units may be owned or desired. Participation may be stochastic. We introduce a very mild notion of “a little independence.” We prove that all nontrivial equilibria of auctions that satisfy this notion are asymptotically efficient. For any α > 0 inefficiency disappears at rate 1/n2−α.

Type

Article

Author(s)

Jeroen Swinkels, Martin Cripps

Date Published

2006

Citations

Swinkels, Jeroen, and Martin Cripps. 2006. Depth and Efficiency of Large Double Auctions. Econometrica. 74(1): 47-92.

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