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Factions and Political Competition, Journal of Political Economy

Abstract

This paper presents a new model of political competition in which candidates belong to factions. Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of the party to the allocation of resources. In doing so, the model provides a unified explanation of two prominent features of public resource allocations: the persistence of (possibly inefficient) policies and the tendency of public spending to favor incumbent party strongholds over swing constituencies.

Type

Article

Author(s)

Nicola Persico, Dan Silverman, Jose-Carlos Rodriguez-Pueblita

Date Published

2011

Citations

Persico, Nicola, Dan Silverman, and Jose-Carlos Rodriguez-Pueblita. 2011. Factions and Political Competition. Journal of Political Economy. 119(2): 242-288.

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