Papers that are published or forthcoming:

1. “Reputation and Competition”, American Economic Review, June 2002, 644-663.

2. “A Perpetual Race to Stay Ahead”, Review of Economic Studies, 71(4), 1065-1088, December 2004.

3. “Coase and Hotelling: A Meeting of the Minds”, with M.I. Kamien, The Journal of Political Economy, 112, June 2004, 718-23.

4. “Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games”, with Jeffrey C. Ely and Wojciech Olszewski, Econometrica, May 2005, 73(2), 377-415.
Additional appendix: "Dispensability of Public Randomization device."

5. “Costly Signaling in Auctions” with Nicolas Sahuguet, forthcoming, Review of Economic Studies.

6. “The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring”, with Wojciech Olszewski, Econometrica, November 2006, 74(6), 1499-1545.

7. “Collusion with (almost) no Information” with Julian Jamison, forthcoming, RAND Journal of Economics.

8. “Public Enterprises and Labor Market Performance”, with L. Ngai and C. Olivetti, forthcoming, International Economic Review.

Articles in Books:
“Signalling”, New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, forthcoming.

Some downloadable papers:

"A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels" (joint with Nicolas Sahuguet)

"Sequential Common-Value Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders" (joint with Julian Jamison)

"Too Much of a Good Thing? Resale and the Coase Conjecture" (joint with M.I. Kamien)

"Payoff-Dominance in Dynamic Coordination Games"

"The Wisdom of the Minority" (joint with Steve Callander)

"When is the individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?" (joint with Olivier Gossner)

"Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information" (joint with Stefano Lovo)

"On Markov Games with Incomplete Information on One Side" (joint with Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille)

"How Robust is the Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring" (joint with Wojciech Olszewski)

"Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons" (joint with Nicolas Vielle)

"Arbitration, Mediation and Cheap-Talk" (joint with Maria Goltsman, Gregory Pavlov and Francesco Squintani"

"Efficiency in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma under Private Monitoring" (joint with Kyna Fong, Olivier Gossner and Yuliy Sannikov)