Resale Price Maintenance and Manufacturer Competition for Exclusive Dealerships, Journal of Industrial Economics

Abstract

Two manufacturers distribute their brands through exclusive retail dealers, and must compete for consumers indirectly by inducing retailers to carry their brands. We compare equilibrium outcomes with and without resale price maintenance. Maximum RPM lowers the retail price if manufacturers cannot employ franchise fees. Minimum RPM raises the retail price if manufacturers cannot set a wholesale price above marginal cost and must employ only a franchise fee. However, these traditional insights are reversed if manufacturers can set both a wholesale price and a franchise fee in the equilibrium without RPM.

Type

Article

Author(s)

Martin K. Perry, David Besanko

Date Published

1991

Citations

Perry, K. Martin, and David Besanko. 1991. Resale Price Maintenance and Manufacturer Competition for Exclusive Dealerships. Journal of Industrial Economics. 39(5): 517-544.

KELLOGG INSIGHT

Explore leading research and ideas

Find articles, podcast episodes, and videos that spark ideas in lifelong learners, and inspire those looking to advance in their careers.
learn more

COURSE CATALOG

Review Courses & Schedules

Access information about specific courses and their schedules by viewing the interactive course scheduler tool.
LEARN MORE

DEGREE PROGRAMS

Discover the path to your goals

Whether you choose our Full-Time, Part-Time or Executive MBA program, you’ll enjoy the same unparalleled education, exceptional faculty and distinctive culture.
learn more