Logo Logo

Bargaining and Regulation with Asymmetric Information about Demand and Supply, Journal of Economic Theory

Abstract

Rate regulation is studied as a bargaining process in which consumers and the firm negotiate output and payments under asymmetric information. The feasible set of transactions given incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints is characterized. The set of interim incentive efficient mechanisms for the direct revelation game is also characterized. Sufficient conditions are given for efficient mechanisms to be full information efficient. Efficient mechanisms are identified which correspond to nonlinear monopoly pricing, monosony compensation schedules, and the Baron-Myerson regulation model.

Type

Article

Author(s)

Daniel Spulber

Date Published

1988

Citations

Spulber, Daniel. 1988. Bargaining and Regulation with Asymmetric Information about Demand and Supply. Journal of Economic Theory. 44(2): 251-268.

KELLOGG INSIGHT

Explore leading research and ideas

Find articles, podcast episodes, and videos that spark ideas in lifelong learners, and inspire those looking to advance in their careers.
learn more

COURSE CATALOG

Review Courses & Schedules

Access information about specific courses and their schedules by viewing the interactive course scheduler tool.
LEARN MORE

DEGREE PROGRAMS

Discover the path to your goals

Whether you choose our Full-Time, Part-Time or Executive MBA program, you’ll enjoy the same unparalleled education, exceptional faculty and distinctive culture.
learn more