Managerial Economics & Strategy
BA, Economics & Mathematics, Amherst College, 2012
Interests: Microeconomic Theory, Information Economics
"Dynamic Screening with Differentially Informed Principals"
(job market paper)
Abstract: This paper studies a dynamic principal-agent model of adverse selection under competition among principals. Principals are ex-ante identical, but receive information about the agent independently which creates a setting of imperfect competition. We study how the agent's payoffs in this setting differ compared to the regular monopoly principal-agent case, and how that affects the agent's incentives to reveal/hide information. When the game is played in a repeated setting with only short-term commitment, the familiar Ratchet effect kicks in and makes it difficult for principals to incentivize the agent. Finally, we show that allowing voluntary information sharing among principals can benefit principals and improve welfare in general.
“Price Competition with Asymmetric Information”
, with Colin Shopp [in progress]
Abstract: Firms in an (imperfectly) competitive market often engage in market research in order to optimally price their products given the underlying market features. These features often affect demand for all products, for example demographics or overall spending power. The returns to acquiring more precise information may depend on how competitive the product market is. In this paper, We model this by assuming there are two symmetric firms producing substitute goods who privately engage in costly market research of an underlying demand parameter that affects both firms. Based on the information acquired, they simultaneously choose prices. We focus on comparative statics results about how market competitiveness affects the firms' incentives to acquire better information.
Prof. Michael Powell
Prof. Peter Klibanoff
Prof. Daniel Barron
Prof. Mark Satterthwaite