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Research Details

Corporate Governance: Voting Rights and Majority Rules, Journal of Financial Economics

Abstract

In this paper, we derive conditions under which the simple majority voting rule for electing controlling management and one share-one vote constitute a socially optimal corporate governance rule. We also show that other majority rules and/or multiple classes of shares are not socially optimal. Finally we show that an entrepreneur would choose to issue two securities, one with only cash flow claims and no votes and one with only votes and no cash flow claims, if this were allowed. This scheme, regardless of the majority rule adopted, is not socially optimal.

Type

Article

Author(s)

Milton Harris, Artur Raviv

Date Published

1988

Citations

Harris, Milton, and Artur Raviv. 1988. Corporate Governance: Voting Rights and Majority Rules. Journal of Financial Economics.(1-2): 203-235.

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