Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players, Jorunal of Economic Theory

Abstract

Bayesian Nash equilibria that fail to be hindsight-(or, alternatively, ex-post) stable do not provide reliable predictions of outcomes of games in many applications. We characterize a family of large Bayesian games (with many players) in which all equilibria are asymptotically hindsight-stable, and discuss the con-sequences of this robustness property. In contrast to earlier literature, we establish hindsight stability in a class of games in which players are not anonymous and type spaces and action spaces can be infinite.

Type

Article

Author(s)

Ehud Kalai, J. Deb

Date Published

2015

Citations

Kalai, Ehud, and J. Deb. 2015. Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players. Jorunal of Economic Theory. 157: 1041-1055.

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