Take Action
Home | Faculty & Research Overview | Research
Research Details
Rationalizable Trade, Games and Economic Behavior
Abstract
We formulate necessary and sufficient conditions for the impossibility of interim rationalizable trade between two agents, without assuming common priors or common ex-post values. Since equilibrium trade is always interim rationalizable, the conditions are also sufficient for no equilibrium trade.
Type
Article
Author(s)
Stephen Morris, Constantinos Skiadas
Date Published
2000
Citations
Morris, Stephen, and Constantinos Skiadas. 2000. Rationalizable Trade. Games and Economic Behavior.(2): 311-323.
KELLOGG INSIGHT
Explore leading research and ideas
Find articles, podcast episodes, and videos that spark ideas in lifelong learners, and inspire those looking to advance in their careers.
learn more
COURSE CATALOG
Review Courses & Schedules
Access information about specific courses and their schedules by viewing the interactive course scheduler tool.
LEARN MORE
DEGREE PROGRAMS
Discover the path to your goals
Whether you choose our Full-Time, Part-Time or Executive MBA program, you’ll enjoy the same unparalleled education, exceptional faculty and distinctive culture.
learn more