Logo Logo

Incomplete Information Games with Ambiguity Averse Players

Abstract

We study incomplete information games of perfect recall involving players who perceive ambiguity and may be ambiguity averse. Our focus is on equilibrium concepts satisfying sequential optimality -- each player's strategy must be optimal at each stage given the strategies of the other players and the player's conditional beliefs. We show that, for the purpose of identifying strategy profiles that are part of a sequential optimum, it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to a particular generalization of Bayesian updating. We examine comparative statics in ambiguity aversion and results and examples on belief robustness and new strategic behavior.

Type

Working Paper

Author(s)

Eran Hanany, Peter Klibanoff, Sujoy Mukerji

Date Published

2018

Citations

Hanany, Eran, Peter Klibanoff, and Sujoy Mukerji. 2018. Incomplete Information Games with Ambiguity Averse Players.

KELLOGG INSIGHT

Explore leading research and ideas

Find articles, podcast episodes, and videos that spark ideas in lifelong learners, and inspire those looking to advance in their careers.
learn more

COURSE CATALOG

Review Courses & Schedules

Access information about specific courses and their schedules by viewing the interactive course scheduler tool.
LEARN MORE

DEGREE PROGRAMS

Discover the path to your goals

Whether you choose our Full-Time, Part-Time or Executive MBA program, you’ll enjoy the same unparalleled education, exceptional faculty and distinctive culture.
learn more