Georgy Egorov
Georgy Egorov

MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS & DECISION SCIENCES
Associate Professor of Managerial Economics & Decision Sciences

Print Overview

Georgy Egorov joined the Kellogg faculty in 2009 after receiving his PhD in Economics from Harvard University. His research interests include political economy, economic theory, and game theory. He is currently working on weak institutions, dynamics of institutions and on interaction between market and non-market actors in business environments. Professor Egorov’s papers have been published in leading journals, including American Economic Review, American Political Science Review, Review of Economic Studies, and the Quarterly Journal of Economics.



Areas of Expertise
Contract Theory
Crisis Management
Economics of Organizations
Political Economy/Design
Voting Systems
Print Vita
Education
PhD, 2009, Economics, Harvard University
MA, 2008, Economics, Harvard University
MA, 2003, Economics, New Economic School, Moscow, cum laude
MS, 2001, Mathematics, Department of Mechanics and Mathematics, Moscow State University, summa cum laude

Academic Positions
Assistant Professor, Managerial Economics & Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2009-present
Faculty Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research

Editorial Positions
Editorial Board, Economics and Mathematical Methods, 2011-ongoing

 
Print Research
Research Interests
Political economy; Economic theory; Game theory

Articles
Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. Forthcoming. A Political Theory of Populism. Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. 2012. Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs. American Economic Review. 102(4): 1446-1476.
Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. 2011. Political Model of Social Evolution. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 108(suppl. 4): 21292-21296.
Egorov, Georgy and Konstantin Sonin. 2011. Dictators and their Viziers: Endogenizing the Loyalty-Competence Trade-off. Journal of European Economic Association. 9(5): 903-930.
Egorov, Georgy and Konstantin Sonin. 2011. Authoritarian Politics 101: Examples and Exercises . The Political Economist. 13(2): 2-4.
Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. 2010. Political Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 125(4): 1511-1575.
Egorov, Georgy, Sergei Guriev and Konstantin Sonin. 2009. Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data. American Political Science Review. 103(4): 645-668.
Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. 2009. Do Juntas Lead to Personal Rule?. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings. 99(2): 298-303.
Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. 2008. Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies. Review of Economic Studies. 75(4): 987-1009.
Egorov, Georgy. 2004. Ramified Coverings over C2 and the Jacobian Conjecture (in Russian). Mathematical Notes. 76(2): 172-182.
Egorov, Georgy. 2002. An Example of Five-Sheeted Exotic Covering over C2 (in Russian). Mathematical Notes. 71(4): 532-547.
Working Papers
Egorov, Georgy and Mattias Polborn. 2013. Endogenous Research Agendas.
Egorov, Georgy and Mattias Polborn. 2013. Media Demand and Endogenous Polarization.
Diermeier, DanielGeorgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. 2013. Endogenous Property Rights.
Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. 2013. Political Economy in a Changing World.
Egorov, Georgy and Konstantin Sonin. 2013. Incumbency Advantages in Nondemocracies.
Egorov, Georgy. 2013. Single Issue Campaigns and Multi-Dimensional Politics.
Ambrus, Attila and Georgy Egorov. 2012. Commitment-Flexibility Trade-Off and Withdrawal Penalties.
Egorov, Georgy and Bard Harstad. 2012. Private Politics and Public Regulation.
Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. 2009. Equilibria Refinement in Dynamic Voting Games.
Egorov, Georgy. 2009. Political Accountability under Special Interest Politics.
Ambrus, Attila and Georgy Egorov. 2012. Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives.

 
Print Teaching
Full-Time / Part-Time MBA
Leadership and Crisis Management (KPPI-440-A)

This course counts toward the following majors: Social Enterprise

Formerly SEEK-440-A

In recent decades corporations have increasingly become the dominant source for political and social change. Increased globalization and technological progress have further accelerated this process. Businesses are now held accountable by standards other than legal compliance or financial performance. Successful business leaders have recognized that these challenges are best mastered by a commitment to values-based management. However, simply "doing the right thing" is not enough. Rather, companies increasingly find themselves as targets of aggressive legal action, media coverage and social pressure. Organizations must be prepared to handle rapidly changing environments and anticipate potential threats. This requires a deep understanding of the strategic complexities in managing various stakeholders and constituencies. To confront students with these challenges in a realistic fashion, the class is structured around a rich set of challenging case studies and crisis simulation exercises.

Microeconomic Analysis (MECN-430-0)

This course counts toward the following majors: Managerial Economics.

Among the topics this core course addresses are economic analysis and optimal decisions, consumer choice and the demand for products, production functions and cost curves, market structures and strategic interactions, and pricing and non-price concepts. Cases and problems are used to understand economic tools and their potential for solving real-world problems.

Doctoral
Social Choice and Voting Models (MECS-466-0)
Political economics takes a formal approach to collective decisions and political institutions. This course gives an overview of the field by discussing its analytical tools and recent research frontiers. We will start by studying the general problem of social choice and collective decisions, then analyze representative democracies as principal-agent problems. Based on this framework, we will investigate alternative political institutions and the organization of governments.