Research Papers

Diermeier, D. & Fong, P. (September 2012) Non-Cooperative Characterizations of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Dynamic Policy-Making with a Persistent Agenda Setter. Games and Economic Behavior 76(1):349-353.

Diermeier, D. Positive Political Theory. Encyclopedia of Political Thought. Wiley-Blackwell. Forthcoming.

Diermeier, D., Prato, C., & Vlaicu, R. Self-Organization in Legislatures. Working paper.

Diermeier, D., Prato, C., & Vlaicu, R. (2012) Procedural Choice in Majoritarian Organizations. Under review.

Baron, D., Diermeier, D., & Fong, P.  (2012). A Dynamic Theory of Parliamentary Democracy. Economic Theory 49(1):703-738.

Diermeier, D. (2011) Coalition Experiments.  J. N. Druckman, D. P. Green, J. H. Kuklinski, and A. Lupia (Eds.) Handbook of Experimental Political Science (399-412). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Diermeier, D., & Vlaicu, R.  (2011). Legislative success. Review of Economic Studies 78(3): 846-871.

Diermeier, D., & Vlaicu, R.  (2011). Parties, Coalitions, and the Internal Organization of Legislatures. American Political Science Review 105: 359-380.

Diermeier, D., & Fong, P. (2011).  Bargaining Over the Budget. Social Choice and Welfare 36 (3-4): 565-589.

Diermeier, D., Eraslan, H., & Merlo, A. (2007). Bicameralism and Government Formation. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2, 1-26.

Diermeier, D. (2006). Coalition Government. In B. Weingast & D. Wittman (Eds.), Oxford handbook of political economy (162-179). Oxford University Press.

Diermeier, D., Eraslan, H., & Merlo, A. (2006). The Effects of Constitutions on Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies. In R. Congleton & B. Swedenborg (Eds.), Democratic constitutional design and public policy: Analysis and evidence (133-162). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Bendor, J., Diermeier, D., & Ting, M. (2003). Recovering Behavioralism: Adaptively rational strategic behavior with endogenous aspirations. In K. Kollman & S. Page (Eds.), Computational Models in Political Economy (213-274). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Diermeier, D., & Krehbiel, K. (2003). Institutionalism as a Methodology. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 15(2), 123-144.

Diermeier, D., Eraslan, H., & Merlo, A. (2003). A Structural Model of Government Formation. Econometrica, 71(1), 27-70.

Diermeier, D. (2002). Some Conceptual Issues in Institutionalist Theories of Politics. In H.P. Burth & T. Pluemper (Eds.), Jahrbuch fuer Handlungs und Entscheidungs Theorie [Yearbook of theory of decision and action] (31-56). Leske+Budrich.

Diermeier, D., Eraslan, H., & Merlo, A. (2002). Coalition Government and Comparative Constitutional Design. European Economic Review, 46, 893-907.

Baron, D., & Diermeier, D. (2001). Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(3), 933-967. Reprinted in T. Dewan, K. Dowding, K. A. Shepsle (Eds). (2009) Rational Choice Politics, 283-312. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Diermeier, D., & Stevenson, R. (2000). Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events. American Political Science Review, 94(3), 627-640.

Diermeier, D., & Merlo, A. (2000). Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies. Journal of Economic Theory, 94, 46-79.

Diermeier, D., & Myerson, R.B. (1999). Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures. American Economic Review, 89(5), 1182-1196. Reprinted in T. Dewan, K. Dowding, K. A. Shepsle (Eds). (2009) Rational Choice Politics, 163-184. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Diermeier, D., & Stevenson, R. (1999). Cabinet Survival and Competing Risks. American Journal of Political Science, 43(5), 1051-1098.

Diermeier, D., & Feddersen, T.J. (1998). Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure. American Political Science Review, 92(3), 611-621. Reprinted in T. Dewan, K. Dowding, K. A. Shepsle (Eds). (2009). Rational Choice Politics (324-   ). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Diermeier, D., & van Roozendaal, P. (1998). The Duration of Cabinet Formation Processes in Western Multi-Party Democracies. British Journal of Political Science, 28, 609-626.

Diermeier, D., Ericson, J., Frye, T., & Lewis, S. (1997). Credibility and Commitment: The Case of Property Rights. In D. Weimer (Ed.), The political economy of property rights (20-42). Cambridge (UK) University Press.

Diermeier, D. (1997). [Review of J.H. Aldrich, ‘Why parties?’ ( in German) ]. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 4, 886-888.

Diermeier, D. (1996). Spieltheoretische Modelle in der Theorie der Politik (Game theoretic models in the theory of politics) [in German]. In U. Druwe & V. Kunz (Eds.), Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie in der Politikwissenschaft: Eine Einfuehrung in Konzepte und Forschungsstand (207-226). Leske+Budrich.

Diermeier, D. (1995). Commitment, deference, and legislative institutions. American Political Science Review, 89(2), 344-355.

Diermeier, D. (1995). Rational choice and the role of theory in political science. Critical Review, 9(1-2), 59-70. Reprinted in J. Friedman (Ed.), The Rational Choice Controversy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

 





Home | Bio | Research | Ford Center | Reputation Rules | CEO Perspectives | Global Health | Complex Systems | Teaching | Consulting | Links | Contact
© Copyright 2011 Kellogg School of Management