Georgy Egorov
Georgy Egorov

Associate Professor of Managerial Economics & Decision Sciences

Print Overview

Georgy Egorov joined the Kellogg faculty in 2009 after receiving his PhD in Economics from Harvard University. His research interests include political economy, economic theory, and game theory. He is currently working on weak institutions, dynamics of institutions and on interaction between market and non-market actors in business environments. Professor Egorov’s papers have been published in leading journals, including American Economic Review, Journal of Political Economy, American Political Science ReviewReview of Economic Studies, and the Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Areas of Expertise
Contract Theory
Crisis Management
Economics of Organizations
Political Economy/Design
Voting Systems

Print Vita
PhD, 2009, Economics, Harvard University
MA, 2008, Economics, Harvard University
MA, 2003, Economics, New Economic School, Moscow, cum laude
MS, 2001, Mathematics, Department of Mechanics and Mathematics, Moscow State University, summa cum laude

Academic Positions
Associate Professor, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2013-present
Faculty Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010-present
Assistant Professor, Managerial Economics & Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2010-2013
Senior Lecturer & Jacobs Scholar, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2009-2010

Editorial Positions
Associate Editor, Review of Economic Design, 2015
Editorial Board, Economics and Mathematical Methods, 2011-Present

Print Research
Research Interests
Political economy; Economic theory; Game theory

Beath, Andrew, Fotini Christia, Georgy Egorov and Ruben Enikolopov. Forthcoming. Electoral Rules and the Quality of Politicians: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment. Review of Economic Studies.
Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. 2013. A Political Theory of Populism. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 128(2): 771-805.
Ambrus, Attila and Georgy Egorov. 2013. Comment on "Commitment vs. Flexibility". Econometrica. 81(5): 2113-2124.
Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. 2015. Political Economy in a Changing World. Journal of Political Economy. 123(5): 1038-1086.
Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. 2012. Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs. American Economic Review. 102(4): 1446-1476.
Egorov, Georgy and Konstantin Sonin. 2011. Dictators and their Viziers: Endogenizing the Loyalty-Competence Trade-off. Journal of European Economic Association. 9(5): 903-930.
Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. 2011. Political Model of Social Evolution. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 108(suppl. 4): 21292-21296.
Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. 2010. Political Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 125(4): 1511-1575.
Egorov, Georgy, Sergei Guriev and Konstantin Sonin. 2009. Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data. American Political Science Review. 103(4): 645-668.
Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. 2008. Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies. Review of Economic Studies. 75(4): 987-1009.
Egorov, Georgy. 2004. Ramified Coverings over C2 and the Jacobian Conjecture (in Russian). Mathematical Notes. 76(2): 172-182.
Egorov, Georgy. 2002. An Example of Five-Sheeted Exotic Covering over C2 (in Russian). Mathematical Notes. 71(4): 532-547.
Working Papers
Egorov, Georgy. 2013. Single Issue Campaigns and Multi-Dimensional Politics.
Egorov, Georgy and Bard Harstad. 2015. Private Politics and Public Regulation.
Diermeier, Daniel, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. 2013. Endogenous Property Rights.
Egorov, Georgy and Konstantin Sonin. 2013. Incumbency Advantages in Nondemocracies.
Egorov, Georgy and Mattias Polborn. 2012. Endogenous Research Agendas.
Ambrus, Attila and Georgy Egorov. 2012. Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives.
Egorov, Georgy. 2009. Political Accountability under Special Interest Politics.

Print Teaching
Full-Time / Part-Time MBA
Microeconomic Analysis (MECN-430-0)
1Ys: This course is either waived during the admissions process or completed during the Summer term. Among the topics this core course addresses are economic analysis and optimal decisions, consumer choice and the demand for products, production functions and cost curves, market structures and strategic interactions, and pricing and non-price concepts. Cases and problems are used to understand economic tools and their potential for solving real-world problems.

Social Choice and Voting Models (MECS-466-0)
Political economics takes a formal approach to political decisions and institutions. Topics include: analytical tools; recent research; social choice and collective decisions; alternative political institutions; competition and cooperation between local governments; federalism and the art of reform.