Recent research papers by Roger B. Myerson

COMPARISON OF SCORING RULES IN POISSON VOTING GAMES (revised March 2001, 172 kB)
Abstract:  Scoring rules are compared by their equilibria in simple voting games with Poisson population uncertainty, using new techniques for computing pivot probabilities. Best-rewarding rules like plurality voting can generate discriminatory equilibria where the voters disregard some candidate as not a serious contender, although he may be universally liked, or symmetric to other candidates as in the Condorcet cycle. Such discriminatory equilibria are eliminated by worst-punishing rules like negative voting, but then even a universally disliked candidate may have to be taken seriously. In simple bipolar elections, equilibria are always majoritarian and efficient under approval voting, but not other scoring rules.

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONS (March 2000, 49 kB)
Abstract.  This paper is a preliminary draft of an article to appear in Chicago Law Review (2000), as part of a symposium reviewing two new books on economic analysis of constitutions: Dennis Mueller's Constitutional Democracy and Robert Cooter's Strategic Constitution. Some of the basic questions of constitutional analysis are introduced, and the importance of work in this area is shown as one of the major new developments in social theory. The methods of economic theory are then shown to be particularly appropriate and useful for such constitutional analysis. The author then tries to follow Cooter and Mueller in sketching some of the most important results of economic analysis of constitutional structures, but finds a perspective quite different from theirs.

POLITICAL ECONOMICS AND THE WEIMAR DISASTER (revised January 1999, 70 kB)
Abstract:  The Allied leaders who produced the Treaty of Versailles and the German leaders who created the Weimar constitution relied significantly on the theoretical expertise of John Maynard Keynes and Max Weber respectively. It is argued here that integrated analytical approaches to the study of political and economic competition, which have been developed with game-theoretic methodology since the time of Keynes and Weber, can offer a valuable perspective to better understand the decisions that faced the leaders of Weimar and Versailles.

LARGE POISSON GAMES (revised May 1998, 324 kB)
Abstract:  Existence of equilibria is proven for Poisson games with compact type sets and finite action sets. Then three theorems are introduced for characterizing limits of probabilities in Poisson games when the expected number of players becomes large. The magnitude theorem characterizes the rate at which probabilities of events go to zero. The offset theorem characterizes the ratios of probabilities of events that differ by a finite additive translation. The hyperplane theorem estimates probabilities of hyperplane events. These theorems are applied to derive formulas for pivot probabilities in binary elections, and to analyze a voting game that was studied by Ledyard.

FUNDAMENTALS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY (September 1996, 117 kB)
Abstract:  This paper offers a short introduction to some of the fundamental results of social choice theory. Topices include: Nash implementability and the Muller-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem, anonymous and neutral social choice correspondences, two-party competition in tournaments, binary agendas and the top cycle, and median voter theorems. The paper begins with a simple example to illustrate the importance of multiple equilibria in game-theoretic models of political institutions.

DECISIVENESS OF CONTRIBUTORS' PERCEPTIONS IN ELECTIONS, coauthored with Rebecca Morton (December 1992, 141 kB).
Abstract:  We consider a model of two-candidate elections where spending on campaign advertisements can directly influence voters' preferences, and contributors give the money for campaign spending in exchange for promised services if the candidate wins.  We find that the winner of the election depends crucially on the contributors' beliefs about who is likely to win, and the contribution market tends towards nonsymmetric equilibria in which one of the two candidates has no chance of winning.  If the voters are only weakly influenced by advertising or if permissible campaign spending is small, then the candidates choose policies close to the median voter's ideal point, but the contributors still determine the winner. Uncertainty about the Condorcet-winning point (or its nonexistence) can change these results and generate equilibria in which both candidates have substantial probabilities of winning.

LEARNING GAME THEORY FROM JOHN HARSANYI (17 kB), notes for a memorial service at Berkeley on August 31, 2000.

All files here are in Adobe PDF format. For other research papers, see also Northwestern's Center for Mathematical Studies.

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