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Delegated Law Enforcement and Noncooperative Behavior, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization

Abstract

This article addresses two significant problems arising from the delegation of law enforcement. First, the policymaker's problem of designing incentives to induce efficient performance by the enforcement agency is examined. Second, the effect of delegation on the enforcer's strategic interaction with potential offenders is specified.

Type

Article

Author(s)

David Besanko, Daniel Spulber

Date Published

1989

Citations

Besanko, David, and Daniel Spulber. 1989. Delegated Law Enforcement and Noncooperative Behavior. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization. 5(1): 25-52.

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