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Large Non-anonymous repeated games (with Rann Smorodinsky) |
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| Games and Economic Behavior, 2001, vol. 37, pp. 26-39 | ||
| Green (1980) and Sabourian (1990) studied repeated games where a player's payoff depends on his actions and an anonymous aggregate outcome, and show that long-run players behave myopically in any equilibrium of such games. In this paper we extend these results to games where the aggregate outcome is not necessarily an anonymous function of players' actions, and where players' strategies may depend non anonymously on signals of other players' behavior. Our argument also provides a conceptually simpler proof of Green and Sabourian's results, showing how their analysis is driven by general bounds on the number of pivotal player in a game. | ||
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| October 28, 2005 |