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Eliciting Preferences to Assign Positions and Compensation, Games and Economic Behavior

Abstract

We describe strategy-proof rules for economies where an agent is assigned a position (e.g., a job) plus some of a divisible good. For the 2-agent-2-position case we derive a robust characterization. For the multi-agent-position case, many "arbitrary" such rules exist, so we consider additional requirements. By also requiring coalitional strategy-proofness or nonbossiness, the range of a solution is restricted to the point that such rules are not more complex than those for the Shapley-Scarf housing model (no divisible good). Third, we show that essentially only constant solutions are immune to manipulations involving "bribes." Finally, we demonstrate a conflict between efficiency and strategy-proofness. The results extend to models (without externalities) in which agents share positions.

Type

Article

Author(s)

James Schummer

Date Published

2000

Citations

Schummer, James. 2000. Eliciting Preferences to Assign Positions and Compensation. Games and Economic Behavior. 30(2): 293-318.

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