We study dynamic selection of governments under different political institutions, with a special focus on institutional “flexibility.” A government consists of a subset of the individuals in the society. The competence level of the government in office determines collective utilities (e.g., by determining the amount and quality of public goods), and each individual derives additional utility from being part of the government (e.g., rents from holding office). We characterize the dynamic evolution of governments and determine the structure of stable governments, which arise and persist in equilibrium. In our model, perfect democracy, where current members of the government do not have veto power over changes in governments, always leads to the emergence of the most competent government. However, any deviation from perfect democracy, to any regime with incumbency veto power, destroys this result. There is always at least one other, less competent government that is also stable and can persist forever, and even the least competent government can persist forever in office. We also show that there is a nonmonotonic relationship between the degree of incumbency veto power and the quality of government. In contrast, in the presence of stochastic shocks or changes in the environment, a regime with less incumbency veto power has greater flexibility and greater probability that high-competence governments will come to power. This result suggests that a particular advantage of “democratic regimes” (with a limited number of veto players) may be their greater adaptability to changes rather than their performance under given conditions. Finally, we show that “royalty-like” dictatorships may be more successful than “junta-like” dictatorships because in these regimes veto players are less afraid of change.
The aim of every political Constitution, is or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust.

Equally important, but less often stressed, is the “flexibility” of institutions, meaning their ability to deal with shocks and changing situations. In this paper, we construct a dynamic model of government formation to highlight the potential sources of inefficiency in the selection of governments and to identify features of political processes that create “institutional flexibility.”

The “government” is made up of a subset of the citizens (e.g., each three-player group may be a government, etc.). Each (potential) government has a different level of competence, determining the collective utility it provides to citizens (e.g., the level of public goods). Each individual also receives rents from being part of the government (additional income, utility of office, or rents from corruption). New governments are put in place by a combination of “votes” from the citizens and “consent” from current government members. We parameterize different political regimes with the extent of necessary consent of current government members, which we refer to as incumbency veto power. A “perfect” democracy can be thought of as a situation in which there is no incumbency veto power and no such consent is necessary. Many political institutions, in contrast, provide additional decision making or blocking power to current government members. For instance, in many democracies, various sources of incumbency veto power

1. For instance, the skills necessary for successful wartime politicians and governments are very different from those that are useful for the successful management of the economy during peacetime, as illustrated perhaps most clearly by Winston Churchill’s political career.

2. Even though we model changes in the underlying environment and the competences of different governments as resulting from stochastic shocks, in practice these may also result from deterministic changes in the nature of the economy. For example, authoritarian regimes such as the rule of General Park in South Korea or Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore may be beneficial or less damaging during the early stages of development, whereas a different style of government, with greater participation, may be necessary as the economy develops and becomes more complex. Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006) suggest that “appropriate” institutions may be a function of the distance of an economy from the world technology frontier, and Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2009) provide empirical evidence consistent with this pattern.

3. The role of veto players in politics is studied in Tsebelis (2002); “individual veto players” in Tsebelis (2002) are similar to “members of royalty” discussed below. Instead, incumbency veto power in our model implies that some of the current members of the government need to consent to changes (and the identity of those providing their consent is not important).
make the government in power harder to oust than instituting it anew would have been had it been out of power (see, e.g., Cox and Katz [1996] for a discussion of such incumbency veto power in mature democracies). In nondemocratic societies, the potential veto power of current government members is more pronounced, so one might naturally think that consent from several members of the current government would be required before a change was implemented. In this light, we take incumbency veto power as an inverse measure of democracy, though it only captures one stylized dimension of how democratic a regime is.

The first contribution of our paper is to provide a general and tractable framework for the study of dynamic political selection issues and to provide a detailed characterization of the structure (and efficiency) of the selection of politicians under different political institutions (assuming sufficiently forward-looking players). Perfect democracy always ensures the emergence of the best (most competent) government. In contrast, under any other arrangement, incompetent and bad governments can emerge and persist despite the absence of information-related challenges to selecting good politicians. For example, even a small departure from perfect democracy, whereby only one member of the current government needs to consent to a new government, may make the worst possible government persist forever. The intuitive explanation for why even a small degree of incumbency veto power might lead to such outcomes is as follows: improvements away from a bad (or even the worst) government might lead to another potential government that is itself unstable and will open the way for a further round of changes. If this process ultimately leads to a government that does not have any common members with the initial government, then it may fail to get the support of any of the initial government members. In this case, the initial government survives even though it has a low, or even possibly the lowest, level of competence. This result provides a potential explanation for why many autocratic or semiautocratic regimes, including those currently in power in Iran, Russia, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe, resist the inclusion of “competent technocrats” in the government—because they are afraid that these technocrats can later become supporters of further reform, ultimately unseating even the most powerful current incumbents.4

4. For example, on Iranian politics and resistance to the inclusion of technocrats during Khomeini’s reign, see Menashri (2001), and more recently under
Another important implication of these dynamic interactions in political selection is that, beyond perfect democracy, there is no obvious ranking among different shades of imperfect democracy. Any of these different regimes may lead to better governments in the long run. This result is consistent with the empirical findings in the literature that show no clear-cut relationship between democracy and economic performance (e.g., Barro [1996]; Przeworski and Limongi [1997]; Minier [1998]). In fact, under all regimes except perfect democracy, the competence of the equilibrium government and the success of the society depend strongly on the identity of the initial members of the government, which is in line with the emphasis in the recent political science and economics literatures on the role that leaders may play under weak institutions (see, for example, Brooker [2000] or Jones and Olken [2005], who show that the death of an autocrat leads to a significant change in growth and this does not happen with democratic leaders).

Our second contribution relates to the study of institutional flexibility. For this purpose, we enrich the above-mentioned framework with shocks that change the competence of different types of governments (thus capturing potential changes in the needs of the society for different types of skills and expertise). Although a systematic analysis of this class of dynamic games is challenging, we provide a characterization of the structure of equilibria when stochastic shocks are sufficiently infrequent and players are sufficiently patient. Using this characterization, we show how the quality (competence level) of governments evolves in the presence of stochastic shocks and how this evolution is impacted by political institutions. Whereas without shocks a greater degree of democracy (fewer veto players) does not necessarily guarantee a better government, in the stochastic environment it leads to a greater institutional flexibility and to better outcomes in the long run (in particular, a higher probability that the best government will be in power). Intuitively, this is because a regime with fewer veto players enables greater adaptability to changes in the environment (which alter the relative ranking of governments in terms of quality). At a slightly more technical level, this result reflects


5. The stochastic analysis also shows that random shocks to the identity of the members of the government may sometimes lead to better governments in...
the fact that in a regime with limited incumbency veto power, there are “relatively few” other stable governments near a stable government, so a shock that destabilizes the current government likely leads to a big jump in competence.

Finally, we also show that in the presence of shocks, “royalty-like” nondemocratic regimes, where some individuals must always be in the government, may lead to better long-run outcomes than “junta-like” regimes, where a subset of the current members of the junta can block change (even though no specific member is essential). The royalty-like regimes might sometimes allow greater adaptation to change because one (or more) of the members of the initial government is secure in his or her position. In contrast, as discussed above, without such security the fear of further changes might block all competence-increasing reforms in government.6

We now illustrate some of the basic ideas with a simple example.

**Example 1.** Suppose that the society consists of $n \geq 6$ individuals, and that any $k = 3$ individuals could form a government. A change in government requires both the support of the majority of the population and the consent of $l = 1$ member of the government, so that there is a “minimal” degree of incumbency veto power. Suppose that individual $j$ has a level of competence $\gamma_j$ and order the individuals, without loss of any generality, in descending order according to their competence, so $\gamma_1 > \gamma_2 > \cdots > \gamma_n$. The competence of a government is the sum of the competences of its three members. Each individual obtains utility from the competence level of the government and also a large rent from being in office, so that each prefers to be in office regardless of the competence level of the government. Suppose also that individuals have a sufficiently high discount factor so that the future matters a lot relative to the present.

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6. This and several of the results for junta-like regimes discussed above contrast with the presumption in the existing literature that a greater number of veto players increases policy stability (e.g., Tsebelis [2002]). In particular, the presence of a veto player (or member of “royalty”) would increase stability when players were not forward-looking or discounted the future very heavily, but we show that it can reduce stability when they are forward-looking and patient.
It is straightforward to determine the stable governments that will persist and remain in power once formed. Evidently, \{1, 2, 3\} is a stable government, because it has the highest level of competence, so neither a majority of outsiders nor members of the government would like to initiate a change (some outsiders may want to initiate a change: for example, 4, 5, and 6 would prefer government \{4, 5, 6\}, but they do not have the power to enforce such a change). In contrast, governments of the form \{1, i, j\}, \{i, 2, j\}, and \{i, j, 3\} are unstable (for \(i, j > 3\)), which means that starting with these governments, there will necessarily be a change. In particular, in each of these cases, \{1, 2, 3\} will receive support both from one current member of government and from the rest of the population, who would be willing to see a more competent government.

Consider next the case where \(n = 6\) and suppose that the society starts with the government \{4, 5, 6\}. This is also a stable government, even though it is the lowest-competence government and thus the worst possible option for the society as a whole. This is because any change in government must result in a new government of one of the following three forms: \{1, i, j\}, \{i, 2, j\}, or \{i, j, 3\}. But we know that all of these types of governments are unstable. Therefore, any of the more competent governments will ultimately take the society to \{1, 2, 3\}, which does not include any of the members of the initial government. Because individuals are relatively patient, none of the initial members of the government would support (consent to) a change that will ultimately exclude them. As a consequence, the initial worst government persists forever. Returning to our discussion of the unwillingness of certain governments to include skilled technocrats, this example shows why such a technocrat, for example individual 1, will not be included in the government \{4, 5, 6\}, even though he would potentially increase the quality and competence of the government substantially.

One can further verify that \{4, 5, 6\} is also a stable government when \(l = 3\), because in this case any change requires the support of all three members of government and none of them would consent to a change that removed him or her from the government. In contrast, under \(l = 2\), \{4, 5, 6\} is not a stable government, and thus the quality of the government
is higher under intermediate incumbency veto power, \( l = 2 \), than under \( l = 1 \) or \( l = 3 \).

Now consider the same environment as above but with potential changes in the competences of the agents. For example, individual 4 may see an increase in competence, so that he or she becomes the third most competent agent (i.e., \( \gamma_4' \in (\gamma_3, \gamma_2) \)). Suppose that shocks are sufficiently infrequent so that the stability of governments in periods without shocks is given by the same reasoning as in the nonstochastic case. Consider the situation starting with the government \( \{4, 5, 6\} \) and suppose \( l = 1 \). Then this government remains in power until the shock occurs. Nevertheless, the equilibrium government will eventually converge to \( \{1, 2, 3\} \). At some point a shock will change the relative competences of agents 3 and 4, and the government \( \{4, 5, 6\} \) will become unstable; individual 4 will support the emergence of the government \( \{1, 2, 4\} \), which now has the highest competence. In contrast, when \( l = 3 \), the ruling government remains in power even after the shock. This simple example thus illustrates how, even though a regime with fewer veto players does not ensure better outcomes in nonstochastic environments, it may provide greater flexibility and hence better long-run outcomes in the presence of shocks.

Our paper is related to several different literatures. Although much of the literature on political economy focuses on the role of political institutions in providing (or failing to provide) the right incentives to politicians (see, among others, Niskanen [1971]; Barro [1973]; Ferejohn [1986]; Shleifer and Vishny [1993]; Besley and Case [1995]; Persson, Roland, and Tabellini [1997]; and Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier [2004]), there is also a small (but growing) literature investigating the selection of politicians, most notably Banks and Sundaram (1998), Besley (2005), and Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo (2005). The main challenge facing the society and the design of political institutions in these papers is that the ability and motivations of politicians are not observed by voters or outside parties. Although such information-related selection issues are undoubtedly important, our paper focuses on the difficulty of ensuring that the “right” government is selected even when information is perfect and common. Also differently from these literatures, we emphasize the importance of institutional flexibility in the face of shocks.
Osborne and Slivinski (1996), Besley and Coate (1997, 1998), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Caselli and Morelli (2004), Messner and Polborn (2004), Mattozzi and Merlo (2008), Padro-i-Miquel (2007), and Besley and Kudamatsu (2009) provide alternative and complementary “theories of bad governments/politicians.” For example, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) emphasize the composition of the “selectorate,” the group of players that can select governments, as an important factor leading to inefficient policies. In Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Padro-i-Miquel (2007), and Besley and Kudamatsu (2009), the fear of future instability also contributes to the emergence of inefficient policies. Caselli and Morelli (2004) suggest that voters might be unwilling to replace a corrupt incumbent by a challenger whom they expect to be equally corrupt. Mattozzi and Merlo (2008) argue that more competent politicians have higher opportunity costs of entering politics. However, these papers do not develop the potential persistence in bad governments resulting from the dynamics of government formation and do not focus on the importance of institutional flexibility. We are also not aware of other papers providing a comparison of different political regimes in terms of the selection of politicians under nonstochastic and stochastic conditions.

Also closely related are prior analyses of dynamic political equilibria in the context of club formation, as in Roberts (1999) and Barberà, Maschler, and Shalev (2001), as well as dynamic analyses of choice of constitutions and equilibrium political institutions as in Barberà and Jackson (2004), Messner and Polborn (2004), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006), and Lagunoff (2006). Our recent work, Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008), provides a general framework for the analysis of the dynamics of constitutions, coalitions, and clubs. The current paper is a continuation of this line of research. It differs from our previous work in a number of important dimensions. First, the focus here is on the substantive questions concerning the relationship between different

7. McKelvey and Reizman (1992) suggest that seniority rules in the Senate and the House create an endogenous advantage for the incumbent members, and current members of these bodies will have an incentive to introduce such seniority rules.

8. Our results are also related to recent work on the persistence of bad governments and inefficient institutions, including Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni (2010), and Egorov and Sonin (2010). Acemoglu (2008) also emphasizes the potential benefits of democracy in the long run but through a different channel—because the alternative, oligarchy, creates entry barriers and sclerosis.
political institutions and the selection of politicians and governments, which is new, relatively unexplored, and (in our view) important. Second, this paper extends our previous work by allowing stochastic shocks and enables us to investigate issues of institutional flexibility. Third, it involves a structure of preferences to which our previous results cannot be directly applied.  

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the model. Section III introduces the concept of (Markov) political equilibrium, which allows a general and tractable characterization of equilibria in this class of games. Section IV provides our main results on the comparison of different regimes in terms of selection of governments and politicians. Section V extends the analysis to allow stochastic changes in the competences of members of the society and presents a comparison of different regimes in the presence of stochastic shocks. Section VI concludes. The Appendix contains the proofs of some of our main results; analyzes an extensive-form game with explicitly specified proposal and voting procedures, and shows the equivalence between the Markov perfect equilibria (MPEs) of this game and the (simpler) notion of political equilibrium we use in the text; and provides additional examples illustrating some of the claims we make in the text. Online Appendix B contains the remaining proofs.

II. Model

We consider a dynamic game in discrete time indexed by $t = 0, 1, 2, \ldots$. The population is represented by the set $\mathcal{I}$ and consists of $n < \infty$ individuals. We refer to nonempty subsets of $\mathcal{I}$ as coalitions and denote the set of coalitions by $\mathcal{C}$. We also designate a subset of coalitions $\mathcal{G} \subset \mathcal{C}$ as the set of feasible governments. For example, the set of feasible governments could consist of all groups of individuals of size $k_0$ (for some integer $k_0$) or all groups of individuals of size greater than $k_1$ and less than some other integer $k_2$. To simplify the discussion, we define $\bar{k} = \max_{G \in \mathcal{G}} |G|$, so $\bar{k}$ is the upper bound for the size of any feasible government: that is, for any $G \in \mathcal{G}$, $|G| \leq \bar{k}$. It is natural to presume that $\bar{k} < n/2$.

In each period, the society is ruled by one of the feasible governments $G^t \in \mathcal{G}$. The initial government $G^0$ is given as part

9. In particular, the results in Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008) apply under a set of acyclicity conditions. Such acyclicity does not hold in the current paper (see Online Appendix B). This makes the general characterization of the structure of equilibria both more challenging and of some methodological interest.
of the description of the game and \( G^t \) for \( t > 0 \) is determined in equilibrium as a result of the political process described below. The government in power at any date affects three aspects of the society:

1. It influences collective utilities (for example, by providing public goods or influencing how competently the government functions).
2. It determines individual utilities (members of the government may receive additional utility because of rents of being in office or corruption).
3. It indirectly influences the future evolution of governments by shaping the distribution of political power in the society (for example, by creating incumbency advantage in democracies or providing greater decision-making power or veto rights to members of the government under alternative political institutions).

We now describe each of these in turn. The influence of the government on collective utilities is modeled via its \textit{competence}. In particular, at each date \( t \), there exists a function 

\[
\Gamma^t : \mathcal{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}
\]

designating the competence of each feasible government \( G \in \mathcal{G} \) (at that date). We refer to \( \Gamma^t_G \in \mathbb{R} \) as government \( G \)'s competence, with the convention that higher values correspond to greater competence. In Section IV, we will assume that each individual has a certain level of competence or ability, and the competence of a government is a function of the abilities of its members. For now, this additional assumption is not necessary. Note also that the function \( \Gamma^t \) depends on time. This generality is introduced to allow for changes in the environment (in particular, changes in the relative competences of different individuals and governments).

Individual utilities are determined by the competence of the government that is in power at that date and by whether the individual in question is part of the government. More specifically, each individual \( i \in \mathcal{I} \) at time \( \tau \) has discounted (expected) utility given by

\[
U^\tau_i = E \sum_{t=\tau}^{\infty} \beta^{(t-\tau)} u^t_i,
\]
where $\beta \in (0, 1)$ is the discount factor and $u_i^t$ is individual’s stage payoff, given by \[ u_i^t = w_i(G^t, \Gamma_{G^t}^t) = w_i(G^t), \] where in the second equality we suppress dependence on $\Gamma_{G^t}^t$ to simplify notation; we will do this throughout unless special emphasis is necessary. Throughout, we impose the following assumptions on $w_i$.

**Assumption 1.** The function $w_i$ satisfies the following properties:

1. For each $i \in I$ and any $G, H \in G$ such that $\Gamma_{G}^t > \Gamma_{H}^t$: if $i \in G$ or $i \notin H$, then $w_i(G) > w_i(H)$.
2. For any $G, H \in G$ and any $i \in G \setminus H$, $w_i(G) > w_i(H)$.

Part 1 of this assumption is a relatively mild restriction on payoffs. It implies that all else equal, more competent governments give higher stage payoffs. In particular, if an individual belongs to both governments $G$ and $H$, and $G$ is more competent than $H$, then he or she prefers $G$. The same conclusion also holds when the individual is not a member of either of these two governments or is only a member of $G$ (and not of $H$). Therefore, this part of the assumption implies that the only situation in which an individual may prefer a less competent government to a more competent one is when he or she is a member of the former but not of the latter. This simply captures the presence of rents from holding office or additional income from being in government due to higher salaries or corruption. The interesting interactions in our setup result from the “conflict of interest”: individuals prefer to be in the government even when this does not benefit the rest of the society. Part 2 of the assumption strengthens the first part and imposes the condition that this conflict of interest is always present; that is, individuals receive higher payoffs from governments that include them than from those that exclude them (regardless of the competence levels of the two governments). We impose both parts of this assumption throughout. It is important to note that Assumption 1 implies that all voters who are not part of the government care about a one-dimensional government competence; this feature simplifies the analysis considerably. Nevertheless, the tractability of our framework makes it possible to enrich this environment by allowing other sources of disagreement or conflict of interest among voters, and we return to this issue in the Conclusions.
Example 2. As an example, suppose that the competence of government \( G \), \( \Gamma_G \), is the amount of public good produced in the economy under feasible government \( G \), and

\[
w_i(G) = v_i(\Gamma_G) + b_i \mathbf{1}_{\{i \in G\}},
\]

where \( v_i : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R} \) is a strictly increasing function (for each \( i \in \mathcal{I} \)) corresponding to the utility from public good for individual \( i \), \( b_i \) is a measure of the rents that individual \( i \) obtains from being in office, and \( \mathbf{1}_X \) is the indicator of event \( X \). If \( b_i \geq 0 \) for each \( i \in \mathcal{I} \), then (3) satisfies part 1 of Assumption 1. In addition, if \( b_i \) is sufficiently large for each \( i \), then each individual prefers to be a member of the government, even if this government has a very low level of competence; thus part 2 of Assumption 1 is also satisfied.

Finally, the government in power influences the determination of future governments whenever consent of some current government members is necessary for change. We represent the set of individuals (regular citizens and government members) who can, collectively, induce a change in government by specifying the set of \textit{winning coalitions}, \( \mathcal{W}_G \), which is a function of current government \( G \) (for each \( G \in \mathcal{G} \)). This is an economical way of summarizing the relevant information, because the set of winning coalitions is precisely the set of subsets of the society that are able to force (or to block) a change in government. We impose only a minimal amount of structure on the set of winning coalitions.

\textbf{Assumption 2.} For any feasible government \( G \in \mathcal{G} \), \( \mathcal{W}_G \) is given by

\[
\mathcal{W}_G = \{ X \in \mathcal{C} : |X| \geq m_G \text{ and } |X \cap G| \geq l_G \},
\]

where \( l_G \) and \( m_G \) are integers satisfying \( 0 \leq l_G \leq |G| \leq k < m_G \leq n - k \) (recall that \( k \) is the maximal size of the government and \( n \) is the size of the society).

The restrictions imposed in Assumption 2 are intuitive. In particular, they state that a new government can be instituted if it receives a sufficient number of votes from the entire society (\( m_G \) total votes) \textit{and} if it receives support from some subset of the members of the current government (\( l_G \) of the current government members need to support such a change). This definition allows \( l_G \) to be any number between 0 and \( |G| \). One special feature of Assumption 2 is that it does not relate the number of veto players in the current government, \( l_G \), to the total number of individuals in
the society who wish to change the government, \( m_G \). This aspect of Assumption 2 can be relaxed without affecting our general characterization; we return to a discussion of this issue in the Conclusions.

Given this notation, the case where there is no incumbency veto power, \( l_G = 0 \), can be thought of as perfect democracy, where current members of the government have no special power. The case where \( l_G = |G| \) can be thought of as extreme dictatorship, where unanimity among government members is necessary for any change. Between these extremes are imperfect democracies (or less strict forms of dictatorships), which may arise either because there is some form of (strong or weak) incumbency veto power in democracy or because current government (junta) members are able to block the introduction of a new government. In what follows, one might wish to interpret \( l_G \) as an inverse measure of the degree of democracy, though naturally this only captures one dimension of democratic regimes in practice.

Note also that Assumption 2 imposes some mild assumptions on \( m_G \). In particular, less than \( \bar{k} \) individuals are insufficient for a change to take place. This ensures that a rival government cannot take power without any support from other individuals (recall that \( \bar{k} \) denotes the maximum size of the government, so the rival government must have no more than \( \bar{k} \) members), and \( m_G \leq n - \bar{k} \) individuals are sufficient to implement a change provided that \( l_G \) members of the current government are among them. For example, these requirements are naturally met when \( \bar{k} < n/2 \) and \( m_G = \lfloor (n+1)/2 \rfloor \) (i.e., majority rule).10

In addition to Assumptions 1 and 2, we also impose the following genericity assumption, which ensures that different governments have different competences. This assumption simplifies the notation and can be made without much loss of generality, because if it were not satisfied for a society, any small perturbation of competence levels would restore it.

**Assumption 3.** For any \( t \geq 0 \) and any \( G, H \in \mathcal{G} \) such that \( G \neq H \),
\[
\Gamma^t_G \neq \Gamma^t_H.
\]

**III. Political Equilibria in Nonstochastic Environments**

In this section, we focus on nonstochastic environments, where \( \Gamma^t = \Gamma \) (or \( \Gamma^t_G = \Gamma_G \) for all \( G \in \mathcal{G} \)). For these environments,

10. Recall also that \( \lfloor x \rfloor \) denotes the integer part of a real number \( x \).
we introduce our equilibrium concept, (Markov) political equilibrium, and show that equilibria have a simple recursive characterization.\textsuperscript{11} We return to the more general stochastic environments in Section V.

\textbf{III.A. Political Equilibrium}

Our equilibrium concept, (Markov) political equilibrium, imposes that only transitions from the current government to a new government that increase the discounted utility of the members of a winning coalition will take place; and if no such transition exists, the current government will be stable (i.e., it will persist in equilibrium). The qualifier “Markov” is added because this definition implicitly imposes that transitions from the current to a new government depend on the current government—not on the entire history.

To introduce this equilibrium concept more formally, let us first define the transition rule \( \phi : \mathcal{G} \to \mathcal{G} \), which maps each feasible government \( G \) in power at time \( t \) to the government that would emerge in period \( t + 1 \).\textsuperscript{12} Given \( \phi \), we can write the discounted utility implied by \( (1) \) for each individual \( i \in I \) starting from the current government \( G \in \mathcal{G} \) recursively as \( V_i(G | \phi) \), given by

\begin{equation}
V_i(G | \phi) = w_i(G) + \beta V_i(\phi(G) | \phi) \quad \text{for all } G \in \mathcal{G}.
\end{equation}

Intuitively, starting from \( G \in \mathcal{G} \), individual \( i \in I \) receives a current payoff of \( w_i(G) \). Then \( \phi \) (uniquely) determines the next period’s government \( \phi(G) \), and thus the continuation value of this individual, discounted to the current period, is \( \beta V_i(\phi(G) | \phi) \).

A government \( G \) is stable given mapping \( \phi \) if \( \phi(G) = G \). In addition, we say that \( \phi \) is acyclic if for any (possibly infinite) chain \( H_1, H_2, \ldots \subset \mathcal{G} \) such that \( H_{k+1} = \phi(H_k) \), and any \( a < b < c \), if \( H_a = H_c \) then \( H_a = H_b = H_c \).

Given (4), the next definition introduces the notion of a political equilibrium, which will be represented by the mapping \( \phi \) provided that two conditions are met.

\textsuperscript{11} Throughout, we refer to this equilibrium concept as “political equilibrium” or simply as “equilibrium.” We do not use the acronym MPE, which will be used for the Markov perfect equilibrium of a noncooperative game in the Appendix.

\textsuperscript{12} In principle, \( \phi \) could be set-valued, mapping from \( \mathcal{G} \) into \( \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{G}) \) (the power set of \( \mathcal{G} \)), but our analysis below shows that, thanks to Assumption 3, its image is always a singleton (i.e., it is a “function” rather than a “correspondence,” and also by implication, it is uniquely defined). We impose this assumption to simplify the notation.
Definition 1. A mapping $\phi : G \to G$ is a (Markov) political equilibrium if for any $G \in \mathcal{G}$, the following two conditions are satisfied:

i. either the set of players who prefer $\phi(G)$ to $G$ (in terms of discounted utility) form a winning coalition, that is, $S = \{i \in I : V_i(\phi(G) | \phi) > V_i(G | \phi)\} \in \mathcal{W}_G$ (or equivalently $|S| \geq m_G$ and $|S \cap G| \geq l_G$); or else, $\phi(G) = G$;

ii. there is no alternative government $H \in \mathcal{G}$ that is preferred both to a transition to $\phi(G)$ and to staying in $G$ permanently, that is, there is no $H$ such that

$$S'_H = \{i \in I : V_i(H | \phi) > V_i(\phi(G) | \phi)\} \in \mathcal{W}_G$$
and

$$S''_H = \{i \in I : V_i(H | \phi) > w_i(G)/(1 - \beta)\} \in \mathcal{W}_G$$

(alternatively, for any alternative $H$, either $|S'_H| < m_G$, or $|S'_H \cap G| < l_G$, or $|S''_H| < m_G$, or $|S''_H \cap G| < l_G$).

This definition states that a mapping $\phi$ is a political equilibrium if it maps the current government $G$ to alternative $\phi(G)$, which (unless it coincides with $G$) must be preferred to $G$ (taking continuation values into account) by a sufficient majority of the population and a sufficient number of current government members (in order not to be blocked). Note that in part (i), the set $S$ can be equivalently written as $S = \{i \in I : V_i(\phi(G) | \phi) > w_i(G)/(1 - \beta)\}$, because if this set is not a winning coalition, then $\phi(G) = G$ and thus $V_i(G | \phi) = w_i(G)/(1 - \beta)$. Part (ii) of the definition requires that there does not exist another alternative $H$ that would have been a “more preferable” transition; that is, there should be no $H$ that is preferred both to a transition to $\phi(G)$ and to staying in $G$ forever by a sufficient majority of the population and a sufficient number of current government members. The latter condition is imposed, because if there exists a winning coalition that prefers $H$ to a transition to $\phi(G)$ but there is no winning coalition that prefers $H$ to staying in $G$ forever, then at each stage a move to $H$ can be blocked.

We use the definition of political equilibrium in Definition 1 in this and the next section. The advantage of this definition is its simplicity. A disadvantage is that it does not explicitly specify how offers for different types of transitions are made and the exact sequences of events at each stage. In the Appendix, we describe an infinite-horizon extensive-form game, where there is an explicit sequence in which proposals are made, votes are cast,
and transitions take place. We then characterize the MPEs of this dynamic game and show that they are equivalent to political equilibria as defined in Definition 1. Briefly, in this extensive-form game, any given government can be in either a sheltered or an unstable state. Sheltered governments cannot be challenged but become unstable with some probability. When the incumbent government is unstable, all individuals (according to a prespecified order) propose possible alternative governments. Primaries across these governments determine a challenger government, and then a vote between this challenger and the incumbent governments determines whether there is a transition to a new government (depending on whether those in support of the challenger form a winning coalition according to Assumption 2). New governments start out as unstable, and with some probability become sheltered. All votes are sequential. We prove that for a sufficiently high discount factor, the MPE of this game does not depend on the sequence in which proposals are made, the protocols for primaries, or the sequence in which votes are cast, and coincides with political equilibria described by Definition 1. This result justifies our focus on the much simpler notion of political equilibrium in the text. The fact that new governments start out as unstable provides a justification for part (ii) of Definition 1 that there should not exist another alternative $H$ that is “more preferable” than $\phi(G)$ and than staying in $G$ forever; otherwise there would be an immediate transition to $H$.

III.B. General Characterization

We now prove the existence and provide a characterization of political equilibria. We start with a recursive characterization of the mapping $\phi$ described in Definition 1. Let us enumerate the elements of the set $G$ as $\{G_1, G_2, \ldots, G_{|G|}\}$ such that $\Gamma_{G_x} > \Gamma_{G_y}$ whenever $x < y$. With this enumeration, $G_1$ is the most competent (“best”) government, whereas $G_{|G|}$ is the least competent government. In view of Assumption 3, this enumeration is well defined and unique.

Now, suppose that for some $q > 1$, we have defined $\phi$ for all $G_j$ with $j < q$. Define the set

$$\mathcal{M}_q \equiv \{j : 1 \leq j < q, \{i \in I : w_i(G_j) > w_i(G_q)\} \in \mathcal{W}_{G_q},$$

and $\phi(G_j) = G_j\}.$

Note that this set depends simply on stage payoffs in (2), not on the discounted utilities defined in (4), which are “endogenous” objects.
This set can thus be computed easily from the primitives of the model (for each \( q \)). Given this set, let the mapping \( \phi \) be

\[
\phi(G_q) = \begin{cases} 
G_q & \text{if } M_q = \emptyset; \\
G_{\min\{j \in M_q\}} & \text{if } M_q \neq \emptyset.
\end{cases}
\]

Because the set \( M_q \) is well defined, the mapping \( \phi \) is also well defined, and by construction it is single-valued. Theorems 1 and 2 next show that, for sufficiently high discount factors, this mapping constitutes the unique acyclic political equilibrium and that, under additional mild conditions, it is also the unique political equilibrium (even considering possible cyclic equilibria).

**Theorem 1.** Suppose that Assumptions 1–3 hold and let \( \phi : \mathcal{G} \to \mathcal{G} \) be as defined in (6). Then there exists \( \beta_0 < 1 \) such that for any discount factor \( \beta > \beta_0 \), \( \phi \) is the unique acyclic political equilibrium.

**Proof:** See the Appendix. \( \blacksquare \)

Let us now illustrate the intuition for why the mapping \( \phi \) constitutes a political equilibrium. Recall that \( G_1 \) is the most competent (“best”) government. It is clear that we must have \( \phi(G_1) = G_1 \), because all members of the population that are not in \( G_1 \) will prefer it to any other \( G' \in \mathcal{G} \) (from Assumption 1). Assumption 2 then ensures that there will not be a winning coalition in favor of a permanent move to \( G' \). However, \( G' \) itself may not persist, and it may eventually lead to some alternative government \( G'' \in \mathcal{G} \). But in this case, we can apply this reasoning to \( G'' \) instead of \( G' \), and thus the conclusion \( \phi(G_1) = G_1 \) applies. Next suppose we start with government \( G_2 \) in power. The same argument applies if \( G' \) is any one of \( G_3, G_4, \ldots, G_{|\mathcal{G}|} \). One of these may eventually lead to \( G_1 \); thus for sufficiently high discount factors, a sufficient majority of the population may support a transition to such a \( G' \) in order eventually to reach \( G_1 \). However, discounting also implies that in this case, a sufficient majority would also prefer a direct transition to \( G_1 \) to this dynamic path (recall part (ii) of Definition 1). So the relevant choice for the society is between \( G_1 \) and \( G_2 \). In this comparison, \( G_1 \) will be preferred if it has sufficiently many supporters, that is, if the set of individuals preferring \( G_1 \) to \( G_2 \) is a winning coalition within \( G_2 \), or more formally if

\[
\{i \in \mathcal{I} : w_i(G_1) > w_i(G_2)\} \in \mathcal{W}_{G_2}.
\]
If this is the case, \( \phi(G_2) = G_1 \); otherwise, \( \phi(G_2) = G_2 \). This is exactly what the function \( \phi \) defined in (6) stipulates. Now let us start from government \( G_3 \). We then only need to consider the choice between \( G_1 \), \( G_2 \), and \( G_3 \). To move to \( G_1 \), it suffices that a winning coalition within \( G_3 \) prefers \( G_1 \) to \( G_3 \). However, whether the society will transition to \( G_2 \) depends on the stability of \( G_2 \). In particular, we may have a situation in which \( G_2 \) is not a stable government, which, by necessity, implies that \( \phi(G_2) = G_1 \). Then a transition to \( G_2 \) will lead to a permanent transition to \( G_1 \) in the next period. However, this sequence may be undesirable for some of those who prefer to move to \( G_2 \). In particular, there may exist a winning coalition in \( G_3 \) that prefers to stay in \( G_3 \) rather than to transit permanently to \( G_1 \) (and as a consequence, there is no winning coalition that prefers such a transition), even though there also exists a winning coalition in \( G_3 \) that would have preferred a permanent move to \( G_2 \). Writing this more explicitly, we may have

\[
\{ i \in I : w_i(G_2) > w_i(G_3) \} \in \mathcal{W}_{G_3},
\]

but

\[
\{ i \in I : w_i(G_1) > w_i(G_3) \} \notin \mathcal{W}_{G_3}.
\]

If so, the transition from \( G_3 \) to \( G_2 \) may be blocked with the anticipation that it will lead to \( G_1 \), which does not receive the support of a winning coalition within \( G_3 \). This reasoning illustrates that for a transition to take place, not only should the target government be preferred to the current one by a winning coalition (starting from the current government), but also that the target government should be "stable," that is, \( \phi(G') = G' \). This is exactly the requirement in (6). In this light, the intuition for the mapping \( \phi \) and thus for Theorem 1 is that a government \( G \) will persist in equilibrium (will be stable) if there does not exist another stable government receiving support from a winning coalition (a sufficient majority of the population and the required number of current members of government).

Theorem 1 states that \( \phi \) in (6) is the unique acyclic political equilibrium. However, it does not rule out cyclic equilibria. We provide an example of a cyclic equilibrium in Example 11 in the

13. If some winning coalition also prefers \( G_2 \) to \( G_3 \), then \( G_1 \) should still be chosen over \( G_2 \), because only members of \( G_2 \) who do not belong to \( G_1 \) prefer \( G_2 \) to \( G_1 \), and Assumption 2 ensures that those preferring \( G_1 \) over \( G_2 \) (starting in \( G_3 \)) also form a winning coalition. Then a transition to \( G_2 \) is ruled out by part (ii) of Definition 1.
Appendix. Cyclic equilibria are unintuitive and “fragile.” We next show that they can also be ruled out under a variety of relatively weak assumptions. The next theorem thus strengthens Theorem 1 so that $\phi$ in (6) is the unique equilibrium (among both cyclic and acyclic ones).

**Theorem 2.** The mapping $\phi$ defined in (6) is the unique political equilibrium (and hence in the light of Theorem 1, any political equilibrium is acyclic) if any of the following conditions holds:

1. For any $G \in \mathcal{G}$, $|G| = k, l_G = l$ and $m_G = m$ for some $k, l$ and $m$.
2. For any $G \in \mathcal{G}$, $l_G \geq 1$.
3. For any collection of different feasible governments $H_1, \ldots, H_q \in \mathcal{G}$ (for $q \geq 2$) and for all $i \in I$, we have $w_i(H_1) \neq \left(\sum_{p=1}^q w_i(H_p)\right)/q$.
4. $\theta > \varepsilon \cdot |\mathcal{G}|$, where $\theta \equiv \min_{i \in I \text{ and } G, H \in \mathcal{G} \setminus H_1} \{w_i(G) - w_i(H)\}$ and $\varepsilon \equiv \max_{i \in I \text{ and } G, H \in \mathcal{G} \setminus H_1} \{w_i(G) - w_i(H)\}$.

**Proof.** See Online Appendix B.

This theorem states four relatively mild conditions under which there are no cyclic equilibria (thus making $\phi$ in (6) the unique equilibrium). First, if all feasible governments have the same size, $k$, the same degree of incumbency veto power, $l$, and the same threshold for the required number of total votes for change, $m$, then all equilibria must be acyclic and thus $\phi$ in (6) is the unique political equilibrium. Second, the same conclusion applies if we always need the consent of at least one member of the current government for a transition to a new government. These two results imply that cyclic equilibria are only possible if starting from some governments, there is no incumbency veto power and either the degree of incumbency veto power or the vote threshold differs across governments. The third part of the theorem shows that there are also no acyclic political equilibria under a mild restriction on payoffs (which is a slight strengthening of Assumption 3 and holds generically, meaning that if it did not hold, a small perturbation of payoff functions would restore it). Finally, the fourth part of the theorem provides a condition on preferences that also rules out cyclic equilibria. In particular, this condition states that if each individual receives sufficiently high

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14. This requirement is exactly the same as Assumption 3′, which we impose in the Appendix in the analysis of the extensive form game.
utility from being in government (greater than $\theta$) and does not care much about the composition of the rest of the government (the difference in his or her utility between any two governments including him or her is always less than $\varepsilon$), then all equilibria must be acyclic. In the Appendix, we show (Example 11) how a cyclic political equilibrium is possible if none of the four sufficient conditions in Theorem 2 holds.

IV. CHARACTERIZATION OF NONSTOCHASTIC TRANSITIONS

IV.A. Main Results

We now compare different political regimes in terms of their ability to select governments with high levels of competence. To simplify the exposition and focus on the more important interactions, we assume that all feasible governments have the same size, $k \in \mathbb{N}$, where $k < n/2$. More formally, let us define

$$C^k = \{Y \in C : |Y| = k\}.$$  

Then $G = C^k$. In addition, we assume that for any $G \in G$, $l_G = l \in \mathbb{N}$ and $m_G = m \in \mathbb{N}$, so that the set of winning coalitions can be simply expressed as

$$W_G = \{X \in C : |X| \geq m \text{ and } |X \cap G| \geq l\},$$

where $0 \leq l \leq k < m \leq n - k$. If $l = 0$, then all individuals have equal weight and there is no incumbency veto power; thus we have a perfect democracy. In contrast, if $l > 0$, the consent of some of the members of the government is necessary for a change; thus there is some incumbency veto power. We have thus strengthened Assumption 2 to the following.

ASSUMPTION 2’. We have that $G = C^k$, and that there exist integers $l$ and $m$ such that the set of winning coalitions is given by (7).

In view of part 1 of Theorem 2, Assumption 2’ ensures that the acyclic political equilibrium $\phi$ given by (6) is the unique equilibrium; naturally, we will focus on this equilibrium throughout the rest of the analysis. In addition, given this additional structure, the mapping $\phi$ can be written in a simpler form. Recall that governments are still ranked according to their level of competence, so that $G_1$ denotes the most competent government. Then
we have

\[ M_q = \{ j : 1 \leq j < q, |G_j \cap G_q| \geq l \}, \quad \text{and} \quad \phi(G_j) = G_j, \]

and, as before,

\[ \phi(G_q) = \begin{cases} G_q & \text{if } M_q = \emptyset; \\ G_{\min\{j \in M_q\}} & \text{if } M_q \neq \emptyset. \end{cases} \]

Naturally, the mapping \( \phi \) is again well defined and unique. Finally, let us also define

\[ D = \{ G \in \mathcal{G} : \phi(G) = G \} \]

as the set of stable governments (the fixed points of the mapping \( \phi \)). If \( G \in D \), then \( \phi(G) = G \), and this government will persist forever if it is the initial government of the society.

We now investigate the structure of stable governments and how it changes as a function of the underlying political institutions—in particular, the extent of incumbency veto power, \( l \). Throughout this section, we assume that Assumptions 1, 2', and 3 hold, and we do not add these qualifiers to any of the propositions to economize on space.

Our first proposition provides an important technical result (part 1). It then uses this result to show that perfect democracy \((l = 0)\) ensures the emergence of the best (most competent) government, but any departure from perfect democracy destroys this result and enables the emergence of highly incompetent/inefficient governments. It also shows that extreme dictatorship \((l = k)\) makes all initial governments stable, regardless of how low their competence may be.

**Proposition 1.** The set of stable feasible governments \( D \) satisfies the following properties.

1. If \( G, H \in D \) and \( |G \cap H| \geq l \), then \( G = H \). In other words, any two distinct stable governments may have at most \( l - 1 \) common members.
2. Suppose that \( l = 0 \). Then \( D = \{ G_1 \} \). In other words, starting from any initial government, the society will transit to the most competent government.
3. Suppose \( l \geq 1 \). Then there are at least two stable governments; that is, \( |D| \geq 2 \). Moreover, the least competent governments may be stable.
4. Suppose \( l = k \). Then \( D = G \), so every feasible government is stable.

**Proof.** See Online Appendix B. ■

Proposition 1 shows the fundamental contrast between perfect democracy, where incumbents have no veto power, and other political institutions, which provide some additional power to “insiders” (current members of the government). Perfect democracy leads to the formation of the best government. With any deviation from perfect democracy, there will necessarily exist at least one other stable government (by definition less competent than the best), and even the worst government might be stable. The next example supplements Example 1 from the Introduction by showing a richer environment in which the least competent government is stable.

**Example 3.** Suppose \( n = 9 \), \( k = 3 \), \( l = 1 \), and \( m = 5 \), so that a change in government requires support from a simple majority of the society, including at least one member of the current government. Suppose that \( I = \{1, 2, \ldots, 9\} \), and that stage payoffs are given by (3) in Example 2. Assume also that 
\[
\Gamma_{\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}} = 1000 - 100i_1 - 10i_2 - i_3 \quad (\text{for } i_1 < i_2 < i_3). 
\]
This implies that \( \{1, 2, 3\} \) is the most competent government, and is therefore stable. Any other government that includes 1 or 2 or 3 is unstable. For example, the government \( \{2, 5, 9\} \) will transit to \( \{1, 2, 3\} \), as all individuals except 5 and 9 prefer the latter. However, government \( \{4, 5, 6\} \) is stable: any government that is more competent must include 1 or 2 or 3, and therefore either is \( \{1, 2, 3\} \) or will immediately transit to \( \{1, 2, 3\} \), which means that any such transition will not receive support from any of the members of \( \{4, 5, 6\} \). Now, proceeding inductively, we find that any government other than \( \{1, 2, 3\} \) and \( \{4, 5, 6\} \) that contains at least one individual 1, 2, \ldots, 6 is unstable. Consequently, government \( \{7, 8, 9\} \), which is the least competent government, is stable.

Proposition 1 establishes that under any regime other than perfect democracy, there will necessarily exist stable inefficient/incompetent governments and these may in fact have quite low levels of competence. It does not, however, provide a characterization of when highly incompetent governments will be stable.

We next provide a systematic answer to this question, focusing on societies with large numbers of individuals (i.e., \( n \) large).
Before doing so, we introduce an assumption that will be used in the third part of the next proposition and in later results. In particular, in what follows we will sometimes suppose that each individual \( i \in \mathcal{I} \) has a level of ability (or competence) given by \( \gamma_i \in \mathbb{R}_+ \) and that the competence of the government is a strictly increasing function of the abilities of its members. This is more formally stated in the next assumption.

**Assumption 4.** Suppose \( G \in \mathcal{G} \), and individuals \( i, j \in \mathcal{I} \) are such that \( i \in G \), \( j \notin G \), and \( \gamma_i \geq \gamma_j \). Then \( \Gamma_G \geq \Gamma_{(G \setminus \{i\}) \cup \{j\}} \).

The canonical form of the competence function consistent with Assumption 4 is

\[
\Gamma_G = \sum_{i \in G} \gamma_i,
\]

though for most of our analysis, we do not need to impose this specific functional form.

Assumption 4 is useful because it enables us to rank individuals in terms of their “abilities.” This ranking is strict, because Assumptions 3 and 4 together imply that \( \gamma_i \neq \gamma_j \) whenever \( i \neq j \). When we impose Assumption 4, we also enumerate individuals according to their abilities, so that \( \gamma_i > \gamma_j \) whenever \( i < j \).

The next proposition shows that for societies above a certain threshold of size (as a function of \( k \) and \( l \)), there always exist stable governments that contain no member of the ideal government and no member of any group of certain prespecified sizes (thus, no member of a group that would generate a range of potentially high-competence governments). Then, under Assumption 4, it extends this result, providing a bound on the percentile of the ability distribution such that there exist stable governments that do not include any individuals with competences above this percentile.

**Proposition 2.** Suppose \( l \geq 1 \) (and, as before, that Assumptions 1, 2', and 3 hold).

1. If

\[
n \geq 2k + k(k - l) \frac{(k - 1)!}{(l - 1)! (k - l)!},
\]

then there exists a stable government \( G \in \mathcal{D} \) that contains no members of the ideal government \( G_1 \).
2. Take any \( x \in \mathbb{N} \). If

\[
(12) \quad n \geq k + x + x(k - l) \frac{(k - 1)!}{(l - 1)!(k - l)!},
\]

then for any set of individuals \( X \) with \( |X| \leq x \), there exists a stable government \( G \in \mathcal{D} \) such that \( X \cap G = \emptyset \) (so no member of set \( X \) belongs to \( G \)).

3. Suppose in addition that Assumption 4 holds and let

\[
(13) \quad \rho = \frac{1}{1 + (k - l) \frac{(k - 1)!}{(l - 1)!(k - l)!}}.
\]

Then there exists a stable government \( G \in \mathcal{D} \) that does not include any of the \( \lfloor \rho n \rfloor \) highest-ability individuals.

Proof. See Online Appendix B.

Let us provide the intuition for part 1 of Proposition 2 when \( l = 1 \). Recall that \( G_1 \) is the most competent government. Let \( G \) be the most competent government among those that do not include members of \( G_1 \) (such a \( G \) exists, because \( n > 2k \) by assumption). In this case, Proposition 2 implies that \( G \) is stable; that is, \( G \in \mathcal{D} \). The reason is that if \( \phi(G) = H \neq G \), then \( \Gamma_H > \Gamma_G \), and therefore \( H \cap G_1 \) contains at least one element by construction of \( G \). But then \( \phi(H) = G_1 \), as implied by (9). Intuitively, if \( l = 1 \), then once the current government contains a member of the most competent government \( G_1 \), this member will consent to (support) a transition to \( G_1 \), which will also receive the support of the population at large. He or she can do so, because \( G_1 \) is stable, and thus there are no threats that further rounds of transitions will harm him or her. But then, as in Example 1 in the Introduction, \( G \) itself becomes stable, because any reform away from \( G \) will take us to an unstable government. Part 2 of the proposition has a similar intuition, but it states the stronger result that one can choose any subset of the society with size not exceeding the threshold defined in (12) such that there exist stable governments that do not include any member of this subset (which may be taken to include several of the most competent governments). Finally, part 3, which follows immediately from part 2 under Assumption 4, further strengthens both parts 1 and 2 of this proposition and also parts 3 and

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15. Note that the upper bound on \( X \) in part 2 of Proposition 2 is \( O(x) \), meaning that increasing \( x \) does not require an exponential increase in the size of population \( n \) for Proposition 2 to hold.
4 of Proposition 1: it shows that there exist stable governments that do not include a certain fraction of the highest-ability individuals. Interestingly, this fraction, given in (13), is nonmonotonic in \( l \), reaching its maximum at \( l = k/2 \), that is, for an intermediate level of incumbency veto power. This partly anticipates the results pertaining to the relative success of different regimes in selecting more competent governments, which we discuss in the next proposition.

Before providing a more systematic analysis of the relationship between political regimes and the quality of governments, we first extend Example 1 from the Introduction to show that, starting with the same government, the long-run equilibrium government may be worse when there is less incumbency veto power (as long as we are not in a perfect democracy).

**Example 4.** Take the setup from Example 3 \((n = 9, k = 3, l = 1,\) and \( m = 5)\), and suppose that the initial government is \(\{4, 5, 6\}\). As we showed there, government \(\{4, 5, 6\}\) is stable and will therefore persist. Suppose, however, that \( l = 2 \) instead. In that case, \(\{4, 5, 6\}\) is unstable and \( \phi(\{4, 5, 6\}) = \{1, 4, 5\} \); thus there will be a transition to \(\{1, 4, 5\}\). Because \(\{1, 4, 5\}\) is more competent than \(\{4, 5, 6\}\), this is an example where the long-run equilibrium government is worse under \( l = 1 \) than under \( l = 2 \). Note that if \( l = 3 \), \(\{4, 5, 6\}\) would be stable again.

When either \( k = 1 \) or \( k = 2 \), the structure of stable governments is relatively straightforward. (Note that in this proposition, and in the examples that follow, \( a, b \) or \( c \) denote the indices of individuals, with our ranking in which lower-ranked individuals have higher ability; thus \( \gamma_a > \gamma_b \) whenever \( a < b \).)

**Proposition 3.** Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2', 3, and 4 hold.

1. Suppose that \( k = 1 \). If \( l = 0 \), then \( \phi(G) = \{G_1\} = \{1\} \) for any \( G \in \mathcal{G} \). If \( l = k = 1 \), then \( \phi(G) = G \) for any \( G \in \mathcal{G} \).
2. Suppose that \( k = 2 \). If \( l = 0 \), then \( \phi(G) = G_1 = \{1, 2\} \) for any \( G \in \mathcal{G} \). If \( l = 1 \), then if \( G = \{a, b\} \) with \( a < b \), we have \( \phi(G) = \{a - 1, a\} \) when \( a \) is even and \( \phi(G) = \{a, a + 1\} \) when \( a \) is odd; in particular, \( \phi(G) = \{a, a + 1\} \) when \( a \) is odd and \( b = a + 1 \). If \( l = 2 \), then \( \phi(G) = G \) for any \( G \in \mathcal{G} \).

**Proof.** See Online Appendix B.
Proposition 3, though simple, provides an important insight into the structure of stable governments that will be further exploited in the next section. When \( k = 2 \) and \( l = 1 \), the competence of the stable government is determined by the more able of the two members of the initial government. This means that, with rare exceptions, the quality of the initial government will improve to some degree; that is, typically \( \Gamma_{\phi(G)} > \Gamma_G \). However, this increase is generally limited; when \( G = \{a, b\} \) with \( a < b \), \( \phi(G) = \{a - 1, a\} \) or \( \phi(G) = \{a, a + 1\} \), so that at best the next-higher-ability individual is added to the initial government instead of the lower-ability member. Therefore, summarizing these three cases, we can say that with a perfect democracy, the best government will arise; with an extreme dictatorship, there will be no improvement in the initial government; and in between this, there will be some limited improvements in the quality of the government.

When \( k \geq 3 \), the structure of stable governments is more complex, though we can still develop a number of results about and insights into the structure of such governments. Naturally, the extremes with \( l = 0 \) and \( 3 \) are again straightforward. If \( l = 1 \) and the initial government is \( G = \{a, b, c\} \), where \( a < b < c \), then we can show that members ranked above \( a - 2 \) will never become members of the stable government \( \phi(G) \), and the most competent member of \( G \), \( a \), is always a member of the stable government \( \phi(G) \). Therefore, again with \( l = 1 \), only incremental improvements in the quality of the initial government are possible. This ceases to be the case when \( l = 2 \). In this case, it can be shown that whenever \( G = \{a, b, c\} \), where \( a + b < c \), \( \phi(G) \neq G \); instead \( \phi(G) = \{a, b, d\} \), where \( d < c \) and in fact, \( d \ll a \) is possible. This implies a potentially very large improvement in the quality of the government (contrasting with the incremental improvements in the case where \( l = 1 \)). Loosely speaking, the presence of two veto players when \( l = 2 \) allows the initial government to import very-high-ability individuals without compromising stability. The next example illustrates this feature, which is at the root of the result highlighted in Example 4, whereby lesser incumbency veto power can lead to worse stable governments.

16. More specifically, government \( G = \{a, b, c\} \), where \( a < b < c \), is stable if and only if \( a = b - 1 = c - 2 \), and \( c \) is a multiple of \( 3 \). Moreover, for any government \( G = \{a, b, c\} \) with \( a < b < c \), \( \phi(G) = \{a - 2, a - 1, a\} \) if \( a \) is a multiple of \( 3 \), \( \phi(G) = \{a - 1, a, a + 1\} \) if \( a + 1 \) is a multiple of \( 3 \), and \( \phi(G) = \{a, a + 1, a + 2\} \) if \( a + 2 \) is a multiple of \( 3 \).
EXAMPLE 5. Suppose $k = 3$, and first take the case where $l = 1$. Suppose $G = \{100, 101, 220\}$, meaning that the initial government consists of individuals ranked 100, 101, and 220 in terms of ability. Then $\phi_{l=1}(G) = \{100, 101, 102\}$ so that the third member of the government is replaced, but the highest and the second-highest-ability members are not. More generally, recall that only very limited improvements in the quality of the highest-ability member are possible in this case. Suppose instead that $l = 2$. Then it can be shown that $\phi_{l=2}(G) = \{1, 100, 101\}$, so that now the stable government includes the most able individual in the society. Naturally if the gaps in ability at the top of the distribution are larger, implying that highest-ability individuals have a disproportionate effect on government competence, this feature becomes particularly valuable.

The following example extends the logic of Example 5 to any distribution and shows how expected competence may be higher under $l = 2$ than $l = 1$, and in fact, this result may hold under any distribution over initial (feasible) governments.

EXAMPLE 6. Suppose $k = 3$, and fix a (any) probability distribution over initial governments with full support (i.e., with a positive probability of picking any initial feasible government). Assume that of players $i_1, \ldots, i_n$, the first $q$ (where $q$ is a multiple of 3 and $3 \leq q < n - 3$) are “smart,” whereas the rest are “incompetent,” so that governments that include at least one of players $i_1, \ldots, i_q$ will have very high competence relative to governments that do not. Moreover, differences in competence among governments that include at least one of the players $i_1, \ldots, i_q$ and also among those that do not are small relative to the gap between the two groups of governments. Then it can be shown that the expected competence of the stable government $\phi_{l=2}(G)$ (under $l = 2$) is greater than that of $\phi_{l=1}(G)$ (under $l = 1$)—both expectations are evaluated according to the probability distribution fixed at the outset. This is intuitive in view of the structure of stable governments under the two political regimes. In particular, if $G$ includes at least one of $i_1, \ldots, i_q$, so do $\phi_{l=1}(G)$ and $\phi_{l=2}(G)$. But if $G$ does not, then $\phi_{l=1}(G)$ will not include them either, whereas $\phi_{l=2}(G)$ will include one with positive probability, because the presence of two veto players will allow the incorporation of one of the “smart” players without destabilizing the government.
Conversely, suppose that $\Gamma_G$ is very high if all its players are from $\{i_1, \ldots, i_q\}$, and very low otherwise. In that case, the expected competence of $\phi(G)$ will be higher under $l = 1$ than under $l = 2$. Indeed, if $l = 1$, the society will end up with a competent government if at least one of the players is from $\{i_1, \ldots, i_q\}$, whereas if $l = 2$, because there are now two veto players, there needs to be at least two “smart” players for a competent government to form (though, when $l = 2$, this is not sufficient to guarantee the emergence of a competent government either).

Examples 5 and 6 illustrate a number of important ideas. With greater incumbency veto power, in these examples with $l = 2$, a greater number of governments near the initial government are stable, and thus there is a higher probability of improvement in the competence of some of the members of the initial government. In contrast, with less incumbency veto power, in these examples with $l = 1$, fewer governments near the initial one are stable; thus incremental improvements are more likely. Consequently, when including a few high-ability individuals in the government is very important, regimes with greater incumbency veto power perform better; otherwise, regimes with less incumbency veto power perform better. Another important implication of these examples is that the situations in which regimes with greater incumbency veto power may perform better are not confined to some isolated instances. This feature applies to a broad class of configurations and to expected competences evaluated by taking uniform or nonuniform distributions over initial feasible governments. Nevertheless, we will see that in stochastic environments, there will be a distinct advantage to political regimes with less incumbency veto power or “greater degrees of democracy.” The intuition for this phenomenon will also be illustrated using Examples 5 and 6.

IV.B. Royalty-Type Regimes

We have so far focused on political institutions that are “junta-like” in the sense that no specific member is indispensable. In such an environment, the incumbency veto power takes the form of the requirement that some members of the current government must

17. In the former case, this effect is nonmonotonic, because the perfect democracy, $l = 0$, always performs best.
consent to change. The alternative is a “royalty-like” environment where one or several members of the government are irreplaceable (i.e., correspond to “individual veto players” in terms of Tsebelis’s [2002] terminology). This can be conjectured to be a negative force, because it would mean that a potentially low-ability person must always be part of the government. However, because such an irreplaceable member (the member of “royalty”) is also unafraid of changes, better governments may be more likely to arise under certain circumstances, whereas, as we have seen, junta members would resist certain changes because of the further transitions that these would unleash.

Let us change Assumption 2 and the structure of the set of winning coalitions $\mathcal{W}_G$ to accommodate royalty-like regimes. We assume that there are $l$ royalty whose votes are always necessary for a transition to be implemented (regardless of whether they are current government members). We denote the set of these individuals by $Y$. So the new set of winning coalitions becomes

$$\mathcal{W}_G = \{ X \in \mathcal{C} : |X| \geq m \text{ and } Y \subset X \}.$$ 

We also assume that all members of royalty are in the initial government; that is, $Y \subset G^0$. Note that the interpretation of the parameter $l$ is now different from what it was for junta-like regimes. In particular, in junta-like regimes, $l$ measured the incumbency veto power and could be considered an inverse measure of (one dimension of) the extent of democracy. In contrast, in the case of royalty, $l = 1$ corresponds to a one-person dictatorship, whereas $l > 1$ could be thought of as a “more participatory” regime.

The next proposition compares royalty-like and junta-like institutions in terms of the expected competence of the equilibrium government, where, as in Example 6, the expectation is taken with respect to any full support probability distribution over the composition of the initial government.

**Proposition 4.** Consider a royalty-like regime with $1 \leq l < k$ such that $l$ royals are never removed from the government. Suppose that the competence of governments is given by (10). Let $\gamma_i$ be the ability of the $i$th most able person in society, so $\gamma_i > \gamma_j$ for $i < j$. If $\{\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n\}$ is sufficiently “convex,” meaning that

$$\frac{\gamma_1 - \gamma_2}{\gamma_2 - \gamma_3}$$

is sufficiently large, then the expected competence of the government under the royalty system is greater than under the original junta-like system (with the same $l$). The opposite conclusion holds if

$$\frac{\gamma_1 - \gamma_{n-1}}{\gamma_n - \gamma_{n-1}}$$

is sufficiently low.
Proposition 4 shows that royalty-like regimes achieve better expected performance than junta-like regimes provided that $\{\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n\}$ is highly “convex” (such convexity implies that the benefit to society from having the highest-ability individual in government is relatively high). As discussed above, juntas are unlikely to lead to such high-quality governments because of the fear of a change leading to a further round of changes, which would exclude all initial members of the junta. Royalty-like regimes avoid this fear. Nevertheless, royalty-like regimes have a disadvantage in that the ability of royals may be very low (or, in a stochastic environment, may become very low at some point), and the royals will always be part of the government. In this sense, royalty-like regimes create a clear disadvantage. However, this result shows that when $\{\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n\}$ is sufficiently convex (to outweigh the loss of expected competence because of the presence of a potentially low-ability royal), expected competence is nonetheless higher under the royalty-like system. This result is interesting because it suggests that different types of dictatorships may have distinct implications for long-term quality of government and performance, and regimes that provide security to certain members of the incumbent government may be better at dealing with changes and in ensuring relatively high-quality governments in the long run.

This proposition also highlights that, in contrast to existing results on veto players, a regime with individual veto players (members of royalty) can be less stable and more open to change. In particular, a junta-like regime with $l > 0$ has no individual veto players in the sense of Tsebelis (2002), whereas a royalty-like regime with the same $l$ has such veto players, and Proposition 4 shows that the latter can lead to greater changes in the composition of the government.\(^\text{18}\)

### V. Equilibria in Stochastic Environments

In this section, we introduce stochastic shocks to the competence of different coalitions (or different individuals) in order to study the flexibility of different political institutions in their

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\(^{18}\) If, instead, we assume that $\beta$ is close to zero or that the players are myopic (as discussed in Example 12), then individual veto players always increase stability and reduce change in the composition of the government, as in the existing literature. This shows the importance of dynamic considerations in the analysis of changes in the structure of government and the impact of veto players.
ability to adapt the nature and the composition of the government to changes in the underlying environment. Changes in the nature and structure of “high-competence” governments may result from changes in the economic, political, or social environment, which may in turn require different types of government to deal with newly emerging problems. Our main results in this section establish the relationship between the extent of incumbency veto power (one aspect of the degree of democracy) and the flexibility to adapt to changing environments (measured by the probability that the most competent will come to power).

Changes in the environment are modeled succinctly by allowing changes in the function $\Gamma^t_G : G \to \mathbb{R}$, which determines the competence associated with each feasible government. Formally, we assume that at each $t$, with probability $1 - \delta$, there is no change in $\Gamma^t_G$ from $\Gamma^{t-1}_G$, and with probability $\delta$, there is a shock and $\Gamma^t_G$ may change. In particular, following such a shock, we assume that there exists a set of distribution functions $F_t(\Gamma^t_G \mid \Gamma^{t-1}_G)$ that gives the conditional distribution of $\Gamma^t_G$ at time $t$ as functions of $\Gamma^{t-1}_G$.

The characterization of political equilibria in this stochastic environment is a challenging task in general. However, when $\delta$ is sufficiently small so that the environment is stochastic but subject to infrequent changes, the structure of equilibria is similar to that in Theorem 1. We will exploit this characterization to illustrate the main implications of stochastic shocks for the selection of governments.

In the rest of this section, we first generalize our definition of (Markov) political equilibrium to this stochastic environment and generalize Theorems 1 and 2 (for $\delta$ small). We then provide a systematic characterization of political transitions in this stochastic environment and illustrate the links between incumbency veto power and institutional flexibility.

V.A. Stochastic Political Equilibria

The structure of stochastic political equilibria is complicated in general because individuals need to consider the implications of current transitions on future transitions under a variety of scenarios. Nevertheless, when the likelihood of stochastic shocks, $\delta$, is sufficiently small, as we have assumed here, then political equilibria must follow a logic similar to that in Definition 1 in Section III. Motivated by this reasoning, we introduce a similar definition of stochastic political equilibria (with infrequent shocks). Online Appendix B establishes that when the discount
factor is high and stochastic shocks are sufficiently infrequent, the MPE of the explicit-form game outlined there and our notions of (stochastic) political equilibrium are indeed equivalent.

To introduce the notion of (stochastic Markov) political equilibrium, let us first consider a set of mappings \( \phi_{i} : G \rightarrow G \) defined as in (6), but now separately for each \( \{ \Gamma_{G} \}_{G \in \mathcal{G}} \). These mappings are indexed by \( \{ \Gamma_{G} \} \) to emphasize this dependence. Essentially, if the configuration of competences of different governments given by \( \{ \Gamma_{G} \}_{G \in \mathcal{G}} \) applied forever, we would be in a nonstochastic environment and \( \phi_{i} \) would be the equilibrium transition rule, or simply the political equilibrium, as shown by Theorems 1 and 2. The idea underlying our definition for this stochastic environment with infrequent changes is that although the current configuration is \( \{ \Gamma_{G} \}_{G \in \mathcal{G}} \), \( \phi_{i} \) will still determine equilibrium behavior, because the probability of a change in competences is sufficiently small (see Online Appendix B). When the current configuration is \( \{ \Gamma_{G} \}_{G \in \mathcal{G}} \), \( \phi_{i} \) will determine political transitions, and if \( \phi_{i}(G) = G \), then \( G \) will remain in power as a stable government. However, when a stochastic shock hits and \( \{ \Gamma_{G} \}_{G \in \mathcal{G}} \) changes to \( \{ \Gamma'_{G} \}_{G \in \mathcal{G}} \), political transitions will be determined by the transition rule \( \phi_{i} \), and unless \( \phi_{i}(G) = G \), following this shock, there will be a transition to a new government, \( G' = \phi_{i}(G) \).

**Definition 2.** Let the set of mappings \( \phi_{i} : G \rightarrow G \) (a separate mapping for each configuration \( \{ \Gamma_{G} \}_{G \in \mathcal{G}} \)) be defined by the following two conditions. When the configuration of competences is given by \( \{ \Gamma_{G} \}_{G \in \mathcal{G}} \), we have that for any \( G \in \mathcal{G} \):

i. the set of players who prefer \( \phi_{i}(G) \) to \( G \) (in terms of discounted utility) form a winning coalition, that is, \( S = \{ i \in I : V_i(\phi_{i}(G)) - V_i(G) > \beta \} \in \mathcal{W}_G \);

ii. there is no alternative government \( H \in \mathcal{G} \) that is preferred both to a transition to \( \phi_{i}(G) \) and to staying in \( G \) permanently, that is, there is no \( H \) such that

\[
S'_H = \{ i \in I : V_i(H) - V_i(\phi_{i}(G)) > \beta \} \in \mathcal{W}_G
\]

and

\[
S''_H = \{ i \in I : V_i(H) - V_i(G) > \beta \} \in \mathcal{W}_G
\]

(alternatively, \( |S'_H| < m_G \), or \( |S'_H \cup G| < l_G \), or \( |S''_H| < m_G \), or \( |S''_H \cup G| < l_G \)).

Then a set of mappings \( \phi_{i} : G \rightarrow G \) constitutes a (stochastic Markov) political equilibrium for an environment with sufficiently infrequent changes if there is a transition to
government $G_{t+1}$ at time $t$ (starting with government $G_t$) if and only if $\{\Gamma_t\}_{G \in \mathcal{G}} = \{\Gamma_t\}_{G \in \mathcal{G}}$ and $G_{t+1} = \phi_{\{\Gamma_t\}}(G_t)$.

Therefore, a political equilibrium with sufficiently infrequent changes involves the same political transitions (or the stability of governments) as those implied by the mappings $\phi_{\{\Gamma_t\}}$ defined in (6), applied separately for each configuration $\{\Gamma_t\}$.

The next theorem provides the general characterization of stochastic political equilibria in environments with sufficiently infrequent changes.

**Theorem 3.** Suppose that Assumptions 1–3 hold, and let $\phi_{\{\Gamma_t\}} : \mathcal{G} \rightarrow \mathcal{G}$ be the mapping defined by (6) applied separately for each configuration $\{\Gamma_t\}$. Then there exist $\beta_0 < 1$ and $\delta_0 > 0$ such that for any discount factor $\beta > \beta_0$ and any positive probability of shocks $\delta < \delta_0$, $\phi_{\{\Gamma_t\}}$ is a unique acyclic political equilibrium.

**Proof.** See Online Appendix B. ■

The intuition for this theorem is straightforward. When shocks are sufficiently infrequent, the same calculus that applied in the nonstochastic environment still determines preferences because all agents put most weight on the events that will happen before such a change. Consequently, a stable government will arise and will remain in place until a stochastic shock arrives and changes the configuration of competences. Following such a shock, the stable government for this new configuration of competences emerges. Therefore, Theorem 3 provides us with a tractable way of characterizing stochastic transitions. In the next section, we use this result to study the links between different political regimes and institutional flexibility.

**V.B. The Structure of Stochastic Transitions**

In the rest of this section, we compare different political regimes in terms of their flexibility (adaptability to stochastic shocks). Our main results will show that, even though limited incumbency veto power does not guarantee the emergence of more competent governments in the nonstochastic environment (nor does it guarantee greater expected competence), it does lead to greater “flexibility” and to better performance according to certain measures in the presence of shocks. In what follows, we always impose Assumptions 1, 2', 3, and 4, which ensure that when the discount factor $\beta$ is sufficiently large and the frequency of stochastic shocks $\delta$ is sufficiently small, there will be a unique (and acyclic)
We also impose some additional structure on the distribution \( F_\Gamma (\Gamma_G | \Gamma_G^{-1}) \) by assuming that any shock corresponds to a rearrangement (“permutation”) of the abilities of different individuals. Put differently, we assume throughout this section that there is a fixed vector of abilities, say \( a = \{a_1, \ldots, a_n\} \), and the actual distribution of abilities across individuals at time \( t \), \( \{y_j^t\}_{j=1}^n \), is given by some permutation \( \varphi^t \) of this vector \( a \). We adopt the convention that \( a_1 > a_2 > \cdots > a_n \). Intuitively, this captures the notion that a shock will change which individual is best placed to solve certain tasks and thus most effective in government functions.

We next characterize the “flexibility” of different political regimes. Throughout the rest of this section, our measure of flexibility is the probability with which the best government will be in power (either at given \( t \) or as \( t \to \infty \)). More formally, let \( \pi_t(l, k, n | G, \{\Gamma_G\}) \) be the probability that in a society with \( n \) individuals under a political regime characterized by \( l \) (for given \( k \)), a configuration of competences given by \( \{\Gamma_G\} \), and current government \( G \in \mathcal{G} \), the most competent government will be in power at the time \( t \). Given \( n \) and \( k \), we will think of a regime characterized by \( l' \) as more flexible than one characterized by \( l \) if \( \pi_t(l', k, n | G, \{\Gamma_G\}) > \pi_t(l, k, n | G, \{\Gamma_G\}) \) for all \( G \) and \( \{\Gamma_G\} \) and for all \( t \) following a stochastic shock. Similarly, we can think of the regime as asymptotically more flexible than another, if \( \lim_{t \to \infty} \pi_t(l', k, n | G, \{\Gamma_G\}) > \lim_{t \to \infty} \pi_t(l, k, n | G, \{\Gamma_G\}) \) for all \( G \) and \( \{\Gamma_G\} \) (provided that these limits are well defined). Clearly, “being more flexible” is a partial order.

**Proposition 5.** Suppose that any permutation \( \varphi \) of the vector \( a \) following a shock is equally likely.

1. If \( l = 0 \), then a shock immediately leads to the replacement of the current government by the new most competent government.
2. If \( l = 1 \), the competence of the government following a shock never decreases further; instead, it increases with

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19. This is a natural metric of flexibility in the context of our model; because we have not introduced any cardinal comparisons between the competences of governments, “expected competence” would not be a meaningful measure (see also Footnote 21). Note also that we would obtain similar results if we related flexibility to the probability that one of the best two or three governments comes to power, etc.
probability no less than
\[
1 - \frac{(k - 1)!(n - k)!}{(n - 1)!} = 1 - \left(\frac{n - 1}{k - 1}\right)^{-1}.
\]
Starting with any \(G\) and \(\{\Gamma_G\}\), the probability that the most competent government will ultimately come to power as a result of a shock is
\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} \pi_t(l, k, n | G, \{\Gamma_G\}) = \pi(l, k, n) \equiv 1 - \left(\frac{n - k}{k}\right)\left(\frac{n}{k}\right)^{-1} < 1.
\]
For fixed \(k\) as \(n \to \infty\), \(\pi(l, k, n) \to 0\).

3. If \(l = k \geq 2\), then a shock never leads to a change in government. The probability that the most competent government is in power at any given period (any \(t\)) after the shock is
\[
\pi_t(l = k, k, n | \cdot, \cdot) = \left(\frac{n}{k}\right)^{-1}.
\]
This probability is strictly less than \(\pi_t(l = 0, k, n | G, \{\Gamma_G\})\) and \(\pi_t(l = 1, k, n | G, \{\Gamma_G\})\) for any \(G\) and \(\{\Gamma_G\}\).

Proof. See Online Appendix B. ■

Proposition 5 contains a number of important results. A perfect democracy \((l = 0)\) does not create any barriers against the installation of the best government at any point in time. Hence, under a perfect democracy, every shock is “flexibly” met by a change in government according to the wishes of the population at large (which here means that the most competent government will come to power). As we know from the analysis in Section IV, this is no longer true as soon as members of the governments have some veto power. In particular, we know that without stochastic shocks, arbitrarily incompetent governments may come to power and remain in power. However, in the presence of shocks, the evolution of equilibrium governments becomes more complex.

Next consider the case with \(l \geq 1\). Now, even though the immediate effect of a shock may be a deterioration in government competence, there are forces that increase government competence in the long run. This is most clearly illustrated in the case where \(l = 1\). With this set of political institutions, there is zero
probability that there will be a further decrease in government competence following a shock. Moreover, there is a positive probability that competence will improve and in fact a positive probability that, following a shock, the most competent government will be instituted. In particular, a shock may make the current government unstable, and in this case, there will be a transition to a new stable government. A transition to a less competent government would never receive support from the population. The change in competences may be such that the only stable government after the shock, starting with the current government, may be the best government.\footnote{Nevertheless, the probability of the most competent government coming to power, though positive, may be arbitrarily low.}

Proposition 5 also shows that when political institutions take the form of an extreme dictatorship, there will never be any transition; thus the current government can deteriorate following shocks (in fact, it can do so significantly).

Most importantly, Proposition 5, as well as Proposition 6 below, shows that regimes with intermediate levels of incumbency veto power have a higher degree of flexibility than extreme dictatorship, ensuring better long-run outcomes (and naturally, perfect democracy has the highest degree of flexibility). This unambiguous ranking in the presence of stochastic shocks (and its stronger version stated in the next proposition) contrasts with the results in Section IV, which showed that general comparisons between regimes with different degrees of incumbency veto power (beyond perfect democracy) are not possible in the nonstochastic case.

An informal intuition for the greater flexibility of regimes with more limited incumbency veto power in the presence of stochastic shocks can be obtained from Examples 5 and 6 in the preceding section. Recall from these examples that an advantage of the less democratic regime, $l = 2$, is that the presence of two veto players makes a large number of governments near the initial one stable. But this implies that if the initial government is destabilized because of a shock, there will only be a move to a nearby government. In contrast, the more democratic regime, $l = 1$, often makes highly incompetent governments stable because there are no nearby stable governments (recall, for example, part 2 of Proposition 3). But this also implies that if a shock destabilizes the current government, a significant improvement in the quality of the government becomes more likely. Thus, at a broad level and
contrasting with the presumption in the existing literature (e.g., Tsebelis [2002]), regimes with greater incumbency veto power “create more stability,” which facilitates small or moderate-sized improvements in initial government quality; but they do not create a large “basin of attraction” for the most competent government. In contrast, in regimes with less incumbency veto power, low-competence governments are often made stable by the instability of nearby alternative governments; this instability can be a disadvantage in deterministic environments, as illustrated in the preceding section, but turns into a significant flexibility advantage in the presence of stochastic shocks because it creates the possibility that, after a shock, there may be a jump to a very high-competence government (in particular, to the best government, which now has a larger “basin of attraction”).

The next proposition strengthens the conclusions of Proposition 5. In particular, it establishes that the probability of having the most competent government in power is decreasing in $l$ (or in other words, it is increasing in this measure of the “degree of democracy”).

**Proposition 6.** The probability of having the most competent government in power after a shock (for any $t$), $\pi_t(l,k,n \mid G, \{\Gamma_G\})$, is decreasing in $l$ for any $k$, $n$, $G$, and $\{\Gamma_G\}$.

**Proof:** See Online Appendix B.

Propositions 5 and 6 highlight a distinct flexibility advantage (in terms of the probability of the most competent government coming to power) of regimes with low incumbency veto power (“more democratic” regimes). These results can be strengthened further when shocks are “limited” in the sense that only the abilities of two (or several) individuals in the society are swapped. The next proposition contains these results.

**Proposition 7.** Suppose that any shock permutes the abilities of $x$ individuals in the society.

21. This conclusion need not be true for the “expected competence” of the government, because we have not made cardinal assumptions on abilities and competences. In particular, it is possible that some player is not a member of any stable government for some $l$ and becomes part of a stable government for some $l' < l$. If this player is such that the competence of any government that includes him or her is very low (e.g., his or her ability is very low), then expected competence under $l'$ may be lower. In Online Appendix B, we provide an example (Example 10) illustrating this point, and we also show that the expected competence of government is decreasing in $l$ when $l$ is close to 0 or to $k$. 
1. If \( x = 2 \) (so that the abilities of two individuals are swapped at a time) and \( l \leq k - 1 \), then the competence of the government in power is nondecreasing over time; that is, \( \pi_t(l, k, n | G, (\Gamma_G)) \) is nondecreasing in \( t \) for any \( l, k, n, G, \) and \( \{\Gamma_G\} \) such that \( l \leq k - 1 \). Moreover, if the probability of swapping of abilities between any two individuals is positive, then the most competent government will be in power as \( t \to \infty \) with probability 1; that is, \( \lim_{t \to \infty} \pi_t(l, k, n | G, (\Gamma_G)) = 1 \) (for any \( l, k, n, G, \) and \( \{\Gamma_G\} \) such that \( l \leq k - 1 \)).

2. If \( x > 2 \), then the results in part 1 hold provided that \( l \leq k - \lfloor x/2 \rfloor \).

**Proof.** See Online Appendix B.

An interesting application of Proposition 7 is that when shocks are (relatively) rare and limited in their scope, relatively democratic regimes will gradually improve over time and install the most competent government in the long run. This is not true for the most autocratic governments, however. This proposition, therefore, strengthens the conclusions of Propositions 5 and 6 in highlighting the flexibility benefits of more democratic regimes.

**VI. Conclusions**

In this paper, we have provided a tractable model of dynamic political selection. The main barrier to the selection of good politicians and to the formation of good governments in our model is not the difficulty of identifying competent or honest politicians, but the incumbency veto power of current governments. Our framework shows how a small degree of incumbency veto power can lead to the persistence of highly inefficient and incompetent governments. This is because incumbency veto power implies that one of (potentially many) members of the government needs to consent to a change in the composition of government. However, all current members of the government may recognize that any change may unleash a further round of changes, ultimately unseating them. In this case, they will all oppose any change in government, even if such changes can improve welfare significantly for the rest of the society, and highly incompetent governments can remain in power.

Using this framework, we study the implications of different political institutions for the selection of governments in both
nonstochastic and stochastic environments. A perfect democracy corresponds to a situation in which there is no incumbency veto power; thus citizens can nominate alternative governments and vote them to power without the need for the consent of any member of the incumbent government. In this case, we show that the most competent government will always come to power. However, interestingly, any deviation from perfect democracy breaks this result and the long-run equilibrium government can be arbitrarily incompetent (relative to the best possible government). In extreme dictatorship, where any single member of the current government has a veto power on any change, the initial government always remains in power and can be arbitrarily costly for the society. More surprisingly, the same is true for any political institution other than perfect democracy. Moreover, there is no obvious ranking between different sets of political institutions (other than perfect democracy and extreme dictatorship) in terms of what they imply for the quality of long-run government. In fact, regimes with greater incumbency veto power, which may be thought of as “less democratic,” can lead to higher-quality governments both in specific instances and in expectation (with uniform or nonuniform distribution over the set of feasible initial governments). Even though no such ranking across political institutions is possible, we provide a fairly tight characterization of the structure of stable governments in our benchmark nonstochastic society.

In contrast, in stochastic environments, more democratic political regimes have a distinct advantage because of their greater “flexibility.” In particular, in stochastic environments, either the abilities and competences of individuals or the needs of government functions change, shuffling the ranking of different possible governments in terms of their competence and effectiveness. Less incumbency veto power then ensures greater “adaptability” or flexibility. This result therefore suggests that a distinct advantage of “more democratic” regimes might be their greater flexibility in the face of shocks and changing environments.

Finally, we also compare “junta-like” and “royalty-like” regimes. The former is our benchmark society, where change in government requires the consent or support of one or multiple members of the current government. The latter corresponds to situations in which one or multiple individuals are special and must always be part of the government (hence the title “royalty”). If royal individuals have low ability, royalty-like regimes can lead to the persistence of highly incompetent governments. However,
we also show that in stochastic environments, royalty-like regimes may lead to the emergence of higher quality governments in the long run than junta-like regimes. This is because royal individuals are not afraid of changes in governments, because their tenure is absolute. In contrast, members of the junta may resist changes that may increase government competence or quality because such changes may lead to another round of changes, ultimately excluding all members of the initial government.

An important contribution of our paper is to provide a tractable framework for the dynamic analysis of the selection of politicians. This tractability makes it possible to extend the analysis in various fruitful directions. For example, it is possible to introduce conflict of interest among voters by having each government be represented by two characteristics: competence and ideological leaning. In this case, not all voters will simply prefer the most competent government. The general approach developed here remains applicable in this case. Another generalization would allow the strength of the preferences of voters for a particular government to influence the number of veto players, so that a transition away from a semi-incompetent government can be blocked by a few insiders, but more unified opposition from government members would be necessary to block a transition away from a highly incompetent government.

The current framework also abstracts from “self-selection” issues, whereby some citizens may not wish to be part of some, or any, governments (e.g., as in Caselli and Morelli [2004] or Mattozzi and Merlo [2008]). Such considerations can also be incorporated by adding a second dimension of heterogeneity in the outside opportunities of citizens, and restricting feasible transitions to coalitions that only include members who would prefer or can be incentivized to be part of the government.

An open question, which may be studied by placing more structure on preferences and institutions, is the characterization of equilibria in the stochastic environment when shocks occur frequently. The most important direction for future research, which is again feasible using the general approach here, is an extension of this framework to incorporate the asymmetric information issues emphasized in the previous literature. For example, we can generalize the environment in this paper so that the ability of an individual is not observed until he or she becomes part of the government. In this case, to install high-quality governments, it is necessary to first “experiment” with different types of governments.
The dynamic interactions highlighted by our analysis will then become a barrier to such experimentation. In this case, the set of political institutions that will ensure high-quality governments must exhibit a different type of flexibility, whereby some degree of “churning” of governments can be guaranteed even without shocks. Another interesting area is to introduce additional instruments, so that some political regimes can provide incentives to politicians to take actions in line with the interests of the society at large. In that case, successful political institutions must ensure both the selection of high-ability individuals and the provision of incentives to these individuals once they are in government. Finally, as hinted by the discussion in this paragraph, an interesting and challenging extension is to develop a more general “mechanism design” approach in this context, whereby certain aspects of political institutions are designed to facilitate the appropriate future changes in government. We view these directions as interesting and important areas for future research.

APPENDIX

Let us introduce the following binary relation on the set of feasible governments $G$. For any $G, H \in \mathcal{G}$ we write

(14) \hspace{1cm} H \succ G \text{ if and only if } \{i \in \mathcal{I} : w_i(H) > w_i(G)\} \in \mathcal{W}_G.

In other words, $H \succ G$ if and only if there exists a winning coalition $\mathcal{W}_G$ in $G$ such that all members of $\mathcal{W}_G$ have higher stage payoff in $H$ than in $G$. Let us also define set $D$ as

$$D = \{G \in \mathcal{G} : \phi(G) = G\}.$$

A. Proof of Theorem 1

We start with two lemmas that establish useful properties of the payoff functions and the mapping $\phi$ and then present the proof of Theorem 1.

**Lemma 1.** Suppose that $G, H \in \mathcal{G}$ and $\Gamma_G \succ \Gamma_H$. Then

1. For any $i \in \mathcal{I}$, $w_i(G) < w_i(H)$ if and only if $i \in H \setminus G$.
2. $H \not\succ G$.
3. $|\{i \in \mathcal{I} : w_i(G) > w_i(H)\}| > n/2 \geq k$.

**Proof of Lemma 1.** Part 1. If $\Gamma_G \succ \Gamma_H$ then, by Assumption 1, $w_i(G) > w_i(H)$ whenever $i \in G$ or $i \not\in H$. Hence, $w_i(G) < w_i(H)$ is
possible only if $i \in H \setminus G$ (note that $w_i(G) = w_i(H)$ is ruled out by Assumption 3). At the same time, $i \in H \setminus G$ implies that $w_i(G) < w_i(H)$ by Assumption 1, hence the equivalence.

Part 2. We have $|H \setminus G| \leq |H| \leq k \leq m_G$, because by Assumption 2 $k \leq m_G$, so that $H \setminus G \not\in \mathcal{V}_G$, and $H \not\in G$ by definition (14).

Part 3. We have $\{i \in I : w_i(G) > w_i(H)\} = I \setminus \{i \in I : w_i(G) < w_i(H)\} \supset I \setminus (H \setminus G)$; hence $|\{i \in I : w_i(G) > w_i(H)\}| \geq n - k \geq n - n/2 = n/2 \geq k.$

**Lemma 2.** Consider the mapping $\phi$ defined in (6) and let $G, H \in \mathcal{G}$.

Then

1. Either $\phi(G) = G$ (and then $G \in \mathcal{D}$) or $\phi(G) > G$.
2. $\Gamma_{\phi(G)} \geq \Gamma_G$.
3. If $\phi(G) > G$ and $H > G$, then $\Gamma_{\phi(G)} \geq \Gamma_H$.
4. $\phi(\phi(G)) = \phi(G)$.

**Proof of Lemma 2.** The proof of this lemma is straightforward and is omitted.

**Proof of Theorem 1.** As in the text, let us enumerate elements of $\mathcal{G}$ as $\{G_1, G_2, \ldots, G_{|\mathcal{G}|}\}$ such that $\Gamma_{G_x} > \Gamma_{G_y}$ whenever $x < y$. First, we prove that the function $\phi$ defined in (6) constitutes a (Markov) political equilibrium. Take any $G_q$, $1 \leq q \leq |\mathcal{G}|$. By (6), either $\phi(G_q) = G_q$, or $\phi(G_q) = \Gamma_{\min\{j \in \mathcal{M}_q\}}$. In the latter case, the set of players who obtain higher-stage payoff under $\phi(G_q)$ than under $G_q$ (i.e., those with $w_i(\phi(G_q)) > w_i(G_q)$) form a winning coalition in $G_q$ by (5). Because by definition $\phi(G_q)$ is $\phi$-stable, that is, $\phi(G_q) = \phi(\phi(G_q))$, we have $V_i(\phi(G_q)) > V_i(G_q)$ for a winning coalition of players. Hence, in either case condition (i) of Definition 1 is satisfied.

Now, suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that condition (ii) of Definition 1 is violated, and $X, Y \in \mathcal{W}_{G_q}$ are winning coalitions such that $V_i(H) > w_i(G_q)/(1 - \beta)$ for all $i \in X$ and $V_i(H) > V_i(\phi(G_q))$ for all $i \in Y$ and some alternative $H \in \mathcal{G}$. Consider first the case $\Gamma_{\phi(H)} \neq \Gamma_{\phi(G_q)}$; then $V_i(H) > V_i(\phi(G_q))$ would imply $w_i(\phi(H)) > w_i(\phi(G_q))$ as $\beta$ is close to 1, and hence the set of players who have $w_i(\phi(H)) > w_i(\phi(G_q))$ would include $Y$, and thus would be a winning coalition in $G_q$. This is impossible if $\Gamma_{\phi(H)} < \Gamma_{\phi(G_q)}$ (only players in $\phi(H)$ would possibly prefer $\phi(H)$, and they are fewer than $m_{G_q}$). If $\Gamma_{\phi(H)} > \Gamma_{\phi(G_q)}$, however, we would get a government $\phi(H)$ that was $\phi$-stable by construction of $\phi$ and that was preferred to $G_q$ by at least $m_{G_q}$ players (all except perhaps members of $G_q$) and at least $l_G$ members of $G_q$, as $\phi(H)$ is stable and
\( \Gamma_{\phi(G_q)} \geq \Gamma_{G_q} \) (indeed, at least \( l_G \) members of \( G_q \)—those in coalition \( X \)—had \( V_i(\phi(H)) > w_i(G_q)/(1 - \beta) \), which thus means they belong to \( \phi(H) \), and hence must have \( w_i(\phi(H)) > w_i(G_q) \)). This would imply that \( \phi(H) \in \mathcal{M}_q \) by (5), but in that case \( \Gamma_{\phi(H)} > \Gamma_{\phi(G_q)} \) would contradict (6).

Finally, consider the case \( \Gamma_{\phi(H)} = \Gamma_{\phi(G_q)} \), which by Assumption 3 implies that \( \phi(H) = \phi(G_q) \). Now \( V_i(H) > V_i(\phi(G_q)) \) implies that \( w_i(H) > w_i(\phi(G_q)) \) for all \( i \in Y \), as the instantaneous utilities are the same except for the current period. Because this includes at least \( m_G \) players, we must have that \( \Gamma_H > \Gamma_{\phi(G_q)} \). But \( \Gamma_{\phi(H)} \geq \Gamma_H \) by (6), so \( \Gamma_{\phi(H)} \geq \Gamma_H > \Gamma_{\phi(G_q)} \), which contradicts \( \Gamma_{\phi(H)} = \Gamma_{\phi(G_q)} \). This contradiction proves that mapping \( \phi \) satisfies both conditions of Definition 1, and thus forms a political equilibrium.

To prove uniqueness, suppose that there is another acyclic political equilibrium \( \psi \). For each \( G \in \mathcal{G} \), define \( \chi(G) = \psi|^{G}(G) \); due to acyclicity, \( \chi(G) \) is \( \psi \)-stable for all \( G \). We prove the following sequence of claims. First, we must have that \( \Gamma_{\chi(G)} \geq \Gamma_G \); indeed, otherwise condition (i) of Definition 1 would not be satisfied for large \( \beta \).

Second, we prove that all transitions must take place in one step; that is, \( \chi(G) = \psi(G) \) for all \( G \). If this were not the case, then, due to the finiteness of any chain of transitions, there would exist \( G \in \mathcal{G} \) such that \( \psi(G) \neq \chi(G) \), but \( \psi^2(G) = \chi(G) \). Take \( H = \chi(G) \). Then \( \Gamma_H > \Gamma_{\psi(G)} \), \( \Gamma_H > \Gamma_G \), and \( \psi(H) = H \). For \( \beta \) sufficiently close to 1, the condition \( V_i(H) > w_i(\psi(G))/(1 - \beta) \) is automatically satisfied for the winning coalition of players, who had \( V_i(\psi(G)) > w_i(G)/(1 - \beta) \). We next prove that \( V_i(H) > V_i(\psi(G)) \) for a winning coalition of players in \( G \). Note that this condition is equivalent to \( w_i(H) > w_i(\psi(G)) \). The fact that at least \( m_G \) players prefer \( H \) to \( \psi(G) \) follows from \( \Gamma_H > \Gamma_{\psi(G)} \). Moreover, because \( \chi(G) = H \), at least \( l_G \) members of \( G \) must also be members of \( H \); naturally, they prefer \( H \) to \( \psi(G) \). Consequently, condition (ii) of Definition 1 is violated. This contradiction proves that \( \chi(G) = \psi(G) \) for all \( G \).

Finally, we prove that \( \psi(G) \) coincides with \( \phi(G) \), defined in (6). Suppose not; that is, suppose that \( \phi(G) \neq \psi(G) \). Without loss of generality, we may assume that \( G \) is the most competent government that has \( \phi(G) \neq \psi(G) \); that is, \( \phi(H) = \psi(H) \) whenever \( \Gamma_H > \Gamma_G \). By Assumption 3, we have that \( \Gamma_{\phi(G)} \neq \Gamma_{\psi(G)} \). Suppose that \( \Gamma_{\phi(G)} > \Gamma_{\psi(G)} \) (the case \( \Gamma_{\phi(G)} < \Gamma_{\psi(G)} \) is treated similarly). As \( \psi(G) \) forms a political equilibrium, it must satisfy condition (ii) of Definition 1, for \( H = \phi(G) \) in particular. Because \( \phi(G) \) is a political equilibrium, it must be the case that \( w_i(\phi(G)) > w_i(G) \), and...
thus \( V_i(H | \phi) > w_i(G)/(1 - \beta) \), for a winning coalition of players. Now, we see that the following two facts must hold. First, \( V_i(H | \psi) > w_i(G)/(1 - \beta) \) for a winning coalition of players; this follows from the fact that \( H \) is \( \phi \)-stable and thus \( \psi \)-stable as \( \Gamma_H > \Gamma_G \) and from the choice of \( G \). Second, \( V_i(H | \psi) > V_i(\psi(G) | \psi) \) for a winning coalition of players; indeed, \( H \) and \( \psi(G) \) are \( \psi \)-stable, and the former is preferred to the latter (in terms of stage payoffs) by at least \( m_G \) players and at least \( l_G \) government members, as \( \Gamma_{\phi(G)} > \Gamma_{\psi(G)} \) and the intersection of \( H \) and \( G \) contains at least \( l_G \) members (because \( H = \phi(G) \)). The existence of such \( H \) leads to a contradiction, which completes the proof.

**B. Dynamic Game**

We now present a dynamic game that captures certain salient features of the process of government change. This game involves different individuals proposing alternative governments and then all individuals (including current members of the government) voting over these proposals. Then we define the MPEs of this game, establish their existence and their properties, and show the equivalence between the notion of MPE and that of the (stochastic) Markov political equilibrium defined in the text. We also provide a number of examples referred to in the text (e.g., on the possibility of a cyclic MPE or political equilibrium, and on changes in expected competence).

Let us first introduce this additional state variable, denoted by \( v^t \), which determines whether the current government can be changed. In particular, \( v^t \) takes two values: \( v^t = s \) corresponds to a “sheltered” political situation (or “stable” political situation, although we reserve the term “stable” for governments that persist over time) and \( v^t = u \) designates an unstable situation. The government can be changed only during unstable times. A sheltered political situation destabilizes (becomes unstable) with probability \( r \) in each period; that is, \( \Pr(v^t = u | v^{t-1} = s) = r \). These events are independent across periods, and we also assume that \( v^0 = u \). An unstable situation becomes sheltered when an incumbent government survives a challenge or is not challenged at all (as explained below).

We next describe the procedure for challenging an incumbent government. We start with some government \( G^t \) at time \( t \). If at time \( t \) the situation is unstable, then all individuals \( i \in I \) are ordered according to some sequence \( \eta_{G^t} \). Individuals, in turn, nominate subsets of alternative governments \( A^t_i \subset \mathcal{G} \setminus \{G^t\} \), which
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will be part of the primaries. An individual may choose not to nominate any alternative government, in which case he or she may choose $A_i^t = \emptyset$. All nominated governments make up the set $A^t$, so

$$A^t = \{ G \in \mathcal{G} \setminus \{ G^t \} : G \in A_i \text{ for some } i \in \mathcal{T} \}.$$  

If $A^t \neq \emptyset$, then all alternatives in $A^t$ take part in the primaries at time $t$. The primaries work as follows. All of the alternatives in $A^t$ are ordered $\xi_{G^t}(1), \xi_{G^t}(2), \ldots, \xi_{G^t}(|A^t|)$ according to some prespecified order (depending on $A^t$ and the current government $G^t$). We refer to this order as the protocol, $\xi_{G^t}$. The primaries are then used to determine the challenging government $G' \in A^t$. In particular, we start with $G'_1$, given by the first element of the protocol $\xi_{G^t}(1), \xi_{G^t}(2), \ldots$. We assume that all votes are sequential (and show below that the sequence in which votes take place does not have any affect on the outcome). If more than $n/2$ of individuals support the latter, then $G'_2 = \xi_{G^t}(2)$; otherwise $G'_2 = G'_1$. Proceeding in order, $G'_3, G'_4, \ldots$, and $G'_{|A^t|}$ are determined, and $G'$ is equal to the last element of the sequence, $G'_{|A^t|}$. This ends the primary.

After the primary, the challenger $G'$ is voted against the incumbent government $G^t$. $G'$ wins if and only if a winning coalition of individuals (i.e., a coalition that belongs to $W^t_{G^t}$) supports $G'$. Otherwise, we say that the incumbent government $G^t$ wins. If $A^t = \emptyset$ to start with, then there is no challenger and the incumbent government is again the winner.

If the incumbent government wins, it stays in power, and moreover the political situation becomes sheltered; that is, $G^{t+1} = G^t$ and $v^{t+1} = s$. Otherwise, the challenger becomes the new government, but the situation remains unstable; that is, $G^{t+1} = G'$ and $v^{t+1} = v^t = u$. All individuals receive stage payoff $w_i(G^t)$ (we assume that the new government starts acting from the next period).

More formally, the exact procedure is as follows.

- Period $t = 0, 1, 2, \ldots$ begins with government $G^t$ in power. If the political situation is sheltered, $v^t = s$, then each individual $i \in \mathcal{T}$ receives stage payoff $u_i(G^t)$; in the next period, $G^{t+1} = G^t$, $v^{t+1} = v^t = s$ with probability $1 - r$ and $v^{t+1} = u$ with probability $r$.
- If the political situation is unstable, $v_i = u$, then the following events take place:
1. Individuals are ordered according to $\eta_{G^t}$, and in this sequence, each individual $i$ nominates a subset of feasible governments $A^t_i \subset G \setminus \{G^t\}$ for the primaries. These determine the set of alternatives $A^t$ as in (15).

2. If $A^t = \emptyset$, then we say that the incumbent government wins, $G^{t+1} = G^t$, $v^{t+1} = s$, and each individual receives states payoff $u_i^t(G^t)$. If $A^t \neq \emptyset$, then the alternatives in $A^t$ are ordered according to protocol $\xi_{G^t}^{A^t}$.

3. If $A^t \neq \emptyset$, then the alternatives in $A^t$ are voted against each other. In particular, at the first step, $G'_1 = \xi_{G^t}^{A^t}(1)$. If $|A^t| > 1$, then for $2 \leq j \leq |A^t|$, at step $j$, alternative $G'_{j-1}$ is voted against $\xi_{G^t}^{A^t}(j)$. Voting in the primary takes place as follows: all individuals vote yes or no sequentially according to some prespecified order, and $G'_j = \xi_{G^t}^{A^t}(j)$ if and only if the set of the individuals who voted yes, $Y_j^t$, is a simple majority (i.e., if $|Y_j^t| > n/2$); otherwise, $G'_j = G'_{j-1}$. The challenger is determined as $G' = G'_{|A^t|}$.

4. Government $G'$ challenges the incumbent government $G^t$, and voting in the election takes place. In particular, all individuals vote yes or no sequentially according to some prespecified order, and $G'$ wins if and only if the set of the individuals who voted yes, $Y^t$, is a winning coalition in $G^t$ (i.e., if $Y^t \in W^t_{G^t}$); otherwise, $G^t$ wins.

5. If $G'$ wins, then $G^{t+1} = G'$, $v^{t+1} = s$; if $G'$ wins, then $G^{t+1} = G'$, $v^{t+1} = u$. In either case, each individual obtains stage payoff $u_i^t(G^t) = w_i(G^t)$.

Several important features of this dynamic game are worth emphasizing. First, the set of winning coalitions, $W^t_{G^t}$ when the government is $G^t$, determines which proposals for change in the government are accepted. Second, to specify a well-defined game we had to introduce the prespecified order $\eta_G$ in which individuals nominate alternatives for the primaries, the protocol $\xi_{G^t}^{A^t}$ for the order in which alternatives are considered, and also the order in which votes are cast. Ideally we would like these orders not to have a major influence on the structure of equilibria, because they are not an essential part of the economic environment and we do not have a good way of mapping the specific orders to reality. We will see that this is indeed the case in the equilibria of interest. Finally, the rate at which political situations become unstable, $r$,
has an important influence on payoffs by determining the rate at which opportunities to change the government arise. In what follows, we assume that \( r \) is relatively small, so that political situations are not unstable most of the time. Here, it is also important that political instability ceases after the incumbent government withstands a challenge (or if there is no challenge). This can be interpreted as the government having survived a “no-confidence” motion. In addition, as in the text, we focus on situations in which the discount factor \( \beta \) is large.

C. Strategies and Definition of Equilibrium

We define strategies and equilibria in the usual fashion. In particular, let \( h^t, Q^t \) denote the history of the game up to period \( t \) and stage \( Q^t \) in period \( t \) (there are several stages in period \( t \) if \( v^t = u \)). This history includes all governments, proposals, votes, and stochastic events up to this time. The set of histories is denoted by \( \mathcal{H}^t, Q^t \). A history \( h^t, Q^t \) can also be decomposed into two parts. We can write \( h^t, Q^t = (h^t, Q^t) \) and correspondingly \( \mathcal{H}^t, Q^t = \mathcal{H}^t \times Q^t \), where \( h^t \) summarizes all events that have taken place up to period \( t - 1 \) and \( Q^t \) is the list of events that have taken place within the time instant \( t \) when there is an opportunity to change the government.

A strategy of individual \( i \in I \), denoted by \( \sigma_i \), maps \( \mathcal{H}^t, Q^t \) (for all \( t \) and \( Q^t \)) into a proposal when \( i \) nominates alternative governments for primaries (i.e., at the first stage of the period where \( v^t = u \)) and a vote for each possible proposal at each possible decision node (recall that the ordering of alternatives is automatic and is done according to a protocol). A subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) is a strategy profile \( \{ \sigma_i \}_{i \in I} \) such that the strategy of each \( i \) is the best response to the strategies of all other individuals for all histories. Because there can be several SPE in dynamic games, many supported by complex trigger strategies, which are not our focus here, in this Appendix, we will limit our attention to the Markovian subset of SPEs. We next introduce the standard definition of MPE:

**Definition 3.** A Markov perfect equilibrium is a profile of strategies \( \{ \sigma_i^* \}_{i \in I} \) that forms an SPE and such that \( \sigma_i^* \) for each \( i \) in each period \( t \) depends only on \( G^t \), \( \Gamma^t \), \( W^t \), and \( Q^t \) (previous actions taken in period \( t \)).

MPEs are natural in such dynamic games, because they enable individuals to condition on all of the payoff-relevant information, but rule out complicated trigger-like strategies, which
are not our focus in this paper. It turns out that even MPEs potentially lead to a very rich set of behavior. For this reason, it is also useful to consider subsets of MPEs—in particular, acyclic MPEs and order-independent MPEs. As discussed in the text, an equilibrium is acyclic if cycles (changing the initial government but then reinstalling it at some future date) do not take place along the equilibrium path. Cyclical MPEs are both less realistic and more difficult to characterize, motivating our main focus on acyclic MPEs. Formally, we have

**Definition 4.** An MPE $\sigma^*$ is cyclic if the probability that there exist $t_1 < t_2 < t_3$ such that $G^{t_3} = G^{t_1} \neq G^{t_2}$ along the equilibrium path is positive. An MPE $\sigma^*$ is acyclic if it is not cyclic.

Another relevant subset of MPEs, order-independent MPEs or simply order-independent equilibria, is introduced by Moldovanu and Winter (1995). These equilibria require that strategies should not depend on the order in which certain events (e.g., proposal-making) unfold. Here we generalize (and slightly modify) their definition for our present context. For this purpose, let us denote the above-described game when the set of protocols is given by $\xi = \{G_{G,A}^{t}\}_{G \in \mathcal{G}, A \in \mathcal{P}(G)}$ as $\text{GAME}[\xi]$ and denote the set of feasible protocols by $\mathcal{X}$.

**Definition 5.** Consider $\text{GAME}[\xi]$. $\sigma^*$ is an order-independent equilibrium for $\text{GAME}[\xi]$ if for any $\xi' \in \mathcal{X}$, there exists an equilibrium $\sigma'^*$ of $\text{GAME}[\xi']$ such that $\sigma^*$ and $\sigma'^*$ lead to the same distributions of equilibrium governments $G^\tau | G^t$ for $\tau > t$.

We establish the relationship between acyclic and order-independent equilibria in Theorem 5.²²

**D. Characterization of Markov Perfect Equilibria**

Recall the mapping $\phi : \mathcal{G} \to \mathcal{G}$ defined by (6). We use the next theorem to establish the equivalence between political equilibria and MPEs in the dynamic noncooperative game.

**Theorem 4.** Consider the game described above. Suppose that Assumptions 1–3 hold and let $\phi : \mathcal{G} \to \mathcal{G}$ be the political

²² One could also require order independence with respect to $\eta$ as well as with respect to $\xi$. It can be easily verified that the equilibria we focus on already satisfy this property and hence, this is not added as a requirement of “order independence” in Definition 5.
equilibrium given by (6). Then there exists $\varepsilon > 0$ such that for any $\beta$ and $r$ satisfying $\beta > 1 - \varepsilon$ and $r/(1 - \beta) < \varepsilon$ and any protocol $\xi \in \mathcal{X}$,

1. There exists an acyclic MPE in pure strategies $\sigma^*$.
2. Take an acyclic MPE in pure or mixed strategies $\sigma^*$. Then we have that, if $\phi(G^0) = G^0$, then there are no transitions; otherwise, with probability 1, there exists a period $t$ where the government $\phi(G^0)$ is proposed, wins the primaries, and wins the power struggle against $G^t$. After that, there are no transitions, so $G^\tau = \phi(G^0)$ for all $\tau \geq t$.

Proof of Theorem 4. Part 1. The proof of this theorem relies on Lemma 1. Let $\beta_0$ be such that for any $\beta > \beta_0$ the following inequalities are satisfied:

(16) for any $G, G', H, H' \in \mathcal{G}$ and $i \in I : w_i(G) < w_i(H)$ implies

$$w_i(G') + \beta^{|G|} w_i(G) < (1 - \beta^{|G|}) w_i(H') + \beta^{|G|} w_i(H).$$

For each $G \in \mathcal{G}$, define the following mapping $\chi_G : \mathcal{G} \to \mathcal{G}$:

$$\chi_G(H) = \begin{cases} 
\phi(H) & \text{if } H \neq G \\
G & \text{if } H = G.
\end{cases}$$

Take any protocol $\xi \in \mathcal{X}$. Now take some node of the game in the beginning of some period $t$ when $\nu^t = u$. Consider the stages of the dynamic game that take place in this period as a finite game by assigning the following payoffs to the terminal nodes:

(17)

$$v_i(G, H) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} w_i(\phi(H)) & \text{if } H \neq G \\
\frac{1 + r\beta}{1 - \beta (1 - r)} w_i(G) + \frac{r\beta^2}{(1 - \beta)(1 - \beta (1 - r))} w_i(\phi(G)) & \text{if } H = G.
\end{cases}$$

where $H = G^{t+1}$ is the government that is scheduled to be in power in period $t + 1$, that is, the government that defeated the incumbent $G^t$ if it was defeated, and $G^t$ itself if it was not. For any such period $t$, take an SPE in pure strategies $\sigma^*_G = \sigma^*_G$ of the truncated game, such that this SPE is the same for any two nodes with the same incumbent government; the latter requirement ensures that once we map these SPEs to a strategy profile $\sigma^*$ of the entire
game \text{GAME}[\xi], this profile will be Markovian. In what follows, we prove that for any \( G \in \mathcal{G} \), (a) if \( \sigma^*_G \) is played, then there is no transition if \( \phi(G) = G \) and there is a transition to \( \phi(G) \) otherwise; and (b) actions in profile \( \sigma^* \) are best responses if continuation payoffs are taken from profile \( \sigma^* \) rather than assumed to be given by (17). These two results will complete the proof of part 1.

We start with part (a). Take any government \( G \) and consider the SPE of the truncated game \( \sigma^*_G \). First, consider the subgame where some alternative \( H \) has won the primaries and challenges the incumbent government \( G \). Clearly, proposal \( H \) will be accepted if and only if \( \phi(H) \succ G \). This implies, in particular, from the construction of mapping \( \phi \), that if \( \phi(G) = G \), then no alternative \( H \) may be accepted. Second, consider the subgame where nominations have been made and the players are voting according to protocol \( \xi \). We prove that if \( \phi(G) \in \mathcal{A} \), then \( \phi(G) \) wins the primaries regardless of \( \xi \) (and subsequently wins against \( G \), as \( \phi(\phi(G)) = \phi(G) > G \). This is proved by backward induction: assuming that \( \phi(G) \) has number \( q \) in the protocol, let us show that if it makes its way to the \( j \)th round, where \( q \leq j \leq |\mathcal{A}| \), then it will win in this round. The base is evident: if \( \phi(G) \) wins in the last round, players will get \( v(G, \phi(G)) = \chi_G(\phi(G)) = \frac{1}{1-\beta} w(\phi(G)) \) (we drop the subscript for the player to refer to \( w \) and \( v \) as vectors of payoffs), whereas if it loses, they get \( v(G, H) \) for some \( H \neq \phi(G) \). Clearly, voting for \( \phi(G) \) is better for a majority of the population, and thus \( \phi(G) \) wins the primaries and defeats \( G \). The step is proven similarly, hence, in the subgame that starts from the \( q \)th round, \( \phi(G) \) defeats the incumbent government. Because this holds irrespective of what happens in previous rounds, this concludes the second step as well. Third, consider the stage where nominations are made, and suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that \( \phi(G) \) is not proposed. Then, in the equilibrium, players get a payoff vector \( v(G, H) \), where \( H \neq \phi(G) \). But then, clearly, any member of \( \phi(G) \) has a profitable deviation, which is to nominate \( \phi(G) \) instead of or in addition to what he or she nominates in profile \( \sigma^*_G \). Because in an SPE there should be no profitable deviations, this completes the proof of part (a).

Part (b) is straightforward. Suppose that the incumbent government is \( G \). If some alternative \( H \) defeats government \( G \), then from part (a), the payoffs that players get starting from next period are given by \( \frac{1}{1-\beta} w_i(H) \) if \( \phi(H) = H \) and \( w_i(H) + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} w_i(\phi(H)) \) otherwise; in either case, the payoff is exactly equal to \( v_i(G, H) \).
POLITICAL SELECTION AND BAD GOVERNMENTS

If no alternative defeats government $G$, then $v^t = s$ (the situation becomes stable), and after that, government $G$ stays until the situation becomes unstable, and government $\phi(G)$ is in power in all periods ever since; this again gives the payoff $\frac{1+r\beta}{1-\beta(1-r)}w_i(G) + \frac{r\beta^2}{(1-\beta)(1-\beta(1-r))}w_i(\phi(G))$. This implies that the continuation payoffs are indeed given by $v_i(G, H)$, which means that if in the entire game profile $\sigma^*$ is played, no player has a profitable deviation. This proves part 1.

Part 2. Suppose $\sigma^*$ is an acyclic MPE. Take any government $G = G_t$ at some period $t$ in some node on or off the equilibrium path. Define binary relation $\rightarrow$ on set $G$ as follows: $G \rightarrow H$ if and only if either $G = H$ and $G$ has a positive probability of staying in power when $G_{t+1} = G$ and $v^t = u$, or $G \neq H$ and $G_{t+1} = H$ with positive probability if $G^t = G$ and $v^t = u$. Define another binary relation $\mapsto\mapsto$ on $G$ as follows: $G \mapsto\mapsto H$ if there is an on-equilibrium path that involves a sequence of transitions from $G$ to $H$ and stabilization of political situation at $H$. Now, because $\sigma^*$ is an acyclic equilibrium, there is no sequence that contains at least two different governments $H_1, \ldots, H_q$ such that $G \rightarrow H_1 \rightarrow H_2 \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow H_q = H$ and $H \rightarrow H$. In other words, $G \mapsto\mapsto H$ if there is an on-equilibrium path that involves a sequence of transitions from $G$ to $H$ and stabilization of political situation at $H$.

Consider the restriction of profile $\sigma^*$ on the part of the game where government $G$ is in power, and call it $\sigma^*_G$. The way we picked $G$ implies that some government may defeat $G$ with a positive probability, and for any such government $H$ the subsequent evolution prescribed by profile $\sigma^*$ does not exhibit any uncertainty, and the political situation will stabilize at the unique government $H' \neq G$ (but perhaps $H' = H$) such that $H \mapsto\mapsto H'$ in no more than $|G| - 2$ steps. Given our assumption (16) and the assumption that $r$ is small, this implies that no player is indifferent between two terminal nodes of this period that ultimately lead to two different governments $H'_1$ and $H'_2$, or between one where $G$ stays and one where it is overthrown. But players act sequentially, one at a time, which means that the last player to act on the equilibrium path when it is still possible to get different outcomes must mix, and
therefore be indifferent. This contradiction proves that for any $G$, government $H$ such that $G \mapsto H$ is well defined. Denote this government by $\psi(G)$.

To complete the proof, we must show that $\psi(G) = \phi(G)$ for all $G$. Suppose not; then, because $\psi(G) > G$ (otherwise $G$ would not be defeated, as players would prefer to stay in $G$), we must have that $\Gamma_{\phi(G)} > \Gamma_{\psi(G)}$. This implies that if some alternative $H$ such that $H \mapsto \phi(G)$ is nominated, it must win the primaries; this is easily shown by backward induction. If no such alternative is nominated, then, because there is a player who prefers $\phi(G)$ to $\psi(G)$ (any member of $\phi(G)$ does), that player would be better off deviating and nominating $\psi(G)$. A deviation is not possible in equilibrium, so $\psi(G) = \phi(G)$ for all $G$. By construction of mapping $\psi$, this implies that there are no transitions if $G = \phi(G)$ and one or more transitions ultimately leading to government $\phi(G)$ otherwise. This completes the proof.

The most important result of this theorem is that any acyclic MPE leads to equilibrium transitions given by the same mapping $\phi$, defined in (6), that characterizes political equilibria as defined in Definition 1. This result thus provides further justification for the notion of political equilibrium used in the paper.

The hypothesis that $r$ is sufficiently small ensures that stable political situations are sufficiently “stable,” so that if the government passes a “no-confidence” vote, it stays in power for a non-trivial amount of time. Such a requirement is important for the existence of an MPE in pure strategies and thus for our characterization of equilibria. It underpins the second requirement in part 2 of Definition 1. Example 7, which is presented next, illustrates the potential for nonexistence of pure strategy MPEs without this assumption.

**Example 7.** Suppose that the society consists of five individuals $1, 2, 3, 4, 5$ $(n = 5)$. Suppose each government consists of two members, so $k = 2$. Suppose also that $l = 1$ and $m = 3$, and $\Gamma_{[i, j]} = 30 - \min(i, j) - 5 \max(i, j)$. Moreover, assume that all individuals care a lot about being in the government and about competence if they are not in the government; however, if an individual compares the utility of being a member of two different governments, he or she is almost indifferent. In this environment, there are two fixed points of mapping $\phi$: $\{1, 2\}$ and $\{3, 4\}$.
Let us show that there is no MPE in pure strategies if $v^t = u$ for all $t$ (so that the incumbent government is contested in each period). Suppose that there is such an equilibrium for some protocol $\xi$. One can easily see that no alternative may win if the incumbent government is $\{1, 2\}$: indeed, if in equilibrium there is a transition to some $G \neq \{1, 2\}$, then in the last vote, when $\{1, 2\}$ is challenged by $G$, both 1 and 2 would be better off rejecting the alternative and postponing the transition to the government (or a chain of governments) that they like less. It is also not hard to show that any of the governments that include 1 or 2 (i.e., $\{1, 3\}$, $\{1, 4\}$, $\{1, 5\}$, $\{2, 3\}$, $\{2, 4\}$, and $\{2, 5\}$) lose the contest for power to $\{1, 2\}$ in equilibrium. Indeed, if $\{1, 2\}$ is included in the primaries, it must be the winner (intuitively, this happens because $\{1, 2\}$ is the Condorcet winner in simple majority voting). Given that, it must always be included in the primaries, for otherwise individual 1 would have a profitable deviation and nominate $\{1, 2\}$. We can now conclude that government $\{3, 4\}$ is stable: any government that includes 1 or 2 will immediately lead to $\{1, 2\}$, which is undesirable for both 3 and 4, whereas $\{3, 5\}$ and $\{4, 5\}$ are worse than $\{3, 4\}$ for 3 and 4 as well; therefore, if there is some transition in equilibrium, then 3 and 4 are better off staying at $\{3, 4\}$ for an extra period, which is a profitable deviation.

We now consider the governments $\{3, 5\}$ and $\{4, 5\}$. First, we rule out the possibility that from $\{3, 5\}$ the individuals move to $\{4, 5\}$ and vice versa. Indeed, if this were the case, then in the last vote when the government was $\{3, 5\}$ and the alternative was $\{4, 5\}$, individuals 1, 2, 3, 5 would be better off blocking this transition (i.e., postponing it for one period). Hence, either one of governments $\{3, 5\}$ and $\{4, 5\}$ is stable or one of them leads to $\{3, 4\}$ in one step or $\{1, 2\}$ in two steps. We consider these three possibilities for the government $\{3, 5\}$ and arrive at a contradiction; the case of $\{4, 5\}$ may be considered similarly and also leads to a contradiction.

It is trivial to see that a transition to $\{1, 2\}$ (in one or two steps) cannot be an equilibrium. If this were the case, then in the last vote, individuals 3 and 5 would block this transition, because they are better off staying in $\{3, 5\}$ for one more period (even if the intermediate step to $\{1, 2\}$ is a government that includes either 3 or 5). This is a profitable deviation that cannot happen in an equilibrium. It is also trivial to check
that \(\{3, 5\}\) cannot be stable. Indeed, if this were the case, then if alternative \(\{3, 4\}\) won the primaries, it would be accepted, as individuals 1, 2, 3, 4 would support it. At the same time, any alternative that would lead to \(\{1, 2\}\) would not be accepted, and neither would alternative \(\{4, 5\}\), unless it led to \(\{3, 4\}\). Because of that, alternative \(\{3, 4\}\) would make its way through the primaries if nominated, for it is better than \(\{3, 5\}\) for a simple majority of individuals. But then \(\{3, 4\}\) must be nominated, for, say, individual 4 is better off if it were, because he or she prefers \(\{3, 4\}\) to \(\{3, 5\}\). Consequently, if \(\{3, 5\}\) were stable, we would get a contradiction, because we proved that in this case, \(\{3, 4\}\) must be nominated, win the primaries, and take over the incumbent government \(\{3, 5\}\).

The remaining case to consider is where from \(\{3, 5\}\) the individuals transit to \(\{3, 4\}\). Note that in this case, alternative \(\{1, 2\}\) would be accepted if it won the primaries: indeed, individuals 1 and 2 prefer \(\{1, 2\}\) over \(\{3, 4\}\) for obvious reasons, but individual 5 is also better off if \(\{1, 2\}\) is accepted, even if the former grants him an extra period of staying in power (as the discount factor \(\beta\) is close to 1). Similarly, any alternative that would lead to \(\{1, 2\}\) in the next period must also be accepted in the last vote. This implies, however, that the alternative (\(\{1, 2\}\) or some other one that leads to \(\{1, 2\}\)) must necessarily win the primaries if nominated (by the previous discussion, \(\{4, 5\}\) may not be a stable government, and hence the only choice the individuals make is whether to move ultimately to \(\{3, 4\}\) or to \(\{1, 2\}\), of which they prefer the latter). This, in turn, means that \(\{1, 2\}\) must be nominated, for otherwise, say, individual 1 would be better off doing that. Hence, we have come to a contradiction in all possible cases, which proves that for no protocol \(\xi\) a MPE exists in pure strategies. Thus, the proof that both cyclic and acyclic MPEs do not exist is complete.

E. Cycles, Acyclicity, and Order-Independent Equilibria

The acyclicity requirement in Theorem 4 (similar to the requirement of acyclic political equilibrium in Theorem 1) is not redundant. We next provide an example of a cyclic MPE.

Example 8. Consider a society consisting of five individuals (\(n = 5\)). The only feasible governments are \(\{1\}\), \(\{2\}\), \(\{3\}\), \(\{4\}\), \(\{5\}\). Suppose that there is “perfect democracy,” that is, \(l_G = l = 0\) for \(G \in \mathcal{G}^k\), and that voting takes the form of simple majority.
rule, that is, \( m_G = m = 3 \) for all \( G \). Suppose also that the competences of different feasible governments are given by \( \Gamma_G \), so \( \{1\} \) is the best government. Assume also that stage payoffs are given as in Example 2. In particular, \( w_i(G) = \Gamma_G + 100I_{i \in G} \). These utilities imply that each individual receives a high value from being part of the government relative to the utility he or she receives from government competence.

Finally, we define the protocols \( \xi_G^A \) as follows. If \( G = \{1\} \), then \( \xi_G^G = \xi_1^{(1, 3, 4, 5)} = ((3), (4), (5), (2)) \) and \( \xi_G^A \) for \( A \neq \{(3), (4), (5), (2)\} \) is obtained from \( \xi_1^{(1, 3, 4, 5)} \) by dropping governments that are not in \( A \): for example, \( \xi_1^{(1, 3, 4, 5)} = ((3), (5), (2)) \). For other governments, we define \( \xi_2^{(1, 3, 4, 5)} = ((4), (5), (1), (3)) \), \( \xi_3^{(1, 2, 4, 5)} = ((5), (1), (2), (4)) \), \( \xi_4^{(1, 2, 3, 5)} = ((1), (2), (3), (5)) \) and \( \xi_5^{(1, 2, 3, 4)} = ((2), (3), (4), (1)) \), and for other \( A \) again define \( \xi_G^A \) by dropping the governments absent in \( A \). Then there exists an equilibrium where the governments follow a cycle of the form \( 5 \rightarrow 4 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 1 \rightarrow 5 \rightarrow \ldots \).

To verify this claim, consider the following nomination strategies by the individuals. If the government is \( \{1\} \), two individuals nominate \( \{2\} \) and the other three nominate \( \{5\} \); if it is \( \{2\} \), two individuals nominate \( \{3\} \) and three nominate \( \{1\} \); if it is \( \{3\} \), two nominate \( \{4\} \) and three nominate \( \{2\} \); if it is \( \{4\} \), two nominate \( \{5\} \) and three nominate \( \{3\} \); if it is \( \{5\} \), two nominate \( \{1\} \) and three nominate \( \{4\} \).

Let us next turn to voting strategies. Here we appeal to Lemma 1 from Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008), which shows that in this class of games, it is sufficient to focus on strategies in which individuals always vote for the alternative yielding the highest payoff for them at each stage. In equilibrium, any alternative government that wins the primaries, on or off equilibrium path, subsequently wins against the incumbent government. In particular, in such an equilibrium, supporting the incumbent government breaks a cycle, but only one person (the member of the incumbent government) is in favor of it. We next show if only one individual deviates in the nomination stage, the next government in the cycle still wins in the primaries. Suppose that the current government is \( \{3\} \) (other cases are treated similarly). Then by
construction, governments \{2\} and \{4\} are necessarily nominated, and \{1\} or \{5\} may either be nominated or not. If the last vote in the primaries is between \{2\} and \{4\}, then \{2\} wins: indeed, all individuals know that both alternatives can take over the incumbent government, but \{2\} is preferred by individuals 1, 2, and 5 (because they want to be government members earlier rather than later). If, however, the last stage involves voting between \{4\} on the one hand and either \{1\} or \{5\} on the other, then \{4\} wins for similar reason. Now, if either \{1\} or \{5\} is nominated, then in the first voting it is voted against \{2\}. All individuals know that accepting \{2\} will ultimately lead to a transition to \{2\}, whereas supporting \{1\} or \{5\} will lead to \{4\}. Because of that, at least three individuals (1, 2, 5) will support \{2\}. This proves that \{2\} will win against the incumbent government \{3\}, provided that \{2\} and \{4\} participate in the primaries, which is necessarily the case if no more than one individual deviates. This, in turn, implies that nomination strategies are also optimal in the sense that there is no profitable one-shot deviation for any individual. We can easily verify that this holds for other incumbent governments as well.

We have thus proved that the strategies we constructed form SPE; because they are also Markovian, it is an MPE as well. Along the equilibrium path, the governments follow a cycle \{5\} → \{4\} → \{3\} → \{2\} → \{1\} → \{5\} → ···. We can similarly construct a cycle that moves in the other direction: \{1\} → \{2\} → \{3\} → \{4\} → \{5\} → \{1\} → ··· (though this would require different protocols). Hence, for some protocols, cyclic equilibria are possible.

Intuitively, a cycle enables different individuals that will not be part of the limiting (stable) government to enjoy the benefits of being in power. This example, and the intuition we suggest, also highlight that even when there is a cyclic equilibrium, an acyclic equilibrium still exists. (This is clear from the statement in Theorem 1, and also from Theorem 5.) Example 8 also makes it clear that cyclic equilibria are somewhat artificial and less robust. Moreover, as emphasized in Theorems 1 and 4, acyclic equilibria have an intuitive and economically meaningful structure. In the text, we showed how certain natural restrictions rule out cyclic political equilibria (Theorem 2). Here we take a complementary approach and show that the refinement of MPE introduced
above, *order-independent equilibrium*, is also sufficient to rule out cyclic equilibria (even without the conditions in Theorem 2). This is established in Theorem 5 below, which also shows that with order-independent MPE, multi-step transitions, which are possible under MPE as shown in the next example, will also be ruled out.

**Example 9.** Take the setup of Example 8, with the exception that $l_{\{1\}} = 1$ (so that consent of individual 1 is needed to change the government when the government is $\{1\}$). It is easy to check that the strategy profile constructed in Example 8 is an MPE in this case as well. However, this strategy profile will lead to different equilibrium transitions. Indeed, if the government is $\{1\}$, individual 1 will vote against any alternative which wins the primaries, and thus alternative $\{5\}$ will not be accepted in equilibrium, so government $\{1\}$ will persist. Hence, in equilibrium, the transitions are as follows: $\{5\} \rightarrow \{4\} \rightarrow \{3\} \rightarrow \{2\} \rightarrow \{1\}$.

We now establish that order-independent equilibria always exist, are always acyclic, and lead to rapid (one-step) equilibrium transitions. As such, this theorem will be a strong complement to Theorem 2 in the text, though its proof requires a slightly stronger version of Assumption 3, which we now introduce.

**Assumption 3′.** For any $i \in I$ and any sequence of feasible governments, $H_1, H_2, \ldots, H_q \in \mathcal{G}$ which include at least two different ones, we have

$$w_i(H_1) \neq \frac{\sum_{j=2}^{q} w_i(H_j)}{q - 1}.$$

Recall that Assumption 3 imposed that no two feasible governments have exactly the same competence. Assumption 3′ strengthens this and requires that the competence of any government should not be the average of the competences of other feasible governments. Like Assumption 3, Assumption 3′ is satisfied “generically,” in the sense that if it were not satisfied for a society, any small perturbation of competence levels would restore it.

**Theorem 5.** Consider the game described above. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2, and 3′ hold and let $\phi: \mathcal{G} \rightarrow \mathcal{G}$ be the political equilibrium defined by (6). Then there exists $\varepsilon > 0$ such that
for any $\beta$ and $r$ satisfying $\beta > 1 - \varepsilon$ and $r/(1 - \beta) < \varepsilon$ and any protocol $\xi \in \mathcal{X}$:

1. There exists an order-independent MPE in pure strategies $\sigma^*$.
2. Any order-independent MPE in pure strategies $\sigma^*$ is acyclic.
3. In any order-independent MPE $\sigma^*$, we have that, if $\phi(G^0) = G^0$, then there are no transitions and government $G^t = G^0$ for each $t$; if $\phi(G^0) \neq G^0$, then there is a transition from $G^0$ to $\phi(G^0)$ in period $t = 0$, and there are no more transitions: $G^t = \phi(G^0)$ for all $t \geq 1$.
4. In any order-independent MPE $\sigma^*$, the payoff of each individual $i \in \mathcal{I}$ is given by

$$u^0_i = w_i(G^0) + \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} w_i(\phi(G^0)).$$

Proof of Theorem 5. See Online Appendix B. ■

F. Stochastic Markov Perfect Equilibria

We next characterize the structure of (order-independent) stochastic MPEs (that is, order-independent MPEs in the presence of stochastic shocks) and establish the equivalence between order-independent (or acyclic) MPE and our notion of (acyclic stochastic) political equilibrium. Once again, the most important conclusion from this theorem is that MPE of the dynamic game discussed here under stochastic shocks lead to the same behavior as our notion of stochastic political equilibrium introduced in Definition 2.

THEOREM 6. Consider the above-described stochastic environment. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2, 3', and 4 hold. Let $\phi^t : G \rightarrow G$ be the political equilibrium defined by (6) for $\Gamma^t_G$. Then there exists $\varepsilon > 0$ such that for any $\beta$ and $r$ satisfying $\beta > 1 - \varepsilon$, $r/(1 - \beta) < \varepsilon$, and $\delta < \varepsilon$, for any protocol $\xi \in \mathcal{X}$, we have the following results:

1. There exists an order-independent MPE in pure strategies.
2. Suppose that between periods $t_1$ and $t_2$ there are no shocks. Then in any order-independent MPE in pure strategies, the following results hold: if $\phi(G^{t_1}) = G^{t_1}$, then there are no transitions between $t_1$ and $t_2$; if $\phi(G^{t_1}) \neq G^{t_1}$, then alternative $\phi(G^{t_1})$ is accepted during the first period of instability (after $t_1$).
Proof of Theorem 6. See Online Appendix B. ■

G. Additional Examples

The next example (Example 10) shows that in stochastic environments, even though the likelihood of the best government coming to power is higher under more democratic institutions, the expected competence of stable governments may be lower.

Example 10. Suppose \( n = 9, k = 4, l = l_1 = 3, m = 5 \). Let the individuals be denoted 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, with decreasing ability. Namely, suppose that the abilities of individuals 1, \ldots, 8 are given by \( \gamma_i = 2^{8-i} \), and \( \gamma_9 = -10^6 \). Then the 14 stable governments, in the order of decreasing competence, are given as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\{1, 2, 3, 4\} & \quad \{2, 3, 5, 8\} \\
\{1, 2, 5, 6\} & \quad \{2, 3, 6, 7\} \\
\{1, 2, 7, 8\} & \quad \{2, 4, 5, 7\} \\
\{1, 3, 5, 7\} & \quad \{2, 4, 6, 7\} \\
\{1, 3, 6, 8\} & \quad \{3, 4, 5, 6\} \\
\{1, 4, 5, 8\} & \quad \{3, 4, 7, 8\} \\
\{1, 4, 6, 7\} & \quad \{5, 6, 7, 8\}
\end{align*}
\]

(Note that this would be the list of stable governments for any decreasing sequence \( \{\gamma_i\}_{i=1}^9 \), except that, say, \( \Gamma_{\{1368\}} \) may become less competent than \( \Gamma_{\{1458\}} \).) Now consider the same parameters, but take \( l = l_2 = 2 \). Then there are three stable governments \( \{1, 2, 3, 4\}, \{1, 5, 6, 7\}, \) and \( \{2, 5, 8, 9\} \). For a random initial government, the probability that individual 9 will be a part of the stable government that evolves is \( 9/126 = 1/16 \): of \( \binom{9}{4} = 126 \) feasible governments there are 9 governments that lead to \( \{2, 5, 8, 9\} \), which are \( \{2, 5, 8, 9\}, \{2, 6, 8, 9\}, \{2, 7, 8, 9\}, \{3, 5, 8, 9\}, \{3, 6, 8, 9\}, \{3, 7, 8, 9\}, \{4, 5, 8, 9\}, \{4, 6, 8, 9\}, \) and \( \{4, 7, 8, 9\} \). Clearly, the expected competence of government for \( l_2 = 2 \) is negative, whereas for \( l_1 = 1 \) it is positive, as no stable government includes the least competent individual 9.

Next, we provide an example (Example 11) of a cyclic political equilibrium.

Example 11. There are \( n = 19 \) players and three feasible governments: \( A = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7\}, B = \{7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13\}, C = \{13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19\} \) (so \( k = 7 \)). The discount factor
is sufficiently close to 1, say, $\beta > 0.999$. The institutional parameters of these governments and players’ utilities from them are given in the following table:

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We claim that $\phi$, given by $\phi(A) = C$, $\phi(B) = A$, $\phi(C) = B$ is a (cyclic) political equilibrium. Let us first check property (ii) of Definition 1. The set of players with $V_i(C) > V_i(A)$ is $\{10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19\}$ (as $\beta$ is close to 1, the simplest way to check this condition for player $i$ is to verify whether $w_i(A)$ is greater or less than the average of $w_i(A)$, $w_i(B)$, $w_i(C)$; the case where these are equal deserves more detailed study, and is critical for this example). These ten players form a winning coalition in $A$. The set of players with $V_i(A) > V_i(B)$ is $\{2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19\}$; these eleven players form a winning coalition in $B$. The set of players with $V_i(B) > V_i(C)$ is $\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12\}$; these twelve players form a winning coalition in $C$.

Let us now check condition (ii) of Definition 1. Suppose the current government is $A$; then the only $H$ we need to consider is $B$. Indeed, if $H = C$ then $V_i(H) > V_i(\phi(A)) = V_i(C)$ is impossible for any player, and if $H = A$, then $V_i(H) > V_i(\phi(A))$ cannot hold for a winning coalition of players, as the opposite inequality $V_i(\phi(A)) > V_i(A)$ holds for a winning coalition (condition (i)), and any two winning coalitions intersect in this example. But for $H = B$, condition (ii) of Definition 1 is also satisfied, as $V_i(B) > w_i(A)/(1 - \beta)$ holds for players from the set $\{10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18\}$ only, which is not a winning coalition, as there are only nine players (we used the fact that player 19 has $V_i(A) > V_i(B)$, but $V_i(B) > w_i(A)/(1 - \beta)$ for $\beta$ close to 1, as 45 is the average of 20 and 70). If the current government is $B$, then, as before, only government $H = C$ needs to be considered. But $V_i(C) > V_i(A)$ holds for ten players only, and this is not a winning coalition in $B$. Finally, if the current government is $C$, then again, only the case $H = A$ needs to be checked. But $V_i(A) > V_i(B)$ holds for only eleven players, and this is not a winning coalition in $C$. So both conditions of Definition 1 are satisfied, and thus $\phi$ is a cyclic political equilibrium.
The results in the paper are obtained for $\beta$ close to 1 (and in the case with shocks, for $r$ small). If $\beta$ is close to 0, then an MPE in pure strategies always exists (in the stochastic case, it does for any $r$). In fact, it is straightforward to show that the equilibrium mapping $\phi_0$ takes the following form (again, assuming that governments are enumerated from the best one to the worst one): for all $q \geq 1$, define
\[ N_q = \{ j : 1 \leq j < q, |G_j \cap G_q| \geq l \}, \]
and then, as in the case with $\beta$ close to 1, define $\phi_0$ by
\[ \phi_0(G_q) = \begin{cases} G_q & \text{if } N_q = \emptyset; \\ G_{\min \{ j \in N_q \}} & \text{if } N_q \neq \emptyset. \end{cases} \]
Intuitively, $\beta = 0$, or close to 0, corresponds to myopic players, and the equilibrium mapping simply defines the best government that includes at least $l$ members from the current government. Consequently, there is no longer any requirement related to the stability of the new government $\phi(G)$, which resulted from dynamic considerations.

We now demonstrate (Example 12) that for intermediate values of $\beta$, the situation is significantly different (and the same argument applies when $r$ is not close to 0): there might not exist an MPE in pure strategies.

**Example 12.** Set $\beta = 1/2$, and suppose $n = 5$. Assume $k = 2$ and $l = 1$. That is, feasible governments consist of two players, and a transition requires the consent of a simple majority of individuals which must include a member of the incumbent government. For simplicity, restrict the set of feasible governments, $G$, to four elements: \{1, 2\}, \{1, 3\}, \{2, 4\}, \{3, 4\}. Preferences of players over these governments are defined in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$G$</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>{1, 2}</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>{1, 3}</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>{2, 4}</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>{3, 4}</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this example, 5 is a “dummy player” who always prefers more competent governments because he has no opportunity to become a member of the government. Players 1 and 2 have well-behaved preferences, so governments \{1, 3\} and \{2, 4\}...
would lead to \( \{1, 2\} \) in one step. Both 1 and 2 value their own membership in the government much more than the quality of governments they are not members of, so transitions from \( \{1, 3\} \) and \( \{2, 4\} \) to these governments will not happen in equilibrium. Player 3 also prefers to stay in \( \{3, 4\} \) forever rather than moving to \( \{1, 2\} \) via \( \{1, 3\} \). In contrast, player 4 would prefer to transit to \( \{1, 2\} \) through \( \{2, 4\} \) rather than staying in \( \{3, 4\} \) forever. The majority, however, prefers the latter transition to the former one, and these considerations together lead to nonexistence.

To obtain a contradiction, suppose that there exists a MPE in pure strategies that implements some transition rule \( \phi \). First, we prove that \( \phi(\{1, 2\}) = \phi(\{1, 3\}) = \{1, 2\} \). Then we will show that \( \phi(\{3, 4\}) \) cannot be any of the feasible governments.

It is straightforward that \( \phi(\{1, 2\}) = \{1, 2\} \) as otherwise 1 and 2 would block the last transition, as they prefer to stay in \( \{1, 2\} \) for one more period. Now let us take government \( \{1, 3\} \), and prove that \( \phi(\{1, 3\}) = \{1, 2\} \). To show this, notice first that a transition to \( \{2, 4\} \) or \( \{3, 4\} \) would never be approved at the last voting, no matter what the equilibrium transition from \( \{1, 3\} \) is. Indeed, a transition to \( \{2, 4\} \) will ultimately be blocked by 1, 3, 5, for each of whom a single period in \( \{2, 4\} \) is worse than staying in \( \{1, 3\} \) for one period, no matter what the subsequent path is; this follows from evaluating discounted utilities with \( \beta = 1/2 \). A transition to \( \{3, 4\} \) will be blocked by 1, 2, 5 for similar reasons. But then it is easy to see that \( \{1, 3\} \) cannot be stable either. Indeed, if alternative \( \{1, 2\} \) is proposed for the primaries, then the ultimate choice that players make is between staying in \( \{1, 3\} \) and transiting to \( \{1, 2\} \), as transiting to any of the other two governments is not an option, as such a transition would be blocked at the last stage. But a transition to \( \{1, 2\} \) is preferred by all players except 3; hence, it will eventually be the outcome of the primaries and will defeat \( \{1, 3\} \) in the election stage. Anticipating this, if \( \{1, 2\} \) is not in the primaries in equilibrium player 1 is better off proposing \( \{1, 2\} \), and this is a profitable deviation. This proves that \( \phi(\{1, 3\}) = \{1, 2\} \).

Our next step is to prove that \( \phi(\{2, 4\}) = \{1, 2\} \). A transition to \( \{3, 4\} \) will be blocked at the last stage regardless of the equilibrium transition rule, because both 2 and 4 are worse off, and one incumbent is needed. The same is true about a transition to \( \{1, 3\} \). Hence, \( \{2, 4\} \) is either stable or must
transition to \{1, 2\}; an argument similar to the one before shows that \{2, 4\} cannot be stable, as then alternative \{1, 2\} would win the primaries and be implemented, and therefore some player will propose it for the primaries. This shows that \(\phi(\{2, 4\}) = \{1, 2\}\).

Finally, consider state \{3, 4\}. It is easy to see that \(\phi(\{3, 4\})\) cannot equal \{1, 2\}. Moreover, an immediate transition to \{1, 2\} will not be accepted at the last voting stage regardless of the equilibrium transition, because both 3 and 4 would prefer to stay in \{3, 4\} for an extra period (indeed, even if in the next period they expect to transition to the state they like least, such as \{1, 3\} for player 4, staying in \{3, 4\} is still preferred as they know that the next transition would be to \{1, 2\} anyway).

Consequently, there are three possibilities. Consider first the case where \{3, 4\} is stable. This means that an offer to move to \{1, 3\} would be blocked by 3 and 4 (both get a lower expected utility from that then from staying in \{3, 4\}). Hence, the only alternative that may be accepted is \{2, 4\}, and it will actually be accepted if proposed for primaries, as it gives a higher discounted utility to players 1, 2, 4, 5 than staying in \{3, 4\}. The same reasoning as before suggests that it will then be nominated for primaries, which in turn means that \{3, 4\} cannot be stable.

Consider the possibility that \(\phi(\{3, 4\}) = \{2, 4\}\). If this is the case, then alternative \{1, 3\} would be accepted, if it makes its way to the final voting. Indeed, for players 1, 3, 5 (and perhaps even player 2, depending on the value of \(r\)), transiting to \{1, 3\} is preferred to staying in \{3, 4\}, even if eventually a transition to \{2, 4\} will happen. Hence, if some player nominates \{1, 3\}, then players will compare transiting to \{1, 3\} to transiting \{2, 4\} and staying in \{3, 4\}, and here \{1, 3\} is the Condorcet winner: it beats staying in \{3, 4\} as we just proved, and it beats transiting to \{2, 4\} because 1, 3, 5 prefer transiting to \{1, 2\} via \{1, 3\} than via \{2, 4\}. Consequently, \{1, 3\} will be implemented if nominated, and hence some player, say, 1, will be better off nominating it. Consequently, \(\phi(\{3, 4\}) = \{2, 4\}\) is impossible.

The last possibility is that \(\phi(\{3, 4\}) = \{1, 3\}\). But then, given \(\beta = 1/2\), both 3 and 4 are better off blocking this transition to \{1, 3\} at the final voting in order to stay in \{3, 4\} for at least one more period (and perhaps more, depending on \(r\)). This
shows that a transition to \(\{1, 3\}\) cannot happen in equilibrium. This final contradiction shows that there is no MPE in pure strategies in this example.

**REFERENCES**


