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Research Details
Multiple period Contracts between Principal and Agent with Adverse Selection, Economic Letters
Abstract
Multi-period contracts with adverse selection at the time of contracting are studied. With risk-neutrality and independent private information, all inefficiency arises in the first period only. With positive serial correlation, inefficiency is more pervasive but declines over time.
Type
Article
Author(s)
Date Published
1985
Citations
Besanko, David. 1985. Multiple period Contracts between Principal and Agent with Adverse Selection. Economic Letters.(1-2): 33-37.
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