MECS 466: Social Choice and Voting Models

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Mondays, Leverone 561, 2pm-5pm

Although applications are considered where appropriate, this course focuses on the general theory of collective decision-making and strategic political behaviour. The first three sessions (3/29, 4/04, 4/11) in the course survey the main results from the general (cooperative game-theoretic) theory of preference aggregation and social choice. The remainder of the course considers (noncooperative game-theoretic) theories of committee voting and agenda-selection (4/18, 4/25), legislative bargaining (5/02, 5/09) and parties (5/16, 5/23).

Teaching is by lecture and student presentations of particular papers from the literature. Assessment is by class participation and a research paper.

Course Outline

1. Social choice over finite sets


2. Social choice in the spatial model

   Plott, C. 1967. A notion of equilibrium and its possibility under majority rule *AER*, 57: 787-806


3. Committee voting and agendas


4. Legislative bargaining theory


5. **Parties**


