Jin Li
Jin Li

Assistant Professor of Strategy

Print Overview

Jin Li is Assistant Professor of Strategy at Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. Prior to Kellogg, he received his PhD in economics from M.I.T. Professor Li’s research interests include labor economics, organizational economics, and applied microeconomics. Professor Li has studied tacit collusion in auction, worker turnover with asymmetric information, and the role of learning and assignment in wage determination. Recently, he has been studying how the possibility of replacement influences long-term economic relationship and how market competition affects firm organization. At Kellogg, Professor Li teaches human resources management to MBA students and organizational economics to doctoral students.

Areas of Expertise
Contract Theory
Economics of Organizations
Information Economics

Print Vita
PhD, 2007, Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
BS, 2002, Applied Mathematics, California Institute of Technology
BA, 2002, Economics and Mathematics, Wesleyan University

Academic Positions
Assistant Professor in Management and Strategy Department, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2008-present
Donald P. Jacobs Scholar, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2007-2008

Print Research
Research Interests
Labor economics, organizational economics

Li, Jin and Charles Plott. 2009. Tacit Collusion in Auctions and Conditions for Its Facilitation and Prevention: Equilibrium Selection in Laboratory Experimental Markets. Economic Inquiry. 47(3): 425-448.
Li, Jin. 2013. Job Mobility, Wage Dispersion, and Technological Chane: As Asymmetric Information Perspective. European Economic Review. 60: 105-126.
Matouschek, Niko and Jin Li. 2013. Managing Conflicts in Relational Contracts. American Economic Review. 103(6): 2328-51.
Working Papers
Fong, Yuk-fai and Jin Li. 2010. Information Revelation in Relational Contracts.
Li, Jin. 2013. A Theory of Wage Distribution and Dynamics with Assignment and Pareto Learning.
Li, Jin and Yuk-fai Fong. 2012. When Does Aftermarket Monopolization Soften Foremarket Competition?.
Fong, Yuk-fai and Jin Li. 2012. Relational Contracts, Efficiency Wage, and Employment Dynamics.
Li, Jin, Joyee Deb and Arijit Mukherjee. 2012. Relational Contracts with Subjective Peer Evaluations.
Li, Jin, Pak Hung and Yuk-fai Fong. 2011. Reputation Turnaround Through Voluntary Ownership and Management Turnover.
Li, Jin. 2011. A Theory of Turnover and Wage Dynamics.
Powell, MichaelJin Li and Rongzhu Ke. Managing Careers in Organizations.
Powell, MichaelNiko Matouschek and Jin Li. The Burden of Past Promises.
Li, Jin. 2013. Theory of Delegation Dynamics.

Print Teaching
Full-Time / Part-Time MBA
Personnel Strategy (MGMT-440-0)

This course counts toward the following majors: Human Resource Management, Management & Strategy.

Labor can be viewed as an input to firms' production processes. Labor markets are, however, very different from other input markets firms face. To manage human resources effectively, managers need to understand how and why labor markets are so unique. This course focuses on the specific properties of labor markets, and helps students develop effective strategies for managing this vital input. This course is targeted at students interested in careers as general managers, management consultants or entrepreneurs. Topics include job-market matching, non-wage compensation and benefits, training and human capital, careers and employees' career concerns, seniority, promotions, raids and offer-matching, job-market signaling, retirement, stock-option based pay, CEO compensation, up-or-out systems, discrimination in labor markets, goals and methods of labor unions, and more. Teaching methods include a mix of case discussion and lectures. Evaluation will be based on group work (problem sets and a project) and individual exams.

Strategy & Organization (MGMT-452-0)

This course counts toward the following majors: Managerial Analytics, Managerial Economics, Managament & Strategy

This course focuses on the link between organizational structure and strategy, making heavy use of the microeconomic tools taught in MECN-430. The core question students address is how firms should be organized to achieve their performance objectives. The first part of the course takes the firm's activities as given and studies the problem of organizational design; topics may include incentive pay, decentralization, transfer pricing, and complementarities. The second part examines the determinants of a firm's boundaries and may cover such topics as outsourcing, horizontal mergers, and strategic commitment.