Positive Political Theory II

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Egregious Errata

Positive Political Theory II (University of Michigan Press, 2005) regrettably contains a variety of obscurities and errors, both typographical and substantive. Most of these are apparent and the appropriate corrections evident. Unfortunately, a few of the mistakes to surface are egregious (and thus correspondingly embarrassing ...). So, with apologies to Jeff and to those using this book, the mistakes within this category identified so far are located and corrected below.

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p.5, remarks on simple rules and the Nakamura number.

The examples using majority and plurality rule on this page (from the top to the final paragraph) presume unrestricted domain.

p.38, line 5.

Should have k and $n-k+1$ below the equality, *not* i_k and $n-i_k+1$, respectively.

p.79, four lines up from Example 3.3.

The sentence beginning, "Formally, therefore, ..." should read:

"Formally, therefore, Maskin monotonicity implies monotonicity which in turn implies weak monotonicity; ... "

p.82, Definition 3.7.

The definition should have "... $|\cap_{y \in X} R(x, y; \rho)| \geq n-1$ implies $x \in \varphi(\rho)$", rather than $R(x, y; \rho) = n-1$ for all $y \in X$ implies ...".

p.92, Second sentence of paragraph immediately preceding Corollary 3.2.

The vote profiles $m \in \mathcal{M}$ should be understood as rationalizable preference relations (see PPT I, ch.1, on rationalizable preferences).

p.139, from the end of line 5 to the middle of line 12.

The claim made in this section is that condition (*) is a *necessary* condition for an alternative y to be agenda independent. This is false and the comments immediately following (*) are thereby nonsense. The text beginning on line 5 with the sentence "In other words ..." to the end of the sentence concluding on line 12 with "... $S(\Gamma_\alpha, P) = y$", should be deleted and replaced with the following:

"On the other hand, a sufficient condition for an alternative $y \in X \backslash \{x_0\}$ to be the sophisticated outcome irrespective of the agenda $\Gamma_\alpha \in \mathcal{A}(x_0)$, is that

$$y \in P(x_0) \text{ and, } \forall z \in P(x_0) \backslash \{y\},\ y \in P(z). \qquad (*)$$

That is, if y satisfies (*) then, for all $\Gamma_\alpha \in \mathcal{A}(x_0)$, $S(\Gamma_\alpha, P) = y$. To see this, recall that every terminal node of an amendment agenda pairs the status quo x_0 against an alternative from the agenda, with every such alternative appearing on at least one terminal node. By the first property of (*), that $y \in P(x_0)$, and the earlier logic for solving binary voting games, y must be the sophisticated equivalent of every terminal node at which y is compared with x_0. Now consider any alternative $z \neq y$. If z is the sophisticated equivalent of some terminal node, then either $z = x_0$ or $z \in P(x_0)$. In either case, (*) implies that y must be the sophisticated equivalent of any pairwise comparison between y and z at the next stage; and so on back up the voting tree, thus establishing the claim. In other words ... "

p.172, Figure 5.12.

The payoff pair to the terminal node associated with the path $\langle D, l\rangle$ should be $(0, 2)$, *not* $(2, 0)$; and the payoff pair associated with the path $\langle D, r, R\rangle$ should be $(3, 3)$, *not* $(3, 2)$; (And note that G_λ is the subgame beginning with 2's decision, while $G_{\lambda'}$ is the subgame beginning with 1's second decision.)

p.178, line 4.

The definition of $R(x)$ should read, $R(x) = \{y \in X : yRx\}$.

p.287, line 4.

The definition of $\omega_i^\beta(a, b)$ is missing a minus sign: it should read, $\omega_i^\beta(a, b) = -\frac{\partial}{\partial t} p_i(u_i(a), t)\big|_{t=u_i(b)}$.

p.288, line 2 of Corollary 7.3.

The assumption that "$p_i(\cdot) = p(\cdot)$" should be replaced by "$\omega_i^c(\cdot)$ is independent of i"; the first line of the proof is then redundant.

p.336, Example 8.2 (5).

Proportional representation, even as described here, is not a scoring rule.

p.383, Exercise 8.3(b).

The last conditional, "... if m is odd" should read "... if $m = 3$". Furthermore, the exercise is intended to concern only pure strategy equilibria.