Research Papers

Diermeier, D., Egorov, G., Sonin, K. (2013). Endogenous Property Rights. Social Science Research Network.

Bendor, J., Diermeier, D., & Ting, M.  Aspirations, Reference Groups, and Collective Action. Under review.

Diermeier, D., Prato, C., & Vlaicu, R. Self-Organization in Legislatures. Working paper.

Diermeier, D. Positive Political Theory. Encyclopedia of Political Thought. Wiley-Blackwell. Forthcoming.

Diermeier, D. & Fong, P. (2012) Non-Cooperative Characterizations of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Dynamic Policy-Making with a Persistent Agenda Setter. Games and Economic Behavior 76(1):349-353.

Diermeier, D., Prato, C., & Vlaicu, R. (2012) Procedural Choice in Majoritarian Organizations. Under review.

Baron, D., Diermeier, D., & Fong, P.  (2012). A Dynamic Theory of Parliamentary Democracy. Economic Theory 49(1):703-738.

Abito, J., Besanko, D., & Diermeier, D. (2011). Corporate Reputational Dynamics, Private Regulation, and Activist Pressure. Under review.

Diermeier, D., & Fong, P. (2011). Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration. Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(2):895-946.

Diermeier, D., & Vlaicu, R.  (2011). Legislative success. Review of Economic Studies 78(3): 846-871.

Diermeier, D., & Vlaicu, R.  (2011). Parties, Coalitions, and the Internal Organization of Legislatures. American Political Science Review 105: 359-380.

Diermeier, D., & Fong, P. (2011).  Bargaining over the Budget. Social Choice and Welfare 36 (3-4): 565-589.

Diermeier, D., & Van Mieghem, J. (2008). Coordination and Turnout in Large Elections.  Mathematical and Computer Modeling, 48: 1478-1496.

Diermeier, D. & Fong, P. (2008). Existence and Computation of Pure-strategy Equilibria in Models of Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration. CMSEMS working paper, no. 1466. Northwestern University.

Diermeier, D. & Fong, P. (2008). Endogenous Limits on Proposal Power. CMSEMS working paper, no. 1465. Northwestern University.

Diermeier, D., & Fong, P. (2008). Policy Persistence in Multi-Party Parliamentary Democracies. In E. Helpman (Ed.), Institutions and economic performance (361-405). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Diermeier, D., Eraslan, H., & Merlo, A. (2007). Bicameralism and Government Formation. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2: 1-26.

Diermeier, D. (2006). Coalition Government. In B. Weingast & D. Wittman (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Political Economy (162-179). Oxford University Press.

Gailmard, S., & Diermeier, D. (2006). Self-Interest, Inequality, and Entitlement in Majoritarian Decision-Making. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 1(4): 327-350.

Diermeier, D., Eraslan, H., & Merlo, A. (2006). The Effects of Constitutions on Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies. In R. Congleton & B. Swedenborg (Eds.), Democratic constitutional design and public policy: Analysis and evidence (133-162). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Diermeier, D., Keane, M., & Merlo, A. (2005). A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers. American Economic Review, 95(1): 347-373.

Diermeier, D., & Morton, R. (2005). Proportionality Versus Perfectness: Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining. In D. Austen-Smith & J. Duggan (Eds.), Social choice and strategic decisions: Essays in the honor of Jeffrey S. Banks (201-227).  Berlin et al.: Springer.

Bendor, J., Diermeier, D., & Ting, M. (2003). Recovering Behavioralism: Adaptively Rational Strategic Behavior with Endogenous Aspirations. In K. Kollman & S. Page (Eds.), Computational Models in Political Economy (213-274). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Bendor, J., Diermeier, D., & Ting, M. (2003). A Behavioral Model of Turnout. American Political Science Review, 97(2).

Bendor, J., Diermeier, D., & Ting, M. (2001). Aspiration-Based Adaptation in Games. Proceedings of the 2000 Workshop on Simulation of Social Agents: Architecture and Institutions, 144-162. Argonne National Laboratory.

Baron, D., & Diermeier, D. (2001). Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(3), 933-967. Reprinted in T. Dewan, K. Dowding, K. A. Shepsle (Eds). (2009) Rational Choice Politics, 283-312. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Diermeier, D., & Stevenson, R. (2000). Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events. American Political Science Review, 94(3): 627-640.

Diermeier, D., & Merlo, A. (2000). Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies. Journal of Economic Theory, 94: 46-79.

Diermeier, D., & Feddersen, T.J. (2000). Information and Congressional Hearings. American Journal of Political Science, 44(1): 51-65.

Diermeier, D., & Myerson, R.B. (1999). Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures. American Economic Review, 89(5): 1182-1196. Reprinted in T. Dewan, K. Dowding, K. A. Shepsle (Eds). (2009) Rational Choice Politics, 163-184. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Diermeier, D., & Feddersen, T.J. (1998). Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure. American Political Science Review, 92(3): 611-621. Reprinted in T. Dewan, K. Dowding, K. A. Shepsle (Eds). (2009). Rational Choice Politics (324-   ). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Diermeier, D. (1996). Spieltheoretische Modelle in der Theorie der Politik (Game theoretic models in the theory of politics) [in German]. In U. Druwe & V. Kunz (Eds.), Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie in der Politikwissenschaft: Eine Einfuehrung in Konzepte und Forschungsstand (207-226). Leske+Budrich.


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