The Workshop

On the Internet we have games with a large number of agents, asynchronous play, and an the absence of full knowledge about the number of agents one is playing against or the beliefs they possess. The Internet is not the only institution to possess these features nor the first. Markets for traditional goods and services as well as travel networks all possess these features.

This workshop is devoted to the analysis of large scale games of the kinds inspired by the Internet and other computer networks, markets, traffic networks and other large systems. We invite papers that will show how to adapt and extend classical game theoretic models to deal with a large number of players, accommodate the absence of common knowledge, common priors, asynchrony in play and distributed computation.

Examples of the kind of work that would be suitable for this workshop include price of anarchy models, robust and on-line mechanism design, timing games, asymptotic analysis of traditional auctions, continuous double auctions (two-sided markets) and network formation.

Organizers:

Lance Fortnow, University of Chicago
Rakesh Vohra, Northwestern University

Invited Speakers:

-Matthew Jackson "Network and Coalition Formation"
-Tim Roughgarden "Price of Anarchy Models"
-Ehud Kalai "Equilibrium Notions for Games with Many Players"
-Jason Hartline "Mechanism Design Models without the Common Prior"
-Mark Satterthwaite "Asymptotic Analysis of Market Mechanisms"

Accepted Papers: