Logo Logo

The Calculus of Ethical Voting, International Journal of Game Theory

Abstract

Papers by Feddersen and Sandroni (2005a and 2005b) and Coate and Colin (2005) provide an explanation for turnout in large elections. These papers introduce ethical agents who are motivated to participate when they determine that agents of their type are morally obligated to do so. Unlike previous duty-based models of participation, ethical agents' moral obligation to vote is determined endogenously as a function of the behavior of other agents. In order to predict outcomes, a solution concept called consistency links agents' preferences with actual behavior in a manner analogous to Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we address the foundational problems in ethical participation models. We show the restrictions consisteny imposes on the central notion of group identity, the incentive constraints on ethical reasoning, and the existence and uniqueness of consistent profiles.

Type

Article

Author(s)

Timothy Feddersen, Alvaro Sandroni

Date Published

2006

Citations

Feddersen, Timothy, and Alvaro Sandroni. 2006. The Calculus of Ethical Voting. International Journal of Game Theory. 35(1): 1-25.

KELLOGG INSIGHT

Explore leading research and ideas

Find articles, podcast episodes, and videos that spark ideas in lifelong learners, and inspire those looking to advance in their careers.
learn more

COURSE CATALOG

Review Courses & Schedules

Access information about specific courses and their schedules by viewing the interactive course scheduler tool.
LEARN MORE

DEGREE PROGRAMS

Discover the path to your goals

Whether you choose our Full-Time, Part-Time or Executive MBA program, you’ll enjoy the same unparalleled education, exceptional faculty and distinctive culture.
learn more