Network Formation and Bargaining in Vertical Markets: The Case of Narrow Networks in Health Insurance

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Abstract

“Network adequacy regulations” expand patients’ access to hospitals by mandating a lower bound on the number of hospitals that health insurers must include in their networks. Such regulations, however, compromise insurers’ bargaining position with hospitals, which may increase hospital reimbursement rates, and may consequently be passed through to consumers in the form of higher premiums. In this paper, I quantify this effect by developing a model that endogenously captures (i) how insurers form hospital-networks, (ii) how they bargain with hospitals over rates by threatening to drop them from the network or to replace them with an out-of-network hospital, and (iii) how they set premiums in an imperfectly competitive market. I estimate this model using detailed data from a Massachusetts health insurance market, and I simulate the effects of a range of regulations. I find that “tighter” regulations, which force insurers to include more than 85% of the hospital systems in the market, raise the average reimbursement rates paid by some insurers by at least 28%. More moderate regulations can expand the hospital networks without causing large hikes in reimbursement rates.

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1 Introduction

Insurers increasingly use “narrow network” plan designs in the health insurance exchanges established by the Affordable Care Act (ACA). These plans offer their enrollees a small set of “in-network” hospitals to choose from, and if the enrollee decides to go “out of network,” s/he will have to pay all or most of the healthcare expenses out of pocket.¹,²

Narrow hospital networks have received vast and often unfavorable media attention. Some provider- as well as consumer-advocacy groups have filed lawsuits against both insurers and the federal government over narrow networks. They have also pressed the administrators of the healthcare exchanges, mainly Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), for “network adequacy regulations”, which are regulations that would force minimum mandated network sizes on insurers in order to expand narrower networks and increase consumers’ access to hospitals.³

However, the impacts of network adequacy regulations are not confined to hospital access. They also can have price consequences. Under such regulations, insurers cannot drop a hospital out of network if that action would take them below the minimum mandated network size. Taking advantage of this restriction faced by insurers, hospitals may gain further bargaining leverage and successfully negotiate higher reimbursement rates with insurers for the care they provide to patients. Insurers can, in turn, respond to the increased rates by raising their monthly premiums and passing the extra cost on to consumers.

The objective of this paper is to quantify the price consequences of network adequacy regulations. I do this by developing an empirically estimable model of insurer-hospital markets with two crucial features. First, I endogenize how insurers (i) form hospital networks, (ii) bargain with hospitals over rates, and (iii) set premiums. Second, my formulation of the bargaining allows insurers to try to negotiate lower rates with hospitals not only by

¹ According to McKinsey & Company, about 60% of the ACA exchange plans cover less than 70 percent of local hospitals where their plans are offered, and about 20% of the plans cover less than 30 percent of local hospitals. Networks are expected to further narrow in 2017.

² Narrow networks are not confined to hospitals. The same is true of other types of providers, such as physician groups and prescription drugs. My focus in this paper is on hospitals.

³ In fact, CMS had planned on introducing such regulations for the ACA exchanges in 2017. But in its final rule, it chose not to do so.
threatening to drop them out of the hospital network, but also by threatening to replace them with currently out-of-network hospitals. I leverage detailed medical claims and insurance plan enrollments data to structurally estimate the model for the CommCare market, a health insurance exchange in Massachusetts, predating the ACA but similar to the ACA exchanges in many respects. I then use the estimated model to simulate a range of network adequacy regulations and study how they impact hospital networks, negotiated rates, and premiums. I identify and analyze multiple economic forces governing how narrow network plans respond to the regulation as well as how broader network plans, which are not directly affected by the regulation, respond to the responses of narrower network ones.

My model consists of a game with two main steps. In the first step, equilibrium hospital networks and reimbursement fees are simultaneously determined. In the second step, insurers set premiums a la Bertrand. To model the first step, I impose network-stability conditions and bargaining conditions on the equilibrium hospital networks and reimbursements. For network-stability, I adapt pairwise stability conditions from Jackson and Wolinsky [1996]. I require that at the equilibrium, no insurer or hospital can strictly profit either from dropping a bilateral contract or from adding a new bilateral contract that the other party would be willing to sign.

My bargaining conditions offer a substantial advantage over standard approaches to the modeling of bargaining in vertical markets, by accounting for an economic force that arises in settings where the bargaining does not take place on a fixed network, but rather affects and is affected by network formation. The standard model of bargaining on a network in the empirical industrial organization literature is called Nash-in-Nash (NiN henceforth) and is based on Horn and Wolinsky [1988]. NiN assumes that the reimbursement rate negotiated between hospital $i$ and insurer $j$ is the outcome of a Nash Bargaining procedure (a la Binmore et al. [1986]) between the two, taking as given the rest of the network structure and reimbursements. The construction of the Nash Bargaining formulation roughly implies that hospital $i$ can charge a high rate if insurer $j$ would lose a substantial amount of profit from leaving hospital $i$ out of its hospital network, but not modifying the network otherwise. This is the case under NiN even if insurer $j$ would lose little or no profit, or would gain some profit, from leaving hospital $i$ out and instead accepting a competing offer made by
a currently-out-of-network hospital $i'$ that is trying to outbid hospital $i$ and replace it in the network, in a simultaneous negotiation process to the negotiation between $i$ and $j$. In other words, the negotiated reimbursement rate predicted by NiN is not affected at all by what hospitals are outside the network of insurer $j$ and how close of substitutes they are to hospital $i$.

To capture insurers’ ability to use such out-of-network hospitals as “replacement-threats” is critical in the context of studying network adequacy regulations. For an insurer that is just meeting the minimum network size mandated by a network adequacy regulation, dropping hospitals without replacement is not an option. Thus, for such insurers replacement threats are the only bargaining chip that can help to keep reimbursement rates low. Not accounting for these threats, NiN would predict unrealistically high charges by hospitals to insurers bound by such regulations. My bargaining formulation, instead, assumes that the rate negotiated between hospital $i$ and insurer $j$ is equal to the Nash Bargaining rate only if under that rate, the insurer cannot strictly profit from replacing $i$ with a currently-out-of-network $i'$ at the lowest rate that $i'$ would accept. If, however, under the Nash Bargaining rate, insurer $j$ can strictly profit from such replacement, my bargaining formulation assumes that hospital $i$ brings its rate down to a level that would make the insurer indifferent between keeping hospital $i$ and replacing it with hospital $i'$.

I show that my formulation can be sustained as an outcome of a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of a non-cooperative extensive form game for a class of $2 \times 1$ (i.e. two upstream firms and one downstream) settings.

My empirical analysis has several steps in which I estimate demand and cost functions for insurers and hospitals. First, I use detailed medical claims data on CommCare to estimate a model of hospital choice, backing out perceived hospital qualities by patients for different diagnoses as well as patients’ disutility from travel. Based on these estimates, I construct

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3That is, hospital $i$ will charge the highest rate that deters replacement threats by the insurer. Of course, if such a rate is so low that hospital $i$ would rather drop the contract, then pairwise stability is violated and current network structure cannot be part of the equilibrium configuration. Hence, the replacement must take place. See section 3 for more details.

5Even though I use my model to analyze general $m \times n$ games, I only have non-cooperative foundations for a class of $2 \times 1$ games. In a separate working paper, I am working on developing non-cooperative foundations for a slightly generalized version of my model of network formation and bargaining for general $m \times n$ games.
network-expected-utility measures for each CommCare plan across different demographic groups of enrollees. I then use the network-expected-utility measures along with data on other plan characteristics and on CommCare enrollments to estimate a demand model for insurance plans. I estimate marginal costs of inpatient care to hospitals using hospital cost reports, and to insurers, using the observed payments in my CommCare medical claims data. Finally, I combine all of these estimates and impose the structure of my model to back out relative bargaining-powers for insurers and hospitals as well as insurers’ fixed and variable non-inpatient costs.\(^6\)

I use the estimated model to simulate a range of network adequacy regulations. I focus on the Greater Boston Area and the 2011 fiscal year. I consider regulations in the form of forcing all insurers in the market to cover at least \(X\%\) of the hospital systems present in the market. A higher \(X\), hence, means a “tighter” regulation. I simulate the regulation over a range of values for \(X\), and examine the responses of the hospital networks, reimbursement rates, and premiums.

My main finding is that under tight regulations, with \(X > 85\%\), affected insurers (i.e. those that are forced by the regulation to expand their networks) experience large increases in the average reimbursement rates they pay to their in network hospitals. Some of these insurers respond by raising their monthly premiums.\(^7\) For instance, Celticare, a CommCare plan which covered four out of the 16 hospital systems in 2011, is predicted to pay about $4,000 (or 28%) higher to its in-network hospitals per average hospital admission, when it’s forced to cover at least 14 hospital systems. Celticare responds by raising its premium from $404/month to $425/month.\(^8\) The key driving force behind this result is a sorting effect: the additional hospitals that insurers include in response to the regulation are those with the lowest cost and/or in highest demand. In other words, they are the “best” hospitals. This would leave the insurer with a pool of out-of-network hospitals comprising the “worst” \((100 - X)\%\) of the hospitals in the market. Thus, with high \(X\), the replacement threats

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\(^6\) Sources of non-inpatient costs can be outpatient care, doctor visits outside of hospitals, prescription drugs, and administrative costs.

\(^7\) Others do not raise premiums due to a premium cap which was imposed by the Massachusetts Health Connector, which administered CommCare.

\(^8\) The premium could rise even further if there were no regulated premium cap at $425/month in CommCare. I will discuss these premium regulations in the section 4.
that the insurer can make using its weakened out-of-network pool only become credible when the in-network hospitals, in particular the best ones among them, charge high rates.

Besides the main result, my simulations also point to other interesting predictions about the functioning of health insurance markets under network adequacy regulations. I find that for lower ranges of $X$, in which the sorting effect weakening the out-of-network pools of insurers is less stringent, network adequacy regulations may in fact lower the average reimbursement rates paid by some insurers. This happens when hospitals added in response to regulation have lower marginal costs of providing care than the insurer’s pre-regulation hospitals. I also find that even though they expand the narrower hospital networks, network adequacy regulations in some cases shrink the broader ones. This happens because some hospitals that get to charge higher rates to a narrow network plan that is constrained by the regulation, are encouraged to leave some of the broader hospital networks in order to steer their more loyal patients to the plan that pays those hospitals more for treating the patients. I discuss these findings in more details in section 6 of the paper.

The framework I develop in this paper applies beyond network adequacy regulations. It can be applied to problems in which the interaction between network formation and bargaining is key. For example, it may be used to study how hospital-networks would respond to increased hospital bargaining power due to hospital consolidation. It may also be applied to other two-sided markets such as the market between TV channels and Cable companies.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 sets up the model. Section 4 describes the CommCare market. Section 5 explains the estimation procedure and estimation results. Section 6 presents and interprets the counterfactual simulation results for CommCare and discusses potential differences from the ACA exchanges in terms of consumer-welfare implications. Section 7 concludes.

2 Related Literature

This paper can be considered part of the expanding body of literature in economics on issues related to the implementation of the Affordable Care Act. Recent papers have exam-
ined issues like subsidy schemes (Tebaldi [2015]), tiered networks (Prager [2015]), market competition and premiums (Dafny et al. [2015a]), and selection (Hackmann et al. [2015], Shepard [2015]). Some papers have studied issues directly related to narrow networks by comparing the health outcomes between enrollees of narrow and broad network plans (Gruber and McKnight [2014]), examining the relationship between network breadth and premium (Dafny et al. [2015b]), and estimating how much different groups of consumers value network breadth (Ericson and Starc [2014]). My paper takes another step by studying the consequences of regulating the networks for insurer-hospital bargaining and insurers’ premiums.

From a methodological standpoint, this paper also makes two substantial contributions to the empirical analysis of vertical markets. First, to my knowledge, this paper is the first to develop a model of two-sided markets that fully endogenizes network formation, bargaining, and downstream price setting in an estimable way. Most papers in the literature either analyze bargaining on a fixed network (e.g. Crawford and Yurukoglu [2012], Crawford et al. [2015], Gowrisankaran et al. [2013], Ho and Lee [2013], Prager [2015]) or analyze network formation given fixed reimbursements (e.g. Pakes [2010], Ho [2006, 2009]). This paper nests these two approaches.\footnote{Some of these papers do use moment conditions based on network formation or network-tiering in their estimation procedures. But with the exception of Crawford et al. [2015], none allows for the network structure to endogenously arise in counterfactual analysis. Crawford et al. [2015] allows for network inclusion and bargaining fees for only one upstream firm to respond to policy changes. I allow for more comprehensive responses. In my model, the hospital network of an insurer, the reimbursements it pays to its in-network hospitals, and the monthly premium it charges can all respond to a change in the model parameters, to each other’s responses to the change, and to the responses of other insurers in the market.} \footnote{Also some of these papers (Gowrisankaran et al. [2013], Prager [2015]) abstract away from insurer competition by premium setting.}

\footnote{An exception is Lee and Fong [2013] who analyze both bargaining and network formation in a dynamic game context using the concept of Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) a la Maskin and Tirole [1988]. To my knowledge, this approach has not yet been applied to an empirical setting most likely because MPE combined with network formation and bargaining is very computationally demanding, even if we abstract away from strategic premium setting as Lee and Fong [2013] do. In addition, that approach would need long panel data on many variables including some that may be hard to observe, like costs that firms incur from forming, retaining, and removing links with other firms.} I recently became aware that an independent paper by Ho and Lee is in the process of being written, which has a similar practical objective my paper -i.e. examining network adequacy regulations- and similar
Second, the approach I develop in this paper to model replacement threats can be employed to study other empirical questions regarding the functioning of vertical markets, including but not limited to insurer-provider markets. One major instance of such applications is merger analysis. A merger between two hospital systems, whose presence in plans’ networks do not highly positively correlate, would take away the insurers’ ability to use these systems as replacement threats to each other. Therefore, unlike the model in this paper, NiN would dismiss part of the anti-competitive effects of a merger that takes those threats away.\footnote{There are other approaches in the literature that, unlike NiN, capture the idea that if an insurer drops a hospital from its network, it can re-negotiate with other hospitals (e.g. Stole and Zwiebel [1996a,b], Dranove et al. [2016], Lee and Fong [2013]). Unlike my model, however, these approaches are based on the idea that the renegotiation takes place \textit{after} the dropping and not \textit{simultaneously} to it. This takes away the insurer’s ability to play hospitals off against each other for network inclusion and can still predict unrealistically high reimbursement rates in response to network adequacy regulations. Also these approaches, when applied to settings with endogenous network formation and bargaining, are very computationally complex.}

\section{Model}

\subsection{Basic Setup and Notations}

My model captures interactions among three types of players in a vertical market: \( m \) hospitals (upstream firms, denoted \( u_i \)), \( n \) insurers (downstream firms, denoted \( d_j \)), and consumers (who are enrollees for insurers and patients for hospitals). The state of the market, or the “market outcome”, is described by three important elements: network structure, denoted \( G \); reimbursement rates, denoted \( T \); and premiums, denoted \( P \). Figure 3.1 exhibits the schematic and matrix representations of \( G, T \) and \( P \) through an example with 3 hospitals modeling contributions -i.e. (i) endogenizing network formation, bargaining and premium setting, and (ii) augmenting the NiN framework with replacement threats. The proposed bargaining formulation in that paper is similar to my bargaining model. Their network formation model has differences from mine, which, I believe, can have important implications for the predictions of the two models. Also, their empirical setting is the employer sponsored market in California, rather than the individual market in Massachusetts. Finally, in their modeling of network adequacy regulations, they do not focus on the idea that insurers lose bargaining leverage due restriction in their ability to make threats of dropping, which is the main price consequence of the regulation that my paper focuses on.
Figure 3.1: schematic and matrix representations of the state of the market

and 2 insurers.

Network $G$ represents who contracts with whom, or equivalently, which hospitals are covered by each insurer. It can be represented graphically (as in figure 3.1) or using a matrix of zeros and ones. Reimbursements $T$ is also represented in a matrix form with elements $t_{ij}$. As is clear from the figure, for every inactive link $g_{ij} = 0$ in network $G$, the corresponding reimbursement rate is null: $t_{ij} = \emptyset$. For an active link $g_{ij} = 1$, the corresponding $t_{ij}$ is interpreted as follows: insurer $d_j$ reimburses hospital $u_i$ with $t_{ij}$ dollars for every unit of healthcare provided to an enrollee of $d_j$ at hospital $u_i$. Also, each element $p_j$ of $P$ is the amount each enrollee of insurer $d_j$ pays to that insurer per month.

I assume that the expected profit to each firm in the market is only a function of the market outcome. That is, the profit functions are in the form of $\pi_{u_i}(G, T, P)$ and $\pi_{d_j}(G, T, P)$ for all $u_i$ and $d_j$. The exact nature of the profit functions arises from demand and cost functions in the market, which I will turn to in next sections. My model of the market takes the profit functions as premitives and predicts what market outcome(s) $(G^*, T^*, P^*)$ will arise at the equilibrium.

This model consists of a sequential game with four main steps as depicted in figure 3.2. In step 1, hospitals and insurers will engage in a “network-formation and bargaining” game. The outcome of this step is the equilibrium network and reimbursements $(G^*, T^*)$. The structure of this step will be discussed in section 3.2. In step 2, insurers engage in a premium setting game ala Bertrand, taking into account the outcome of the previous step, $(G^*, T^*)$. The outcome of this step is the set of equilibrium premiums $P^*$. In the third step, consumers decide which insurance plan to buy in the market. Finally in the fourth step,
if they get sick and need hospitalization, they decide which hospital within the network of providers of their plan (as specified by $G^*$) to refer to for treatment.

Step 2 in this game is fairly straightforward. Steps 3 and 4 are explained in more details in the estimation section. In the remainder of this section, I’ll focus on step 1, where network-formation and bargaining are endogenously captured.

### 3.2 Network-Formation and Bargaining Game

I combine two sets of conditions in order to characterize the equilibrium pair of network structure and reimbursements ($G^*, T^*$). The first set consists of network-stability conditions, which roughly require that no unilateral or joint deviation (among a pre-specified set of deviations) from $G^*$ be able to strictly pareto-improve the profits to the firms participating in the deviation. The second set of conditions consists of bargaining conditions which determine, for all $ij$ with $g^*_{ij} = 1$, what $t^*_{ij}$ the negotiation between hospital $u_i$ and insurer $d_j$ will result in.

The rest of this subsection is organized as follows. First I develop a base model with very simple network stability and bargaining conditions. Then I demonstrate by an example that the base model is inadequate for capturing competition among hospitals for inclusion in hospital networks of insurers, which is crucial to my empirical analysis in this paper. I then modify the bargaining conditions to capture this force. I close this subsection by
discussing the advantages of my model over some other potential alternatives.

### 3.2.1 Base Model

I start by introducing the network stability conditions, which are adapted with small modifications from the notion of pairwise stability in Jackson and Wolinsky [1996].

**Definition 1.** The network-reimbursements pairs \((G^*, T^*)\) satisfies “pairwise network-stability” if the following hold:

(i) For \(\forall g_{ij} = 1\), neither \(u_i\) nor \(d_j\) can strictly profit by unilaterally severing the link \(g_{ij}\). That is:

\[
\pi_{u_i}(G^*, T^*) \geq \pi_{u_i}(G_{-ij}^*, T_{-ij}^*) \quad (3.1)
\]

\[
\pi_{d_j}(G^*, T^*) \geq \pi_{d_j}(G_{-ij}^*, T_{-ij}^*) \quad (3.2)
\]

(ii) For \(\forall g_{ij} = 0\), there is no contract that \(u_i\) and \(d_j\) can sign and get a strict pareto improvement in their profits. That is:

\[
\exists t_{ij} \in \mathbb{R} \text{ s.t. } \pi_{u_i}(G_{ij}^*, T_{ij}^*) \geq \pi_{u_i}(G_{-ij}^*, T_{-ij}^*) \quad (3.3)
\]

with at least one inequality holding strictly.

where \((G_{-ij}^*, T_{-ij}^*)\) is constructed from \((G^*, T^*)\) by switching \(g_{ij}\) from 1 to 0 and \(t_{ij}\) to 0; and \((G_{ij}^*, T_{ij}^*)\) is constructed by doing the exact inverse. Also note that in this section, the notation on \(P^*\) has been suppressed as it’s been assumed \(P^*\) is anticipated by firms at the first stage of the game.

The bargaining conditions for the base model come from the NiN idea in Horn and Wolinsky [1988].

**Definition 2.** The network-reimbursement pairs \((G^*, T^*)\) satisfies “NiN bargaining” relative to the “bargaining parameters matrix” \(\gamma_{m \times n} \in [0, 1]^{m \times n}\) if for \(\forall g_{ij} = 1\), we have \(t_{ij}^* = t_{ij}^{NB}(G, T, \gamma_{ij})\), where \(t_{ij}^{NB}(G, T, \gamma_{ij})\) is defined as:

\[
\arg \max_{t \in \mathbb{R}} \left[ \pi_{u_i}(G^*, (\tilde{t}, T_{-ij}^*)) - \pi_{u_i}(G_{-ij}^*, T_{-ij}^*)) \right]^{\gamma_{ij}} \times \left[ \pi_{d_j}(G^*, (\tilde{t}, T_{-ij}^*)) - \pi_{d_j}(G_{-ij}^*, T_{-ij}^*)) \right]^{1-\gamma_{ij}}
\]

(3.4)
where \((\bar{t}, T^*_{-ij})\) is constructed from \(T^*\) by substituting \(\bar{t}\) for its \(ij\) element.

The rough intuition behind the NiN conditions is that at the equilibrium, every \(ij\) pair is taking the rest of \((G^*, T^*)\) as fixed and negotiates over how to divide the total surplus created because of the presence of \(g_{ij}\). The value \(t^*_{ij}\) is the one that divides this total surplus between \(u_i\) and \(d_j\) based on their respective bargaining parameters \(\gamma_{ij}\) and \(1 - \gamma_{ij}\).\(^{14}\)

Combining pairwise network-stability and NiN bargaining, the base model gives us a solution concept that can predict equilibrium \((G^*, T^*)\) pairs. So, thus far, we have a model that in principle does capture network formation and bargaining (and in the next stage, premium setting) endogenously. Nevertheless, the particular way that the base model accomplishes this job may be a source for concern, which I turn to now.

3.2.2 Problems with the Base Model

It’s well documented in the literature (Gowrisankaran et al. [2013], Lee and Fong [2013], etc.) that the implicit assumption in NiN bargaining (i.e. \(u_i\) and \(d_j\) taking the rest of \((G, T)\) as fixed when bargaining with one another) may be a source for concern. I show, using a stylized example, that this concern is more pronounced when endogenous network formation is involved. My example focuses on a case where an insurer is bound by a “network adequacy regulation” to cover at least one of the two hospitals (absent the regulation, it would cover none\(^{15}\)). I show that the base model fails to capture “competition from out of network hospitals” and, hence, will highly over-predict how much the hospital, that the insurer will cover to abide by the mandate, will be able to leverage the mandate and charge the insurer.

Setting of the example: There are two hospitals \(u_1\) and \(u_2\) and one insurer \(d\).

\(^{14}\)Note that what the Nash Bargainign formulation formally does (which is maximizing a weighted product of the surpluses made by \(u_i\) and \(d_j\) where the corresponding weights are \(\gamma_{ij}\) and \(1 - \gamma_{ij}\)), does not always lead to dividing the total surplus between the two according to shares of \(\gamma_{ij}\) and \(1 - \gamma_{ij}\). Nevertheless, the surplus division interpretation is useful for providing intuition about Nash Bargaining.

\(^{15}\)This assumption is not realistic for a working insurance market. But it does capture the more general effect that I intend to highlight, while allowing for the setting to have only two hospitals, which significantly simplifies the discussion.
Bargaining parameters are symmetric: $\gamma = \begin{bmatrix} 0.5 \\ 0.5 \end{bmatrix}$. The insurer’s premium is equal to 1.\textsuperscript{16}

If $u_1$ is covered by $d$, it will bring 2 enrollees. $u_2$ brings 1 enrollee. Each enrollee consumes 1 unit of healthcare per month. There is no substitution between $u_1$ and $u_2$.\textsuperscript{17} Covering each of the hospitals induces a large fixed cost of 3 to $d$. Finally, regulation would make $d$ pay 100 in fine if it did not cover any hospital. Figure 3.3 schematically presents the profits to all $u_i$ and $d$ as functions of the $(G, T)$.\textsuperscript{18}

**Analysis of the example using the base model:** It’s fairly straightforward to verify that the base model predicts two equilibria: $(G^{1*}, T^{1*}) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$, $[24.75 \ 0 \ 49]$ and $(G^{2*}, T^{2*}) = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$, $[\emptyset \ 49]$. Two features of this set of equilibria deserve further discussion. First, $t_{11}^1$ and $t_{21}^2$ both seem too high. The base model predicts these high reimbursement rates because, for instance at $(G^{1*}, T^{1*})$, hospital $u_1$ is taking advantage of the 100 that $d$ would have to pay in fine if the link $g_{11}^1$ broke off. What the base model does not capture is that, on the one hand, $d$ can substitute $u_1$ with $u_2$ for any $t_2 \geq 0$ (so $u_2$ is willing to participate) and make a much higher profit than it makes under $(G^{1*}, T^{1*})$. The base model also does not capture that $u_1$ can foresee the aforementioned possibility and offer a much lower price than $t_{11}^1 = 24.75$ in order to deter this substitution threat. The second issue is that even though $u_1$ seems to dominate $u_2$ as a choice for $d$, we see that $G^{2*}$

\textsuperscript{16}For simplicity, I do not assume here that the insurer sets its premium optimally. This assumption is not crucial but simplifies a lot.

\textsuperscript{17}That is, the profits that $u_i$ and $d$ make by signing a contract do not depend on whether $u_3$ and $d$ are also contracting or not. This assumption makes the exposition of the example simpler but is not crucial to the analysis and is not imposed on my empirical model.

\textsuperscript{18}I am keeping suppressing the notation on $P$ as it’s assumed constant here.
is sustained as part of an equilibrium. The reason is that at \((G^2, T^2)\), neither dropping \(u_2\) nor adding \(u_1\) is beneficial to \(d\), even though doing them together (i.e. replacing \(u_2\) with \(u_1\)) is. Next subsection introduces a model that deals with these issues.

### 3.2.3 Bargaining with Replacement Threats

The objective of this subsection is to *minimally* expand on the bargaining conditions from the base model to deal with the issues illustrated above, while keeping the model *computationally tractable*. The basic intuition for the expansion is to allow the firm in danger of being substituted to anticipate this danger and bargain less aggressively. Definitions below formalize this idea.

**Definition 3.** Under \((G, T)\), reimbursement rate \(t_{ij}\) is “safe for \(u_i\)” if \(\exists u_i', t_{ij} \) with \(g_{ij} = 0\) such that the following hold:

**Profitability:**

\[
\pi_{d_j} \left( G^*_i, T^*_j - t_{ij}, T^*_j - t_{ij} \right) \geq \pi_{d_j} \left( G^*, T^* \right)
\]  

(3.5)

**Incentive Compatibility:**

\[
\pi_{u_{i'}} \left( G^*_i, T^*_j - t_{ij}, T^*_j - t_{ij} \right) \geq \pi_{u_{i'}} \left( G^*, T^* \right)
\]  

(3.6)

**No Commitment:**

\[
\pi_{u_{i'}} \left( G^*_i, T^*_j - t_{ij}, T^*_j - t_{ij} \right) \geq \pi_{u_{i'}} \left( G^*_i, T^*_j \right)
\]  

(3.7)

where either profitability (condition 3.5) or incentive-compatibility (condition 3.6) holds strictly.

In words, reimbursement rate \(t_{ij}\) is “safe for \(u_i\)” if insurer \(d_j\) cannot strictly profit from replacing hospital \(u_i\) with hospital \(u_{i'}\) in a way that \(u_{i'}\) is willing to participate. Conditions (3.5) through (3.7) formalize this idea. The profitability condition (3.5) says that \(d_j\) prefers replacing its current contract with \(u_i\) with a contract of \(t_{ij}\) with \(u_{i'}\) over the status quo.
The incentive compatibility condition (3.6) says that \( u_i' \) also prefers this move over the status quo. Finally, the no-commitment condition (3.7) says that after the substitution takes place, \( u_i' \) would not prefer to drop its contract with \( d_j \). Trivial and unnecessary as it may seem, condition (3.7) plays an important role in ensuring existence of an equilibrium where multiple insurers are competing and enrollees can spill over among them.\(^{19}\)

**Definition 4.** Under \((G,T)\), for a \( g_{ij} = 1 \), the “best safe reimbursement rate” for \( u_i \) is denoted \( \hat{t}_{ui}(G,T,d_j) \) and defined as the highest-profit to \( u_i \) among all values of \( \tilde{t}_{ij} \) that would be safe for \( u_i \) if charged to \( d_j \).

Definition 4 provides us with the necessary notation for setting up the new bargaining conditions. The basic intuition is that at the equilibrium \((G^*,T^*)\), each non-null \( t_{ij}^* \) is equal to the Nash-bargaining reimbursement rate \( t_{ij}^{NB}(G,T,\gamma_{ij}) \) unless \( t_{ij}^{NB}(G,T,\gamma_{ij}) \) is not “safe” for \( u_i \) in which case, \( u_i \) will retreat to its best safe rate.

**Definition 5.** \((G^*,T^*)\) satisfies “bargaining with replacement threats” conditions if for \( \forall g_{ij}^* = 1 \) we have:

\[
t_{ij}^* = \min\{ t_{ij}^{NB}(G,T,\gamma_{ij}), \hat{t}_{ui}(G,T,d_j) \}
\] (3.8)

My new solution concept for \((G^*,T^*)\) combines pairwise stability conditions on network formation with bargaining-with-replacement-threats (rather than combining pairwise stability and Nash-in-Nash). Now let’s revisit the above example to see the implications of the new concept. There is now only one equilibrium: \((G^*,T^*) = \left( \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0.5 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \right) \).

Because the insurer can now swap the hospitals, a network with only \( u_2 \) covered cannot be an equilibrium anymore.\(^{20}\) Also because now hospitals can anticipate and try to deter threats of replacement, \( u_1 \) does not charge unreasonably large amounts at the equilibrium just because the fine to not abide by the mandate is very high. Rather, given that the replacement threat is binding, \( u_1 \) is only charging for how better it is than \( u_2 \).

\(^{19}\)For more details on this, see appendix C.3.

\(^{20}\)Like with existence, I do not prove any uniqueness result. But so far, in all of my counterfactual analyses, my results have been unique.
3.2.4 Discussion of Model Choice

I believe the model developed in this section is more suited, than other potential candidates in the economic theory literature, to structural empirical analysis of interactions among network formation, bargaining, and downstream price (i.e. premium) setting in vertical markets. Cooperative-based models of network formation and bargaining (e.g. Jackson [2005]) do not restrict the transfers to be only between firms who are contracting with one another. Thus, such models always deliver efficiency, which for the health insurance market, would imply that only one insurer stays in the market and pays off all other insurers to stay out, in order to extract the most out of consumers. Non-cooperative models like Abreu and Manea [2012] offer the advantage of having a well defined extensive form; but heavily restrict externalities by assuming for each link there is exactly one unit of surplus to divide between the two sides no matter what the rest of the network looks like. Models of many-to-many matching with transfers (e.g. Hatfield et al. [2013]) also heavily restrict externalities. Additionally, none of the models above capture the idea that transfers among firms can affect the total surplus (e.g. reimbursement rates can affect premiums, and hence, total market demand). Papers on vertical contracting (like Segal [1999], Rey and Whinston [2013], Prat and Rustichini [2003]) give the full bargaining power to one side (either upstream or downstream) and do not capture the full range. Also, these papers examine settings either with a single upstream or with a single downstream.\footnote{The only paper with multiple firms on both sides, to my knowledge, is Prat and Rustichini [2003] which restricts the externalities in a way that cannot accept standard demand functions and premium competition as modeled in my paper and other empirical papers on vertical markets.} Also I do not use Stole and Zwiebel [1996a,b] or Lee and Fong [2013] for the reasons discussed in section 2.

Finally, equation (3.8) is not the only way to incorporate threats of replacement into the formulation of bargaining. Another potential way, for instance, would be to keep using (3.4) but have \( d_j \)’s “outside option profit” (which is equal to \( \pi_{d_j} \left( G_{-ij}^*, T_{-ij}^* \right) \) in (3.4)) equal to the maximum profit \( d_j \) could attain by either severing the link with \( u_i \) or replacing \( u_i \) with some \( u_i' \) in a way that would satisfy (3.6) and (3.7). However, I choose the formulation in (3.8) over other alternatives because I can show that for a class of \( 2 \times 1 \) games, it can be sustained as the outcome of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of an extensive form game.
which is constructed by extending the alternating offers game in Binmore et al. [1986] to from a bilateral bargaining to two upstream firms and one downstream. See appendix A for more details.

4 The CommCare Market

In this section, I introduce CommCare, the market to which I apply my framework in order to study the effects of network adequacy regulations. CommCare -or more precisely, the “Commonwealth Care” market- was a subsidized health insurance exchange where people with low income (below 300% of federal poverty line) who could not get insured by an employer or public programs were eligible to enroll. CommCare was operated by the state of Massachusetts as part of the Massachusetts Healthcare Reform (which preceded the ACA.) I chose CommCare for the analysis because I believe it is the most similar market to the ACA exchanges among those health insurance markets for which comprehensive data on claims, plan enrollments, network structures and premiums are available. Both markets are subsidized health insurance exchanges for individuals where private insurers compete by offering highly standardized plans. Nevertheless there are some differences between the two markets. In section 6, I will discuss how some of these differences might lead us to expect different responses to network adequacy regulations between CommCare and the ACA exchanges.

CommCare was established in 2007 and had around 200000 enrollees annually in fiscal

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22 Other common features between CommCare and ACA exchanges include but are not limited to: (1) Mandatory participation for people who are eligible and cannot find insurance elsewhere; (2) Risk-adjustment programs to discourage insurers from competing for healthier enrollees.

23 Some of the differences are: (1) CommCare included below poverty people but ACA exchanges leave that group for state Medicaid programs. (2) ACA exchanges also include people ineligible for subsidies but CommCare left them for another program named CommChoice, short for “Commonwealth Choice”. (3) CommCare was more highly standardized than ACA exchanges are. In the ACA exchanges, plans can be offered in different “metal tiers” with different benefits. In CommCare, there was no deductible or co-insurance. There was only a small co-pay which was not to be decided by the insurer. It was the same for each income group across all insurers and all hospitals (MassHealth [2011]). (4) The subsidies for each income group are fixed in the ACA exchanges but were linked to premiums in CommCare, meaning in CommCare most consumers would receive more in subsidies if they bought a higher premium plan.
years of 2011 through 2013. Enrollees were partitioned into three income-groups: below the Federal Poverty Line (FPL), between 100% and 200% of FPL, and between 200% and 300% of FPL. Each income group was subject to a different subsidy rate and would pay a different (uniform) co-pay when visiting an in-network hospital.\textsuperscript{24} In particular, the below FPL group was fully subsidized and paid no premium. This group also paid zero co-pay. Other groups were also heavily subsidized but paid positive premiums and co-payments. Given that the full subsidization of below poverty enrollees made them price insensitive, CommCare imposed a new, auction-like, regulation from 2012 on in order to foster price competition among insurers. The regulation roughly stated that below poverty consumers who just join the market are only allowed to choose between the two cheapest plans.

I examine the whole CommCare market for estimation and identification. But for the counterfactual policy and I apply some restrictions. First, I focus on the 2011 fiscal year. I do this because the particular auction-like regulation for 2012 and 2013 complicates the premium setting game.\textsuperscript{25} Also, to save on computation, I restrict my analysis geographically by concentrating on the Greater Boston Area (which I define by all zip-codes not farther away than 30 miles from zip-code 02114 in downtown Boston). Finally, I focus on General Acute Care hospitals rather than all hospitals (throughout this paper, unless otherwise stated, by “hospital” I mean General Acute Care hospital.) There are 28 hospitals in Greater Boston Area, which are owned by 16 hospital systems. Figure 4.1 shows this hospitals on a map.

In 2011 (and thereafter, until 2014 when CommCare was shut down and the ACA took over), five insurers competed in CommCare. One of them (Fallon) was inactive the Boston area. So I focus on the other four: BMC (Boston Medical Center), Celticare, NHP (Neighborhood Health Plan), and Network Health. Given that in CommCare below poverty consumers are insensitive to premiums, CommCare sets a cap on premiums in

\textsuperscript{24}Actually, more precisely, the total number of income group was five rather than three: below FPL, 100%-150% of FPL, 150%-200% of FPL, 200%-250% of FPL, and 250%-300% of FPL. Unfortunately, in my data, I cannot distinguish between 100%-150% of FPL and 150%-200% of FPL or between 200%-250% of FPL and 250%-300% of FPL. Therefore, I work with three income groups.

\textsuperscript{25}With this regulation, the Bertrand Nash model for premium setting often leads to mixed strategy Nash equilibria. Also, I found evidence for insurers’ incomplete information about each others’ pricing. For more details on this evidence, see appendix D.
order to prevent arbitrary price increases. In 2011, the cap was 425$/month per person. CommCare also had a mandated premium floor (likely to help prevent adverse selection by shifting the competition from the price domain to quality domain) which was at the level of 404$/month in 2011. Table 1 summarizes the state of the market in the 2011 fiscal year. Celticare has the narrowest network among the four with only 4 systems covered out of the whole 16. It also charges the lowest premium. Nevertheless, my estimations indicate that Celticare pays on average a higher reimbursement to its in-network hospitals for a severity-adjusted admission than each of the other three insurers does. The main reason is that Celticare covers the two most expensive hospitals in Massachusetts: Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH henceforth) as well as Brigham and Women Hospital (BWH henceforth). Both MGH and BWH belong to the “Partners Healthcare” system (Partners henceforth). MGH and BWH are highly prestigious academic medical centers and attract a lot of patients in any network in which they are present, in particular if that network is a smaller one like Celticare’s, leading to high average reimbursements as well as high average marginal cost of inpatient care. All the other plans have broader networks, higher premiums, and lower estimated average reimbursements than Celticare.

Celticare has other major differences from the other insurers in the market. Celticare has a substantially lower market share than the rest of the plans. Also, unlike BMC, NHP, and Network Health, which are all based in Massachusetts and entered CommCare in fiscal year of 2007, Celticare is based in St. Louis, Missouri, and entered the market in 2010. In
other words, Celticare is a smaller insurer compared to the other three. As section 5 will point out in more details, Celticare’s small enrollment size and little known brand indeed have implications for its hospital network and premium. There is evidence from the ACA exchanges that smaller insurers have harder times building hospital networks due in part to lack of established relationships with agents, as well as lack of sufficient number of enrollees to diversify risk (McKinsey [2015]). Celticare itself cites its “small size” as its biggest limitation to engage with providers [Health Policy Commission, 2013]. Also, according to McKinsey [2015], less well-known insurers like Celticare “may face greater pressure to be price competitive to attract members” to make up for their weak brand names. Section 5 shows how different features of my formulations for profit functions $\pi_{ui}(G,T,P)$ and $\pi_{dj}(G,T,P)$ capture these differences among plans as well as the implications of these differences for network formation, bargaining, and premiums.

## 5 Estimation

The model’s purpose was predicting the market outcome $(G^*, T^*, P^*)$ given all profit functions $\pi_{ui}(\cdot)$ and $\pi_{dj}(\cdot)$ and bargaining parameters matrix $\gamma_{m \times n}$. Estimation is the reverse. We observe $(G^*, T^*, P^*)$ plus some partial data about $\pi_{ui}(\cdot)$ and $\pi_{dj}(\cdot)$, and our objective is fully backing out estimates $\hat{\pi}_{ui}(\cdot)$, $\hat{\pi}_{dj}(\cdot)$, and $\hat{\gamma}_{ij}$ for all $i, j$ so we can then do counterfactual analysis. Of course, part of the identification comes from parametric assumptions on profit functions and bargaining powers. I start by specifying how profit functions depend on de-
mand and cost functions. Later on (in sections 5.2 through 5.5), I will further specify what assumptions are made on demand functions, cost functions, and the bargaining parameter matrix.

Hospital $u_i$’s profit from each insurer $d_j$ that covers $u_i$ is how many units of healthcare per month care it provides to enrollees of $d_j$ times the marginal profit $u_i$ makes from each unit of care provided to $d_j$ enrollees.\footnote{One “unit of healthcare” is one hospital admission with average severity. Severities are measured in DRG weights and discussed in section 5.2.} Different consumer groups $\kappa$ may have different tastes for hospitals and insurers (I will discuss in more details how consumers are binned into different $\kappa$ groups in section 5.2). So, $u_i$’s total profit is given by:

$$\pi_{u_i}(G, T, P) = \sum_{\kappa} \sum_j \left( D^\kappa_j(G, P) \times \sigma^{\kappa}_{ij}(G) \times (t_{ij} - c_i) \right)$$ (5.1)

In (5.1), $c_i$ is the marginal cost of providing one unit of care to a patient. Function $D^\kappa_j(G, P)$ depicts how many enrollees from bin $\kappa$ choose to enroll with insurer $d_j$. Function $\sigma^{\kappa}_{ij}(G)$ represents how many unites of care per month the average $d_j$ enrollee from bin $\kappa$ receive from hospital $u_i$.\footnote{Note that neither $D^\kappa_j(G, P)$ nor $\sigma^{\kappa}_{ij}(G)$ is a function of $T$. The reason is that in CommCare, there was no co-insurance. Where there is co-insurance, $T$ needs to be included as an argument to both functions.}

Insurer $d_j$’s profit is the sum of premiums it charges minus different types of costs it incurs:

$$\pi_{d_j}(G, T, P) = \sum_{\kappa} \left( D^\kappa_j(G, P) \times \left( p_j - \xi_j - \sum_i \left( \sigma^{\kappa}_{ij}(G) \times t_{ij} \right) \right) \right) - \sum_{i \text{ s.t. } g_{ij}=1} f_{ij}$$ (5.2)

where $p_j$ is the premium that $d_j$ charges. The first element of cost to $d_j$ is $\xi_j$, which denotes monthly “non-inpatient costs” to $d_j$ per each enrollee. $\xi_j$ can include costs from out-patient care by hospitals, pharmacies, non-hospital care, the variable component of administrative costs, etc. The second element is the amount that $d_j$ pays to each in-network hospital $u_i$ in reimbursements, which is equal to $\sigma^{\kappa}_{ij}(G) \times t_{ij}$ for an average enrollee of type $\kappa$. Finally, the third component of costs to $d_j$ is the set of fixed costs $f_{ij}$ which $d_j$ incurs for every hospital $u_i$ that it covers.\footnote{As I will formally define soon, by construction, $\sigma^{\kappa}_{ij}(G) = 0$ for all $ij$ such that $g_{ij} = 0$.} There are multiple sources for such fixed costs. First, the
bargaining process itself is costly. Second, “risk-diversification” can be modeled as insurers facing fixed costs. Third, insurers sometimes leave hospitals out of network if they fail to meet some quality standards that may not be directly observable to patients. I model such quality concerns as part of the $f_{ij}$ costs. Finally, the third source is insurer $d_j$’s over- or under-estimation of how profitable signing a contract with hospital $u_i$ would be.

Given the specifications of $\pi_{u_i}(\cdot)$ and $\pi_{d_j}(\cdot)$ in (5.1) and (5.2), estimating the profit functions means estimating all $\hat{\sigma}_{\kappa ij}(\cdot)$, $\hat{D}_{\kappa j}(\cdot)$, $\hat{\xi}_j$, and $\hat{f}_{ij}$ for all $i$ and $j$. The procedure that I develop to for this estimation has four steps which correspond to the four steps of the sequential game (shown in figure 3.2) in reverse order. Figure 5.1 schematically represents the four steps to the estimation process. The first two steps are based heavily on methods developed by Capps et al. [2003] and Ho [2006]. In step 1, I estimate all $\hat{\sigma}_{\kappa ij}(\cdot)$ using a logit model of hospital choice. In step 2, given the outcome of step 1, I estimate all $\hat{D}_{\kappa j}(\cdot)$ using a model of plan choice. In step 3, given the full demand estimation outcome from steps 1 and 2, I impose the Nash Bertrand assumption on premium setting to back out all to rationalize the data as an equilibrium. But there is evidence that this such costs actually exist and are large enough to affect, in an economically meaningful way, some of the decisions made by insurers on what hospitals to cover and how to bargain with them. For instance, in the absence of such fixed costs, one would not expect low-cost hospitals to be left out of hospital-networks that cover high cost hospitals; because covering a hospital that would agree to join the network with a low price could steer away patients from more expensive hospitals, and, in the worst case of steering no-one away, would do no harm to the insurer. Nevertheless we observe that, for instance, Celticare covers Partners and does not cover a lot of cheaper hospitals.

Insurers with smaller sizes (e.g. Celticare in CommCare) often have harder times contracting with hospitals since the expected numbers of their enrollees who would visit a hospital are less likely to be large enough to make the insurer feel more confident that those enrollees, who turn out to be more costly to the insurer, will be cancelled out by those who are less costly. Of course, the most accurate way to model this risk-diversification issue would be to (1) directly model the financial risk that insurers are facing about the healthcare costs of their enrollees, and (2) model insurers as risk-averse agents. This would substantially complicate the model. However, modeling this phenomenon as a fixed cost does not further complicate the model and, at the same time, captures the idea that a small insurer might have a harder time sign a contract with a hospital without facing risks.

For instance, if a hospital has old equipment which the insurer believes might have serious side effects for patients, the insurer may decide to leave the hospital out of network. Whether this comes from altruism towards customers or from concerns about future profit, it can be captured as a cost to the insurer from covering that hospital in its network.
Figure 5.1: Four steps of the estimation procedure

non inpatient costs $\xi_j$. Finally, in step 4, I impose the network formation and bargaining model developed in section 3 to back out all $\hat{f}_{ij}$ and $\hat{\gamma}_{ij}$. In the remainder of this section, I overview the data and discuss each of the four steps of the estimation procedure in more details. For each step, after further parameterization of the object of interest if necessary, I (i) describe the estimation methodology, (ii) discuss the identification, and (iii) report and interpret the results.

5.1 Data

Datasets used in my analysis consist of (1) Data on hospital discharges and medical claims, (2) data on insurance plan enrollments, (3) data on hospital and insurance plan characteristics. Below, I discuss these different data in more details.

5.1.1 Data on Hospital Discharges and Medical Claims

I use data on hospital discharges and medical claims at two points. First, I use data on payments from insurers to hospitals in order to construct a measure of the reimbursements matrix $T^*$, the details of which are explained in appendix E. Second, I use data on hospital discharges in step 1 of the estimation procedure (see figure 5.1) where I back out hospital choice functions $\hat{\sigma}_{ij}(\cdot)$. The primary source of my data for discharges and medical claims is the Massachusetts All Payers Claims Database (MA-APCD), from the Center for Health
Information and Analysis (CHIA). MA-APCD has a medical claims dataset which offers very rich and comprehensive information on medical claims and discharges from 2010 to 2014.

In the medical claims dataset, the unit of observation is claim-line which pertains to an individual medical bill that a provider (e.g. physician, hospital, pharmacy) sends to an insurer. For each claim-line, MA-APCD’s medical claims dataset contains information on patient demographics, diagnosis, type of claim (in particular whether or not the claim pertains to an inpatient hospital admission), date, payments, and identifiers for the provider, the patient, and the insurer. The demographic information consists of gender, age, and the 5-digit zip-code of residence. The diagnosis information is reported in ICD-9-CM diagnosis codes. The payments are broken down into payments by patient and payment by carrier (i.e. insurer). The provider ID is the National Provider Identifier (NPI) issued to providers by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). A hospital may have multiple NPIs. The patient identifier is an ID assigned by CHIA. It is an “APCD internal ID” which enables researchers to link together different claims and enrollment records of the same patient within the APCD.

I carry out several further processings on the medical claims data before I use it in the estimation procedure. I restrict the medical claims dataset to inpatient claims only. I also use data on the NPIs of General Acute Care hospitals in Massachusetts from CMS both to restrict the claims data to those from general hospitals in Massachusetts and to match each claim line in the data to a hospital name. Since a hospital may issue multiple bills to an insurer for different services provided during a single hospital stay, I aggregate the claims data from the “claim-line level” to the “admission-episode” level, by lumping together all claims that have the same patient ID, insurer ID, hospital name (I do not use hospital NPI since a hospital can have multiple NPIs), diagnosis, and service provision year and month. Finally, I link the ICD-9-CM diagnosis codes to a coarser category called Clinical Classifications Software (CCS) developed by the Agency of Healthcare Research

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32 ICD-CM is short for International Classification of Diseases, Clinical Modification. ICD-9-CM is an adaptation by the U.S. National Center for Health Statistics of ICD-9 diagnostic codes which are used internationally for diagnosis classification. There are about 14000 ICD-9 codes.

33 This ID cannot be used to personally identify any patient or enrollee.
and Quality (AHRQ). This linkage enables me to link the diagnoses to MS-DRG severity indices for different diagnosis groups.

5.1.2 Data on Insurance Plan Enrollments

I use data on enrollments in CommCare insurance plans to back out plan demand functions $\hat{D}^\kappa_j(\cdot)$ off of consumers’ plan choice patterns in step 2 of the estimation procedure (see figure 5.1 and section 5.3). My enrollments data comes from the MA-APCD’s enrollments dataset.

In the enrollments dataset, the unit of observation is enrollment record. An enrollment record is uniquely identified by its enrollee ID and fiscal year. The enrollee IDs are the same IDs as those assigned to patients in the medical claims file so the two files can be linked together. Fiscal year is a variable that I construct for each record from enrollment start year and month as well as publicly available information on the timing of CommCare’s operation. A CommCare fiscal year started on a July with an open enrollment period, making, for instance, July of 2010 the first month of the 2011 fiscal year (henceforth, 2011FY). For each enrollment record, MA-APCD’s enrollments dataset contains information on enrollee demographics and insurer ID. Demographic information in the enrollments dataset consists of the same demographic elements that were included in the medical claims file plus an additional one: the income-group of the enrollee, which can be one of the following three groups: below FPL, within 100%-200% of FPL, and within 200%-300% of FPL.

5.1.3 Data on Hospital and Insurance Plan Characteristics

I supplement the MA-APCD medical claims data and enrollments data with several other datasets. I use public data from the Mass Connector on CommCare plans’ hospital-networks. I use this dataset in the hospital choice estimation (see step 1 in figure 5.1) to identify the choice set of each patient who visits a hospital. I also use it in the plan demand estimation (see step 2 in figure 5.1), in conjunction with the results of the hospital choice estimation, in order to construct measures of relative values of different plans’ hospital networks to different consumer bins $\kappa$ on CommCare. I also use data from the Mass Connector on CommCare plans’ premiums as well as subsidy rates in CommCare. I use
these data in the plan demand estimation process (see step 2 in figure 5.1).\textsuperscript{34}

Finally, I use data on hospitals’ costs from CMS’s Healthcare Cost Report Information System (HCRIS). These data include annual costs reports by all Medicare-certified providers (which include all of the hospitals I study) to CMS, broken down into seven cost centers -such as general service, inpatient service, outpatient service, and ancillary service- and then, for each cost center, broken down in great details into many items. I then adopt the approach used in Schmitt [2015] to construct from these cost items a measure of $c_i$, hospital average inpatient costs per severity adjusted hospital admission. For the details of how I construct these $c_i$ measures, see appendix E .\textsuperscript{35}

5.2 Step 1: Estimating Hospital Demand

In the first step of estimating the model, I back out the hospital choice function $\sigma_{ij}^\kappa(G)$. This function represents the total demand for hospital $u_i$ from an average consumer that is within bin $\kappa$ and has enrolled in insurance plan $d_j$. It is a weighed sum of demand levels $\sigma_{ij}^{\kappa,\psi}(G)$ for different diagnoses $\psi$ where the weight for each diagnosis is its DRG severity measure $w_\psi$. Formally:

$$
\sigma_{ij}^\kappa(G) = \sum_{\psi \in \Psi} w_\psi \times \sigma_{ij}^{\kappa,\psi}(G)
$$

Note that (5.3) has a direct implication for the interpretation of (5.1) and (5.2). It implies that the reimbursement made by insurer $d_j$ to hospital $u_i$ for a hospital admission with diagnosis $\psi$ is equal to $w_\psi \times t_{ij}$. Similarly, the marginal cost to hospital $u_i$ of providing care to an admitted patient with diagnosis $\psi$ is implicitly assumed equal to $w_\psi \times c_i$. This linearity assumption is standard in the literature (see, for example, Gowrisankaran et al. [2013], Ho and Lee [2013], Prager [2015]).

\textsuperscript{34}Even though data on hospital networks, plan premiums, and subsidies in CommCare was public, it was taken off the Mass Connector website before I could access it. I thank Mark Shepard for sharing these data with me.

\textsuperscript{35}The original data cost reports from HCRIS is very raw and needs a great deal of processing before $c_i$ measures can be constructed off of it. I thank Matt Schmitt for sharing with me a cleaned up version of the HCRIS data.
Diagnosis-specific hospital choice function $\sigma_{ij}^{\kappa,\psi}(G)$ is assumed to come from a multinomial logit model of hospital choice for different consumer bin $\kappa$. I bin the consumers based on two observables: the 5-digit zip code of residence location, and income group (below poverty, between 100% and 200% of poverty, and between 200% and 300% of poverty). Therefore, bin $\kappa$ is a combination of location $l$, and income group $y$. For each individual $k$, I use the notation $\kappa(k)$ (notation picked up from Ho and Lee [2013]) to represent the consumer bin that consumer $k$ belongs to. Notations $l(k)$ and $y(k)$ are also used in a similar manner.

Underlying my multi-nomial choice model is the following utility function for individual $k$ with diagnosis $\psi$ getting admitted at hospital $u_i$:

$$V_{ik\psi}^H = \delta d_{il(k)} + v_i \times \left(1 + \theta^{\text{diag}} \times w_\psi \right) + \varepsilon_{ik\psi} \tag{5.4}$$

This utility function assumes that when evaluating hospital $u_i$, consumer $k$ pays attention to how far the hospital is located from where she lives as well as to the quality of the hospital. In (5.4), $d_{ik}$ is the distance between hospital $i$ and the residence of individual $k$ who belongs to bin $\kappa(k)$, and $\delta$ is the corresponding coefficient, $v_i$ captures hospital $i$’s quality as perceived by consumers. The utility function in (5.4) allows for the possibility that for more severe conditions, consumers care more about hospital quality and less about distance. Therefore, in (5.4), there is also an interaction term $v_i \times w_\psi$ is multiplied by the coefficient $\theta^{\text{diag}}$ which measures the extent to which patients with more severe conditions (i.e. higher $w_\psi$) pay extra attention to hospital qualities $v_i$ compared to patients with less severe conditions. Last term in (5.4), $\varepsilon_{ik\psi}$ is an idiosyncratic error term whose distribution is i.i.d Type 1 extreme value with variance of 1. The the distribution of $\varepsilon_{ik\psi}$ gives a closed form representation for $\sigma_{ij}^{\kappa,\psi}(G)$. For $g_{ij} = 0$, we have $\sigma_{ij}^{\kappa,\psi}(G) = 0$. For $g_{ij} = 1$ we get:

$$\sigma_{ij}^{\kappa,\psi}(G) = \frac{\bar{V}_{i\kappa\psi}^H}{\sum_{i' \text{ s.t. } g_{i'j} = 1} \bar{V}_{i'\kappa\psi}^H} \tag{5.5}$$

where $\bar{V}_{i\kappa\psi}^H$ (note that in the subscript, it’s $\kappa$ and not $k$) the average of $V_{ik\psi}^H$ over all consumers $k$ of type $\kappa$. That is $\bar{V}_{i\kappa\psi}^H = \delta d_{il} + v_i \times (1 + \theta^{\text{diag}} \times w_\psi)$, where $l$ is the location element of $\kappa$. Also $\lambda_{\kappa,\psi}$ is the expected rate of hospital admission with diagnosis $\psi$ per month per member for consumer bin $\kappa$. 27
**Estimation Procedure:** The parameters to estimate in this step are \( (\hat{\delta}, \hat{v}_i, \hat{\theta}_{\text{diag}}, \hat{\lambda}_{\kappa,\psi}) \). I observe \( \hat{\lambda}_{\kappa,\psi} \) directly from the data. To estimate the rest of the parameters, I estimate a multi-nomial logit model. I observe hospital choices \( \sigma_{ij}^{\kappa,\psi}(G) \) for all \( i, j, \kappa, \psi \) in my data.\(^{36}\) I estimate the parameters using a maximum likelihood approach, matching the observed \( \sigma_{ij}^{\kappa,\psi}(G) \).

**Identification:** Hospital qualities \( v_i \) are identified by cross hospital variation in discharge volumes. If hospital \( u_i \) has a higher discharge share than hospital \( u_{i'} \) among consumer bins \( \kappa \) that live in locations equally far from \( u_i \) and \( u_{i'} \), then \( v_i \) must be larger than \( v_{i'} \). Distance coefficient \( \delta \) is identified by within-hospital, cross-location variation in discharge volumes. The faster the discharge share of hospital \( u_i \) diminishes as we look at consumer bins \( \kappa \) farther from \( u_i \), the more negative the distance coefficient \( \delta \) must have been. The severity weight coefficient \( \theta_{\text{diag}} \) is identified by the variation in discharge volumes within consumer bins \( \kappa \) but across hospitals and diagnoses. The more the discharge shares get skewed towards higher quality hospitals as we look at more severe diagnoses \( \psi \), the higher the implied \( \theta_{\text{diag}} \) would be.

**Results and Interpretation:** Table 2 summarizes the results of the multi-nomial logit estimation of the hospital choice model. The distance coefficient is estimated to be \( \hat{\delta} = -0.137 \), which is consistent with the literature. It implies that an extra 10 miles of distance reduces the share of a hospital by an average of 29%. The DRG weight coefficient is estimated to be \( \hat{\theta}_{\text{diag}} = 0.036 \). To illustrate the interpretation of this number, suppose hospitals \( u_i \) and \( u_{i'} \) are such that \( \frac{\hat{v}_i - \hat{v}_{i'}}{\hat{\delta} \times (1 + \hat{\theta}_{\text{diag}})} = 10 \). That is, the average patient with diagnosis \( \psi \) of severity \( w_\psi = 1 \) would choose \( u_{i'} \) over \( u_i \) if \( u_{i'} \) is no more than 10 miles further away from her than is \( u_i \). Then, a DRG coefficient of \( \hat{\theta}_{\text{diag}} = 0.036 \) would imply that the average patient with diagnosis \( \psi' \) of severity \( w_{\psi'} = 2 \) would be willing to travel \( 10 \times \frac{1+2 \times 0.036}{1+0.036} \simeq 10.36 \) more miles to visit hospital \( u_{i'} \) than she would be to visit \( u_i \).

\(^{36}\)I construct \( \sigma_{ij}^{\kappa,\psi}(G) \) for each \( i, j, \kappa, \psi \) using the discharge data for choices made by patients and data on the network \( G \) for the choice-set.
### Hospital Choice Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>coeff.</th>
<th>std. error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>distance (miles)</td>
<td>-0.136***</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRG weight</td>
<td>0.036**</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital FEs</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. hospital admissions</td>
<td>40247</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.413</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

std errors in parentheses, *: $p < 0.1$, **: $p < 0.05$, ***: $p < 0.01$

Table 2: Hospital Choice Model

### 5.3 Step 2: Estimating Insurance Plan Demand

Having estimated a model of hospital choice, I now turn to estimating the insurance plan demand functions $\hat{D}_j^k(\cdot)$. I assume that consumer $k$’s valuation of insurance plan $j$ comes from the following utility function:

$$V_{jk}^I = \alpha \times EU_{j\kappa(k)} + \beta_{y(k)}p_{jk}^{\text{sub}} + \Delta_j + \epsilon_{jk} \tag{5.6}$$

where $EU_{j\kappa(k)}$ is the expected utility of insurer $d_j$’s network of providers for consumer $k$ of type $\kappa$, and $\alpha$ represents how much consumers care about network expected utility when they evaluate plans against each other. Network-of-providers utility $EU_{jk}$ is given by:

$$EU_{jk} = \frac{\sum_{\psi} \lambda_{\kappa,\psi} EU_{j\kappa}}{\sum_{\psi} \lambda_{\kappa,\psi}} \tag{5.7}$$

which means $EU_{jk}$ comes from a weighted average of $EU_{j\kappa}$ which are values of plan $j$’s network of providers for different diagnoses $\psi$ to a consumer of type $\kappa$. The weights come from the likelihoods of different conditions for type $\kappa$. Given the distribution of $\epsilon_{ik\psi}$, there is a closed form representation for how the values $\bar{V}_{ik\psi}^H$ of hospitals covered by $d_j$ contribute to $EU_{jk}^\psi$:

$$EU_{jk}^\psi = \ln \left( \sum_{i \text{ s.t. } g_{ij} = 1} e^{\bar{V}_{ik\psi}^H} \right) \tag{5.8}$$

$\Delta_j$ in (5.6) is insurer $d_j$’s fixed effect which can be interpreted as “brand effect”. $\beta_{y(k)}$ is sensitivity of consumer $k$, who belongs to income group $y(k)$, to the monthly premium $p_{jk}^{\text{sub}}$. 29
she has to pay for plan \( j \). Due to subsidization in CommCare, there’s a difference between the premium \( p_j \) each insurer charges for its plan and \( p_{j,k}^{\text{sub}} \), the one a consumer buying that plan pays. The relationship between \( p_{j,k}^{\text{sub}} \) and \( p_j \) is linear. There is a fixed subsidy \( b_y \) and a “pass through” rate \( a_y \) for each income group forming a linear relationship as shown in (5.9).\(^{37}\) All \( a_y \) and \( b_y \) are observed.\(^{38}\)

\[
p_{j,k}^{\text{sub}} = a_y(k) \times p_j - b_y(k) \tag{5.9}
\]

Finally, in (5.6), \( \epsilon_{jk} \) is an i.i.d extreme value type I error term, which gives us the following closed form solution for \( D_j^\kappa(G, P) \):

\[
D_j^\kappa(G, P) = \Lambda_\kappa \frac{e^{\bar{V}_{j,k}}}{\sum_{j'} e^{\bar{V}_{j',\kappa}}}
\tag{5.10}
\]

where (similarly to the construction of \( V_{j,k}^H \)) \( \bar{V}_{j,k}^I \) is constructed by averaging \( V_{j,k}^I \) over all consumers \( k \) of type \( \kappa \) (which gives the same formula as \( V_{j,k}^I \) but without the error term \( \epsilon_{jk} \)). Also \( \Lambda_\kappa \) is the population of individual consumers of type \( \kappa \).

**Estimation Procedure:** The parameters to estimate in this step are coefficients on network utility and monthly premium, as well as the brand effects: \( (\hat{\alpha}, \hat{\beta}_y, \hat{\Delta}_j) \). Populations \( \Lambda_\kappa \) are observed, and network utilities \( EU_{j,k} \) can be constructed from the results of the hospital choice estimation (and, are hence, treated as data in this step). To back out \( (\hat{\alpha}, \hat{\beta}_y, \hat{\Delta}_j) \), I estimate the multi-nominal logit model set up in equations (5.6) through (5.10) using a maximum likelihood approach.

**Identification:** Brand fixed effects \( \Delta_j \) are identified by the variation in the enrollment volumes across plans. Network utility coefficient \( \alpha \) is identified by within-plan, cross-location variation in enrollment volumes. To illustrate, if the ratio of Celticare enrollments for a certain income group in a certain year is constant across residents

\(^{37}\)There is one non-linearity in CommCare’s subsidization policy. For the second poorest income group (i.e. between %100 and 150% of poverty), \( b_y \) is determined in a way that there is at least one free option for income group \( y \). That is, \( b_y \) should equate \( \min_j p_{j,k}^{\text{sub}} \) to zero for that group. In my counterfactual analysis, I do not incorporate this effect. Instead, I take all \( a_y \) and \( b_y \) remains constant in response to counterfactual scenarios. This simplify the model greatly and does not substantially change the results.

\(^{38}\)In 2011, an \( X\% \) of the premiums charged by insurers in CommCare was subsidized through fixed subsidies (i.e. \( a_y \)) and another \( Y\% \) through variable subsidies (i.e. \( b_y \)). Consumers paid the remaining 100-X-Y\%.
of different zip-codes, then all of the difference is picked up by brand effects. But if this enrollments ratio is lower in locations where NHP’s hospital network includes some nearby hospitals but Celticare’s does not, then this variation in ratios is explained by a non-zero $\alpha$. Price coefficients $\beta_y$ for different income groups are identified by within-plan, over time variation in subsidy rates and plan premiums. The traditional price-endogeneity issue is less of a concern in CommCare. Individuals with incomes below the federal poverty line accounted for more than 40% of the total CommCare enrollees every year. Health Insurance for this groups was always fully subsidized in CommCare. Therefore, the effective price sensitivity for below-poverty consumers is zero, and the underlying $\beta_y$ for this group is not a coefficient that I estimate. But due to its large size and due to the particular institutional details around how regulations regarding this income group on CommCare, I believe there is enough evidence that most (if not all) of the variation in insurer premiums in my data comes from insurers’ strategies regarding this group. Therefore, there should be little concern about premium variation being endogenous to demand from the other income groups, for which I estimate premium coefficients $\beta_y$. For more details on this, see appendix D.

**Results and Interpretation:** Table 3 summarizes the results of the multi-nomial logit estimation of the plan demand model. An average CommCare enrollee with an income between 100% and 200% of the federal poverty line is estimated to be almost twice as sensitive to after-subsidy premium paid as an average enrollee with an income between 200% and 300% of the federal poverty line. Brand effect estimates indicate that except for Celticare, the brand values for all the plans in CommCare are close to one another. An average CommCare enrollee with an income between 100% and 300% of poverty would be willing to pay about 30$/month less (in after-subsidy premium) for Celticare than she would for BMC, if the two plans offered the same network of hospitals. Similarly, the average above poverty CommCare enrollee would value the NHP brand and Network Health brand respectively $8/month and $3/month below that of BMC.\(^{39}\) Finally, the network utility coefficient $\alpha$ is estimated at 0.72. This magnitude for $\alpha$ implies that, an average

\(^{39}\)Note that this is exactly where the model captures the idea that Celticare is a smaller insurer than the other ones on CommCare. A smaller brand fixed effect $\Delta_j$ implies that a plan gets a smaller market share even if it offer the exact same product as other plans are offering. In other words, $\Delta_j$ speaks to the component of plan market shares that may be out of plans’ control.
CommCare enrollee with an income between 100% and 300% of poverty would be willing
to pay almost 21$ more in after-subsidy premium for Celticare, if Celticare improved its
network of hospitals to one similar to NHPs.\footnote{A last note on my plan demand model is that it does not account for potential inertia in plan choice by consumers. Even though it would be reasonable to believe that such inertia does exist, I think abstracting away from the complexities that it would add to my model does not drastically change the results. This is because in the plan demand estimation, I use data only from fiscal years of 2012 and 2013. And when I use these estimates (which do not account for inertia) to project market shares for the fiscal year of 2011, my predictions are close to the observed shares. Given that substantial changes happened to some plans between 2011 and 2012 as well as between 2012 and 2013, I believe that the model doing well on predicting 2011 market shares suggests that abstracting from inertia is not a far from reasonable.}

### Plan Demand Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>coeff.</th>
<th>std. error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>network expected utility</td>
<td>0.72***</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### price coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>coeff.</th>
<th>std. error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-100 % poverty (omitted, no premiums)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-200 % poverty</td>
<td>-0.0413***</td>
<td>(0.0028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200-300 % poverty</td>
<td>-0.0198***</td>
<td>(0.0021)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### brand fixed effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>coeff.</th>
<th>std. error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BMC (omitted category)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celticare</td>
<td>-1.137***</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallon</td>
<td>0.012***</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHP</td>
<td>-0.296***</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Health</td>
<td>-0.117**</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Num. enrollments       | 381901       |
| pseudo $R^2$           | 0.704        |

std errors in parantheses, *: $p < 0.1$, **: $p < 0.05$, ***: $p < 0.01$
5.4 Step 3: Estimating Insurers’ Non-Inpatient Costs

Variable costs to insurers have two main components. The first component is inpatient costs, which come from the reimbursements $t_{ij}$ that the insurer pays to its in-network hospitals for the care that they provide to its enrollees. The second component is the non-inpatient cost $\xi_j$ in (5.2). In appendix E, I detail how I measure reimbursement rates $t^*_{ij}$ using the medical claims file of the MA-APCD. In the main text, I treat them as data. In this section, I back out the non-inpatient costs $\xi_j$.

**Estimation Procedure:** The parameters to back out in this step are insurers’ non-inpatient costs $\hat{\xi}_j$ for 2011. This is done by imposing the Nash Bertrand equilibrium assumption on the premium setting. That is, no insurer $d_j$ should be able to do better by changing its premium:

$$\pi_{d_j} (G^*, T^*, P^*) \geq \pi_{d_j} (G^*, T^*, (p_j, p^*_j))$$  

(5.11)

Insurer $d_j$’s non-hospital cost per member per month is estimated by finding the $\xi_j$ to make this optimality condition hold.

**Identification:** Unfortunately, the identification is only partial in this step of the estimation process. In 2011, the before-subsidy premiums bid by all CommCare insurers were enforced by regulation to be no more than 425$/month and no less than 404$/month. Thus, all that the identifying assumption (i.e. equation (5.11)) implies is that for every insurer $d_j$, the observed premium $p^*_j$ in the data would do weakly better than any other $p_j \in [404, 425]$. Given that all insurers’ premiums were exactly at either of the two extremes of this continuum, equation (5.11) only gives us bounds on $\xi_j$ values rather than point estimates.

**Results and Interpretation:** Table 4 presents the bounds backed out on non-inpatient costs $\xi_j$ using (5.11).

**Calibration:** Given that I only have bounds on $\xi_j$, I need either further information or further assumptions to back out $\hat{\xi}_j$. My medical claims dataset is comprehensive and encompasses data on all non-inpatient claims (i.e. outpatient, pharmacy, doctors visits outside of hospitals) and how much they cost the insurers. This would give me a direct way
Table 4: Upper or lower bounds on non-inpatient costs $\xi_j$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Bound</th>
<th>BMC</th>
<th>Celticare</th>
<th>NHP</th>
<th>Network Health</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bound on $\xi_j$ ($/\text{month/person}$)</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

to measure $\xi_j$. However, because the number of non-inpatient claims is much larger than that of inpatient ones, and due to my lack of access to high computation-power servers, such a measurement is currently infeasible. Thus, I need to calibrate the non-inpatient costs. I calibrate the vector $\hat{\xi}$ exactly at the boundaries of the inequalities. That is $\hat{\xi} = (284, 275, 281, 276)$. I believe this is a reasonable calibration for multiple reasons. First, the fact that Celticare covers, on average, more expensive hospitals than the other three plans (see table 1) can also push Celticare’s outpatient cost further upward compared to others. Therefore, given that, by table 4, the upper bound on $\xi_{\text{Celticare}}$ is below the lower bound on $\xi_j$ for the other plans, calibration at the boundary seems not far from reasonable. Also, even though non-inpatient costs $\xi_j$ may have varied over time, looking at the pricing decisions of insurers in fiscal years other than 2011 can still be suggestive regarding how reasonable the decision to calibrate $\hat{\xi}$ at the boundary is. In fiscal year 2010, the premium floor and cap were $381/\text{month}$ and $391/\text{month}$ respectively. The fact that BMC, NHP, and Network Health could all profitably price no more than $391/\text{month}$ (i.e. $34/\text{month}$ below their prices in FY2011) suggests that calibrating their $\xi_j$ at the lower bounds is a good working assumption. In addition, during fiscal years of 2012 and 2013 when CommCare had set the premium floor at the much lower levels of $360/\text{month}$ and $354/\text{month}$ respectively, and put in place a procurement process to encourage insurers to price lower, Celticare was not always among the two cheapest plan on CommCare.\footnote{For more details on CommCare procurement rules for fiscal years of 2012 and 2013 and the insurers’ premiums during those years, see appendix D.} This suggests that Celticare must not have had a $\xi_j$ much lower than the other plans, which is consistent with my calibration.
5.5 Step 4: Estimating Insurer Fixed-Costs and Bargaining Parameters

Modifying the Model: Before I do the estimation of this step, I make modifications to the model so as to avoid computational burden for the estimation of fixed costs and bargaining parameters, and more importantly, for the simulation of counterfactual scenarios. There are four modifications. First, instead of the whole state of Massachusetts, I concentrate on the Greater Boston Area which I define by zip-codes that are at most 30 miles far away from 02114, a zip-code in downtown Boston. There are 28 hospitals in this area. Also, Fallon was not active in CommCare in this area. So, I am left with BMC, Celticare, NHP, and Network Health. Second, I coarsen the set of consumer bins \( \kappa \) by aggregating the zip-codes into 38 different locations. I also aggregate all DRG weights into a single one.\(^{42}\) Third, I simplify the way hospital-insurer pairs \( u_i \) and \( d_j \) anticipate how premiums respond to the outcome of their bargaining over reimbursement rate \( t_{ij} \). I assume that when negotiating, the pair take as given the premiums set by all insurers other than \( d_j \). That is, the pair assume that only \( d_j \) will adjust its premium optimally after the outcome of the bargaining between the two is determined. This assumption substantially simplifies the computation as it will not involve computing a complete Nash Bertrand equilibrium for insurer premium setting for every candidate negotiated \( t_{ij} \). In spite of the massive computational advantage, this assumption does capture the first order effect of premium response to bargaining outcomes. It only leaves out how other insurers respond to the premium change by \( d_j \).\(^{43}\) This type of simplifying assumption has been made in the literature to ease the computation of models of bargaining on two sided markets. In fact, Ho and Lee [2013] assume that when bargaining, hospital \( u_i \) and insurer \( d_j \) take as given all of the premiums, including \( p_j \). The assumption in Ho and Lee [2013] simplifies the computation much further than the assumption I impose. Nevertheless, as I will discuss in appendix C, it would not be suitable to a model of bargaining with endogenous network formation like mine, as it would lead to wide ranges of multiple equilibria in many cases.

The fourth modification to the model not only simplifies the computation, but also

\(^{42}\)This aggregation abstracts away from heterogeneity in severities of different admission events. I decided for this aggregation since trying it on the early versions of the model did little to change the results.

\(^{43}\)Note that this assumption still retains the feature that at equilibrium market outcome \((G^*, T^*, P^*)\), premiums \( P^* \) are a Nash Bertrand equilibrium among insurers given \( G^* \) and \( T^* \).
is rooted in the institutional details of the market. I assume hospitals do not bargain individually, but in systems. Participation of hospitals owned by the same hospital system in across plans’ hospital networks are highly correlated with one another, in most cases with full correlation. Therefore, I assume that it’s the whole system, denoted \( s \), that negotiates with each insurer \( d_j \) over the rates and that the outcome of the negotiation is participation of either all of the system’s hospitals \( u_i \) in \( d_j \)’s network or none of them. This partitions the 28 hospitals in the Greater Boston Area into 16 systems\(^{44}\). I also assume that in case of full participation, the prices negotiated between insurer \( d_j \) and all hospitals \( u_i \) in system \( s \) are fully correlated. That is, I construct a fixed “base-rate matrix” \( T^{base} = \left[ t^{base}_{ij} \right]_{m \times n} \) and assume that the negotiated prices between insurer \( d_j \) and all hospitals \( u_i \) in system \( s \) can only take the form of \( t_{ij} = t^{base}_{ij} + z_s \).\(^{45}\) In other words, I assume that the negotiation between the insurer and the hospital system is in fact over \( z_s \). This assumption brings the dimensionality of each bargaining process from the size of system \( s \) to 1, without substantially affecting the outcomes.\(^{46}\)

After implementing all these four modification, I turn to the estimation of fixed costs and bargaining parameters.

**Estimation Procedure:** The parameters to estimate in this step are insurers’ system-specific fixed costs of coverage \( \hat{f}_{sj} \) as well as bargaining parameters \( \hat{\gamma}_{sj} \). Note that given the aforementioned aggregation to the hospital-system level, index \( s \) for systems has replaced index \( i \) for hospitals. I combine the estimation results of the previous steps with network stability conditions in definition 1 and bargaining conditions in definition 5 to back out the set of \( \hat{f}_{sj} \) and \( \hat{\gamma}_{sj} \) that rationalizes the observed market outcome \((G^*, T^*, P^*)\) in the data.

\(^{44}\)If within an actual system (i.e. joint ownership of hospital), network participations of some hospitals do not fully correlate with one another, I consider them separate systems. For instance, Faulkner Hospital is owned by the Partners system, which mean it is in the same system as MGH. Nevertheless, I consider them in separate systems as they do not always appear in the same hospital networks.

\(^{45}\)For every \( ij \) link that does appear in the network structure based on my 2011 data, I set \( t^{base}_{ij} \) to the value of the estimated reimbursement rate \( \hat{t}_{ij} \) corresponding to that link, which, as mentioned before, I measure in appendix E. For all other links \( ij \), I set \( t^{base}_{ij} \) to hospital \( u_i \)’s marginal cost \( c_i \).

\(^{46}\)To see why this assumption does not have large effects on the outcome, observe that increasing some \( t_{ij} \) and decreasing some \( t_{ij} \) would have little net effect on both the insurer profit and the hospital system profit (which is the sum of the profits to the individual hospitals forming that system). Therefore, the bargaining here could be thought of as the insurer trying to get discounts from all of the individual hospitals in the system, and the system trying to charge the insurer more for the service of all of the hospitals.
as an equilibrium of the sequential game schematically represented in figure 3.2, section 3.

Note that by only imposing network-stability conditions and bargaining conditions, we will not get point estimates for all \( \hat{f}_{sj} \). For instance, bargaining conditions do not give any information on \( \hat{f}_{sj} \) for any system-insurer pair who are not contracting with each other (i.e. when \( g_{ij}^* = 0 \) for all \( i \in s \)). For such pairs, network stability conditions also only give a lower bound on \( \hat{f}_{sj} \). To be able to get point estimates, I impose the assumption that fixed costs \( f_{sj} \) depend linearly on observable characteristics of hospital systems and insurance plans. This assumption allows for those \( f_{sj}s \) that are point identified from the structural assumptions to also carry some information about those for which the structure of the model only predicts bounds. Given that the number of data points is limited (there are a total of 64 \( f_{sj} \) values for 16 hospital systems and 4 insurers in the Greater Boston area), for hospital system characteristics, I only include total bed size, denoted \( \chi_s \), and for insurer characteristics, I only include insurer fixed effects. Formally:

\[
    f_{sj} = \Omega \times \chi_s + FE_j + v_{sj}
\]

The procedure through which the linear regression model in (5.12) is combined with the structural equations of the model to estimate fixed costs and bargaining parameters is adopted from the estimation procedure in Gowrisankaran et al. [2013]. My estimation procedure solves a constrained optimization problem. It finds \( (\hat{f}_{sj}, \hat{\Omega}, \hat{FE}_j, \hat{\gamma}_{sj}) \) to minimize the variance of the residuals \( v_{sj} \) as given by equation (5.12) (i.e. the moment condition), subject to two types of constraints on the profit functions: (i) \((G^*, T^*, P^*)\) satisfies the inequalities imposed by the network stability conditions in definition 1, and (ii) \((G^*, T^*, P^*)\) satisfies bargaining with replacement threats in definition 5 relative to bargaining parameter matrix \( \gamma \). Given the results of the previous steps, and given that hospital marginal costs \( c_i \) are observed, profit functions can now be fully computed up to the \( f_{sj} \) fixed costs and \( \gamma_{sj} \) bargaining parameters that are to be estimated in this step. This turns constraints (i) and (ii) on the profit functions into constraints on \( f_{sj} \) and \( \gamma_{sj} \), making the optimization problem well-defined. Given that a high insurer fixed cost \( f_{sj} \) and a low hospital-system bargaining parameter \( \gamma_{sj} \) are expected to affect the bargaining outcomes in similar ways, I conservatively impose strong restrictions on bargaining parameters to ensure identification.
I divide all of the hospital systems into two categories: “star” and “non-star”. I consider two hospital systems to be stars. First, Partners, which includes Massachusetts General Hospital and Brigham and Women’s Hospital. The second one is Tufts Medical Center. These systems are the highest ranked ones in Massachusetts according to US News’ 2016-2017 rankings of best hospitals in Massachusetts. Another reason for considering these two systems to be star systems was that they seemed to have charged abnormally high to all insurers according to my measurement of $T^*$. I then assume that bargaining parameter $\gamma_{sj}$ equals $\gamma_{star}$ for all $j$ when $s$ is one of the two star systems, and it equals $\gamma_{nonStar}$ otherwise. Therefore, the problem of estimating $(\hat{f}_{sj}, \hat{\Omega}, \hat{FE}_j, \hat{\gamma}_{sj})$ boils down to estimating $(\hat{f}_{sj}, \hat{\Omega}, \hat{FE}_j, \hat{\gamma}_{star}, \hat{\gamma}_{nonStar})$.

**Identification:** Identification for all of the parameters come jointly from the structural assumptions of the model described in section 3, as well as from the moement condition in (5.12). Fixed effects $FE_j$ are roughly identified by average differences among different insurers $d_j$ in the bounds on their respective $f_{sj}$ by the structural assumptions. For instance, the imposition of no gains from trade by definition 1 on links $sj$ with $g_{sj}^* = 0$ is expected to imply a lower bound $\underline{f}_{sj}$ on $f_{sj}$. If such implied lower bounds for insurer $d_j$ tend to be larger than those implied for insurer $d_j'$, then $FE_j$ can be larger than $FE_{j'}$. Also given the structure of the model, the bargaining formulation (3.8) implies an upper bound $\overline{f}_{sj}$ on $f_{sj}$. A similar argument applies to when $\overline{f}_{sj}$ tends to be larger for $d_j$ than for $d_{j'}$. The intuition for the identification of $\hat{\Omega}$ is also similar, though the variation this time is within insurer but across hospital systems.

The bargaining parameter for star hospital systems $\gamma_{star}$ is identified by searching for the $\gamma_{star}$ value that makes the predicted fixed costs $f_{sj}$ for partners and tufts systems as close as possible to what a linear model of fixed costs with $\hat{\Omega}, \hat{FE}_j$ would predict. For instance, if the fixed effects $\hat{FE}_j$ and size effect $\hat{\Omega}$ are all positive but with $\gamma_{star} = \frac{1}{2}$ the

---

47In that ranking, Massachusetts General Hospital, Brigham and Women’s Hospital, and Tufts Medical Center are ranked first, second, and fourth respectively. Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center was ranked third, above Tufts Medical Center. But I decided to not consider its parent system (i.e. Care Group) a star system since it also included many much lower ranked hospitals such as Beth Isreal Deaconess Needham and Beth Isreal Deaconess Milton, and especially Mount Auburn Hospital.

48Also, given that networks of different plans can be different, sometimes $\overline{f}_{sj}$ can be compared to $\underline{f}_{sj'}$. Similar arguments apply here.
implied fixed costs for all or most $s_j$ with $s \in \{\text{Partners, Tufts}\}$ and $g_{sj} = 1$ are negative, then we expect that the “true” $\gamma_{star}$ must have been larger than $\frac{1}{2}$. That is, the insurers must have accepted higher reimbursements from those star hospital systems, not because of very low fixed costs of coverage, but because those systems have higher bargaining powers. Bargaining powers $\gamma_{nonStar}$ are also identified based on a similar logic.

A particular feature of my model that further helps to separately identify fixed-costs of coverage from bargaining parameters is endogenous network formation. Some of the equilibrium conditions of the model only restrict fixed costs $f_{sj}$ and are invariant to bargaining parameters $\gamma_{sj}$. For instance, lower bounds $f_{\underline{sj}}$ for those $s_j$ with $g_{sj}^* = 0$ are completely independent of the whole bargaining powers matrix. So, very small values of $\gamma_{star}$ and $\gamma_{nonStar}$, which would imply very low and sometimes negative upper-bounds $\bar{f_{sj}}$ that are far below $f_{\underline{sj}}$, will not do well in minimizing the error in regression equation (5.12), and hence are not chosen by the estimation algorithm.\footnote{The analysis of these lower bounds from the network formation structure was also the reason why I chose how to “split” the effects between the bargaining model and the fixed costs model. In the early versions of the model, I also tried specifications where the fixed costs model included a star dummy but no size effect and the bargaining model had a size effect. That approach led, on average, to a larger diversion in $f_{sj} - FE_j$ for a fixed $j$ across $s$ than my chosen specification does, which means it does worse on matching the moments.}

**Results and Interpretation:** Table 5 summarizes the results. The two hospital systems that I consider star are estimated to have full bargaining power $\hat{\gamma}_{star} = 1$ when negotiating with insurers.\footnote{An estimated bargaining parameter of $\hat{\gamma}_{star} = 1$ might seem too high since it seems to give all the surplus from the contract to the hospital. Two notes about this issue are worth making. First, note that all the surplus does not necessarily go to the hospital since the insurer is also allowed to make threats of replacement. Second, and more importantly, standard plan demand models in the literature (which I am also using in my paper) do not capture consumer risk aversion as a source of bargaining leverage for star hospitals. Therefore, this leverage in my estimation process is picked up by an extremely high estimated bargaining parameter $\hat{\gamma}_{Star}$. See appendix F for more details on this.} I estimate that non-star systems have a bargaining power of $\hat{\gamma}_{nonStar} = 0.72$. The fixed costs of coverage $f_{sj}$ are estimated to be increasing with the total bed size of the hospital system covered. The slope of this increasing relationship is estimated at $\hat{\Omega} = 223K$/year/100 beds. This magnitude, along with the fixed effects $FE_j$ reported in the table, implies that such fixed costs sum up to as large as about a third of
insurer profits (or put differently, a fourth of insurer profits before accounting for the fixed costs themselves).

**Fixed Costs and Bargaining Parameters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>insurer fixed effects (K$/year)</th>
<th>coeff.</th>
<th>std. error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BMC</td>
<td>1146***</td>
<td>(180)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celticare</td>
<td>788***</td>
<td>(177)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHP</td>
<td>415**</td>
<td>(181)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Health</td>
<td>636***</td>
<td>(177)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>effect of size (K$/year/100 beds)</th>
<th>coeff.</th>
<th>std. error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ω</td>
<td>223***</td>
<td>(91)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>bargaining parameters</th>
<th>coeff.</th>
<th>std. errors in parantheses, *: p &lt; 0.1, **: p &lt; 0.05, ***: p &lt; 0.01</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>γ_{star}</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>γ_{nonStar}</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Estimation of fixed costs of coverage and bargaining parameters

6 Counterfactual Analysis

In this section, I use the estimated model to run counterfactual simulations that would help us better understand the effects of Network Adequacy Regulations on the functioning of the CommCare market. In section 6.1, I discuss the main economic forces that I believe underlie how the market responds to network adequacy regulations. In section 6.2, I present and interpret my simulation results on the effects of a range of network adequacy regulations on CommCare. In section 6.3, I discuss some ways in which one might expect the response of the ACA exchanges to such regulations to be different than that of CommCare.
6.1 Main Economic Forces

The hospital network of an insurance plan can affect the reimbursements it pays to its in-network hospitals, as well as the premium it charges, through multiple channels. Among these channels, two are of especial importance when it comes to understanding the effects of network adequacy regulations. The first channel has to do with the features of the in-network hospitals of each insurance plan. Hospitals with higher costs $c_i$ and/or higher quality $v_i$ tend to charge more for their services. So, a hospital network consisting mainly of such hospitals is expected to be more expensive to the insurer. The second channel is has more to do with how in-network hospitals of an insurance plan compare to its out-of-network hospitals. If the out of network hospitals are very close in terms of cost and quality to the in-network ones, the insurer can use them as a strong bargaining chip and make credible replacement threats to its in-network hospitals in order to keep reimbursement rates low.

A network adequacy regulation can affect reimbursements through both of these channels. On the one hand, a network adequacy regulation forces an insurer with a narrow hospital network to add hospitals. Depending on where the joining hospitals stand in terms of cost $c_i$ and quality $v_i$, their addition to the network can bring the average reimbursement rate, and hence the premium, up or down. On the other hand, a network adequacy regulation also weakens the insurer’s “out of network pool” of hospitals. As the insurer is forced to cover more hospitals, it first appends to its hospital network those currently out-of-network hospitals that are the most profitable for it, leaving out of network the least profitable ones. Therefore, the out of network pool becomes a weaker replacement threat tool for the insurer when negotiating rates with in-network hospitals.

The extent to which network adequacy regulations weaken the ability of an insurer to make strong replacement threats depends on how close to one another hospitals are in terms of their profitability to the insurer. To illustrate, if higher quality hospital (i.e. those with higher $v_i$, which can contribute more to network expected utility $EU_{jn}$ of the insurer) tend to also be the hospitals with higher marginal costs $c_j$ and/or fixed coverage costs $f_{sj}$, then one would expect the hospitals to be fairly similarly profitable to the insurer. Hence, once the best out-of-network hospitals go in-network due to network adequacy regulation, the remaining out-of-network hospitals may still provide almost as strong replacement threats.
as the insurer could make before the regulation. However, if, say, higher quality hospitals are also the cheaper ones, the insurer’s ability to make replacement threats should weaken more rapidly as tighter network adequacy regulations are imposed.

6.2 Effects of Network Adequacy Regulations on CommCare

I now simulate the effects of a range of network adequacy regulations using my estimated model on CommCare for the Greater Boston Area FY2011. I examine network adequacy regulations in the form of mandating all the insurers in the market to cover at least $X\%$ of the hospital systems in the Greater Boston Area, for a range of values of $X$.\footnote{For the future, I am planning on also studying other types of network adequacy regulations such as those based on hospital counts or bed counts rather than hospital system counts. However, examining those regulations would require modifying the bargaining formula in (3.8) to capture threats of replacing multiple in-network hospital systems by multiple out-of-network ones. For instance, if an in-network hospital system $u_s$ has five hospitals and no out-of-network system is as large, the insurer needs to be able to threat $u_s$ to replace it, for instance, by two other systems $u_{s'}$ and $u_{s''}$ consisting of two and three hospitals respectively. I believe the main difference between the hospital-system based regulation in my model and, say, a total beds based one would be that a system based regulation will give more bargaining leverage to hospital systems with smaller total bed sizes (and, thereby, less leverage to systems with more beds) compared to a bed based regulation, since a small system counts just as much as a larger system in terms of helping the insurer abide by the minimum mandated network size.}

To model this mandate, I just include an additional term in the insurer-profit-function in (5.2), representing a “fine” that the insurer has to pay if it falls below the $X\%$ requirement:

$$
\pi_{d_j}^{NA}(G, T, P) = \pi_{d_j}(G, T, P) - \eta \Gamma_j(G, X)
$$

(6.1)

where $\pi_{d_j}(G, T, P)$ is insurer $d_j$’s profit function from equation (5.2), and $\Gamma_j(G, X)$ is the number of hospital systems insurer $d_j$ is short of fulfilling the $X\%$ requirement (e.g. $\Gamma_{Celticare}(G^*, 0.5) = 16 \times 0.5 - 4$ because Celticare covers 4 hospital systems and is, hence, 4 hospital systems short of 8 which would be 50\% of the total 16 systems). Also $\eta$ is the amount of fine an insurer has to pay per each of those missing hospital systems.\footnote{A more natural way of modeling the fine would be having a constant fine for being below 50\% no matter how much below. With that formulation, however, my model would not capture Celticare’s incentive to expand its network of hospitals. The reason is that the deviations allowed in my model are dropping, adding, or replacing one hospital system. No single such deviation can take Celticare from covering 4 systems}

The exact
amount of the fine $\eta$ does not play a role in determining the result of the counterfactual simulation.\footnote{If the bargaining model was NiN instead of bargaining with replacement threats, then $\eta$ would play a significant role, with $\eta \to \infty$ implying $t_{ij}^* \to \infty$, which I do not find reasonable.} It just has to be large enough to ensure that no insurer would prefer going below $X\%$ to staying weakly above it. I then simulate the new equilibrium of the model again, using the parameters estimated in section 5 and using (6.1) instead of (5.2) for insurer profit.

Covering only four hospital system out of the total 16, Celticare has by far the narrowest network among the four plans in CommCare. Thus, it is the only plan directly affected by the regulation for most values of $X$. I hence, describe the simulated response of Celticare to network adequacy regulations, and I then turn to other insurers.

As a last point before detailing the simulation results, I would like to reiterate the main point made in section 3.2. As I argued in that section, using the NiN formulation for the bargaining component of the model would result in extremely high and unrealistic predicted increase in the reimbursement rates in response to network adequacy regulations. That is, the predicted reimbursement rates by NiN in response to regulation would not just be empirically biased. They would, in fact, be logically incoherent. In other words, part of the question that my counterfactual analysis asks is “if an insurer who has expanded its hospital network is no further allowed to make a threat of dropping when negotiating with hospitals, to what extent can threats of replacement keep rates from surging?”. If we use NiN which only allows for threats of dropping, it is straightforward that we will not get realistic predictions about situations where this threat cannot be used and insurers tries to keep prices down in other ways. Therefore, in what follows, I analyze the counterfactual simulations only for the bargaining model with threats of replacements. I do not do the analysis for NiN and compare results.

### 6.2.1 Effects on Celticare

Figures 6.1 through 6.3 depict the simulated effects on Celticare of a range of network adequacy regulations with $X = 18.75\%$ (i.e. have to cover at least 3 out of the 16 hospital systems. Therefore, if the fines for all extents of non-compliance with the requirement is the same, my model will not predict a change in Celticare’s behavior.\footnote{If the bargaining model was NiN instead of bargaining with replacement threats, then $\eta$ would play a significant role, with $\eta \to \infty$ implying $t_{ij}^* \to \infty$, which I do not find reasonable.}
systems) through $X = 93.75\%$ (i.e. have to cover at least 15 systems). Absent any regulation, Celticare covers four systems which amount to 25% of those in the Greater Boston Area.

As figures 6.1 and 6.2 shows, even though a regulation of $X = 25\%$ does *not* force Celticare to expand its hospital network, it does raise Celticare’s average reimbursement rate (see the vertical dashed lines in the two figures). This is because this regulation prohibits Celticare from going below $X = 25\%$ by dropping any of its currently in-network hospital systems without replacement. Hospital systems then exploit this prohibition by raising their reimbursement rates exactly to their respective best safe reimbursements according to definition 4. Celticare, in turn, responds by raising its premium.

For $X = 25\%$ through $X = 81.25\%$, the average reimbursement rate declines gradually but fairly consistently. This is because the hospitals that Celticare brings in-network tend to have lower marginal costs $c_i$ on average than the ones already in network, which means they can charge lower. These hospitals also steer some patients away from Celticare’s most ex-
Figure 6.2: Effects of network adequacy regulations on Celticare’s payments to in-network hospitals
pensive hospitals (in particular Brigham and Women’s Hospital and Massachusetts General Hospital), further lowering the average reimbursement rate paid by Celticare. The orange dashed curve in figure 6.2 depicts how the average marginal inpatient cost of Celticare’s hospital network changes with $X$, pushing Celticare’s reimbursements downward.\(^\text{54}\) This effect is partially offset by the second channel through which the regulation affects reimbursement rates: the of weakening replacement threats. As the blue dotted curve in figure 6.2 shows, the average reimbursement rate charged to Celticare by only those hospitals that were in Celticare’s network before the regulation indeed increases steadily. Nevertheless, this latter effect is not strong enough to dominate the effect of lowered average marginal costs. Hence, the average reimbursement goes down. The reason why the effect of the decreasing average marginal cost dominates that of the weakening replacement threats is that hospital systems are indeed close enough to one another in terms of their profitability for

\(^{54}\text{Average marginal inpatient cost is calculated by taking a weighted average of marginal costs }c_i\text{ of Celticare’s in-network hospitals, where the weights come from predicted discharge volume shares of those hospitals among Celticare enrollees, based on my estimated demand model.} \)
Celticare. So, as Celticare appends the best out of network hospital system to its network in response to tighter regulations, the second bests are good enough alternatives for Celticare to use as replacement threats and contain the reimbursements. Over the $X = 25\%$ through $X = 81.25\%$ range of regulations, Celticare’s premium is $404/\text{month/person}$, at the lowest rate allowed by CommCare to charge. Absent this premium floor, Celticare’s premium would be a little below $404/\text{month/person}$ due to reduced average reimbursement.

From $X = 81.25\%$ on, the increasing trend in average reimbursement rates and the premium accelerates. Underlying this acceleration is an important self-reinforcing loop through which premiums and reimbursement rates both increase rapidly. The loop works in the following way: Once reimbursement rates increase due to depletion of Celticare’s the out of network pool, Celticare responds by raising its premium. The increased premium lowers Celticare’s market share. This decreases the inpatient volumes that Celticare’s in-network hospital systems get through Celticare, roughly proportionally to Celticare’s market share decrease. Now, note that the rate that each system charges to Celticare under a binding network adequacy regulation is the highest safe reimbursement rate. That is, each in-network hospital system charges Celticare for the differential profitability between that system and Celticare’s best replacement option. If an in-network hospital system has a lower total volume through Celticare (due to lower Celticare market share), that system will get to charge a larger rate paid per admission in order to cover the difference in profitabilities.\(^{55}\) Therefore, an increase in Celticare’s premium can feed back into increased reimbursement rates. But higher reimbursement rates in turn will lead Celticare to further raise its premium, which again further increases the rates, and so on. Another reason for the large price increase towards the end of the spectrum of the regulations is that with high $X$, other plans are also bound by the regulation, which means their in-network hospitals charge higher to them. Thus, it is more likely that Celticare’s out-of-network hospital systems are now in-network for another plan affected by the regulation. This raises the reimbursement rates that such hospitals would be willing to accept in order to replace

\(^{55}\)One might think that the differences in the profitabilities of hospital systems for Celticare might also decrease proportionally to Celticare’s market share. This is not true, since for Celticare itself, the decrease in market share due to increased premium is (at least partly) compensated for by the higher margin from the increased premium.
a hospital system currently in Celticare’s network. Therefore, Celticare will have weaker threats of replacement, which leads to increased reimbursement rates and premium.

6.2.2 Effects on other insurers:

The other three insurers in the market were BMC, NHP, and Network Health with hospitals networks that included 11, 15, and 14 hospital systems respectively. With $X$ levels such that the regulation is binding for Celticare only, and the other three are only responding to Celticare’s response to the regulation, their responses are not very large. The most notable observation for such $X$ levels is that each of the other three insurers drop a hospital system or two out of their hospital networks. The reason is, for $X$ levels high enough to substantially increase the charges by some hospitals to Celticare but low enough not to directly affect the other insurers, those hospitals that charge high to Celticare are more likely to drop out of the other insurers’ networks. This arises from the fact that those hospitals now have higher incentive to try to steer their more loyal patients from other insurers to Celticare. In order to prevent these hospital systems from leaving, other insurers need to also raise their reimbursements which is not always optimal, especially when the hospital system threatening to leave the network was already only marginally profitable to the insurer. NHP drops along the way the North Shore Health System as well as Emerson Hospital, and Network Health drops Cambridge Health Alliance.  

56 When the regulation becomes binding, BMC, NHP, and Network Health have similar reactions to that of Celticare. The average reimbursement increases abruptly for any insurer $d_j$ once $X$ hits the network size of $d_j$. Also, with higher levels of $X$, the average reimbursement also increases, as the out-of-network pool of hospitals weakens.

6.2.3 Summary of Consumer Welfare Implications

As the analysis in this section shows, lower levels of $X$ can have good consumer-welfare effects. They expand Celticare’s hospital network. Also, since Celticare adds hospitals with  

56 Network Health drops Cambridge Health Alliance after $X$ passes the level that makes the regulation binding for BMC. So, it could be that dropping Cambridge Health Alliance is Network Health’s response to BMC’s response to the regulation, not that to Celticare’s.
lower marginal costs \( c_i \), they bring Celticare’s average reimbursement down.\(^{57}\) So, they do not lead to increased premium, thereby making Celticare a better plan for consumers. Given that Celticare’s response to the regulation does not provoke large reactions by other insurers, the overall effect of such policies is good for consumers. However, higher levels of \( X \) almost fully deplete Celticare’s (and other insurers’) out of network hospital pool. This severely compromises the insurers’ bargaining position against hospitals, leading to substantially higher reimbursements, higher premiums, and poor profit measures for insurers.

Given that there are substantial differences between CommCare and the ACA exchanges, they might have different responses to network adequacy regulations, potentially with different welfare implications. Thus, I leave further details on the welfare analysis of CommCare to the appendix. Instead, I turn to comparing CommCare to the ACA exchanges on consumer welfare relevant features.

### 6.3 Potential Differences between CommCare and the ACA Exchanges

There are at least two major differences between CommCare and the ACA exchanges that could lead to different responses to regulation. The first difference is in subsidy structures and the second is in cost-sharing features of the plans.

#### 6.3.1 Subsidy Structures

In CommCare, the amount \( p_{jk}^{sub} \), which consumer \( k \) pays out of pocket for insurer \( d_j \)’s premium, is a subsidization of \( p_j \) with a fixed and variable component as given by (5.9). The value of the “pass-through” rate \( a_y \) was zero for the below poverty income group. This makes a large portion of CommCare consumers effectively price insensitive, thereby considerably reducing the price sensitivity of an average CommCare consumer. ACA exchanges on the other hand, follow a fixed subsidy policy. Each ACA exchange enrollee pays the premium charged by the plan she’s enrolled in minus the premium charged by the second cheapest

\(^{57}\)Note that those low cost hospitals that Celticare appends to its network in response to regulations usually have high fixed costs \( f_{s_j} \) and that’s the reason why Celticare did not already cover them in its network without regulation. Nevertheless, the \( f_{s_j} \) costs are fixed and will not get passed on to consumers.
“silver plan” offered in the enrollees local exchange market.\textsuperscript{58,59}

This difference in subsidy schemes can have implications for consumer welfare impacts of network adequacy regulations. Lower effective premium sensitivity in CommCare may have led to high reimbursement rates in CommCare, both in the form of insurers covering hospitals with higher $c_i$ and insurers paying a higher $t_{ij}$ to each hospital $u_i$ than they would have, had the subsidy scheme included only a fixed component. But in the ACA exchanges, plans with narrower hospital networks tend to cover, on average, hospitals that have lower $c_i$ (Dafny et al. [2015b]).\textsuperscript{60} Thus, in the ACA exchanges, including a new hospital in response to network adequacy regulation is not as likely to bring down the average cost. Therefore, the effect of the regulation, through the average marginal cost channel, on reimbursement rates, and hence on premiums, could be an increasing effect now, unlike what was the case with Celticare in CommCare. This difference, on the one hand, implies potentially steeper price increases in ACA exchanges, compared to CommCare, in response to the regulation. But on the other hand, given that hospitals with higher $c_i$ tend to also be hospitals with higher quality $v_i$, a network adequacy regulation can improve the ACA exchanges’ hospital networks much more than it does in CommCare, leaving an overall consumer welfare comparison between the effects on CommCare and the exchanges somewhat ambiguous.

\subsubsection*{6.3.2 Cost-sharing Features}

In CommCare, the only cost that patients paid out of pocket for hospital admission was a constant copay, independent of the hospital chosen and the service received. It was by regulation mandated to be only a function of the consumer’s income group. In the ACA exchanges, there are four “metal tiers” of bronze, silver, gold, and platinum. For the bronze

\textsuperscript{58}Bronze, silver, gold, and platinum are four different categories, or “metal tiers” of the ACA exchange plans based on cost sharing parameters. For a typical silver plan, the consumer pays, in expectation, 30% of its healthcare costs out of pocket and the rest is borne by the insurer. Corresponding numbers for bronze, gold and platinum are respectively 40%, 20%, and 10%. CommCare’s cost sharing parameters are more standardized and did not include this kind of tiering.

\textsuperscript{59}If the price calculated by taking this difference is negative, then the consumer will pay zero.

\textsuperscript{60}This is contrary to CommCare, in which Celticare, the plan with the narrowest hospital network, covers, on the average, more expensive hospitals than all other plans.
The average consumer is expected to pay 40% of her healthcare costs out of pocket in the form of co-pays, co-insurance, and deductible. These numbers are 30%, 20%, and 10% respectively for silver, gold, and platinum plans.

The difference in cost-sharing features may also lead to different responses by the two markets to network adequacy regulations, for at least two different reasons. First, unlike CommCare, the cost-sharing structure in the ACA exchanges makes patients sensitive to reimbursement rates $t_{ij}$. This creates another control mechanism for reimbursement rates. In the ACA exchanges, even under network adequacy regulations where insurers have very weak out of network pool to use as replacement threats, in-network hospitals might still want to charge reasonable prices in order to better compete with other in-network hospitals for patients who do care about their out of pocket expenses when choosing which hospital to visit.

The second difference that cost-sharing parameters can make for the ACA exchanges is the network-expected-utility coefficient $\alpha$ introduced and estimated 0.76 in section 5. With higher out of pocket costs in the ACA exchanges for in-network hospital use, it is possible that consumers place less value on how many and which hospitals a plan has in its network. A lower $\alpha$ implies that a hospital’s quality $v_i$ matters less to insurers when evaluating the hospital for its profitability, and that cost parameters $c_i$ and $f_{sj}$ now matter relatively more. This effect can make the out of network hospitals in the exchanges, which seem to be on the high-cost side, weaker replacement threats for the in-network ones, potentially amplifying the reimbursement rate increase in response to network adequacy regulations. Of course when hospital qualities matter less to insurers, it is also possible that insurers spend more uniformly distributed resources on bargaining with different hospitals. This could potentially lower the heterogeneity in fixed costs $f_{sj}$ of coverage, likely mitigating the amplifying effect of a lower $\alpha$ on the response of the market to network adequacy regulations.

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61This might be one reason why in Ericson and Starc [2014], the network-expected-utility coefficient is estimated at 0.375 for CommChoice, another market from the Massachusetts Healthcare Reform with similar cost-sharing tiering to the ACA exchanges. This value is almost half as large as what I estimate for CommCare. Given that similar normalizations are used in my paper and Ericson and Starc [2014], the estimates are directly comparable.
7 Conclusion and Future Research

In this paper, I developed a model of insurer-provider markets with three important features. First, it endogenously captures the formation of hospital networks, the bargaining between hospitals and insurers over reimbursement rates, and the premium setting by insurers. Second, in formulating the bargaining process, my model improves upon a standard model called Nash-in-Nash by allowing for the possibility that when bargaining with hospitals over rates, insurers not only threaten hospitals to drop them out of network, but also threaten to replace with a currently out of network hospital. This helps capture the Bertrand type competition among hospitals for network inclusion and the fact that insurers can play hospitals off against each other and get lower prices. The third feature is computational tractability. My model can be estimated and used for counterfactual simulations on relatively large markets. In this paper, I also develop an estimation procedure for the model and apply it to the CommCare market in the fiscal year of 2011 in the Greater Boston Area with 16 hospital systems and four insurers.

I use my model to study by how much network adequacy regulations in CommCare can undermine insurers’ bargaining position against hospitals and, hence, lead to increased reimbursement rates as well as increased premiums. I find that milder regulations lead to only moderate increments and sometimes even reduction in reimbursement rates and premiums on CommCare. However, enforcing insurers to have almost full networks can lead to drastic price hikes since it depletes insurers’ out of network hospital pool which they use as “replacement threats” against in-network hospitals to keep the rates down. I point out some differences between the ACA exchanges and CommCare which might lead the ACA exchanges to have different responses to such regulations than CommCare does.

This paper can be extended and/or applied in multiple ways. Theoretically, one direction is to study whether the non-cooperative foundation that I provide for a class of $2 \times 1$ games (see appendix A) can be generalized to $m \times n$ settings, potentially with minor adjustments to the formulation. I am currently working on this in a separate paper. Empirically, an important next step would be applying this methodology to some ACA exchanges and studying how different their responses to network adequacy regulations would be from that of CommCare as well as from one another. Finally, the methodology developed in this pa-
per can also be used to empirically investigate other policy related questions in the insurer provider markets and other vertical markets. An important example is merger analysis. An anti-competitive effect of a merger between two hospitals (or other types of firms in vertical markets) is that an insurer can no more use them as substitution threats against each other. Abstracting away from this effect can lead to under-predicting the magnitude of the anti-competitive effects, which my model prevents. Also, my model allows for examining how network structures, upstream prices and downstream prices co-evolve in response to mergers, a co-evolution that might entail interesting dynamics which cannot be studied using models that do not endogenize all of the three.
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Appendices

A Non-cooperative Foundation for a class of $2 \times 1$ games

In this section, I provide a non-cooperative foundation for the solution concept introduced in section 3 of the main text. Note that the non-cooperative foundation provided here is for a class of $2 \times 1$ games (i.e. 2 upstream firms and 1 downstream firm) and are hence not as general as the application in the main text. Nevertheless, studying these $2 \times 1$ games is helpful. The reason is it demonstrates that when, on the one hand, we do not have a fully general non-cooperative foundation, but on the other hand, we do need to modify the Nash-in-Nash formulation to capture the effects of substitution threats, the formulation developed in this paper is a reasonable choice.\textsuperscript{62} This appendix is organized as follows. First, I introduce the general class of $2 \times 1$ whose Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria I intend to solve for. Second, I propose a strategy profile for the game. Finally, I show that my proposed strategy profile is in fact an SPNE of the game and that the network and reimbursements predicted by this SPNE matches what the model suggested in the main text of the paper would predict. Note that the proofs in this appendix are mostly at the technical level. For a more intuitive argument instead, skip the proofs and see the discussion after theorem 2.

A.1 A Class of $2 \times 1$ Network-Formation-and-Bargaining Games

The game that I set up to analyze the problem of network formation and bargaining involves two upstream firms $u_1$ and $u_2$ and a downstream firm $d$. This game will have infinitely many periods and different components of the payoffs to the firms can realize in different periods. In particular, similarly to Collard-Wexler et al. [2014], I make a distinction between two components of firm payoffs. The first one is the “pre-transfer” payoff to each firm, which is the payoff each firm makes if no reimbursement is made by $d$ to either $u_1$ or $u_2$. Denote this

\textsuperscript{62}Note that even the Nash-in-Nash concept (for modeling bargaining on an exogenously given network) did not have a non-cooperative foundation until very recently when Collard-Wexler et al. [2014] developed one. Nevertheless it was widely used in applied work. Moreover, many of the assumptions made in the non-cooperative foundation provided by Collard-Wexler et al. [2014] are not made in the applied papers that use Nash-in-Nash.
by \( \pi_{ui}(G) \) and \( \pi_d(G) \). The second component is, of course, the transfers \( t_i \) of money from \( d \) to \( u_1 \) and \( u_2 \). Note that, unlike the main text, here I am assuming that the reimbursements are in the form of lump-sum transfers. Restrictive as this assumption may be, it significantly reduces the complexity of the proof. Also the same assumption was made by Collard-Wexler et al. [2014] in the development of the non-cooperative model for Nash-in-Nash even though the price-per-unit could be thought of as the working assumption in the empirical literature using Nash-in-Nash. Therefore, for the rest of this appendix, I will call reimbursements \( t_i \) “lump-sum transfers” or simply “transfers.”

Figure A.1 depicts the pre-transfer payoffs to the two upstream firms \( u_1 \) and \( u_2 \) and the one downstream firm \( d \) under different networks and reimbursements. When the network is empty, each firm makes a profit of 0. When \( d \) is connected to \( u_1 \) only, the pre-transfer profit to \( d \) is equal to \( \pi_d \left( \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \right) = \pi_1 > 0 \) and that to \( u_1 \) is \( \pi_{u_1} \left( \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \right) = 0 \) (i.e. \( u_1 \) has a zero cost of production). Also because \( u_2 \) is not doing any trade, we have \( \pi_{u_2} \left( \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \right) = 0 \). When \( d \) is connected only to \( u_2 \), the pre-transfer profits to \( u_2 \) and \( d \) are equal to \( \pi_{u_2} \left( \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} \right) = 0 \) and \( \pi_d \left( \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} \right) = \pi_2 \) respectively, where \( \pi_2 > 0 \) and \( \pi_2 < \pi_1 \) (This latter assumption implies that, all else equal, \( d \) would rather have \( u_1 \) in its network than \( u_2 \)). Finally, when the network is full, then the profits to \( u_1 \), \( u_2 \), and \( d \) are 0, 0, and \( \pi_3 \) respectively, where \( \pi_3 < \pi_2 \) (This latter assumption absent any transfers, then \( d \) would strictly prefer having either of \( u_1 \) and \( u_2 \) in its network to having both).

I now set up a non-cooperative game of network formation and bargaining among \( u_1 \), \( u_2 \), and \( d \). This game is a natural extension of the classic bilateral bargaining game in Binmore et al. [1986] to 2 upstream firms and one downstream, and has a similar structure.
to the game in Collard-Wexler et al. [2014]. The extensive form of the game is as follows:

The game is a dynamic one with infinitely many periods $\tau = 0, 1, 2, 3, \ldots$. The time distance between every two consecutive periods is $\Delta > 0$ (not to be confused with the same notation in the estimation section of the main text. None of the estimation notations of the main text are used in this appendix). The “discount factors” that are used to discount firms’ payoffs are $\delta_{u_1}$, $\delta_{u_2}$, and $\delta_d$ respectively for $u_1$, $u_2$, and $d$. These discount factors are given by: $\delta_{u_i} = e^{-r_{u_i}\Delta}$ and $\delta_d = e^{-r_d\Delta}$. I assume $r_{u_i}, r_d > 0$ which implies that $\delta_{u_i}$ and $\delta_d$ are all within the interval $(0, 1)$.

In period 0, no link has been “formed” yet. Every period has two stages. In the first stage of even periods, all of the upstream firms $u_i$ who haven’t yet formed a link with the downstream $d$ simultaneously make offers of lump-sum transfers $t_i \in \mathbb{R}$. Then, in the second stage of the even periods, the downstream firm considers the offers made in the first stage (if any), and decides which one(s) to accept if any. Once the downstream accepts an offer $t_i$ a corresponding link is “formed” between $d$ and $u_i$. This link stays formed for the rest of the game. Every odd period also has two stages. In the first stage, downstream firm $d$ makes offers $t_i$ to all of the upstream firms with which it hasn’t formed a link yet. In the second stage, all of those upstream firms, to whom $d$ made offer(s) in the first stage, consider the offer(s) $t_i$ and simultaneously decide whether or not to accept. For any offer $t_i$ accepted by a $u_i$ from $d$, a corresponding link will be formed for the rest of the game.

The payoff to each firm is the discounted sum of the payoffs the firm makes in all periods $\tau$. The payoff to downstream firm $d$ realized at the end of period $\tau$ has two components. First, $d$ receives a flow payoff of $(1 - \delta_d)\pi_d (G_\tau)$ where $G_\tau$ is the network structure realized at the end of period $\tau$ and $\pi_d (G_\tau)$ is the pre-transfer payoff to $d$ as specified in figure A.1. The idea behind assuming that the fellow payoff has a $1 - \delta_d$ term is that if the network structure is $G$ throughout the whole game, the net present value of the pre-transfer payoff that it gives to $d$ will be given by:

$$
(1 - \delta_d)\pi_d (G) \times \sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \delta^\tau = (1 - \delta_d)\pi_d (G) \frac{1}{1 - \delta_d} = \pi_d (G)
$$

Therefore, the net present value of the pre-transfer payoff is exactly $\pi_d (G)$.$^{63}$

$^{63}$This idea is adopted from Collard-Wexler et al. [2014].
pre-transfer components of the payoffs to \( u_1 \) and \( u_2 \) at every period \( \tau \) are also formulated similarly, which, given figure A.1, means that this component is always zero for \( u_1 \) and \( u_2 \).

The second component of the payoff realized to each firm at every period \( \tau \) is the transfer. Unlike the pre-transfer payoffs (which are “direct” payoffs from the network structure), I do not assume that payoffs from transfers are realized gradually and in perpetual cash flows. Rather, I assume, similarly to Collard-Wexler et al. [2014], that if at some period \( \tau \), an offer of \( t_i \) is made by \( u_i \) and accepted by \( d \) (or made by \( d \) and accepted by \( u_i \)), then \( u_i \) immediately realizes a flow payoff of \( t_i \) at period \( \tau \) and never after. Similarly, \( d \) realizes an immediate flow payoff of \(-t_i\) at period \( \tau \) and never after from this transaction. Of course, from a net present value perspective, these one-time flow payoffs are evaluated at \( \delta^\tau u_i t_i \) and \(-\delta^\tau d t_i \) for \( u_i \) and \( d \) respectively. Therefore, for instance if in period \( \tau = 0 \) the downstream accepts an offer of \( t_1 \) from \( u_1 \) and never deals with \( u_2 \) throughout the game, the net present values of the payoffs to \( u_1 \), \( u_2 \), and \( d \) will be \( t_1, 0, \) and \( \pi_1 - t_1 \) respectively.

A.2 A Proposed SPNE of the Game

In this section I specify a strategy profile as a candidate SPNE of the game laid out in section A.1. In next sections of this appendix, I prove that is in fact a SPNE and that the payoff it predicts to be realized on the equilibrium path are in line with the formulations used in the main text of this paper to analyze the problem of network formation and bargaining in the health insurance industry.

Denote:

\[
\tilde{t}_1 = \min \left( \pi_1 - \pi_2, \pi_1 \frac{1 - \delta_d}{1 - \delta_d \delta_{u_1}} \right) \tag{A.1}
\]

\[
\tilde{t}_1 = \delta_{u_1} \tilde{t}_1 \tag{A.2}
\]

My proposed suggests the following actions at different types of subgames of the game in section A.1:

I- Subgames \( S \) where \( u_1 \) and \( d \) have already formed a link: These subgames \( S \) are all subgames starting at the first or second stage of an even or odd period \( \tau \) where there is already a link between \( u_1 \) and \( d \), which by the specification of the rules of the game, we know cannot be broken. This, then, boils down to a bilateral Rubinstein bargaining game
with no gains from trade since $\pi_3 < \pi_1$. Therefore, Any offer that $u_2$ would be willing to make would be rejected by $d$ and vice versa. Thus, for such subgames, instead of fully specifying a set of strategies, we just observe that all equilibria of such subgames are offers being made and rejected, which means that we expect no transfers and no change in the network structure once we enter one of such subgames.

**II- Subgames $S$ where $u_2$ and $d$ have already formed a link:** These subgames behave in a similar way to subgames of type I since $\pi_3 < \pi_2$.

**III- Subgames $S$ where $u_1$ and $u_2$ simultaneously make offers to $d$:** These subgames $S$ are all subgames starting at the first stage of an even period $\tau$ where no link between $d$ and any $u_i$ has already been formed yet. Proposed strategies by $u_1$ and $u_2$ at all such $S$ are:

\[
t^*_{u_1} (S) = \bar{t}_1 \\
t^*_{u_2} (S) = 0
\] (A.3) (A.4)

The intuition behind these formulations for $t^*_{u_1} (S)$ and $t^*_{u_2} (S)$ is that $u_2$ tries its best (by offering 0) to undercut $u_1$; and $u_1$ offers a transfer that is consistent with Rubinstein bargaining unless there is a danger of being undercut by $u_2$, in which case $u_1$ offers the highest price that would just prevent $u_2$ from undercutting $u_1$ (this idea is in line with the concept of “highest safe reimbursement” introduced in the main text to formulate the network-formation and bargaining problem).

**IV- Subgames $S$ where $d$ makes offers to both $u_1$ and $u_2$:** These subgames $S$ are all subgames starting at the first stage of an odd period $\tau$ where no link between $d$ and any $u_i$ has already been formed yet. Proposed strategy by $d$ at all such $S$ is as follows:

\[
t^*_{d} (S) = (\bar{t}_1, 0)
\] (A.5)

Note that since at these subgames, $d$ has to make two offers, its strategy is a pair rather than one number.

**V- Subgames $S$ where $u_1$ and $u_2$ are simultaneously considering offers $t_1$ and $t_2$ from $d$:** These are all subgames $S$ starting at the second stage of an odd period of the
game. Strategies here are denoted $A^*_u(S)$ which can take values of 1 (for “accept”) and 0 (for “reject”). The proposed strategies are:

\[
A^*_{u_2}(S) = 1 \left[ t_2 > 0 \right] 
\]

\[
A^*_{u_1}(S) = 1 \left[ (t_2 > 0 \& t_1 > 0) \text{ or } (t_2 \leq 0 \& t_1 \geq \tilde{t}_1) \right] 
\]

The idea behind (A.6) is that $u_2$ (who expects to be excluded from the network and make a zero profit at the equilibrium) accept any offer that gives him anything more that 0. The idea behind (A.7) is that when $t_2 > 0$, upstream firm $u_1$ knows that $u_2$ will accept and if $u_1$ does not accept, the game will enter a subgame of type II which is anticipated to lead to no deal between $u_1$ and $d$, hence a profit of 0 to $u_1$. Thus, if $t_2 > 0$, then $u_1$ will accept any $t_1$ that would give $u_1$ a higher profit than zero, which means any $t_1 > 0$ will be accepted. But if $t_2 \leq 0$, then $u_1$ knows that it will have the opportunity to counter $d$’s offer if it’s not sufficiently profitable for $u_1$. Therefore, if $t_2 \leq 0$, upstream firm $u_1$ is expected to reject $t_1$ if $t_1 < \tilde{t}_1$. That is, as I will discuss in more details, if $u_1$ could do better by waiting and countering $d$’s offer.

VI- Subgames $S$ where $d$ is considering offers $t_1$ and $t_2$ from $u_1$ and $u_2$ respectively: These are all subgames $S$ starting at the second stage of an even period of the game. Strategy of $d$ is denoted $A^*_d(S)$ which can be one of the pairs in the set \{0, 1\}². The second element of the pair represents $d$’s decision on whether to accept $u_1$’s offer and the second element represents that for $u_2$’s. In all such subgames $S$, the strategy of $d$ works as follows: Denote $O = \{\delta_d(\pi_1 - \tilde{t}_1), \pi_1 - t_1, \pi_2 - t_2, \pi_3 - t_1 - t_2\}$.

\[
A^*_d(S) = \begin{cases} 
1,0 & \text{if } \pi_1 - t_1 \in \text{arg max } (O) \\
0,1 & \text{else if } \pi_2 - t_2 \in \text{arg max } (O) \\
0,0 & \text{else if } \delta_d(\pi_1 - \tilde{t}_1) \in \text{arg max } (O) \\
1,1 & \text{else}
\end{cases} 
\]

The idea behind this formulation is that $d$ accepts any offer that gives it a higher net present value of profit from $S$ on, and $d$ breaks ties in favor of $u_1$. 

63
A.3 Showing that the Proposed Strategy is a SPNE

Since this game has infinitely many periods, standard backwards induction cannot be used to analyze its subgame perfect equilibria. But since the discount factors are less than 1, I use the One-Shot-Deviation-Principle (OSDP). According to OSDP, no firm can strictly profit from changing its strategy only in one period of the subgame without changing its strategy elsewhere, where the strategies of the other firms have also been fixed. The following theorem show that this holds for the strategy profile introduced in section A.2.

**Theorem 1.** The strategy profile described in section A.2 is a SPNE of the game set up in section A.1.

**Proof of theorem 1:** I prove that there is no one-shot deviation by any firm at any subgame $S$. I study different subgames according to the types specified in section A.2.

**Subgames $S$ of types I and II:** For these types, as mentioned before, we have a unique no-trade outcome from the bilateral Rubinstein bargaining. Therefore, for these subgames, I did not even specify strategies and just mentioned that no-trade is what we expect in continuation.

**Subgames $S$ of type III:** In these subgames, we have $t_{u_1}^* (S) = \bar{t}_1$ and $t_{u_2}^* (S) = 0$. I first compute the profits that $u_1$ and $u_2$ make under these strategies, and then show that neither $u_1$ nor $u_2$ has a deviation that would strictly increase its profit. Lemma 1 below enables us to calculate payoffs under $t_{u_1}^* (S) = \bar{t}_1$ and $t_{u_2}^* (S) = 0$.

**Lemma 1.** If at a subgame $S$ of type III, $u_1$ and $u_2$ make offers according to (A.3) and (A.4), then in the second stage of that period (which is a subgame of type VI), downstream firm $d$ would accept only $u_1$’s offer if $d$ acts according to (A.8).

**Proof of lemma 1:** I first show that $\pi_1 - t_{u_1}^* (S) \geq \pi_2 - t_{u_2}^* (S)$:

$$\pi_1 - t_{u_1}^* (S) = \pi_1 - \bar{t}_1 = \pi_1 - \min \left( \pi_1 - \pi_2, \pi_1 \frac{1 - \delta_d}{1 - \delta_d \delta_{u_1}} \right)$$

$$= \max \left( \pi_1 - (\pi_1 - \pi_2), \pi_1 - \left( \pi_1 \frac{1 - \delta_d}{1 - \delta_d \delta_{u_1}} \right) \right)$$

$$= \max \left( \pi_2, \pi_1 \left( 1 - \frac{1 - \delta_d}{1 - \delta_d \delta_{u_1}} \right) \right)$$

$$\geq \pi_2 = \pi_2 - t_{u_2}^* (S)$$

(A.9)
Now I show $\pi_1 - t_{u_1}^* (S) \geq \pi_3 - t_{u_1}^* (S) - t_{u_2}^* (S)$. This is immediate from $t_{u_1}^* (S) \geq 0$, $\pi_1 - t_{u_1}^* (S) \geq \pi_2 - t_{u_2}^* (S)$, and $\pi_2 > \pi_3$.

Finally, I show $\pi_1 - t_{u_1}^* (S) \geq \delta_d (\pi_1 - \tilde{t}_1)$. First I rewrite the right-hand-side:

$$\delta_d (\pi_1 - \tilde{t}_1) = \delta_d (\pi_1 - \delta_{u_1} \tilde{t}_1) = \delta_d \left( \pi_1 - \delta_{u_1} \min \left( \pi_1 - \pi_2, \pi_1 \frac{1 - \delta_d}{1 - \delta_d \delta_{u_1}} \right) \right)$$

$$= \delta_d \max \left( \pi_1 - \delta_{u_1} (\pi_1 - \pi_2), \pi_1 \left( 1 - \frac{1 - \delta_d}{1 - \delta_d \delta_{u_1}} \right) \right)$$

$$= \delta_d \max \left( \pi_1 - \delta_{u_1} (\pi_1 - \pi_2), \pi_1 \frac{1 - \delta_{u_1}}{1 - \delta_d \delta_{u_1}} \right)$$

$$= \max \left( \delta_d (\pi_1 - \delta_{u_1} (\pi_1 - \pi_2)), \pi_1 \frac{1 - \delta_{u_1}}{1 - \delta_d \delta_{u_1}} \delta_d \right) \quad (A.10)$$

The fact that $\delta_d (\pi_1 - \tilde{t}_1)$ is the maximum between two terms gives us two natural cases to examine:

Case 1: $\delta_d (\pi_1 - \tilde{t}_1) = \pi_1 \frac{1 - \delta_{u_1}}{1 - \delta_d \delta_{u_1}} \delta_d$. In this case, given (A.9), it is immediate that $\delta_d (\pi_1 - \tilde{t}_1) \leq \pi_1 - t_{u_1}^* (S)$ and the proof of the lemma is complete.

Case 2: $\delta_d (\pi_1 - \tilde{t}_1) = \delta_d (\pi_1 - \delta_{u_1} (\pi_1 - \pi_2))$. Given (A.10), under case 2 we have:

$$\delta_d (\pi_1 - \delta_{u_1} (\pi_1 - \pi_2)) \geq \pi_1 \frac{1 - \delta_{u_1}}{1 - \delta_d \delta_{u_1}} \delta_d$$

$$\Rightarrow \pi_1 - \delta_{u_1} (\pi_1 - \pi_2) \geq \pi_1 \frac{1 - \delta_{u_1}}{1 - \delta_d \delta_{u_1}}$$

$$\Rightarrow \pi_1 (1 - \delta_{u_1}) + \pi_2 \delta_{u_1} \geq \pi_1 \frac{1 - \delta_{u_1}}{1 - \delta_d \delta_{u_1}}$$

$$\Rightarrow \pi_2 \delta_{u_1} \geq \pi_1 (1 - \delta_{u_1}) \left( \frac{1}{1 - \delta_d \delta_{u_1}} - 1 \right)$$

$$\Rightarrow \pi_2 \delta_{u_1} \geq \pi_1 (1 - \delta_{u_1}) \left( \frac{\delta_d \delta_{u_1}}{1 - \delta_d \delta_{u_1}} \right)$$

$$\Rightarrow \pi_2 \geq \pi_1 (1 - \delta_{u_1}) \left( \frac{\delta_d}{1 - \delta_d \delta_{u_1}} \right)$$

$$\Rightarrow \pi_2 (1 - \delta_d \delta_{u_1}) \geq \pi_1 (1 - \delta_{u_1}) \delta_d$$

$$\Rightarrow \pi_2 \geq \delta_d (\pi_1 (1 - \delta_{u_1}) + \pi_2 \delta_{u_1})$$

$$\Rightarrow \pi_2 \geq \delta_d (\pi_1 - \delta_{u_1} (\pi_1 - \pi_2))$$

$$\Rightarrow \pi_2 \geq \delta_d (\pi_1 - \tilde{t}_1) \quad (A.11)$$
Together, (A.9) and (A.11) imply that \( \pi_1 - t^*_u(S) \geq \delta_d (\pi_1 - \tilde{t}_1) \) which completes the proof of the lemma. \( \square \)

Now, given lemma 1, we know that under \( t^*_u(S) = \bar{t}_1 \) and \( t^*_u(S) = 0 \), the present values of the profits for \( u_1 \) and \( u_2 \) will be \( \bar{t}_1 \) and 0 respectively. Now I show that \( u_1 \) and \( u_2 \) cannot strictly profit from deviating from these strategies. First consider \( u_2 \). If \( u_2 \) deviates to some \( t_2 < t^*_u(S) = 0 \), then either its offer will still not get accepted by \( d \), in which case \( u_2 \) should still expect a present value profit of 0, or the offer will be accepted in which case \( u_2 \) will make a negative profit. Therefore, \( u_2 \) cannot strictly benefit from deviating from 0 to a negative number. Also, if \( u_2 \) deviates to some \( t_2 > t^*_u(S) = 0 \), since according to OSDP we’re assuming that \( u_1 \) is sticking to its \( t^*_u(S) = \bar{t}_1 \) strategy and \( d \) is sticking to its strategy in subgames of type VI, it’s straightforward to show that \( d \) will still only accept \( u_1 \)’s offer, taking the game into a subgame of type I in the next period, implying a profit of 0 to \( u_2 \). Thus, \( u_2 \) cannot strictly profit by increasing its price either.

Now let’s consider potential deviations by \( u_1 \). If \( u_1 \) deviates to some \( t_1 < t^*_u(S) = \bar{t}_1 \), then one can use a similar argument to lemma 1 to show that \( d \) will still only accept \( u_1 \)’s offer, taking the game to a type I subgame where nothing will change from then on. This will lead to a present value profit of \( t_1 < \bar{t}_1 \) for \( u_1 \) which is less that what \( u_1 \) got under \( t^*_u(S) = \bar{t}_1 \). So, \( u_1 \) does not have an incentive to reduce its price. To examine potential incentives by \( u_1 \) to increase its price, given that \( t^*_u(S) = \bar{t}_1 = \min(\pi_1 - \pi_2, \pi_1 \frac{1-\delta_d}{1-\delta_d \delta_u}) \), I consider the following two cases:

Case 1, \( \bar{t}_1 = \pi_1 - \pi_2 \): if \( u_1 \) deviates to \( t_1 > t^*_u(S) = \bar{t}_1 \), then given that the OSDP assumption that \( u_2 \) is keeping offering a transfer of 0 and \( d \) will sticks to the same algorithm when deciding the offers in the next stage of this period, one can show that \( d \) will decide to accept \( u_2 \)’s offer since now \( \pi_1 - t_1 < \pi_1 - \bar{t}_1 = \pi_1 - (\pi_1 - \pi_2) = \pi_2 = \pi_2 - t^*_u(S) \).

Case 2, \( \bar{t}_1 = \pi_1 \frac{1-\delta_d}{1-\delta_d \delta_u} < \pi_1 - \pi_2 \): if \( u_1 \) deviates to \( t_1 > t^*_u(S) = \bar{t}_1 \), then we have \( t_1 > \pi_1 \frac{1-\delta_d}{1-\delta_d \delta_u} \). Now I show that under this \( t_1 \), we have

\[ \delta_d (\pi_1 - \bar{t}_1) > \pi_1 - t_1 \]
To show this, note that by (A.10), we have:

\[
\delta_d (\pi_1 - \tilde{t}_1) = \max \left( \delta_d (\pi_1 - \delta_{u_1} (\pi_1 - \pi_2)), \pi_1 \frac{1 - \delta_{u_1}}{1 - \delta_d \delta_{u_1}} \delta_d \right)
\]

\[
\geq \pi_1 \frac{1 - \delta_{u_1}}{1 - \delta_d \delta_{u_1}} \delta_d
\]

\[
= \pi_1 - \pi_1 \frac{1 - \delta_d}{1 - \delta_d \delta_{u_1}} = \pi_1 - \tilde{t}_1 > \pi_1 - t_1
\]

Therefore, given the strategy specified for \(d\) in subgames of type VI, \(d\) will never accept only \(u_1\)'s offer, since \(d\) at least prefers accepting none of the offers to accepting only \(u_1\)'s. It's straightforward that \(d\) will not accept both. So, the only options are \(d\) accepting only \(u_2\)'s offer of zero or accepting none of the offers in this period. If \(d\), accepts only \(u_2\)'s offer, then as discussed before, \(u_1\) will make a profit of zero, implying that moving up to \(t_1 > t^*_{u_1} (S) = \tilde{t}_1\) is not a strictly profitable deviation for \(u_1\). If \(d\) accepts none of the offers, then given that OSDP assumes that from now on, all firms stick to their original strategies, it's expected that next period \(d\) will offer \((\tilde{t}_1, 0)\) and then \(u_1\) will accept and \(u_2\) will reject. This will bring \(u_1\) a profit of \(\tilde{t}_1 \times \delta_{u_1} = \tilde{t}_1\). So, given that \(u_1\) is already making \(\tilde{t}_1\), this deviation will never be strictly profitable for \(u_1\).

**Subgames \(S\) of type IV:** As a reminder, these are subgames where \(d\) is supposed to make a pair of offers \((t_1, t_2)\) to \(u_1\) and \(u_2\). Again, I will first derive \(d\)'s profit under the strategies specified in section A.2 and then I show there is no deviation available to \(d\) that would enable \(d\) to make a strictly higher profit than that. The proposed SPNE strategy for \(d\) was \(t^*_d (S) = (\tilde{t}_1, 0)\). Given the strategies of \(u_1\) and \(u_2\) when considering these offers (see (A.6) and (A.7)), it's expected that \(u_1\) accept \(d\)'s offer and \(u_2\) will reject. This means that from the next round on, the game will enter a subgame of type I where no further change is supposed to happen. Therefore, the payoff to \(d\) is going to be:

\[
\pi_1 - \tilde{t}_1 = \pi_1 - \delta_{u_1} \tilde{t}_1
\]

\[
= \pi_1 - \delta_{u_1} \min \left( \pi_1 - \pi_2, \pi_1 \frac{1 - \delta_d}{1 - \delta_d \delta_{u_1}} \right)
\]

\[
= \max \left( \pi_1 - \delta_{u_1} (\pi_1 - \pi_2), \pi_1 \left( 1 - \delta_{u_1} \frac{1 - \delta_d}{1 - \delta_d \delta_{u_1}} \right) \right)
\]

\[
= \max \left( (1 - \delta_{u_1}) \pi_1 + \delta_{u_1} \pi_2, \pi_1 \frac{1 - \delta_{u_1}}{1 - \delta_d \delta_{u_1}} \right)
\]
Now, in order to analyze the possible deviations, let’s consider four cases.

Case 1- \( d \) deviates from \((\bar{t}_1, 0)\) to some \((t_1, t_2)\) where \( t_2 > 0 \) and \( t_1 \leq 0 \): In this case, given the strategies of \( u_1 \) and \( u_2 \) regarding what offers to accept, only \( u_2 \) will accept \( d \)'s offer.

Then the game enters a subgame of type II following the acceptance by \( u_2 \) and nothing will not change afterwards. Therefore, the profit to \( d \) will be given by \( \pi_2 - t_2 \) which is strictly less than \( \pi_2 \). But by (A.12), \( d \) makes at least \((1 - \delta_{u_1}) \pi_1 + \delta_{u_1} \pi_2 \) under it’s current strategy which is higher than \( \pi_2 \). So, \( d \) will not have the incentive to make such a deviation.

Case 2- \( d \) deviates from \((\bar{t}_1, 0)\) to some \((t_1, t_2)\) where \( t_2 > 0 \) and \( t_1 > 0 \): In this case, given the strategies of \( u_1 \) and \( u_2 \) regarding what offers to accept, both \( u_1 \) and \( u_2 \) will accept the offers, after which all links are formed and nothing will change in the game. The profit that \( d \) will make in this situation will be

\[
\pi_3 - t_1 - t_2 < \pi_3 < \pi_2 < \pi_1 - \bar{t}_1
\]

Therefore, \( d \) will also not have the incentive to make this type of deviation.

Case 3- \( d \) deviates from \((\bar{t}_1, 0)\) to some \((t_1, t_2)\) where \( t_2 \leq 0 \) and \( t_1 > \bar{t}_1 \): In this case, given the strategies of \( u_1 \) and \( u_2 \) regarding what offers to accept, only \( u_1 \) will accept \( d \)'s offer.

Then the game enters a subgame of type I following the acceptance by \( u_1 \) and nothing will not change afterwards. Therefore, the profit to \( d \) will be given by \( \pi_1 - t_1 \) which is less than \( \pi_1 - \bar{t}_1 \). So, \( d \) will not have the incentive to make this type of deviation.

Case 4- \( d \) deviates from \((\bar{t}_1, 0)\) to some \((t_1, t_2)\) where \( t_2 \leq 0 \) and \( t_1 < \bar{t}_1 \): In this case, given the strategies of \( u_1 \) and \( u_2 \) regarding what offers to accept, both \( u_1 \) and \( u_2 \) will reject the offers. So, the game will enter a subgame of type II where \( u_1 \) will make an offer of \( \bar{t}_1 \) and \( u_2 \) will make an offer of 0. Then \( d \) will accept only \( u_1 \)'s offer and nothing else will change after that. The profit that \( d \) will get out of this process will be equal to

\[
\delta_d (\pi_1 - \bar{t}_1) < \pi_1 - \bar{t}_1 < \pi_1 - \delta_{u_1} \bar{t}_1 = \pi_1 - \bar{t}_1
\]

which implies that \( d \) does not have an incentive to make this type of deviation either.

So, I now have shown that in general \( d \) does not have an incentive to deviate from \((\bar{t}_1, 0)\) given that the rest of the strategies, both by other firms and by \( d \) itself on the subsequent subgames stays fixed.
Subgames $S$ of type V: These are subgames where $u_1$ and $u_2$ are supposed to simultaneously decide on whether to accept the offers made to them by $d$, where the offers are $t_1$ and $t_2$. Four the following four cases, I first derive the profits to $u_1$ and $u_2$ under the proposed strategies in (A.6) and (A.7), and then show that neither $u_1$ nor $u_2$ has a strictly profitable deviation.

Case 1) $t_2 > 0$ and $t_1 > 0$: In this case, given the strategies proposed in (A.6) and (A.7), both $u_1$ and $u_2$ accept the offers and the profits they make will be equal to $t_1$ and $t_2$ respectively. If $u_1$ deviates and rejects $d$’s offer, then given that $u_2$ accepts, the game will enter a subgame of type II in the next period and nothing will change afterwards given the strategies of the firms. Therefore, $u_1$ will make a profit of 0 which is less than $t_1$. So, $u_1$ will not have an incentive to not accept. Using a similar argument, $u_2$ does not have an incentive to deviate.

Case 2) $t_2 > 0$ and $t_1 \leq 0$: In this case, given the strategies proposed in (A.6) and (A.7), only $u_2$ accepts the offer and the profits $u_1$ and $u_2$ make will be equal to 0 and $t_2$ respectively (given that these strategies will take us to a subgame of type II from which point no further changes are expected to happen). If $u_1$ deviates to accepting, then the profit to $u_1$ will be $t_1 \leq 0$. So, $u_1$ will not have an incentive for such a deviation. If $u_2$ deviates to rejecting, then in the next round we will enter a subgame of type III, which given the strategies of the firms, is expected to reward $u_2$ with a profit of 0. But $u_2$’s current profit is $t_2 > 0$ so $u_2$ will not deviate.

Case 3) $t_2 \leq 0$ and $t_1 < \tilde{t}_1$: In this case, given the strategies proposed in (A.6) and (A.7), neither of $u_1$ and $u_2$ accept the offers. So, the game will enter a subgame of type III next round and it will deliver present value payoffs of $\delta u_1 \tilde{t}_1 = \tilde{t}_1$ and 0 for $u_1$ and $u_2$ respectively. If $u_1$ deviates to accepting, then, given $u_2$ is rejecting, the game will enter a subgame of type I from which point on no further changes occur. So, the payoff to $u_1$ would be $t_1$ which is less than $\tilde{t}_1$, the payoff $u_1$ is making without deviating. So, $u_1$ will not deviate. If $u_2$ deviates to accepting, given that $u_1$ is rejecting, the game will enter a subgame of type II from which point on no further changes happen. So, the profit this deviation gives to $u_2$ will be $t_2$. But $t_2$ is weakly less than $u_2$’s profit without deviation: 0. So, $u_2$ also will not deviate.
Case 4) $t_2 \leq 0$ and $t_1 \geq \tilde{t}_1$: In this case, given the strategies proposed in (A.6) and (A.7), only $u_1$ accepts the offer and the profits $u_1$ and $u_2$ make will be equal to $t_1$ and 0 respectively (given that these strategies will take us to a subgame of type I from which point no further changes are expected to happen). If $u_1$ deviates to rejecting, given that $u_2$ is also rejecting, the game will enter a subgame of type III which will give a present value payoff of $\delta_{u_1} t_1 = \tilde{t}_1$ to $u_1$. But $u_1$ is already making $t_1 \geq \tilde{t}_1$. So, $u_1$ does not want to deviate. If $u_2$ deviates to accepting, it will make a profit of $t_2$ which is weakly less than 0, what $u_2$ is making without deviation. So, $u_2$ will not deviate either.

Subgames $S$ of type VI: As a reminder, these subgames are those where $d$ is considering the pair of offers $(t_1, t_2)$ from $u_1$ and $u_2$. The proposed strategy for $d$ was specified in (A.8).

Claim 1. If $d$ accepts only $u_1$’s offer, then the present value of the profit to $d$ will be $\pi_1 - t_1$.

To see this, note that once $d$ accepts $u_1$’s offer and rejects $u_2$’s, the game will enter a subgame of type I after which no further change occurs.

Claim 2. If $d$ accepts only $u_2$’s offer, then the present value of the profit to $d$ will be $\pi_2 - t_2$.

A similar argument proves this remark.

Claim 3. If $d$ accepts neither of the offers, then the present value of the profit to $d$ will be $\delta_d (\pi_1 - \tilde{t}_1)$.

To see this, note that if $d$ does not accept any of the offers, we will enter a subgame of type IV where $d$ will make an offer of $\tilde{t}_1$ to $u_1$ which will be accepted and offer of 0 to $u_2$ which will be rejected.

Claim 4. If $d$ accepts both of the offers, then the present value of the profit to $d$ will be $\pi_3 - t_1 - t_2$.

Given the above claims, it’s straightforward that the strategy specified in (A.8) is optimal and if $d$ makes a one-shot deviation from this strategy, $d$ will be weakly worse off. So, $d$ will not have an incentive to deviate. This completes the proof of the theorem. □

Theorem 1 shows that the strategies set out in section A.2 are a SPNE of the game in A.1. My next theorem relates this game to the formulation offered in the main text. The idea is that as $\Delta \to^+ 0$, (that is, as the time difference between two consecutive periods
shrinks), the transfers predicted by the SPNE of the game converges to what equation (5) predicts. Before stating the theorem, observe that the network expected to realize on the equilibrium path of the above SPNE is 
\[ G^* = \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \] and the corresponding transfer is 
\[ t^*_1 = \bar{t}_1, \] which, from equation (A.1), is equal by definition to 
\[ \min \left( \pi_1 - \pi_2, \pi_1 \frac{1 - \delta_d}{1 - \delta_d \delta_{u_1}} \right). \]

**Theorem 2.** Denote \( \gamma_i = \frac{r_d}{r_d + r_{u_1}}. \) Then, the limit of \( \bar{t}_1 \) as \( \Delta \to +0 \) is given by

\[
\lim_{\Delta \to +0} \bar{t}_1 = \min \left( \pi_1 - \pi_2, \pi_1 \gamma_1 \right) \tag{A.13}
\]

**Proof of theorem 2:**

\[
\lim_{\Delta \to +0} \bar{t}_1 = \lim_{\Delta \to +0} \min \left( \pi_1 - \pi_2, \pi_1 \frac{1 - \delta_d}{1 - \delta_d \delta_{u_1}} \right)
= \min \left( \pi_1 - \pi_2, \pi_1 \times \lim_{\Delta \to +0} \left( \frac{1 - \delta_d}{1 - \delta_d \delta_{u_1}} \right) \right)
= \min \left( \pi_1 - \pi_2, \pi_1 \times \lim_{\Delta \to +0} \left( \frac{1 - e^{-r_d \Delta}}{1 - e^{-(r_{u_1} + r_d) \Delta}} \right) \right)
= \min \left( \pi_1 - \pi_2, \pi_1 \times \frac{r_d}{r_d + r_{u_1}} \right)
= \min \left( \pi_1 - \pi_2, \pi_1 \gamma_1 \right)
\]

\[\square\]

Note that according to (A.13), this SPNE of the game coincides with the formulation of used in the main text of the paper for the empirical analysis of the health insurance markets. To see this, note that the construction \( \gamma_i = \frac{r_d}{r_d + r_{u_1}} \) of \( \gamma_i \) matches the way bargaining parameters are defined in Binmore et al. [1986], Collard-Wexler et al. [2014]. So, \( \gamma_1 \) is interpreted is \( u_1 \)'s bargaining power when negotiating with \( d \). Given that the total additional surplus to \( u_1 \) and \( d \) from contracting with one another is equal to \( \pi_1 \), it is expected that a Nash Bargaining between \( u_1 \) and \( d \) divides this total surplus between them in a way that they get \( \gamma_1 \) and \( 1 - \gamma_1 \) fractions of the total surplus respectively. So, the Nash Bargaining transfer between \( u_1 \) and \( d \), when \( d \) and \( u_2 \) are not connected, is expected to be exactly \( \pi_1 \gamma_1 \) which is one of the two terms in (A.13). Now also notice that the other term (i.e. \( \pi_1 - \pi_2 \)), is exactly the highest safe rate that \( u_1 \) can charge to \( d \) as defined in definition (4)
in the main text. To see this, note that if \( u_1 \) charges anything more than \( \pi_1 - \pi_2 \), then \( d \) will have strictly profit from replacing \( u_1 \) with \( u_2 \) at, say, \( t_2 = 0 \) where \( u_2 \) is also willing to participate. But when \( u_1 \) is charging \( \pi_1 - \pi_2 \), the only way for \( d \) to strictly profit from replacing \( u_1 \) with \( u_2 \) is to pay \( u_2 \) a negative amount, which violates incentive compatibility for \( u_2 \). Therefore, \( \pi_1 - \pi_2 \) is in fact the highest safe transfer that \( u_1 \) can charge. So, to sum up, the strategies that were proven to constitute an SPNE of the game imply that at the equilibrium, \( u_1 \) charges the Nash Bargaining price unless under the Nash bargaining price, there is a danger of replacement (that is, unless the Nash Bargaining price is not “safe” from replacement threats), in which case \( u_1 \) charges the highest price that is in fact safe from substitution.

The reason why the logic of the formulation in the main text is sustained as an equilibrium outcome of the extensive form game in section A.1 was explained at a technical and detailed level in sections A.2 and A.3 (By “the logic”, I mean going with Nash Bargaining if it’s safe from replacement threats, and going with the highest safe reimbursement otherwise). To see this at a more intuitive level, suppose that the Nash Bargaining transfer between \( u_1 \) and \( d \) gives a higher profit to \( d \) than \( d \) could get from replacing \( u_1 \) with \( u_2 \) and being charged a price of 0 by \( u_2 \). Now consider a subgame of the offers and counter offers game where \( u_1 \) and \( u_2 \) are simultaneously making offers to \( d \). Suppose that \( u_2 \) is asking for a transfer of 0 and \( u_1 \) is asking for strictly more than the Nash Bargaining price and also strictly more than \( \pi_1 - \pi_2 \). In this situation, the optimal response for \( d \) isn’t one where \( d \) accepts \( u_2 \)’s offer and rejecting \( u_1 \)’s. The optimal response for \( d \) is, rather, rejecting both offers and waiting till the next period where \( d \) will be supposed to make offers, and then offer the Nash Bargaining price to \( u_1 \). In other words, as long as the Nash Bargaining price is safe from substitution threats, any threat from \( d \) of replacing \( u_1 \) with \( u_2 \) is an empty threat and it’s common knowledge that it is so. Therefore, the replacement threat will not affect the outcome of the bargaining if the Nash Bargaining price is safe from replacement. That’s roughly the intuition for why the effects of replacement threats start to kick in the form of a minimum function.
B The Regression Fixed-Point Algorithm

In this appendix, I introduce a computational approach to solve the optimization problem used in the fourth and last step of the estimation procedure (i.e. estimating fixed costs of coverage) in section 5.5 of the paper. Notations in this appendix are separate from the notations in the main text unless otherwise is stated. The reason is that I introduce the algorithm for a general problem that I set up below, not just for the problem in the main text. The rest of this appendix is organized as follows. First, I set up the general estimation problem. Then, I introduce the Regression Fixed-Point approach. Finally, I show that the Regression Fixed-Point algorithm converges to the solution of the estimation problem. I conclude by discussing the more general application of the Regression Fixed-Point approach beyond this paper.

B.1 The Estimation Problem

We have $N$ observations for the following regression:

$$y_n = \beta x_n + \epsilon_n$$  \hspace{1cm} (B.1)

where $y \in \mathbb{R}^N$ is the dependent variable, $x$ is a vector of independent variables, $\beta$ is the vector of true coefficients, and $\epsilon$ is an i.i.d normally distributed error term. The key feature of this problem is that $y$ is not fully observed ($x$ is observed). We only know that $y \in A$ where $A \subset \mathbb{R}^N$. One instance is when $y$ is coming from a discrete choice model, like discrete choice single agent decision making, or a model involving network formation, like the model in the main text of this paper. In these cases, for at least some $n$, instead of observing $y_n$, we only know a bound on $y_n$. Or for some $n$ and $n'$, we have a restriction on the relationship between $y_n$ and $y_{n'}$. For instance, in the estimation problem in the main text, for some hospital-insurer pairs, we only had a lower bound for the corresponding fixed costs. Those lower bounds came from the imposed no-gains-from-trade condition for pairs that do not have a link in the data. Similarly, we had a lower bound on the differences between some of the fixed costs. Those bounds came from the restriction that ensured no incentive for replacement.
The objective is to go from the partial identification of \( y \) (given by some imposed economic model) to full identification, by assuming that the true \( y \) is the one that is best fitted, among all candidates in \( A \), to some observable characteristics \( x \) in as specified in the linear regression (B.1) (In the application in the main text, these characteristics were hospital fixed effects and insurer fixed effects). As such, \( \hat{y} \) is defined by:

\[
\hat{y} = \arg\min_{y \in A} \sigma (y) \tag{B.2}
\]

where \( \sigma (y) \) is the standard error of the regression when \( y \) is plugged into (B.1). Solving this problem using plain constrained optimization can be computationally demanding, especially when \( N \) is large or when this problem needs to be solved multiple times within a loop, nested in a larger iterative process. The Regression Fixed-Point algorithm substantially reduces the computational burden.

### B.2 The Algorithm

The algorithm has three main steps. The input to the algorithm is an arbitrary \( y^0 \in A \). The \( i \)-th iteration of the algorithm updates \( y^{i-1} \) to \( y^i \). We repeat until the output of the algorithm converges to some \( \bar{y} \). In next section, I show that, under some conditions, \( \bar{y} \) is a global optimum of the minimization problem in (B.2). Each iteration \( i \) of the algorithm has the three following steps:

**Step 1:** Plug \( y^{i-1} \) into (B.1) and run the regression to get estimated coefficients \( \beta^{i-1} \).

**Step 2:** Predict a new left-hand side vector \( y^{p,i-1} \) using the estimated coefficients:

\[
y^{p,i-1} = \beta^{i-1} x \tag{B.3}
\]

**Step 3:** Find \( y^i \) as the closest point (by point, I mean a vector in \( \mathbb{R}^N \)) to \( y^{p,i-1} \) among members of \( A \):

\[
y^i = \arg\min_{y \in A} \sum_{n \in \{1, \ldots, N\}} (y_n - y^{p,i-1}_n)^2 \tag{B.4}
\]

where, if the argmin is not a singleton, an arbitrary minimizer is chosen, unless \( y^{i-1} \) is a member of the argmin, in which case the algorithm chooses \( y^i = y^{i-1} \).
Each iteration of this algorithm is computationally straightforward. The only potentially worrisome step is step 3 where we have to solve a constrained optimization problem in \( \mathbb{R}^N \). But this step is usually very fast in most natural cases where the restrictions on \( y \) given by \( A \) are in the form of independent upper- or lower-bounds for different observations or upper- or lower-bounds on the differences. For instance, suppose that \( A \) gives an exact value of \( y_n^A \) for some \( n \) and a lower bound of \( z_n^A \) for the rest of the observations. In that case, \( y^i \) is given by \( y_n^i = y_n^A \) for observations where \( A \) specifies a point and by \( y_n^i = \max \left( y_n^{i-1}, z_n^A \right) \) for observations where \( A \) specifies a lower bound.

### B.3 Properties of the Regression Fixed-Point Algorithm

In this section, I first show that the algorithm always converges to some \( \bar{y} \in A \), and then I characterize the necessary conditions for \( \bar{y} \) to be a local optimum to the minimization problem in (B.2).

**Theorem 3.** The Regression Fixed-Point algorithm converges to a \( \bar{y} \in A \).

**Proof of theorem 3.** By the definition of standard error, we know that \( \forall y \in \mathbb{R}^N : \sigma(y) \geq 0 \). This, combined with the following lemma proves the convergence:

**Lemma 2.** For every two consecutive iterations \( i - 1 \) and \( i \), if \( y^{i-1} \neq y^i \), then \( \sigma(y^i) < \sigma(y^{i-1}) \).

**Proof of Lemma 2.** If \( y^{i-1} \neq y^i \), then, (B.4) and the choice rule for non-singleton argmin imply:

\[
\sum_{n \in \{1,\ldots,N\}} \left( y_n^i - y_n^{p,i-1} \right)^2 < \sum_{n \in \{1,\ldots,N\}} \left( y_n^{i-1} - y_n^{p,i-1} \right)^2 \quad \text{(B.5)}
\]

But \( \sum_{n \in \{1,\ldots,N\}} \left( y_n^{i-1} - y_n^{p,i-1} \right)^2 = \sigma^2(y^{i-1}) \). Therefore:

\[
\sum_{n \in \{1,\ldots,N\}} \left( y_n^i - y_n^{p,i-1} \right)^2 < \sigma^2(y^{i-1})
\]

On the other hand, given (B.3):

\[
\sum_{n \in \{1,\ldots,N\}} \left( y_n^i - y_n^{p,i-1} \right)^2 = \sum_{n \in \{1,\ldots,N\}} \left( y_n^i - \beta^{i-1}x \right)^2 \geq \min_\beta \sum_{n \in \{1,\ldots,N\}} \left( y_n^i - \beta x \right)^2
\]

\[
\Rightarrow \min_\beta \sum_{n \in \{1,\ldots,N\}} \left( y_n^i - \beta x \right)^2 \leq \sum_{n \in \{1,\ldots,N\}} \left( y_n^i - y_n^{p,i-1} \right)^2 \quad \text{(B.6)}
\]
But by the construction of linear regression, \( \min_\beta \sum_{n \in \{1, \ldots, N\}} (y^i_n - \beta x)^2 = \sigma^2 (y) \). Therefore, combining (B.5) and (B.6), we get:

\[
\sigma (y^i) < \sigma (y^{i-1})
\]

which completes the proof of the lemma as well as the theorem. \( \square \)

I so far established that the algorithm has a fixed point. Now observe that each global maximum of the optimization problem (B.2) is a fixed point.

**Proposition 1.** If \( y^i \in \arg \min_{y \in A} \sigma (y) \), then \( y^{i+1} = y^i \).

**Proof of proposition 1.** The proof follows directly from Lemma 2. \( \square \)

I now show that if set \( A \) is convex, then every fixed point \( \bar{y} \) of the algorithm solves the optimization problem in (B.2). Most common applications satisfy convexity of \( A \). For instance, observation-specific lower and/or upper bounds on \( y_n \) gives a convex \( A \). So do pair-specific lower and/or upper bounds on \( y_n - y_n' \).

**Theorem 4.** If set \( A \) is convex, then every fixed point \( \bar{y} \) of the Regression Fixed-Point algorithm solves (B.2).

**Proof of theorem 4.** Define \( B = \{ y \in \mathbb{R}^N : \exists \beta \in \mathbb{R}^M : y = \beta x \} \). That is, \( B \) is the set of all \( y \) that satisfy all \( N \) equations specified by (B.1) with zero error terms.

**Lemma 3.** \( B \) is a closed and convex set.

**Proof of Lemma 3.** For all \( \beta \) and \( \beta' \) in \( \mathbb{R}^M \) and all \( \alpha \in [0, 1] \), the linear combination \( \beta'' = \alpha \beta + (1 - \alpha) \beta' \) is also in \( \mathbb{R}^M \). So, \( \beta'' x \in B \). Thus \( B \) is convex. The proof of closedness is more also straightforward and is left to the reader. \( \square \)

Now suppose \( \bar{y} \) is a fixed point of the Regression Fixed-Point algorithm. Also take

\[
\tilde{y} \in \arg \min_{y \in B} \sum_{n \in \{1, \ldots, N\}} (y_n - \bar{y}_n)^2 \tag{B.7}
\]

In other words, \( \tilde{y} = \bar{\beta} x \) where \( \bar{\beta} \) comes from regressing \( \bar{y} \) on \( x \). Now observe that by \( \bar{y} \)

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64 Also for non-convex \( A \) it can likely be shown that for any fixed-point \( \bar{y} \) of the Regression Fixed-Point algorithm that does NOT solve (B.2), the algorithm reaches \( \tilde{y} \) at its fixed point only if it starts out at \( y^0 = \bar{y} \) (In other words, \( \tilde{y} \) is an “unstable” fixed point). But proving this result is beyond the scope of this appendix.
being a fixed point, we also have:

\[
\bar{y} = \arg \min_{y \in A} \sum_{n \in \{1, \ldots, N\}} (y_n - \bar{y}_n)^2
\]  

(B.8)

That is, \(\bar{y}\) is the closest point in \(A\) to \(\bar{y}\) and also \(\bar{y}\) is the closest point in \(B\) to \(\bar{y}\). Note that the distance between \(\bar{y}\) and \(\bar{y}\) is exactly \(\sigma(\bar{y})\). In order to show that \(\bar{y}\) solves the optimization problem (B.2), one would need to show there is no \(\bar{y}' \in A\) with \(\sigma(\bar{y}') < \sigma(\bar{y})\).

**Lemma 4.** There is no pair \((\bar{y}', \bar{y}')\) with \(\bar{y}' \in A\) and \(\bar{y}' \in B\) such that

\[
\sum_{n \in \{1, \ldots, N\}} (\bar{y}'_n - \bar{y}'_n)^2 < \sum_{n \in \{1, \ldots, N\}} (\bar{y}_n - \bar{y}_n)^2
\]  

(B.9)

**Proof of Lemma 4.** I use convexity of \(A\) (by assumption) and convexity of \(B\) (by lemma 3) and apply the separating hyperplane theorem twice.

First observe that \(\bar{y}\) is the closest point in \(B\) to \(\bar{y}\) and \(B\) is convex. Hence, by the separating hyperplane theorem, for all \(\bar{y}' \in B\) we have:

\[
\left(\bar{y}' - \bar{y}\right) \cdot (\bar{y} - \bar{y}) \geq 0
\]  

(B.10)

Similarly, by convexity of \(A\), for all \(\bar{y}' \in A\), the separating hyperplane theorem gives:

\[
\left(\bar{y} - \bar{y}'\right) \cdot (\bar{y} - \bar{y}) \geq 0
\]  

(B.11)

Now observe that

\[
\left(\bar{y}' - \bar{y}\right) \cdot (\bar{y} - \bar{y}) = \left[\left(\bar{y}' - \bar{y}\right) + (\bar{y} - \bar{y}) + \left(\bar{y} - \bar{y}'\right)\right] \cdot (\bar{y} - \bar{y})
\]

\[
= \left(\bar{y}' - \bar{y}\right) \cdot (\bar{y} - \bar{y}) + (\bar{y} - \bar{y}) \cdot (\bar{y} - \bar{y}) + \left(\bar{y} - \bar{y}'\right) \cdot (\bar{y} - \bar{y})
\]  

(B.12)

The first and the third term in (B.12) are non-negative by (B.10) and (B.11) respectively. Therefore:

\[
\left(\bar{y}' - \bar{y}'\right) \cdot (\bar{y} - \bar{y}) \geq (\bar{y} - \bar{y}) \cdot (\bar{y} - \bar{y})
\]

But given that \((\bar{y} - \bar{y}) \cdot (\bar{y} - \bar{y}) = |\bar{y} - \bar{y}|^2\) and given that \((\bar{y}' - \bar{y}') \cdot (\bar{y} - \bar{y}) \leq |\bar{y} - \bar{y}| \times |\bar{y}' - \bar{y}'|\),

we can write:

\[
|\bar{y} - \bar{y}| \times |\bar{y}' - \bar{y}'| \geq |\bar{y} - \bar{y}|^2
\]
\[ \Rightarrow |\bar{y}' - \tilde{y}'| \geq |\bar{y} - \bar{y}| \]
\[ \Rightarrow |\bar{y}' - \tilde{y}'|^2 \geq |\bar{y} - \bar{y}|^2 \]
\[ \sum_{n \in \{1,...,N\}} (\bar{y}'_n - \tilde{y}'_n)^2 \geq \sum_{n \in \{1,...,N\}} (\bar{y}_n - \tilde{y}_n)^2 \]

which completes the proof of the lemma. \[ \square \]

Now I use lemma 4 to complete the proof of the theorem. Take some \( \bar{y}' \in A \). I now show \( \sigma(\bar{y}') \geq \sigma(\bar{y}) \) which will complete the proof of the theorem. Observe that:

\[ \sigma^2(\bar{y}') = \min_{y \in B} \sum_{n \in \{1,...,N\}} (y_n - \tilde{y}'_n)^2 \quad \text{(B.13)} \]

Denote one of the minimizers of (B.13) by \( \tilde{y}' \in B \). This gives:

\[ \sigma^2(\bar{y}') = \sum_{n \in \{1,...,N\}} (\tilde{y}'_n - \tilde{y}'_n)^2 \]

But by lemma 4 we know

\[ \sum_{n \in \{1,...,N\}} (\tilde{y}'_n - \tilde{y}'_n)^2 \geq \sum_{n \in \{1,...,N\}} (\bar{y}_n - \tilde{y}_n)^2 = \sigma^2(\bar{y}) \]

So, \( \sigma^2(\bar{y}') \geq \sigma^2(\bar{y}) \), and, hence, \( \sigma(\bar{y}') \geq \sigma(\bar{y}) \). \[ \square \]

I used this algorithm in section 5.5 to estimate the hospital system specific fixed costs of coverage \( f_{sj} \) to insurers. In step 3 of each iteration of the algorithm, I use an approximation to which the results are not sensitive.

C The Algorithm for Computing Equilibrium Market-Outcome \((G^*, T^*, P^*)\), and Discussion of Existence and Uniqueness

In this appendix, first I will outline the algorithm that I use to compute the equilibrium market outcome \((G^*, T^*, P^*)\). I will then qualitatively discuss existence and uniqueness of the equilibria for the algorithm.

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C.1 The Computational Algorithm for \((G^*, T^*, P^*)\)

The computational algorithm works by starting from and initial market outcome \((G, T, P)\) and iteratively updating it using an updating procedure which modifies \((G, T, P)\) if and only if it does not satisfy all of the equilibrium conditions outlined in section 3. I keep updating \((G, T, P)\) until it satisfies all the equilibrium conditions and, hence, is not modified by further updates. At this point, the algorithm stops and its most recently updated market outcome \((G, T, P)\) is output as the equilibrium market outcome \((G^*, T^*, P^*)\). In the rest of this section, I first explain a procedure called LINK_UPDATE which is the cornerstone of my updating algorithm. Roughly, the LINK_UPDATE procedure takes an input market outcome \((G_{\text{Input}}, T_{\text{Input}}, P_{\text{Input}})\) plus a pair \((s, j)\) representing hospital system \(s\) and insurer \(j\), and outputs \((G_{\text{Output}}, T_{\text{Output}}, P_{\text{Output}})\) which is an updating of \((G_{\text{Input}}, T_{\text{Input}}, P_{\text{Input}})\) with respect to the \(sj\) link in a sense that I will detail in this section. Once I lay out how LINK_UPDATE works, I explain how it’s used as the building block of a procedure called MARKET-OUTCOME-UPDATE which updates the market outcome completely, not just with respect to a particular link.

C.1.1 The LINK.UPDATE Procedure

Every time the procedure LINK.UPDATE is applied to input information \((G_{\text{Input}}, T_{\text{Input}}, P_{\text{Input}})\) and \((s, j)\), the following algorithm is run to produce output \((G_{\text{Output}}, T_{\text{Output}}, P_{\text{Output}})\):

**Step 1:** Check if there are gains from trade (GFT) for the pair \(sj\) under \((G_{\text{Input}}, T_{\text{Input}}, P_{\text{Input}})\).

That is, fix \(G_{-sj}, T_{-sj}, P_{-j}^{\text{Input}}\) and check if there is any reimbursement \(t_{sj}\) that hospital system \(s\) and insurer \(j\) can contract on and both get higher profits than if they do not have a contract. In making these profit comparisons, assume that insurer \(j\) optimally responds to any reimbursement rate \(t_{sj}\) (or lack thereof). If there is no such \(t_{sj}\) then there is no GFT. In this case, set \(G_{sj}^{\text{Output}}, T_{-sj}, P_{j}^{\text{Output}}\) to \(0\), and \(t_{sj}^{\text{Output}}\) to \(\emptyset\). Then set \(P_{j}^{\text{Output}}\) to insurer \(j\)’s optimal premium response to \((G_{sj}^{\text{Output}}, T_{-sj}, P_{-j}^{\text{Output}})\). Then exit the LINK.UPDATE procedure.

In sum, what step 1 does is it checks if link \(sj\) can be sustained. If not, it drops the link, adjusts insurer \(j\)’s premium accordingly, and exits.
**Step 2:** (Note: If the algorithm enters this step, it means there were GFT in step 1.) Set \( (G_{-sj}^{\text{Interim}}, T_{-sj}^{\text{Interim}}, P_{-j}^{\text{Interim}}) = (G_{-sj}^{\text{Input}}, T_{-sj}^{\text{Input}}, P_{-j}^{\text{Input}}) \). Set \( g_{sj}^{\text{Interim}} \) to 1, and \( \).

Then, following equation (3.8) from section 3, set

\[
t_{sj}^{\text{Interim}} = \min \left( t_{sj}^{NB}(G_{-sj}^{\text{Interim}}, T_{-sj}^{\text{Interim}}, \gamma_{sj}), \hat{t}_{us}(G_{-sj}^{\text{Interim}}, T_{-sj}^{\text{Interim}}, d_{j}) \right)
\]

where in computing both \( \hat{t}_{us} \) and \( t_{sj}^{NB} \), the optimal reaction of \( p_j \) is anticipated. Finally, set \( p_{sj}^{\text{Interim}} \) to insurer \( j \)'s optimal response to \( (G_{-sj}^{\text{Interim}}, T_{-sj}^{\text{Interim}}, P_{-j}^{\text{Interim}}) \).

In sum, step 2 sets the reimbursement rate for link \( sj \) to the Nash Bargaining price or the Best Safe Price, whichever is smaller, according to the model outlined in section 3. It then adjusts insurer \( j \)'s premium accordingly. Next steps make sure that, in order to deter replacement threats, hospital system \( s \) does not offer a reimbursement so low that it actually makes losses on the \( sj \) link.

**Step 3:** Construct another market outcome \( (G_{-sj}^{\text{Interim}2}, T_{-sj}^{\text{Interim}2}, P_{-j}^{\text{Interim}2}) \) by setting

\[
(G_{-sj}^{\text{Interim2}}, T_{-sj}^{\text{Interim2}}, P_{-j}^{\text{Interim2}}) = (G_{-sj}^{\text{Interim}}, T_{-sj}^{\text{Interim}}, P_{-j}^{\text{Interim}}), \text{ setting } g_{sj}^{\text{Interim2}} \text{ to 0, and } t_{sj}^{\text{Interim2}} \text{ to } \emptyset,
\]

and finally setting \( p_{sj}^{\text{Interim2}} \) to insurer \( j \)'s optimal response to \( (G_{-sj}^{\text{Interim2}}, T_{-sj}^{\text{Interim2}}, P_{-j}^{\text{Interim2}}) \).

If

\[
\pi_{us}(G_{-sj}^{\text{Interim}}, T_{-sj}^{\text{Interim}}, P_{-j}^{\text{Interim}}) \geq \pi_{us}(G_{-sj}^{\text{Interim2}}, T_{-sj}^{\text{Interim2}}, P_{-j}^{\text{Interim2}})
\]

then set \( (G_{Output}, T_{Output}, P_{Output}) = (G_{Interim}, T_{Interim}, P_{Interim}) \) and exit.

In sum, step 3 checks whether the reimburse rate \( t_{sj}^{\text{Interim}} \) as specified in (C.1) is too small a rate to be sustainable. Observe that according to definition 4, and equation (C.1), the rate \( t_{sj}^{\text{Interim}} \) has to be small enough to disincentivize insurer \( j \) from replacing system \( s \) with any currently out of network system \( s' \). But a reimbursement rate this small might also be small enough so that hospital system \( s \) would rather drop the \( sj \) link than keep such a low rate (e.g. when \( t_{sj}^{\text{Interim}} \) falls well below the marginal cost of hospital system \( s \)). This would violate network stability conditions from definition 1. That’s why step 3 checks for this condition. If \( t_{sj}^{\text{Interim}} \) is still high enough not to violate network stability conditions, step 3 approves of it and exits the algorithm. Otherwise, hospital system \( s \) is not capable of deterring replacement threats. Therefore, the algorithm moves on to step 4 to actually allow a replacement to happen.
Note that if the algorithm enters step 4, it means that condition C.2 in step 3 did not hold. This can only be the case when:

\[ t_{s_j}^{\text{Interim}} = \hat{t}_{u_j}(G_{\text{Interim}}, T_{\text{Interim}}, d_j) \]

That is, \( t_{s_j}^{\text{Interim}} \) is the highest safe price for system \( s \) when dealing with insurer \( j \). Therefore, under \( t_{s_j}^{\text{Interim}} \), insurer \( j \) is just indifferent between keeping the contract with system \( s \) and replacing system \( s \) with some other system \( s' \). Formally, there is a system \( s' \) and reimbursement rate \( t_{s_j}^{\text{Interim}} \) such that

\[
\begin{align*}
\pi_d_j\left(G_{-s_j + s'j}, T_{-s_j + t_{s_j}^{\text{Interim}}}\right) &= \pi_d_j\left(G_{\text{Interim}}, T_{\text{Interim}}\right) \quad \text{(C.3)} \\
\pi_{u'j}\left(G_{-s_j + s'j}, T_{-s_j + t_{s_j}^{\text{Interim}}}\right) &\geq \pi_{u'j}\left(G_{\text{Interim}}, T_{\text{Interim}}\right) \quad \text{(C.4)} \\
\pi_{u'j}\left(G_{-s_j + s'j}, T_{-s_j + t_{s_j}^{\text{Interim}}}\right) &\geq \pi_{u'j}\left(G_{-s_j}, T_{-s_j}\right) \quad \text{(C.5)}
\end{align*}
\]

Step 4 simply implements the above replacement.

**Step 4:** Set \( \left(G_{-s_j}^{\text{Output}}, T_{-s_j}^{\text{Output}}, P_{-j}^{\text{Output}}\right) = \left(G_{-s_j}^{\text{Interim2}}, T_{-s_j}^{\text{Interim2}}, P_{-j}^{\text{Interim2}}\right) \). Then set \( g_{s_j}^{\text{Output}} \) to 1, and \( t_{s_j}^{\text{Output}} \) to \( t_{s_j}^{\text{Interim}} \), and finally set \( p_{j}^{\text{Output}} \) to insurer \( j \)'s optimal response to \( \left(G_{\text{output}}, T_{\text{output}}, P_{\text{output}}\right) \).

Step 4 was the last step of the LINK_UPDATE procedure. My next procedure, MARKET-OUTCOME-UPDATE, simply applies LINK_UPDATE multiple times.

### C.1.2 The MARKET_OUTCOME_UPDATE procedure

This procedure starts with \( \left(G^{\text{Input}}, T^{\text{Input}}, P^{\text{Input}}\right) \) and outputs \( \left(G^{\text{Output}}, T^{\text{Output}}, P^{\text{Output}}\right) \). It does this job in the following steps:

**Step 1:** Produce a random ordering of all possible links \( s_j \).

**Step 2:** Set \( \left(G^{\text{Interim0}}, T^{\text{Interim0}}, P^{\text{Interim0}}\right) = \left(G^{\text{Input}}, T^{\text{Input}}, P^{\text{Input}}\right) \). Then for each \( \text{index} \in \{1, ..., S \times n\} \), set

\[
\left(G^{\text{Interimindex}}, T^{\text{Interimindex}}, P^{\text{Interimindex}}\right) = LINKUPDATE\left(G^{\text{Interimindex-1}}, T^{\text{Interimindex-1}}, P^{\text{Interimindex-1}}, (s, j)_{\text{index}}\right)
\]
where \((s,j)_{\text{index}}\) means the \textit{index}-th link according to the random ordering generated in step 1 of the algorithm.

**Step 3:** Finally, set \((G^{\text{Output}}, T^{\text{Output}}, P^{\text{Output}}) = (G^{\text{Interim}S \times n}, T^{\text{Interim}S \times n}, P^{\text{Interim}S \times n})\).

The reason why I have a randomization over the ordering of the links to update in step 1 is that this, along with using multiple starting points, is a good way to check for multiple equilibria.

It is straightforward to verify that a market outcome that does not change if \textsc{MarketOutcome.Update} is applied to it satisfies the network stability conditions in definition 1 and the bargaining conditions in definition 5.

### C.2 Existence

As mentioned before, In this section I will not give formal results on existence. Instead, I briefly discuss some of the most important issues regarding it.

1. **Capturing replacement threats helps existence:** My proposed bargaining formulation does much better than NiN bargaining when it comes to equilibrium existence. Using NiN for bargaining as part of a network-formation and bargaining model sometimes leads to non-converging cycles in the algorithm for finding the equilibrium market outcome. To illustrate, the following cycle in the algorithm is possible when using NiN: hospital system \(u_s\) is in the network of insurer \(d_j\) with some \(t_{sj}\) as the Nash Bargaining outcome. Reimbursement rate \(t_{sj}\) is high enough so that there is gain for insurer \(d_j\) to also sign a contract with hospital \(u_s'\) and steer some of its patients from \(u_s\) to \(u_s'\). But once the \(s'j\) link is added to the network, insurer \(d_j\)'s outside option profit in bargaining with \(u_s\) increases because now \(d_j\) has \(u_s'\) in its network and losing \(u_s\) would not have as big of an effect on \(d_j\) as it did before. This enables \(d_j\) to negotiate a lower reimbursement rate with \(u_s\). This lower reimbursement rate is low enough so that \(d_j\) loses the incentive to keep its contract with \(u_s'\). So, the \(s'j\) link severs. But this compromises \(d_j\)'s outside option profit in bargaining with \(u_s\), bringing the \(sj\) negotiated reimbursement back up. But then, the \(sj\) reimbursement rate is now again high enough so that \(d_j\) will have the incentive to sign a contract with \(u_s'\), and so forth.
The type of cycle described above happens with NiN bargaining often in general and always when I simulate network adequacy regulations. With such regulations, when insurer \( d_j \) is just abiding by the regulation (e.g. when it covers exactly \( X\% \) of the hospitals where \( X \) is the mandated minimum percentage), NiN would imply very high negotiated reimbursement rates due to the fact that the insurer is not allowed to drop any of the hospitals. These extremely high rates incentivize the insurer to bring in at least another hospital. But then the regulation is not binding anymore and none of the hospitals that used to charge high sums due to the bind of the regulation are able to keep doing that. Therefore all those reimbursements fall and take back away the insurer’s incentive to have the new additional hospitals in its network. But once those hospitals are out of network, the regulation becomes binding again, leading to very high reimbursement rates, and so forth.

2. The importance of no-commitment conditions for existence: The no-commitment condition (3.7) in definition 3 is important for existence when there are multiple insurers. To illustrate, condition (3.7) makes sure the following cycle does not happen in the algorithm that finds the equilibrium \((G^*, T^*, P^*)\): hospital system \( u_s' \) is willing to replace system \( u_s \) in insurer \( d_j \)’s hospital network and charge a low price. The reason for \( u_s' \)’s willingness is that by taking \( u_s \) out of \( d_j \)’s network, \( d_j \) will become less popular among customers and some of \( d_j \)’s enrollees will now switch to \( d_j' \) which also covers \( u_s' \) and pays a high reimbursement to it. But once the replacement takes place, \( u_s' \) would profit from exiting \( d_j \)’s network because of the low rate it’s charging. Once that happens, \( d_j \) brings \( u_s \) back. Then \( u_s' \) is again willing to substitute \( u_s \) for a low price, and so on and so forth. The no-commitment condition prevents this by imposing the extra restriction that the \( d_j \) will not replace \( u_s' \) for \( u_s \) if \( u_s \) is willing to participate only at rates that it will find unacceptable after the replacement takes place.

3. Existence and horizontal differentiation: When there is horizontal differentiation among hospitals (e.g. heterogeneity in locations), there could be a potential non-existence issue, which happened (though not frequently) in my simulations. To illustrate, suppose hospital systems \( u_s \) and \( u_s' \) are located in two different locations. Also suppose there are two other hospital systems \( u_{s_3} \) and \( u_{s'_1} \) which are located near \( u_s \) and \( u_s' \) respec-
tively. The following cycle can happen through which $u_{s_1}$ and $u'_{s_1}$ are always covered by an insurer $d_j$ but $u_s$ and $u'_{s}$ keep replacing each other: $u_s$ is in network and $u'_{s}$ isn’t. Here, $u_s$’s presence in the market reduces $u_{s_1}$’s rate due to the fact that $d_j$’s outside option profit in the Nash Bargaining with $u_{s_1}$ increases (because if $u_{s_1}$ drops out of $d_j$’s network, some of its patients go to $u_s$). But the low rate charged by $u_{s_1}$, in turn, makes the presence of $u_s$ less necessary. Therefore, insurer $d_j$ replaces $u_s$ by $u'_{s}$. After that, the price by $u_{s_1}$ goes back up due to the fact that now, if $d_j$ drops $u_{s_1}$, patients in that geographical area may drop the insurer rather than spillover to $u_s$. Also, due to presence of $u'_{s}$ in the market, the rate charged by geographically nearby $u'_{s_1}$ goes down, making the presence $u'_{s}$ a little less necessary. These two, together, can lead the insurer to replace $u_s$ back for $u'_{s}$ in the network, and the cycle repeats from here on.

Two natural questions arise about this situation. First, the main purpose of adding replacement threats to the NiN bargaining solution was that it captured the competition that, say, $u_{s_1}$ faces from the neighboring $u_s$ even when $u_s$ is out of $d_j$’s network. So, why is it that when $u_s$ is left out, $u_{s_1}$ gets to charge a higher rate to $d_j$ than when $u_s$ is in-network, which leads, in some cases, to the cycle described in the previous paragraph? The answer is in the particular formulation of replacement threats in the model as constructed in equation (3.8). This formulation assumes that when $u_s$ is out of network, $u_{s_1}$ will charge the highest rate at which $d_j$ would not want to swap $u_s$ and $u_{s_1}$, or even a higher rate. Therefore, even though equation (3.8) captures the competition that $u_{s_1}$ faces from $u_s$ when $u_s$ is out-of-network, this competition exists to a lesser extent than it does when $u_s$ is in-network. This, then leads to the cyclical mechanism mentioned above. Note that there would be possible formulations of replacement threats than (3.8). However, I decided for (3.8) and against those other formulations for two reasons. First, the non-existence cases described above do not happen very often. Second, and more importantly, equation (3.8) has the non-cooperative support detailed in section A but for no other formulation did I succeed in finding any non-cooperative support even for $2 \times 1$ games.

The second natural question is whether there is a workaround in these cases so that the algorithm converges? What I do in these cases, where $d_j$ oscillates by replacing $u_s$ and $u'_{s}$ for one another, is that I make the algorithm choose the network that gives a higher profit.
to the insurer. I assume that the hospital system that is in that profitable network (say it is $u_{s'}$) charges its “lowest acceptable rate” to the insurer, which is the lowest rate under which $u_{s'}$ would not want to leave the network. Under this rate, of course, the insurer would like to replace $u_{s'}$ by $u_s$ but I assume this does not happen to prevent the cycle from happening. In all of my simulations that led to such cycles, this approach assured convergence. Also, in all cases, the two networks between which the algorithm oscillates are very similar to one another in terms of the profits to the firms and the consumer welfare implications. So, a simple algorithm for choosing between the two, like the one I implement here, would be a reasonable approach to deal with the issue of oscillations in the algorithm that searches for the equilibrium market outcome.

C.3 Uniqueness

Like with existence, I do not have formal proofs regarding uniqueness. Nevertheless, in my simulations the equilibrium has always been unique. I conjecture that in situations where non-unique equilibria are natural, my model can generate all of the equilibria (e.g. a product differentiation situation where one insurer covers only the cheap, lower-quality, hospitals to be able to charge a low premium and appeal to more price-sensitive consumers, and another insurer covers all hospitals and charges a higher premium and appeal to more quality-sensitive consumers.) Nonetheless, I have not come across this type of situation in the analysis of CommCare. In this section, I qualitatively discuss features of the model that, based on simulations, I have concluded prevent the existence of multiple equilibria in ways that are not as economically natural as, say, product differentiation.

1. Capturing replacement threats helps uniqueness: NiN bargaining could lead to non-uniqueness of equilibria. To illustrate, suppose there is one insurer $d$ and two hospitals $u_1$ and $u_2$. Suppose that if the insurer does not have any hospital in its network, then signing a contract with hospital $u_1$ will give gains from trade to both the hospital and the insurer. Also suppose that if the insurer is contracting only with $u_1$ and paying the corresponding Nash Bargaining price, it does not have an incentive to bring in also $u_2$, due to the fact that there are fixed costs of bringing in $u_2$ and that $u_1$ already being in the network gives less marginal value to $u_2$. In addition, suppose similar conditions hold between
insurer $d$ and hospital $u_2$. That is, first they do have an incentive to sign a contract if the insurer is not already covering $u_1$, and second, once they are signing their Nash Bargaining contract, the insurer does not have an incentive to sign with $u_1$. Under these circumstances, a model of network formation with NiN bargaining would imply that networks $\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$ and $\begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}$ could both be sustained as part of equilibria. Importantly, even if the insurer prefers the Nash Bargaining contract with hospital $u_1$ to that with hospital $u_2$, a contract with hospital $u_2$ could still be an equilibrium since the only ways the insurer can deviate from this equilibrium is either by dropping the contract or by adding $u_1$ to the network, none of which the insurer would like to do. This issue is not there in my proposed bargaining formulation. In my model, if network $\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$ can be sustained as part of the equilibrium market outcome, it means that hospital $u_1$ is able to reduce its price by enough so that even the lowest price from $u_2$ will not incentivize insurer $d$ to replace $u_2$ for $u_1$. This directly implies that if the current network is $\begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}$, hospital $u_2$ cannot offer a low enough price that would beat hospital $u_1$’s lowest price, and hence, insurer $d$ will inevitably substitute $u_1$ for $u_2$, alleviating the issue of multiple equilibria.

2. Capturing sequential premium setting helps uniqueness: A second thing that could lead to multiple equilibria is assuming that premium setting (see step 2 in figure 3.2) happens simultaneously to network formation and bargaining (see step 1 in figure 3.2). That is, when bargaining, firms take the premiums as fixed and do not anticipate them to change in response to the outcome of the bargaining. This assumption has been used in at least two papers on upstream-downstream bargaining in vertical markets (Ho and Lee [2013], Crawford et al. [2015]) due to the substantial computational simplicity that it provides. Those papers do not fully endogenize network formation. But when network formation is also endogenous, this assumption on premium setting could undermine uniqueness. To illustrate, suppose there are two hospitals $u_1$ and $u_2$ and one insurer $d$. Hospital $u_1$ is a prestigious hospital with very high marginal cost and hospital $u_2$ is the opposite: low quality but also low cost. Now consider two market outcomes. In the first one, the insurer covers hospital $u_1$, pays a high reimbursement to $u_1$ due to $u_1$’s high marginal cost and quality,
and charges a high premium accordingly. In this situation, hospital $u_2$ could, in principle, provide a strong replacement threat for insurer $d$ to use against hospital $u_1$ when bargaining. Since hospital $u_2$ is cheap, replacing it for hospital $u_1$ could allow the insurer to lower its premium and appeal to more consumers. Nevertheless, a model that assumes premiums are set simultaneously with the bargaining would only allow for the insurer to substitute hospital $u_2$ for $u_1$ without changing the premium, making the replacement threat much weaker. A similar issue exists with the reverse situation: Consider a market outcome where the insurer covers hospital $u_2$, pays a low reimbursement to $u_2$ due to $u_2$’s low marginal cost and quality, and charges a low premium accordingly. In this situation, hospital $u_1$ could provide a strong replacement threat for insurer $d$ to use against hospital $u_2$. Since hospital $u_1$ is prestigious, replacing it for hospital $u_2$ could make the insurance plan more attractive. But the insurer might only want to do this if it can raise its premium to cover the higher reimbursement that it has to pay the expensive $u_1$. Nevertheless, a model that assumes premiums are set simultaneously with the bargaining would only allow for the insurer to substitute hospital $u_1$ for $u_2$ without changing the premium, making the replacement threat much weaker. So both market outcomes could possibly be sustained as equilibria. We do not face this issue if the premium setting happens after network formation and bargaining. In this latter case, only one of the two above mentioned market outcomes is sustainable under my network stability and bargaining conditions. If the insurer prefers covering $u_1$ and charging a high premium over covering $u_2$ and charging a low premium, then $u_1$ can deter a threat of replacement by $u_2$ but $u_2$ cannot do the same. The reverse is true if the insurer prefers covering $u_2$ and charging a low premium over covering $u_1$ and charging a high premium. Thus, we get only one equilibrium.

D Exogeneity of Premium Variation in Plan Demand Estimation

In this appendix, I argue that the variation of monthly plan premiums in my plan demand estimation procedure is exogenous to the variation in demand from those income groups for which I seek to estimate premium coefficients (i.e. income groups of between 100% and 200% of poverty and between 200% and 300% of poverty). I do this by arguing that
Table 6: Premiums of all CommCare plans, in $/month/person, in fiscal years of 2012 and 2013

plans' strategies regarding the below poverty income group -who always paid zero premium and for whom I do not estimate premium a coefficient- drove all the premium variation in the data that I use. I first detail the premium variation in my data and then discuss the institutional details behind the variation.

D.1 Premium Variation in the Data

Before I use my enrollments dataset (described in section 5.1.2) to estimate the plan demand model (see step 2 in figure 5.1), I restrict it in two ways. First, I restrict the dataset to fiscal years of 2012 and 2013 as, unfortunately, my data on FY2011 and before has missing records. Second, I restrict to consumers only from the two above poverty income groups, and drop the below poverty ones. The reason for this restriction is the particular policy adopted by CommCare towards this specific income group. I will detail that policy in section D.2. Given that in my model I assume all income groups have the same brand preference and the care to the same extent about hospital networks when choosing insurance plans, dropping this group will not undermine the identification of those coefficients.

CommCare premiums from 2011 on were “community rated.” That is, each of the insurers charged the same pre-subsidy premium to all CommCare consumers, regardless of demographics. Table 6 shows these pre-subsidy premiums set by all CommCare plans in fiscal years of 2012 and 2013.

The premium paid by each consumer depends only on the premiums reported in table 6 and subsidy parameters described in (5.9). The pass-through rate subsidy parameter \( a_y \) for each income groups 100%-200% of poverty and 200%-300% of poverty were approximately 50% and 90% for both 2012 and 2013 fiscal years.\(^{65}\) Table 7 shows the after-subsidy premium


\(^{65}\)Note that as mentioned before, the income-group specific subsidies are based on a finer categorization
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Group</th>
<th>BMC</th>
<th>Celticare</th>
<th>Fallon</th>
<th>NHP</th>
<th>Network Health</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100%-200% of poverty</td>
<td>-50</td>
<td>8.41</td>
<td>-6.93</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-2.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200%-300% of poverty</td>
<td>-91.41</td>
<td>15.38</td>
<td>-12.67</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-4.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Changes in CommCare plans’ premiums (after accounting for subsidies) from FY2012 to FY2013.

changes from FY2012 to FY2013 for all CommCare plans.

D.2 Role of the Below Poverty Income-Group in the Premium Variation

Since FY2012, CommCare mandated that, every year, those below poverty CommCare consumers that did not hold a CommCare plan in the past year, had to choose a plan only between the two cheapest plans offered in the market, as long as those two plans each had a pre-subsidy premium of 380$/month/person or less. This rule, Celticare and Network Health lowered their premiums from 404$/month/person and 425$/month/person respectively in FY2011 to 360$/month/person in FY2012. The two became the cheapest two plans on CommCare for 2012 and enjoyed duopoly for serving the new below poverty enrollees.

Below, I argue that almost all of the premium variation between FY2012 and FY2013 comes from the insurers’ reactions to this particular regulation.

BMC’s premium change of 101$ accounts for a large portion of the total premium variation. The institutional setting detailed in the previous paragraph strongly suggests that BMC reduced its premium by this large amount in order to get access to the new than the one I use in this paper. 100%-150% of poverty and 150%-200% of poverty groups have different subsidy rates. Same with 200%-250% of poverty and 250%-300% of poverty groups. But since in my datasets, I only see the coarser categorization, I simply assume that the pass through rate for the bigger group of 100%-200% of poverty is the average of the rates for 100%-150% and 150%-200% and make a similar assumption for the 200%-300% of poverty group.

66If only one plan had a premium no higher than 380$/month/person, that plan would be the only choice for new below-poverty enrollees. If no plan satisfied this premium requirement, there would be another open enrollment period for the new below poverty enrollees. None of these two situations took place in CommCare however.

67In order to be able to go cheap, Network Health dropped some prestigious hospitals out of its network.
below poverty enrollees, which it successfully did. Also Celticare’s premium increased from 360$/month/person to 377$/month/person, just below the 380$ cap described above. This strongly suggests that in FY2012 Celticare fiercely competed for the two spots for serving the below poverty group; and when it succeeded, it increased its price to 377$/month/person, the highest level under which it could still serve the new below poverty enrollees, only to get surprised by the unanticipated large reduction in BMC’s premium. These changes in BMC’s and Celticare’s premiums, hence, seem to have arisen from their strategies regarding the below poverty group, and not affected by unobservable changes in the demand for insurance plans from the other two groups.

Of course beside the premium changes for BMC and Celticare, there are other premium changes as well between FY2012 and FY2013. Nevertheless, they do not account for as large variations in premiums as the chances for Celticare, and in particular BMC do. Fallon reduced its premium by 14 dollars and this reduction cannot be attributed to the below poverty group. But Fallon’s market share in CommCare was around 3% and this change is not likely to largely affect the estimated premium coefficients. Also Network Health reduced its premium going into FY2013. Nevertheless, this premium changes was only by 5$/month/person, which is not comparable to the much more substantial premium change from slightly more popular BMC. Therefore, I argue that a very large portion of the variation in premiums was exogenous to the demand functions of the two income groups \( y \) for which I estimate price coefficients \( \beta_y \).

**E Constructing measures of hospital marginal costs \( c_i \) and reimbursement rates \( t^*_{ij} \)**

In the main text, I treated both hospitals’ marginal costs \( c_i \) of inpatient care and the reimbursements matrix \( T^* = \left[ t^*_{ij} \right]_{m \times n} \) as data. These quantities, however, are not directly observed in my data. In this appendix, I detail how I construct measures of these quantities using hospitals’ cost reports data and medical claims data.
E.1 Measuring hospital marginal costs $c_i$

In my model, $c_i$ is the severity adjusted inpatient marginal cost to hospital $u_i$. In order to construct a measure of $c_i$ from HCRIS data, I follow these four steps:

**Step 1:** I construct a measure of total variable cost to each hospital. To do that, I sum over all of the costs items in the hospitals cost report for 2011, except for those that I believe are fixed costs. More specifically, I include all cost items except for all capital related costs, employee benefits, operation of plant, nursing school costs, all costs regarding interns and residents, and all non-reimbursable costs.

**Step 2:** I construct a measure of total variable inpatient cost to hospital $u_i$. This cost measure is a fraction of total variable cost determined by how large of a fraction of the total revenue to the hospital is from inpatient care:

$$\text{total variable inpatient cost} = \text{total variable cost} \times \frac{\text{total inpatient revenue}}{\text{total revenue}} \quad (E.1)$$

To illustrate, if 40% of a hospital’s revenue comes from inpatient care, then also 40% of the cost must have come from costs to provide inpatient care. Of course, this approach is non-ideal since it implicitly assumes that the hospital’s profit margins from inpatient and outpatient care are equal. But it is a good approximation and is used in other work (e.g. see Schmitt [2015]).

**Step 3:** I construct a measure of inpatient marginal cost to hospital $u_i$ simply by dividing the total variable inpatient cost by total discharges.

**Step 4:** I construct the severity adjusted inpatient marginal cost $c_i$ by dividing the inpatient marginal cost of hospital $u_i$ by hospital $u_i$’s Case Mix Index (which is a measure of average severity of the inpatient admissions by the hospital constructed by CMS).

E.2 Measuring reimbursement rates $t_{ij}^*$

Reimbursement rate $t_{ij}^*$ is the average payment by insurer $d_j$ to hospital $u_i$ for an inpatient admission an enrollee of $d_j$ at hospital $u_i$. I estimate each $t_{ij}^*$ off of MA-APCD’s medical claims file by simply dividing the total payments from insurer $d_j$ to hospital $u_i$ for inpatient
care in the fiscal year of 2011 by the total number of discharges of $d_j$ enrollees and $u_i$ in that year. The following notes about these rate estimates are worth mentioning.

First, I am not taking MS-DRG severity indices into account in constructing the $t_{ij}^*$ measures. Other papers, (e.g. Gowrisankaran et al. [2013], Ho and Lee [2013]) assume payments are proportional to DRG severity scores. I examined this assumption for CommCare by taking the following regression:

$$\ln (t_a) = FE_{ij,year} + \rho \times \ln (\psi_a) + \varrho_a$$  \hspace{1cm} (E.2)

In this regression, $a$ represents an inpatient admission event. $t_a$ represents the payment from the corresponding insurer to the corresponding hospital for that admission. $FE_{ij,year}$ is a hospital-insurer-year fixed effect. DRG severity score corresponding the principal diagnosis for admission is denoted $\psi_a$. Finally, $\varrho_a$ is an idiosyncratic error term. In this regression, coefficient $\rho$ represents the effect of severity score on the payment. If the payment is, on average, proportional to the severity score, we should expect an estimated $\hat{\rho}$ close to 1 and significant. However, I estimate $\hat{\rho}$ at 0.028 and insignificant at the 5% level. It remains insignificant when I also include the age of the patient as another control variable, and its magnitude remains almost the same. I also anecdotally noticed that there was at least one hospital-insurer pair for which $t_a$ had the same value for all admissions. Thus, I decided against incorporating $\psi_a$ into the modeling of the reimbursement rates.68

The second note about the $t_{ij}^*$ measures is that, unfortunately, I am missing data on Network Health claims from 2012 and before. Therefore, I am not able to estimate $t_{ij}^*$ for $j =$ "Network Health". I instead, calibrate those rates from the outcomes of the estimation process in Shepard [2015] which examines the same market. Shepard [2015] reports average reimbursement rates for hospitals (across all insurers). Given that I estimate the rates for all insurers but Network Health, I use his numbers (in Table 1, Panel A) to back out what the average rate for Network Health must have been. Also, given that Shepard [2015] reports the rates for only 10 of the most expensive hospitals, I cannot use this approach for the rest of the hospitals. For them, I instead use my estimated Network Health rates for 2013. I

68 Of course, if instead of DRG scores, another severity measure is used (for instance, a measure incorporating patient demographics), the results might be different. I may look into other possible severity measure in future versions of this paper.
will receive the full Network Health claims data in the future and replace these calibrated numbers with estimated ones. Nevertheless, I ran the estimation procedure for a range of “reasonable” alternative calibrations and the results are not sensitive to that.

Finally, before using the $t_{ij}^*$ measures in the model for estimating cost functions and running counterfactual simulations, I carry out another further processing. Some of my $t_{ij}$ measures happen to fall below my measures of hospital marginal costs $c_i$. This will be inconsistent with the equilibrium conditions of my model, given that $t_{ij}^* < c_i$ would imply an incentive for the hospital $u_i$ to break off the $ij$ link, unless this hospital is part of a bigger hospital system $s$ which includes other hospitals that charge high enough to $d_j$ to cover the loss from $t_{ij}^* < c_i$. To avoid this and help my model rationalize the date as an equilibrium, I bump up the $t_{ij}^*$ measures in cases where it leads to the aforementioned problems to $c_i + 300$, measures in $$/admission. This procedure modifies 15 of the $t_{ij}^*$ measures out of a total of 112. It increases the average reimbursement rate paid to hospitals by BMC, Celticare, NHP, and Network Health, respectively by 1%, 0%, 2%, and 1%. The $t_{ij}^* < c_i$ could be results of measurement errors in estimating $t_{ij}^*$ and/or $c_i$ potentially both by the econometrician and the hospitals. Another, more rigorous, approach to this issue would be introducing an idiosyncratic error term to the hospital profit function in equation (5.1). However, I decided against for two reasons. First, it would make the estimation procedure more complicated. Second, it would probably add little value to the predictions. I tried a different modification by reducing the $c_i$ (only for insurer $d_j$) instead of increasing $t_{ij}^*$ and got very similar results.

F Consumer risk aversion and bargaining leverage for star hospitals

In this appendix, I describe a hypothesis about the effects of consumers’ risk aversion in how they evaluate health plans against each other, and I argue that, not capturing this risk aversion, standard models of insurance plan demand (developed by Capps et al. [2003], further completed by Ho [2006], and then widely used in the literature) might miss an important source of bargaining leverage for star hospitals in negotiating rates with insurers. Therefore, if such demand models are used in conjunction with a supply model (such as the
model I develop in this paper) to estimate bargaining powers, they may over estimate the bargaining parameters of star hospitals $\hat{\gamma}_{\text{star}}$, as the bargaining leverage from risk aversion is being picked up by $\hat{\gamma}_{\text{star}}$. Formalizing and empirically testing this hypothesis is a project I am planning to start in the future. In this appendix, I only describe this hypothesis and discuss its implication for estimation of bargaining parameters.

**Hypothesis:** Due to risk aversion, consumers place additional value on insurance plans that cover star hospitals in their network, to a much greater extent than their likelihood of using those star hospitals would suggest. That is, even those consumers who are not likely to use the star hospitals (e.g. due to geographical distance) would still place a large value on insurance plans that cover them, just in order to have a peace of mind in case of complex but very rare conditions that star hospitals have a clear advantage at treating.

If the above hypothesis is true, then consumer risk aversion provides a channel through which including a star hospital in network can give an insurer additional enrollees without proportionally giving the star hospital additional patients (due to the fact that those enrollees need the hospital mainly for peace of mind). Therefore, the only way for the star hospital to charge for this “peace of mind effect” would be to load the charge on the reimbursement rates for the patients that the hospital does get, thereby increasing the average reimbursement rate paid by the insurer to the hospital. Of course if this effect is there in the market and we use the demand model that does not capture it, the high reimbursement rates resulting from the peace of mind effect would have to be picked up by another parameter in the model, which in the case of my model is $\hat{\gamma}_{\text{Star}}$. 