Associate Professor of Strategy
Kellogg School of Management
2001 Sheridan Road
CV: PDF (May 2015)
1. Brown, J. and D.A. Matsa. 2015. “Boarding a Sinking Ship? An Investigation of Job Applications to Distressed Firms” Journal of Finance, forthcoming. [working paper version]
3. Brown, J. 2011. “Quitters Never Win: The (Adverse) Incentive Effects of Competing with Superstars.” Journal of Political Economy, 119(5): 982-1013.
4. Brown, J., T. Hossain, and J. Morgan. 2010. “Shrouded Attributes and Information Suppression: Evidence from the Field.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(2): 859-876.
5. Brown, J. and J. Morgan. 2009. “How much is a Dollar Worth? Tipping versus Equilibrium Coexistence on Competing Online Auction Sites.” Journal of Political Economy, 117(4): 668-700.
Commentary and Rejoinder on “Does Quality Win? Network Effects Versus Quality in High-Tech Markets”
7. Berck, P., J. Brown, J.M. Perloff, and S.B. Villas-Boas. 2008. “Sales: Tests of Theories on Causality and Timing.” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26(6): 1257-1273. [doi]
8. Brown, J., J. Hastings, E.T. Mansur, and S.B. Villas-Boas. 2008. “Reformulating Competition? Gasoline Content Regulation and Wholesale Gasoline Prices.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 55(1): 1-19. [doi]
9. Brown, J. and J. Morgan. 2006. “Reputation in Online Auctions: The Market for Trust.” California Management Review, 49(1): 61-81. [doi]
10. Brown, J., J.A.L. Cranfield and S. Henson. 2005. “Relating Consumer Willingness-to-pay for Food Safety to Risk Tolerance: An Experimental Approach.” Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 53(2-3): 249-263. [doi]
11. Brown, J. 2001. “Price discrimination and pricing to market behavior of Canadian canola exporters.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 83(5): 1343-49
12. Jen Brown and Dylan Minor. October 2014. “Misconduct in Financial Services: Differences across Organizational Forms”
ABSTRACT: We examine misconduct in a financial services market with price taking experts. Using sales complaint data for exclusive and independent insurance agents, we find that exclusive insurance agents working for large branded firms are more likely to be the subject of a justified sales complaint, relative to independent experts, despite doing substantially less business. In addition, more experienced experts attract more complaints per year. We propose a market-level model in which price-taking experts extract surplus based on the value of their firm’s brand and their own skill.
13. Phil Brookins, Jen Brown, and Dmitry Ryvkin. “Peer Effects and Risk Taking: Tournaments and Piece-Rates” (coming soon)
14. Jen Brown and Jin Li. July 2010. “Going for it: The Adoption of Risky Strategies in Tournaments.”