Research Papers

Diermeier, D., Egorov, G., Sonin, K. (2013). Endogenous Property Rights. Social Science Research Network.

Diermeier, D., Kaufmann, S., & Sagi, E. (2012). Changing Meaning:  A Quantitative Approach to Framing in Political Speech. Under review.

Diermeier, D. & Fong, P. (September 2012) Non-Cooperative Characterizations of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Dynamic Policy-Making with a Persistent Agenda Setter. Games and Economic Behavior 76(1):349-353.

Diermeier, D., Prato, C., & Vlaicu, R. Self-Organization in Legislatures. Working paper.

Diermeier, D., Prato, C., & Vlaicu, R. (2012) Procedural Choice in Majoritarian Organizations. Under review.

Baron, D., Diermeier, D., & Fong, P.  (2012). A Dynamic Theory of Parliamentary Democracy. Economic Theory 49(1):703-738.

Diermeier, D., Yu, B., Kaufmann, S., & Godbout, J.F.  (2012). Language and Ideology in Congress. British Journal of Political Science 42(1):31-55.

Diermeier, D., & Fong, P. (2011). Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration. Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(2):895-946.

Diermeier, D., & Vlaicu, R.  (2011). Legislative success. Review of Economic Studies 78(3): 846-871.

Diermeier, D., & Vlaicu, R.  (2011). Parties, Coalitions, and the Internal Organization of Legislatures. American Political Science Review 105: 359-380.

Diermeier, D., & Fong, P. (2011).  Bargaining Over the Budget. Social Choice and Welfare 36 (3-4): 565-589.

Diermeier, D. (2008). Governing the Global Economy: The Role of Private Politics. Report prepared for Canada Policy Research Initiative. (Short version published in PRI Horizons Journal under title “Private Politics: Public Activism as an Alternative Regulatory Mechanism?”(2009)).

Diermeier, D., & Fong, P. (2008). Policy Persistence in Multi-party Parliamentary Democracies. In E. Helpman (Ed.), Institutions and economic performance (361-405). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Yu, B., Diermeier, D., & Kaufmann, S. (2008). Ideology Classifiers for Political Speech. Journal of Information Technology and Politics, 5: 33-48.

Diermeier, D. and Fong, P. (2008). Existence and Computation of Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Models of Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration. CMSEMS working paper, no. 1466. Northwestern University.

Diermeier, D. and Fong, P. (2008). Endogenous Limits on Proposal Power. CMSEMS working paper, no. 1464. Northwestern University.

Yu, B., Diermeier, D., & Kaufmann, S. (2008). Exploring the characteristics of opinion expressions for political opinion classification. Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Conference on Digital Government Research (82-91). Montreal, Canada: Digital Government Society of North America.

Diermeier, D., Eraslan, H., & Merlo, A. (2006). The effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies. In R. Congleton & B. Swedenborg (Eds.), Democratic constitutional design and public policy: Analysis and evidence (133-162). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Diermeier, D., Keane, M., & Merlo, A. (2005). A political economy model of congressional careers. American Economic Review, 95(1), 347-373.

Baron, D., & Diermeier, D. (2001). Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(3), 933-967. Reprinted in T. Dewan, K. Dowding, K. A. Shepsle (Eds). (2009) Rational Choice Politics, 283-312. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Diermeier, D., & Stevenson, R. (2000). Cabinet terminations and critical events. American Political Science Review, 94(3), 627-640.

Diermeier, D., & Merlo, A. (2000). Government turnover in parliamentary democracies. Journal of Economic Theory, 94, 46-79.

Diermeier, D., & Feddersen, T.J. (2000). Information and congressional hearings. American Journal of Political Science, 44(1), 51-65.

Diermeier, D., & Myerson, R.B. (1999). Bicameralism and its consequences for the internal organization of legislatures. American Economic Review, 89(5), 1182-1196. Reprinted in T. Dewan, K. Dowding, K. A. Shepsle (Eds). (2009) Rational Choice Politics, 163-184. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Diermeier, D., & Stevenson, R. (1999). Cabinet survival and competing risks. American Journal of Political Science, 43(5), 1051-1098.

Diermeier, D., & Feddersen, T.J. (1998). Cohesion in legislatures and the Vote of Confidence procedure. American Political Science Review, 92(3), 611-621. Reprinted in T. Dewan, K. Dowding, K. A. Shepsle (Eds). (2009). Rational Choice Politics (324-334). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Diermeier, D., & Feddersen, T.J. (1998). Comparing constitutions: Cohesion and distribution in legislatures. European Economic Review, 42(3-5), 665-672.

Diermeier, D., & van Roozendaal, P. (1998). The duration of cabinet formation processes in Western multi-party democracies. British Journal of Political Science, 28, 609-626.

Diermeier, D. (1995). Commitment, deference, and legislative institutions. American Political Science Review, 89(2), 344-355.

Case Studies

Diermeier, D., (2004). Recyclers v Superfund (A). Kellogg School of Management, Case 5-104-022(A).

Diermeier, D., (2004). Recyclers v Superfund (B). Kellogg School of Management, Case 5-104-022(B).

Diermeier, D., (2004). Recyclers v Superfund (C). Kellogg School of Management, Case 5-104-022(C).

Diermeier, D., (2004). Recyclers v Superfund (D). Kellogg School of Management, Case 5-104-022(D).

 





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