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Research Details
Effluent Regulation and Long Run Optimality, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
Abstract
The long-run efficiency properties of regulatory instruments are examined in a multiple-input framework. The effluent tax and tradeable permit are shown to be efficient with free entry and exit of small firms. The across-the-board effluent standard results in excessive entry and excessive industry pollution.
Type
Article
Author(s)
Date Published
1985
Citations
Spulber, Daniel. 1985. Effluent Regulation and Long Run Optimality. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 12(2): 103-116.
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