Research Papers

Diermeier, D. & Fong, P. (September 2012) Non-cooperative characterizations of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter. Games and Economic Behavior76(1):349-353.

Diermeier, D. Positive political theory. Encyclopedia of Political Thought. Wiley-Blackwell. Forthcoming.

Baron, D., Diermeier, D., & Fong, P.  (2012). A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy. Economic Theory 49(1):703-738.

Diermeier, D., Yu, B., Kaufmann, S., & Godbout, J.F.  (2012). Language and Ideology in Congress. British Journal of Political Science 42(1):31-55.

Diermeier, D., & Fong, P. (2011). Legislative bargaining with reconsideration. Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(2):895-946.

Diermeier, D., & Vlaicu, R.  (2011). Legislative success. Review of Economic Studies 78(3): 846-871.

Diermeier, D., & Vlaicu, R.  (2011). Parties, coalitions, and the internal organization of legislatures. American Political Science Review 105: 359-380.

Diermeier, D., & Fong, P. (2011).  Bargaining over the budget. Social Choice and Welfare 36 (3-4): 565-589.

Diermeier, D., Eraslan, H., & Merlo, A. (2007). Bicameralism and government formation. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2, 1-26.

Diermeier, D., Eraslan, H., & Merlo, A. (2006). The effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies. In R. Congleton & B. Swedenborg (Eds.), Democratic constitutional design and public policy: Analysis and evidence (133-162). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Diermeier, D., Eraslan, H., & Merlo, A. (2003). A structural model of government formation. Econometrica, 71(1), 27-70.

Diermeier, D., Eraslan, H., & Merlo, A. (2002). Coalition government and comparative constitutional design. European Economic Review, 46, 893-907.

Baron, D., & Diermeier, D. (2001). Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(3), 933-967. Reprinted in T. Dewan, K. Dowding, K. A. Shepsle (Eds). (2009) Rational Choice Politics, 283-312. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Diermeier, D., & Myerson, R.B. (1999). Bicameralism and its consequences for the internal organization of legislatures. American Economic Review, 89(5), 1182-1196. Reprinted in T. Dewan, K. Dowding, K. A. Shepsle (Eds). (2009) Rational Choice Politics, 163-184. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Diermeier, D., & Feddersen, T.J. (1998). Cohesion in legislatures and the vote of confidence procedure. American Political Science Review, 92(3), 611-621. Reprinted in T. Dewan, K. Dowding, K. A. Shepsle (Eds). (2009). Rational Choice Politics (324-334). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Diermeier, D., & Feddersen, T.J. (1998). Comparing constitutions: Cohesion and distribution in legislatures. European Economic Review, 42(3-5), 665-672.

Diermeier, D., & van Roozendaal, P. (1998). The duration of cabinet formation processes in Western multi-party democracies. British Journal of Political Science, 28, 609-626.

 





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