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On Preferences, Beliefs, and Manipulation within Voting Situations, Econometrica

Abstract

This paper shows that no nondictatorial voting procedure exists that induces each voter to choose his voting strategy solely on the basis of his preferences and independently of his beliefs concerning other voters' preferences. This necessary dependence between a voter's beliefs and his choice of strategy means that a voter can manipulate another voter's choice of strategy by misleading him into adopting inaccurate beliefs concerning other voters' beliefs.

Type

Article

Author(s)

JeanMarie Blin, Mark Satterthwaite

Date Published

1977

Citations

Blin, JeanMarie, and Mark Satterthwaite. 1977. On Preferences, Beliefs, and Manipulation within Voting Situations. Econometrica. 45(4): 881-888.

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