James Schummer
James Schummer

Associate Professor of Managerial Economics & Decision Sciences

Print Overview

James Schummer joined Kellogg in 1997 after getting his PhD in Economics from the University of Rochester. His research areas include game theory and mechanism design.

Within those areas, Professor Schummer's work ranges from foundational models, yielding qualitative insights, to more practical models, yielding more direct advice. A central theme in his work is the question: Taking incentives into account, how can goods best be (re)allocated?  Professor Schummer's past work on auctions is an example of this. He is currently working on the design of incentive mechanisms for the reallocation of airport landing slots, the assignment of randomly arriving objects, and on matching and scheduling platforms.



Areas of Expertise
Game Theory
Mechanism Design
Applied Probability

Print Vita
PhD, 1997, Economics, University of Rochester
MA, 1995, Economics, University of Rochester
BS, 1992, Finance, Pennsylvania State University

Academic Positions
Associate Professor of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2004-present
Assistant Professor of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 1997-2004
Graduate Teaching Fellow, University of Rochester, 1996-1997

Editorial Positions
Associate Editor, Mathematical Social Sciences, 2009-present

Print Research
Research Interests

Game Theory, Mechanism and Market design, Collective Decision-making.

Schummer, James and Rakesh Vohra. 2013. Assignment of Arrival Slots. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 5(2): 164-185.
Bikhchandani, Sushil, Sven de Vries, James Schummer and Rakesh Vohra. 2011. An Ascending Vickrey Auction for Selling Bases of a Matroid. Operations Research. 59(2): 400-413.
Eso, Peter and James Schummer. 2009. Credible Deviations from Signaling Equilibria. International Journal of Game Theory. 48(3): 411-430.
de Vries, Sven, James Schummer and Rakesh Vohra. 2007. On Ascending Vickrey Auctions for Heterogeneous Objects. Journal of Economic Theory. 132(1): 95-118.
Schummer, James. 2004. Almost-Dominant Strategy Implementation: Exchange Economies. Games and Economic Behavior. 48(1): 321-336.
Eso, Peter and James Schummer. 2004. Bribing and signaling in second price auctions. Games and Economic Behavior. 47(2): 299-324.
Schummer, James and Rakesh Vohra. 2003. Auctions for Procuring Options. Operations Research. 51(1): 41-51.
Schummer, James and Rakesh Vohra. 2002. Strategy-Proof Location on a Network. Journal of Economic Theory. 104(2): 405-428.
Chun, Youngsub, James Schummer and William Thomson. 2001. Constrained Egalitarianism: A New Solution for Claims Problems. Seoul Journal of Economics. 14(3)
Schummer, James. 2000. Manipulation through Bribes. Journal of Economic Theory. 91(2): 180-198.
Schummer, James. 2000. Eliciting Preferences to Assign Positions and Compensation. Games and Economic Behavior. 30(2): 293-318.
Schummer, James. 1997. Strategy-proofness vs. Efficiency on Restricted Domains of Exchange Economies. Social Choice and Welfare. 14(3): 47-56.
Schummer, James. 1999. Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency for Small Domains of Preferences over Public Goods. Economic Theory. 13(3): 709-722.
Schummer, James and William Thomson. 1997. Two Derivations of the Uniform Rule and an Application to Bankruptcy. Economics Letters. 55(3): 333-337.
Working Papers
Schummer, James and Azar Abizada. 2014. Incentives in Landing Slot Problems.
Schummer, James. 2015. Influencing Waiting Lists.
Schummer, James and R. Velez. 2016. Sequential Preference Revelation in Incomplete Information Settings.
Book Chapters
Schummer, James and Rakesh Vohra. 2007. "Mechanism Design without Money." In Algorithmic Game Theory, edited by Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos, Vijay V. Vazirani, 243-266. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Bikhchandani, Sushil, Sven de Vries, James Schummer and Rakesh Vohra. 2002. "Linear Programming and Vickrey Auctions." In Mathematics of the Internet: E-auction and Markets, edited by B. Dietrich and R. Vohra, 75-116. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Print Teaching
Teaching Interests

Probability and statistics; microeconomics; pricing; matching (PhD).

Full-Time / Part-Time MBA
Business Analytics I (DECS-430-5)
This course was formerly known as DECS 430-A/DECS 430-B
This course is equivalent to the MMM core course MMM Business Analytics (DECS-440) Analytics is the discovery and communication of meaningful patterns in data. This course will provide students with an analytics toolkit, reinforcing basic probability and statistics while throughout emphasizing the value and pitfalls of reasoning with data. Applications will focus on connections among analytical tools, data, and business decision-making.

Full-Time students are required to complete the Business Analytics Prep Course

Part-Time Students are required to complete the Business Analytics Prep Course

Pricing Strategies (MECN-446-0)
This course provides students with a comprehensive framework for formulating and implementing pricing strategies. Techniques that take account of the often imprecise and uncertain information to which management has access are used to analyze the influence of costs, demand and competition on the pricing decision. Also discussed are research methods that can complement managerial judgment and the importance of maintaining consistency with other elements of the marketing mix. Special attention is devoted to the design of pricing schemes that segment the market, such as peak-load pricing, product bundling and nonlinear pricing. The course also studies vertical pricing problems (transfer pricing, pricing and distribution), legal constraints on pricing and industrial pricing (bidding). Actual pricing schemes in various industries and selected cases are used for illustrative and analytical purposes.

Executive MBA
Managerial Economics (MECNX-430-0)
Managerial Economics introduces the economic principles of pricing. It provides an overview of methods to estimate sensitivity of buyers to price, the trade-off between margin and volume, price discrimination and pricing in competitive environments.

Selected Topics in Economic Theory (MECS-468-2)
Students are exposed to the classic and cutting-edge papers in the area of repeated games with incomplete information, or more commonly known as reputation models. The course begins with the classic papers (Kreps, Wilson, Milgrom and Roberts) with further study focusing on Fudenberg and Levine's model, bargaining games (Abreu and Gul), and the recent developments in repeated games equally patient players. The first half of the class consists of lectures; the second half shifts to student presentations, drawing from applied or theory papers. Grading is based on student presentations and class participation.

Research (MECS-590-0)
Students preparing dissertations in managerial economics and strategy may register under this heading.

Executive Education
Supply Chain Management: Strategy and Planning for Effective Operations
Revolutionize your operations. In this dynamic and collaborative learning environment, you’ll learn the latest tools, techniques and models for efficient — and effective — supply chain management.

View Program