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Self-Selection via Fringe Benefits, Journal of Labor Economics

Abstract

This paper extends the theory of self-selection to circumstances in which economic agents have some access to markets. We use the analysis to explain the existence of multidimensional compensation packages in the presence of limited (re)marketability. Employment contracts that include fringe benefits are prominent examples of such multidimensional packages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Type

Article

Author(s)

Ronald A. Dye

Date Published

1984

Citations

Dye, A. Ronald. 1984. Self-Selection via Fringe Benefits. Journal of Labor Economics. 2(3): 388-411.

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