Research Details

Abstract

A fully committed sender persuades a receiver to accept a project through disclosing information regarding a payoff-relevant state. The receiver's payoff from acceptance increases in the state. The receiver has private information about the state, referred to as his type. We show that the sender-optimal mechanism takes the form of nested intervals: each type accepts on an interval of states and a more optimistic type's interval…  The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/314174422_The_Interval_Structure_of_Optimal_Disclosure [accessed Mar 28, 2017].

Type

Article

Author(s)

Eran Shmaya, yingni guo

Date Published

2018

Citations

Shmaya, Eran, and yingni guo. 2018. The interval structure of optimal disclosure. Econometrica.