

Discussion of  
“Productivity and Misallocation in General Equilibrium”  
by David Baqaee and Emmanuel Farhi

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## Hulten (1978)

- In an efficient economy, the macro impact of a shock to industry  $i$  is determined by that industry's Domar weight

$$\frac{d \log \text{GDP}}{d \log A_i} = \frac{p_i y_i}{\text{GDP}}$$

up to a first-order approximation.

- Extremely powerful result because
  - (i) it is agnostic with respect to the microeconomic structure of the economy.
  - (ii) can be calculated using observables.
- Two key qualifiers:
  - Efficiency is necessary: Hulten is a consequence of envelope theorem.
  - First-order approximations are not useful in non-linear economies.

# This Paper

- A generalization of Hulten's Theorem to inefficient economies.  
how micro productivity and markup shocks shape aggregate outcomes
- A parametric model to relate various terms to structural parameters (micro elasticities, returns to scale, input-output linkages, etc.)
- Key take-aways:
  - Micro shocks impact macro outcomes via two channels:  
(1) a pure technology effect and (2) a reallocation effect
  - The latter can be measured via changes in factor income shares
  - Unlike efficient economies, all micro intricacies become important.

## Key Idea

- Allocation matrix:  $\mathcal{X}(A, \mu)$ , where  $\mathcal{X}_{ij} = x_{ij}/y_i$  be the allocation of inputs across various firms.
- $\text{GDP} = \mathcal{Y}(A, \mathcal{X})$

- Chain rule:

$$\frac{d \log \text{GDP}}{d \log A} = \underbrace{\frac{\partial \log \mathcal{Y}}{\partial \log A}}_{\Delta \text{ technology}} + \underbrace{\frac{\partial \log \mathcal{Y}}{\partial \mathcal{X}} \frac{d \mathcal{X}}{d \log A}}_{\Delta \text{ allocative efficiency}}$$

- If the initial allocation is efficient, then by the envelope theorem, the second term is equal to zero  $\rightarrow$  Hulten's Theorem (almost).
- In an inefficient economy, one needs to understand how the second term responds to shocks.

## Framework

- $n$  goods, each produced by competitive producers using intermediate goods as well as  $F$  factors that are inelastically supplied.

- Producers: constant-returns cost functions

$$\frac{1}{A_i} \mathbf{C}_i(p_1, \dots, p_n, w_1, \dots, w_F) y_i$$

- Markups:

$$p_i = \frac{\mu_i \mathbf{C}_i}{A_i}$$

- Final demand

$$Y = \max \quad \mathcal{D}(c_1, \dots, c_n)$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{i=1}^n p_i c_i = \sum_{f=1}^F w_f L_f + \sum_{i=1}^n \pi_i$$

## Standard Objects

- Input-output matrix:

$$\Omega_{ij} = \frac{p_j x_{ij}}{p_i y_i}$$

- Final expenditure shares:

$$b_i = \frac{p_i c_i}{\text{GDP}}$$

- Domar weights:

$$\lambda_i = \frac{p_i y_i}{\text{GDP}}$$

- Leontief inverse:

$$\Psi = (I - \Omega)^{-1} = I + \Omega + \Omega^2 + \dots$$

- Market-clearing:

$$\lambda_i = \sum_{k=1}^n b_k \Psi_{ki}$$

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## Markup-Adjusted Objects

- Markup adjusted (“cost-based”) input-output matrix:

$$\tilde{\Omega}_{ij} = \mu_i \Omega_{ij}$$

- Markup adjusted (“cost-based”) Leontief inverse:

$$\tilde{\Psi} = (I - \tilde{\Omega})^{-1}$$

- “Cost-based” vs. “revenue-based” Domar weights:

$$\lambda_i = \sum_{k=1}^n b_k \Psi_{ki}$$

$$\tilde{\lambda}_i = \sum_{k=1}^n b_k \tilde{\Psi}_{ki}$$



## Main Result

- Key result of the paper: apply envelope theorem to each producer and combine with chain rule:

$$d \log Y = \frac{\partial \log \mathcal{Y}}{\partial \log A} d \log A + \frac{\partial \log \mathcal{Y}}{\partial \mathcal{X}} d \mathcal{X}$$

### Theorem

*Pure technology effect:*

$$\frac{d \log \mathcal{Y}}{d \log A} d \log A = \sum_{k=1}^n \tilde{\lambda}_k d \log A_k$$


*Resource reallocation:*

$$\frac{\partial \log \mathcal{Y}}{\partial \mathcal{X}} d \mathcal{X} = - \sum_{k=1}^n \tilde{\lambda}_k d \log \mu_k - \sum_{f=1}^F \tilde{\Lambda}_f d \log \Lambda_f.$$

- Reduces to Hulten's theorem when  $\mu_k = 1$  for all  $k$ .

## Example 1: Horizontal Economy + Productivity Shocks


- Elasticity of substitution between various goods =  $\theta$ .



- “Pure” technology effect =  $\lambda_k$ 
  - Holding the allocation of labor to each firm constant, a productivity shock to firm  $k$  increases its output.
  - This in turn increases aggregate output.


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
## Example 1: Horizontal Economy + Productivity Shocks



- Reallocation effect =  $-\lambda_k(\theta - 1) \left( \frac{\mu_k^{-1}}{\sum_i \lambda_i \mu_i^{-1}} - 1 \right)$ 
  - Shock to firm  $k$  reduces its price and increases its demand when  $\theta > 1$  via a substitution effect. Therefore, workers are reallocated to  $k$ .
  - When  $k$ 's markup is larger than average, the firm was too small from a social perspective  $\rightarrow$  A positive shock to  $k$  improves the allocative efficiency.
- No change in allocative efficiency when  $\theta = 1$ , as factor shares do not move.


## Example 1: Horizontal Economy + Markup Shocks

- Reallocation effect =  $\lambda_k \theta \left( \frac{\mu_k^{-1}}{\sum_i \lambda_i \mu_i^{-1}} - 1 \right)$



- $\theta = 0$ : There are no reallocation effects, as the HH consumes a fixed quantity.
- $\theta > 0$ : A markup shock increases  $k$ 's price, reduces its demand, and reallocates workers to other firms.  
Allocate efficiency would increase (decrease) depending on whether  $k$ 's markup was smaller (larger) than average markup.

## Example 2: Vertical Economy



- Allocative efficiency:
  - No room for misallocation.
  - Productivity or markup shocks have no effect on allocative efficiency.
  
- Pure technology effect:  $\frac{d \log Y}{d \log A_k} = \tilde{\lambda}_k = 1$ 
  - Different from Hulten's prediction due to double marginalization:  
 $\tilde{\lambda}_k > \lambda_k = \prod_{i=1}^{k-1} \mu_i^{-1}$ .

## So What?

- Besides comparative statistics, the non-parametric decomposition can be used for to measure *changes* in the economy's allocative efficiency

$$d \log Y - \tilde{\Lambda}' d \log L = \underbrace{\tilde{\lambda}' d \log A}_{\Delta \text{ Technology}} - \underbrace{\tilde{\lambda}' d \log \mu + \tilde{\Lambda}' d \log \Lambda}_{\Delta \text{ allocative efficiency}}$$

as well as growth accounting.

- The parametric model can be used for measuring the *level* of allocative efficiency (among other applications).

## Comment: Inefficient Economies and the Origin of Distortions

- The paper provides a general framework to handle distortions.
- The framework can be generalized to endogenous distortions and productivities by applying the chain rule one more time.
  
- But inefficiencies/distortions are only meaningful with respect to an efficiency benchmark.
- The right notion of efficiency cannot be decoupled from
  - (a) the origin of the inefficiencies/wedges
  - (b) the policy instruments available



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## Measuring Allocative Efficiency

- Typical measure for the *level* of allocative efficiency: distance to the frontier  
Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
- The efficiency benchmark used in the literature is the undistorted economy with no wedges  
→ Allocative inefficiency = increase in output if all wedges were eliminated.
- This is regardless of where the wedges come from (monopoly markups, taxes, financial frictions, etc.)

## Measuring Allocative Efficiency: Information Frictions

- Suppose firms make production decisions under asymmetric information about the fundamentals (Angeletos, Iovino, and La'O, 2009)
- Asymmetry of information induces a wedge with respect to the complete information benchmark.
- Yet, the economy can still be constrained efficient → a planner who cannot transfer private information across firms would face the same exact wedges.
- This would be measured as misallocation, even though the economy is (constrained) efficient: there is no policy instrument that can improve upon the allocation.

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## Changes in Allocative Efficiency

- Similar idea can be applied to *changes* in allocative efficiency.

$$\begin{aligned}\log Y &= \max_{\mathcal{X}} \log \mathcal{Y}(A, \mathcal{X}) \\ \text{s.t. } &\log g(A, \mathcal{X}) \geq 0\end{aligned}$$

- If the equilibrium is constrained efficient, we can reuse the envelope theorem, making the allocative efficiency terms second order again:

$$\frac{d \log Y}{d \log A} = \frac{\partial \log \mathcal{Y}}{\partial \log A} + \eta \frac{\partial \log g}{\partial \log A}$$

- Measuring either the (i) level or (ii) changes in allocative efficiency may require taking the origins of the wedges more seriously.

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## Gains from Eliminating Markups

- The model can be used to estimate the gains from eliminating markups.
- Second-order approximation:

$$\log(\text{GDP}^*) - \log(\text{GDP}) \approx \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{d \log Y}{d \log \mu_i} \left( \frac{1 - \mu_i}{\mu_i} \right).$$

- Using markup data and the calibrated model:

	2014/15	1997
Gutierrez & Philippon	20%	3%
Lerner Index	17%	5%
De Loecker & Eeckhout	35%	21%

- Two main observations:
  - (a) Substantial increase in gains from eliminating markups.
  - (b) Two order of magnitudes larger than Harberger's estimate (0.1%)

## Comment: Gains from Eliminating Markups

$$\log(\text{GDP}^*) - \log(\text{GDP}) \approx \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{d \log Y}{d \log \mu_i} \left( \frac{1 - \mu_i}{\mu_i} \right)$$

- Unlike the decomposition of the Solow residual, measuring the gains from eliminating markups requires the structural model:

$$\frac{d \log Y}{d \log \mu_i} = -\tilde{\lambda}_k - \sum_j (\theta_j - 1) \mu_j^{-1} \lambda_j \text{Cov} \left( \tilde{\Psi}_{(k)}, \Psi_L / \Lambda_L \right) - \lambda_k \frac{\Psi_{kL}}{\Lambda_L}$$

- But the approximation above is exact only if the elasticities are close to 1 (Bigio and La'O, 2016).
- The estimation process seems to be internally inconsistent:
  - (i) Uses structural elasticities when calculating  $d \log Y / d \log \mu_i$ .
  - (ii) Approximates the gains as if all production functions are Cobb-Douglas



## Comment: Gains from Eliminating Markups

- Calibrations for 2014/15:

	Benchmark	CD Counterfactual
GP	20%	4%
LI	17%	4%
DE	35%	7%

- Not sure how to interpret the large gap between the two calibrations.
- What if the much larger numbers of the benchmark (where the elasticities are  $\epsilon = 0, \zeta = 8$ ) are driven by larger approximation errors?
- Since estimating the  $d \log Y / d \log \mu_i$  requires the structural model anyways, why not estimate the gains from reducing markups also structurally?

# Summary

- A generalization of Hulten's theorem to inefficient economies
- Applications:
  - comparative statics
  - growth accounting
  - measuring allocative efficiency
  - macro impacts of micro shocks
  - etc.
  
- The paper makes a strong argument for taking the microeconomic nature of the economy (input-output linkages, micro elasticities, returns to scale) seriously.
- Thinking about misallocation may also require taking the nature and origins of the “wedges” more seriously.