Research Papers

Diermeier, D. Positive Political Theory. Encyclopedia of Political Thought. Wiley-Blackwell. Forthcoming.

Baron, D., Diermeier, D., & Fong, P.  (2012). A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy. Economic Theory 49(1):703-738.

Diermeier, D., & Vlaicu, R.  (2011). Legislative success. Review of Economic Studies 78(3): 846-871.

Diermeier, D., & Vlaicu, R.  (2011). Parties, coalitions, and the internal organization of legislatures. American Political Science Review 105: 359-380.

Diermeier, D., Huffaker, D., & Swaab, R.I. (2011).  The language of coalition formation in online multiparty negotiations. Journal of Language and Social Psychology 30(1):66-81.

Diermeier, D. (2011) Coalition experiments. J. N. Druckman, D. P. Green, J. H. Kuklinski, and A. Lupia (Eds.) Handbook of Experimental Political Science (399-412). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Swaab, R.I., Diermeier, D., Kern, M., & Medvec, V. (2009). Who says what to whom? Effects of communicator and content awareness on coalition formation. Social Cognition 27: 381-397.

Diermeier, D., Swaab, R.I., Medvec, V., & Kern, M. (2008). The micro-dynamics of coalition formation. Political Research Quarterly, 61(3), 484-501.

Swaab, R.I., Diermeier, D., Phillips, K.W., & Medvec, V. (2008). The pros and cons of dyadic conversations in groups: The impact of communication opportunities on group decisions. Small Group Research, 39(3).

Diermeier, D., Eraslan, H., & Merlo, A. (2007). Bicameralism and government formation. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2, 1-26.

Diermeier, D. (2006). Coalition government. In B. Weingast & D. Wittman (Eds.), Oxford handbook of political economy (162-179). Oxford University Press.

Diermeier, D., Eraslan, H., & Merlo, A. (2006). The effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies. In R. Congleton & B. Swedenborg (Eds.), Democratic constitutional design and public policy: Analysis and evidence (133-162). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gailmard, S., & Diermeier, D. (2006). Self-interest, inequality, and entitlement in majoritarian decision-making. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 1(4), 327-350

Diermeier, D., & Morton, R. (2005). Proportionality versus perfectness: Experiments in majoritarian bargaining. In D. Austen-Smith & J. Duggan (Eds.), Social choice and strategic decisions: Essays in the honor of Jeffrey S. Banks (201-227).  Berlin et al.: Springer.

Diermeier, D., & Merlo, A. (2004). An empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures. Journal of Public Economics, 88(3-4), 783-797.

Diermeier, D., Eraslan, H., & Merlo, A. (2003). A structural model of government formation. Econometrica, 71(1), 27-70.

Diermeier, D., Eraslan, H., & Merlo, A. (2002). Coalition government and comparative constitutional design. European Economic Review, 46, 893-907.

Baron, D., & Diermeier, D. (2001). Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(3), 933-967. Reprinted in T. Dewan, K. Dowding, K. A. Shepsle (Eds). (2009) Rational Choice Politics, 283-312. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Diermeier, D., & Stevenson, R. (2000). Cabinet terminations and critical events. American Political Science Review, 94(3), 627-640.

Diermeier, D., & Merlo, A. (2000). Government turnover in parliamentary democracies. Journal of Economic Theory, 94, 46-79.

Diermeier, D., & Stevenson, R. (1999). Cabinet survival and competing risks. American Journal of Political Science, 43(5), 1051-1098.

Diermeier, D., & Feddersen, T.J. (1998). Cohesion in legislatures and the vote of confidence procedure. American Political Science Review, 92(3), 611-621. Reprinted in T. Dewan, K. Dowding, K. A. Shepsle (Eds). (2009). Rational Choice Politics (324-334). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Diermeier, D., & van Roozendaal, P. (1998). The duration of cabinet formation processes in Western multi-party democracies. British Journal of Political Science, 28, 609-626.

Diermeier, D., & Feddersen, T.J. (1995, June). Cohesion in legislatures: Procedural and policy coalitions. Mimeo. Stanford University Graduate School of Business.

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