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Effluent Regulation and Long Run Optimality, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Abstract

The long-run efficiency properties of regulatory instruments are examined in a multiple-input framework. The effluent tax and tradeable permit are shown to be efficient with free entry and exit of small firms. The across-the-board effluent standard results in excessive entry and excessive industry pollution.

Type

Article

Author(s)

Daniel Spulber

Date Published

1985

Citations

Spulber, Daniel. 1985. Effluent Regulation and Long Run Optimality. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 12(2): 103-116.

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