Nicola Persico
Nicola Persico

MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS & DECISION SCIENCES
Professor of Managerial Economics & Decision Sciences
Director of the Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics & Management

Print Overview

Dr. Persico is a Professor of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences at Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Management. He received his PhD in Economics from Northwestern University in 1996, and spent one year on the faculty at UCLA prior to joining Penn in 1997, where he was granted tenure. He moved to NYU in 2006 as Professor of Economics, and Professor of Law and Society. Dr. Persico joined, Kellogg in 2011. Dr. Persico has received a number of honors and fellowships, including several National Science Foundation Grants, and he was an Alfred P. Sloan research fellow from 2002-2004. He served on the editorial board of the International Economic Review, has been associate editor of Econometrica, and of the Journal of the European Economic Association. He is currently associate editor of The American Economic Review, and co-editor of Theoretical Economics. Dr. Persico has published in the areas of political economy, discrimination, and law and economics.



Areas of Expertise
Contract Theory
Economics of Organizations
Game Theory
Microeconomics
Political Economy/Design
Voting Systems
Print Vita
Education
PhD, 1996, Economics, Northwestern University
PhD, 1995, Mathematical Economics , Trieste, Italy
Laurea, 1991, Economics, Università Bocconi, Magna cum Laude

Academic Positions
Research Associate, NBER, 2006-present
Professor, Economics and Law and Society, New York University, 2006-present
Assistant Professor, Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 2001-2006
Visiting Fellow, Economics, Princeton University, 2001-2001
Assistant Professor, Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 1997-2001
Assistant Professor, Economics, UCLA, 1996-1997

Editorial Positions
Co-Editor, Theoretical Economics, 2011-present
Board of Editors, American Economic Review, 2009-present
Associate Editor, Econometrica, 2009-2011
Associate Editor, Journal of the European Economic Association, 2009-2011

 
Print Research
Research Interests
Contract Theory, Economics of Organizations, Political Economy/Design, Voting Systems, Microeconomics, Game Theory

Articles
Persico, Nicola. Forthcoming. Evidence of Discrimination. Journal of Legal Studies.
Persico, Nicola, Edoardo DiPorto and Nicolas Sahuguet. 2013. Decentralized Deterrence, with an Application to labor Tax Auditing. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 5(1): 35-62.
Persico, Nicola, Manolis Galenianos and Rosalie Liccardo. 2011. A Search-Theoretic Model of the Retail Market for Illicit Drugs. The Review of Economic Studies. 79(2): 1239-1269.
Persico, Nicola, Benjamin Lester and Ludo Visschers. 2012. Information Acquisition and the Exclusion of Evidence in Trials. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. 28(1): 163-182.
Persico, Nicola, Dan Silverman and Jose-Carlos Rodriguez-Pueblita. 2011. Factions and Political Competition. Journal of Political Economy. 119(2): 242-288.
Persico, Nicola, Jan Eeckhout and Petra Todd. 2010. A Theory of Optimal Random Crackdowns. American Economic Review. 100(3): 1104-35.
Persico, Nicola. 2009. Racial Profiling? Detecting Bias Using Statistical Evidence. Annual Review of Economics. 1: 229-54.
Persico, Nicola and Petra Todd. 2008. The hit rates test for racial bias in motor-vehicle searches. Justice Quarterly. 25(1): 37-53.
Persico, Nicola and Petra Todd. 2006. Generalising the Hit Rates Test for Racial Bias in Law Enforcement, with an Application to Vehicle Searches in Wichita. The Economic Journal. 116: F351-F367.
Persico, Nicola and Nicolas Sahuguet. 2006. Campaign Spending Regulation in a Model of Redistributive Politics. Economic Theory. 28(1): 95-124.
Persico, Nicola and Alessandro Lizzeri. 2005. A Drawback of Electoral Competition. Journal of the European Economic Association. 3(4): 1318-1348.
Persico, Nicola and Steven Matthews. 2005. Information Acquisition and the Excess Refund Puzzle. Mimeo, University of Pennsylvania.: 1-38.
Persico, Nicola and Petra Todd. 2005. Passenger Profiling, Imperfect Screening, and Airport Security. American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings.: 127-31.
Persico, Nicola and David Castleman. 2005. Detecting Bias: Using Statistical Evidence to Establish Intentional Discrimination in Racial Profiling Cases. University of Chicago Legal Forum.: 217-35.
Persico, Nicola, Andrew Postlewaite and Dan Silverman. 2004. The Effect of Adolescent Experience on Labor Market Outcomes: The Case of Height. Journal of Political Economy. 112(5): 1019-53.
Persico, Nicola and Alessandro Lizzeri. 2004. Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, With an Application to Britain’s ‘Age of Reform. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 119(2): 707–765.
Persico, Nicola. 2004. Committee Design with Endogenous Information. Review of Economic Studies. 71(1): 165-94.
Persico, Nicola. 2002. Racial Profiling, Fairness, and Effectiveness of Policing. American Economic Review. 92(5): 1472-97.
Persico, Nicola and Alessandro Lizzeri. 2001. The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives. American Economic Review. 91(1): 225-39.
Persico, Nicola, John Knowles and Petra Todd. 2001. Racial Bias in Motor-Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Political Economy. 109(1): 203-29.
Persico, Nicola. 2000. Games of Redistributive Politics Are Equivalent to All-Pay Auctions With Consolation Prizes. Mimeo, University of Pennsylvania.: 1-9.
Persico, Nicola. 2000. Information Acquisition in Auctions. Econometrica. 68(1): 135-48.
Persico, Nicola and Alessandro Lizzeri. 2000. Uniqueness and Existence of Equilibrium in Auctions with a Reserve Price. Games and Economic Behavior. 30(1): 83-114.
Working Papers
Persico, Nicola and Oren Bar-Gill. 2013. Exchange Efficiency with Weak Property Rights.
Persico, Nicola. 2013. The Political Economy of Occupational Licensing Associations.
Persico, Nicola, Decio Coviello and Andrea Ichino. 2010. Don't Spread Yourself Too Thin: The impact of task juggling on workers' speed of job completion.
Persico, Nicola. 2010. Generic Uniqueness of the Solutions to a Continuous Linear Programming Problem.
Book Chapters
Persico, Nicola and Alessandro Lizzeri. 2009. "Electoral Incentives, Political Risk-Taking and Policy Reform." In The Political Economy of Democracy, edited by E. Aragones, C. Bevia, H. Llavador, N. Schofield, Fundación BBVA.
Persico, Nicola and Luigi Montrucchio. 1993. "Acyclicity of Optimal Paths." In Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Social Sciences, edited by F. Gori, L. Geronazzo, M. Galeotti, 283-95. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.
Cases
Minor, Dylan and Nicola Persico. 2013. The Volcker Rule: Financial Crisis, Bailouts, and the Need for Financial Regulation. Case 5-412-753 (KEL703).

 
Print Teaching
Teaching Interests
Political Economy, Business Strategy
Full-Time / Part-Time MBA
Leadership and Crisis Management (KPPI-440-A)

This course counts toward the following majors: Social Enterprise

Formerly SEEK-440-A

In recent decades corporations have increasingly become the dominant source for political and social change. Increased globalization and technological progress have further accelerated this process. Businesses are now held accountable by standards other than legal compliance or financial performance. Successful business leaders have recognized that these challenges are best mastered by a commitment to values-based management. However, simply "doing the right thing" is not enough. Rather, companies increasingly find themselves as targets of aggressive legal action, media coverage and social pressure. Organizations must be prepared to handle rapidly changing environments and anticipate potential threats. This requires a deep understanding of the strategic complexities in managing various stakeholders and constituencies. To confront students with these challenges in a realistic fashion, the class is structured around a rich set of challenging case studies and crisis simulation exercises.

Strategic Management in Non-Market Environments (KPPI-441-0)

This course counts toward the following majors: Management & Strategy, Social Enterprise.

Formerly SEEK-441-0

The explicit regulations and implicit norms governing a firm's market behavior are determined by myriad social, political, regulatory and legal institutions. These non-market institutions are arenas in which interest groups compete to change the rules to further their goals. This course takes the perspective of managers or consultants who must anticipate how interests and institutions within the non-market environment will react to new issues and develop strategies for affecting outcomes with the goal of improving firm performance. The course introduces students to a set of frameworks and tools that assist managers in non-market analysis and strategy development. Cases focusing on the media, activists, legislatures, regulatory agencies and international trade are used to practice applying the frameworks and formulating effective strategies.

Executive MBA
Strategic Mgmt in Non-Market Environments (KPPIX-441-0)
All economic systems are defined by "rules of the game:" laws, regulations, and implicit norms of behavior that structure market competition. Examples include: antitrust legislation; regulatory compliance requirements; privacy regulation and norms; intellectual property rules; product liability rules; barriers to exports; etc. In this class you will learn how to think strategically about the rules of the game, and how to make the rules of the game work for your company.

Doctoral
Foundations of Managerial Economics I: Game Theory (MECS-460-3)
This course covers conflict and cooperation among rational decision makers in economic, political and social systems. Topics include games in extensive, normal and characteristic function forms; Nash equilibrium and refinements; Bayesian games; infinitely repeated games; stochastic games; Nash bargaining solution; and cooperative games. The course is self-contained but closely coordinated with ECON-410-3. Prerequisite: Knowledge of probability theory and elementary linear algebra; simultaneous enrollment in ECON-410-3 or permission of the instructor.

Topics in Formal Political Theory (MECS-516-0)
This seminar focuses on formal models of bargaining, coalition formation and information within legislatures. Prerequisite: A graduate-level course in game theory.