Chicago Booth"Muddled Information" (joint with Navin Kartik at Columbia University)1:30-3:00 p.m. Jacobs Center Room 619Abstract: We introduce a model of signaling in which agents are heterogeneous on two dimensions. The first is the natural action: the action taken in the absence of signaling concerns. The second is gaming ability: a parameter for the costs of increasing actions beyond the natural level. Agents’ equilibrium actions “muddle” together information about both dimensions. As incentives to take higher actions increase—due to higher stakes or more easily manipulated signaling technology—more information is revealed about gaming ability, and less about their natural actions. Our analysis points to a tradeoff when observers are interested in agents’ natural actions. Making actions observable to a larger market gives new observers better information, but also raises agents’ incentives to take higher actions. Hence, the information about agents’ natural actions is further muddled for existing observers. We discuss applications to signaling in credit scoring, school testing, and web search.
"Can Healthcare Competition Work? Evidence from the US Medicare Advantage Program"
NEW DAY - THIS WEEK ONLY: Tuesday, April 22
1:30-3:00 p.m. Jacobs Center Room 619
University of British Columbia"Performance Pay and Earnings Dynamics"1:30-3:00 p.m. Jacobs Center Room 619
Stanford GSBTBA1:30-3:00 p.m. Jacobs Center Room 619
OxfordTBA1:30-3:00 p.m. Jacobs Center Room 619
Chicago BoothTBA1:30-3:00 p.m. Jacobs Center Room 619
Warwick"The Changing Returns to Crime: How Do Criminals Respond to Changes in Goods Prices?"1:30-3:00 p.m. Jacobs Center Room 619
WhartonTBA1:30-3:00 p.m. Jacobs Center Room 619