Print Overview
Mehmet Ekmekci is an Assistant Professor of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences. He joined the faculty at the Kellogg School of Management in 2006, after completing his PhD in Economics at Princeton University. His research interests include repeated games, political economy and economic theory. Professor Ekmekci is currently working on models of bargaining and search frictions generating inefficiency

Area of Expertise


Microeconomics
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Print Vita
Education
PhD, 2006, Economics, Princeton University
BS, 2000, Industrial Engineering, Bogazici University, Turkey

Academic Positions
Assistant Professor, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences Department, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2007-present
Donald P. Jacobs Scholar, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences Department, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2006-2007

 
Print Research
Research Interests
Microeconomic theory, game theory, political economics, repeated games and reputations, bargaining and search

Articles
Ekmekci, Mehmet, Olivier Gossner and Andrea Wilson. Forthcoming. Impermanent Types and Permanent Reputations.
Atakan, Alp Enver and Mehmet Ekmekci. Forthcoming. Reputation in Long-Run Relationships.
Ekmekci, Mehmet. 2011. Sustainable Reputations with Rating Systems. Journal of Economic Theory. 146(2): 479-503.
Ekmekci, Mehmet. 2009. Manipulation through Political Endorsements. Journal of Economic Theory. 144(3): 1227-1248.
Working Papers
Atakan, Alp Enver and Mehmet Ekmekci. 2012. Reputation in the Long-Run with Imperfect Monitoring.
Atakan, Alp Enver and Mehmet Ekmekci. 2012. A Two-sided Reputation Result with Long Run Players.
Atakan, Alp Enver and Mehmet Ekmekci. 2012. Bargaining and Reputation in Search Markets.
Ekmekci, Mehmet and Nenad Kos. 2012. Information in Tender Offers with a Large Shareholder.
Ekmekci, Mehmet and Alp Enver Atakan. 2012. Auctions, Actions and the Failure of Information Aggregation.
Ekmekci, Mehmet and Andrea Wilson. Maintaining a Permanent Reputation with Replacements.
Dalkiran, Nuh Aygun and Mehmet Ekmekci. On Continuity of Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information under Imperfect Public Monitoring.

 
Print Teaching
Teaching Interests
Statistics; contract theory and mechanism design