The New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene’s Physical Activity and Nutrition Program needed to come up with an innovative solution to the many health problems, such as obesity, diabetes, and heart disease that plagued residents of poorer areas in the city, while increasing economic opportunity for neighborhood residents. The result was the launching of Green Carts, a new mobile food vending initiative to support the introduction of healthier food options to residents of “food deserts” in New York City boroughs. The challenge was navigating the diverse landscape of players and engaging all of the relevant stakeholders to come up with a solution that was both feasible and sustainable.

This case exemplifies the how partnership and strategic alliances can be used to have significant social impact. The beauty of this example is that it simultaneously addresses two large social issues: 1) access to healthy food options in urban food deserts and 2) creating self-employment opportunities for members of disadvantaged communities. This case also illustrates how the public sector can act as social innovators.

The New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene’s Physical Activity and Nutrition Program needed to come up with an innovative solution to the many health problems, such as obesity, diabetes, and heart disease that plagued residents of poorer areas in the city, while increasing economic opportunity for neighborhood residents. The result was the launching of Green Carts, a new mobile food vending initiative to support the introduction of healthier food options to residents of “food deserts” in New York City boroughs. The challenge was navigating the diverse landscape of players and engaging all of the relevant stakeholders to come up with a solution that was both feasible and sustainable.

This case exemplifies the how partnership and strategic alliances can be used to have significant social impact. The beauty of this example is that it simultaneously addresses two large social issues: 1) access to healthy food options in urban food deserts and 2) creating self-employment opportunities for members of disadvantaged communities. This case also illustrates how the public sector can act as social innovators.

The cases describe the demise of Arthur Andersen, a firm that had long set the industry standard for professionalism in accounting and auditing. Once an example of strong corporate culture with a commitment to public service and independent integrity, Andersen saw its culture and standards weaken as it grew explosively and changed its mode of governance.

The (A) case describes a crisis precipitated by the admission of Waste Management, a major Andersen client, that it overstated its pretax earnings by $1.43 billion from 1992 to 1996. The resulting Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation ended with Andersen paying a $7 million fine, the largest ever levied against an accounting firm, and agreeing to an injunction that effectively placed the accounting giant on probation. Students analyze the causes of Andersen’s problems and advise Andersen leadership.

The (B) case covers Arthur Andersen’s relationship with Enron, one of the great success stories of the “new economy” boom. When Enron’s aggressive use of off-balance sheet partnerships became impossible to hide in autumn 2001, news reports stated that Andersen auditors had engaged in extensive shredding of draft documents and associated communications with Enron. Students are asked to act as crisis management consultants to Andersen CEO Joe Berardino.

The (C) case details Andersen’s collapse following its indictment and conviction on criminal charges of obstructing justice in the Enron case. Its conviction was later overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court on narrow technical grounds, but by then Andersen had ceased to exist, eighty-nine years after Arthur E. Andersen had taken over a small accounting firm in Chicago. Students can focus on the impact of media on a reputational crisis.

The cases describe the demise of Arthur Andersen, a firm that had long set the industry standard for professionalism in accounting and auditing. Once an example of strong corporate culture with a commitment to public service and independent integrity, Andersen saw its culture and standards weaken as it grew explosively and changed its mode of governance.

The (A) case describes a crisis precipitated by the admission of Waste Management, a major Andersen client, that it overstated its pretax earnings by $1.43 billion from 1992 to 1996. The resulting Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation ended with Andersen paying a $7 million fine, the largest ever levied against an accounting firm, and agreeing to an injunction that effectively placed the accounting giant on probation. Students analyze the causes of Andersen’s problems and advise Andersen leadership.

The (B) case covers Arthur Andersen’s relationship with Enron, one of the great success stories of the “new economy” boom. When Enron’s aggressive use of off-balance sheet partnerships became impossible to hide in autumn 2001, news reports stated that Andersen auditors had engaged in extensive shredding of draft documents and associated communications with Enron. Students are asked to act as crisis management consultants to Andersen CEO Joe Berardino.

The (C) case details Andersen’s collapse following its indictment and conviction on criminal charges of obstructing justice in the Enron case. Its conviction was later overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court on narrow technical grounds, but by then Andersen had ceased to exist, eighty-nine years after Arthur E. Andersen had taken over a small accounting firm in Chicago. Students can focus on the impact of media on a reputational crisis.

The cases describe the demise of Arthur Andersen, a firm that had long set the industry standard for professionalism in accounting and auditing. Once an example of strong corporate culture with a commitment to public service and independent integrity, Andersen saw its culture and standards weaken as it grew explosively and changed its mode of governance.

The (A) case describes a crisis precipitated by the admission of Waste Management, a major Andersen client, that it overstated its pretax earnings by $1.43 billion from 1992 to 1996. The resulting Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation ended with Andersen paying a $7 million fine, the largest ever levied against an accounting firm, and agreeing to an injunction that effectively placed the accounting giant on probation. Students analyze the causes of Andersen’s problems and advise Andersen leadership.

The (B) case covers Arthur Andersen’s relationship with Enron, one of the great success stories of the “new economy” boom. When Enron’s aggressive use of off-balance sheet partnerships became impossible to hide in autumn 2001, news reports stated that Andersen auditors had engaged in extensive shredding of draft documents and associated communications with Enron. Students are asked to act as crisis management consultants to Andersen CEO Joe Berardino.

The (C) case details Andersen’s collapse following its indictment and conviction on criminal charges of obstructing justice in the Enron case. Its conviction was later overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court on narrow technical grounds, but by then Andersen had ceased to exist, eighty-nine years after Arthur E. Andersen had taken over a small accounting firm in Chicago. Students can focus on the impact of media on a reputational crisis.

Bryan Preston, CEO of the Back Office Cooperative, leads several large human service providers through the process of building a shared-services platform to leverage scale and efficiencies. This successful collaboration matches the business case for restructuring against the constraints of mission-driven enterprises.

“The building is gone but the Church is still here” was the immediate thought of Pastor Jim Wilson as he watched his church structure burn to the ground in 1998. Pastor Wilson realized that as the leader of the congregation, he needed to take action to manage the crisis and to lead his congregation to a new vision of the future that might be quite different than the past. His choice of leadership style, his gathering a team of leaders around him and his creation of a strong vision for the future are lessons that nonprofit and for-profit leaders can learn from through this case. The case chronicles the story of leadership and change management that led BUMC from the ashes to a new building and a strong, growing congregation.

The case brings to light several critical issues in nonprofit management: change management, leadership and vision, changing demographics and environment, and crisis management.

“The building is gone but the Church is still here” was the immediate thought of Pastor Jim Wilson as he watched his church structure burn to the ground in 1998. Pastor Wilson realized that as the leader of the congregation, he needed to take action to manage the crisis and to lead his congregation to a new vision of the future that might be quite different than the past. His choice of leadership style, his gathering a team of leaders around him and his creation of a strong vision for the future are lessons that nonprofit and for-profit leaders can learn from through this case. The case chronicles the story of leadership and change management that led BUMC from the ashes to a new building and a strong, growing congregation.

The case brings to light several critical issues in nonprofit management: change management, leadership and vision, changing demographics and environment, and crisis management.

In December 2010, one U.S. legislative action was largely overlooked in the popular press: the one-year extension of the 45-cent-per-gallon Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (VEETC), commonly known as the “blender’s credit.” Both proponents and opponents of the blender’s credit liked to cite data to support their positions. Proponents pointed out the number of jobs created by new ethanol plants, while opponents cited unfavorable energy balances from the use of ethanol and the overall budgetary impact of the blender’s credit. What was less clear—but potentially much more important than the selective data cited by advocates and critics of ethanol—was the overall impact of the blender’s credit on the U.S. economy. In particular, to what extent did the ethanol subsidy—by influencing the allocation of resources to the ethanol market—act as a drag on efficiency in the U.S. economy?

This case presents a history of ethanol in the U.S. and an overview of the market for ethanol-based motor fuel, including data on demand and supply fundamentals. It also discusses the broader U.S. energy market, as well as the U.S. market for corn. The case reviews other policy interventions besides the ethanol tax credit that have an impact on the market for ethanol-based motor fuel, such as tariffs and mandates. Finally, it surveys the ways other countries around the world, such as Brazil, have supported the use of ethanol-based fuel.

Although the federal gasoline tax played multiple roles in financing surface transportation infrastructure in the United States, experts did not agree on the tax’s purpose. Some argued that it was essentially a fee for users of the nation’s federally supported highways. Others suggested that it should play a more prominent role in environmental, energy, and transportation policy by correcting for driving-related externalities. Still others suggested that it should be used to reduce the federal budget deficit. Finally, the tax itself had remained at the same level since 1993, and with the Highway Trust Fund virtually insolvent, many experts believed it was time for an increase. The case presents a background on the U.S. federal gasoline tax, an overview of the market for gasoline in the United States, and survey of gasoline taxes in U.S. states as well as several other countries around the world.

In late 2009 Toyota became the subject of media and U.S. government scrutiny after multiple deaths and injuries were attributed to accidents resulting from the unintended and uncontrolled acceleration of its cars. Despite Toyota’s voluntary recall of 4.2 million vehicles for floor mats that could jam the accelerator pedal and a later recall to increase the space between the gas pedal and the floor, the company insisted there was no underlying defect and defended itself against media reports and regulatory statements that said otherwise. As the crisis escalated, Toyota was further criticized for its unwillingness to share information from its data recorders about possible problems with electronic throttle controls and sticky accelerator pedals, as well as braking problems with the Prius. By the time Toyota Motor Company president Akio Toyoda apologized in his testimony to the U.S. Congress, Toyota’s stock price had declined, in just over a month, by 20 percent—a $35 billion loss of market value.

After Hurricane Katrina hit the coast of Louisiana on August 29, 2005, Wal-Mart initiated emergency operations that not only protected and reopened its stores, but also helped its employees and others in the community cope with the disaster’s personal impact. This response was part of a wider effort by the company under CEO Lee Scott to improve its public image. Wal-Mart’s efforts were widely regarded as the most successful of all corporations in the aftermath of the disaster and set the standard for future corporate disaster relief programs.

In early 2004, residents of Inglewood, California, a working-class community just outside Los Angeles composed primarily of African- and Hispanic-Americans, were preparing to vote on a referendum that would change the city charter to allow Wal-Mart to build a supercenter on a huge, undeveloped lot in the city. Walmart had put forward the measure after the city council refused to change the zoning of a sixty-acre plot on which it held an option to build.
Numerous community and religious groups opposed Wal-Mart’s entry and campaigned against the referendum. Walmart promised low-priced merchandise and jobs, but these groups were skeptical about the kinds of jobs and compensation that would be offered, the healthcare that would be provided to employees, and the broader impact Walmart would have on the community. Inglewood was a pro-union community, so there was also opposition based on Walmart’s anti-union position.
On April 6 Inglewood residents voted to reject the referendum by a margin of 60.6 percent to 39.9 percent. Though smaller, less organized, and with fewer resources than Walmart, this coalition of community and religious leaders had defeated the global retailing behemoth.

Great achievements in knowledge are produced by older innovators today than they were a century ago. Using data on Nobel Prize winners and great inventors, I find that the mean age at which noted innovations are produced has increased by 6 years over the 20th Century. I estimate shifts in life-cycle productivity and show that innovators have become especially unproductive at younger ages. Meanwhile, the later start to the career is not compensated for by increasing productivity beyond early middle age. I further show that the early life-cycle dynamics are closely related to variation in the age at Ph.D. and discuss a theory where accumulations of knowledge across generations lead innovators to seek more education over time. More generally, the results show that individual innnovators are productive over a narrowing span of their life-cycle, a trend that reduces, other things equal, the aggregate output of innovators. This drop in productivity is particularly acute if innovators’ raw ability is greatest when young.

Four studies examined the relationship between counterfactual origins – thoughts about how the beginning of institutions and relationships might have turned out differently – and increased feelings of commitment to organizations, countries and social connections. Study 1 found that counterfactually reflecting on the origins of one’s country increased patriotism. Study 2 extended this finding to organizational commitment and examined the mediating role of poignancy. Study 3 found that counterfactual reflection boosts organizational commitment even in the face of other commitment-enhancing appeals and that perceptions of fate mediate the positive effect of counterfactual origins on commitment. Finally, Study 4 temporally separated the counterfactual manipulation from a behavioral measure of commitment, and found even two weeks later that counterfactual reflection predicted whether participants emailed social contacts. The robust relationship between counterfactual origins and commitment was found across a wide range of companies and countries, with undergraduates and MBA students, and on attitudes and behaviors.

Change is hard for all but perhaps more difficult for school leaders and other nonprofit organizations. The role that culture plays in a mission-driven organization can often be an impediment to change. This case uses a unique education institution, St. Martin dePorres School of the Cristo Rey Network, to illustrate the importance of culture in implementing change. It demonstrates how leaders can articulate a vision and create a strategy to change an organization and move toward success.

The case focuses on the leadership team of Principal Mike Odiotti and Assistant Principal Judy Seiberlich and how they used cultural change as the key driver to school success. That success was defined by improved academic performance, greater accountability for students, teachers and staff and stronger empowerment of constituents. It includes an overview of how the school’s leadership team used data to drive decision making.

This case is ideal for MBA students, executives in nonprofit management or school leadership and can be used to illustrate change management, nonprofit leadership, culture change, mission-driven strategy or school leadership. It addresses critical issues that organizations face and provides tools and tactics that can be applied to mission-driven enterprises.

Change is hard for all but perhaps more difficult for school leaders and other nonprofit organizations. The role that culture plays in a mission-driven organization can often be an impediment to change. This case uses a unique education institution, St. Martin dePorres School of the Cristo Rey Network, to illustrate the importance of culture in implementing change. It demonstrates how leaders can articulate a vision and create a strategy to change an organization and move toward success.

The case focuses on the leadership team of Principal Mike Odiotti and Assistant Principal Judy Seiberlich and how they used cultural change as the key driver to school success. That success was defined by improved academic performance, greater accountability for students, teachers and staff and stronger empowerment of constituents. It includes an overview of how the school’s leadership team used data to drive decision making.

This case is ideal for MBA students, executives in nonprofit management or school leadership and can be used to illustrate change management, nonprofit leadership, culture change, mission-driven strategy or school leadership. It addresses critical issues that organizations face and provides tools and tactics that can be applied to mission-driven enterprises.

The purpose of this case is to introduce the topic of socially responsible investing from both the investor and investee perspective. The students will walk away with an understanding of: 1) how to evaluate a portfolio company on a social/environmental mission as well as on traditional financial criteria and 2) what considerations should be top of mind for a social venture considering accepting an equity investment.

Wes Selke is a portfolio manager at Good Capital, an investment fund created to increase the flow of capital to innovative non- and for-profit social ventures that are using market-based solutions to solve problems of poverty, illiteracy, and inequality. In 2007, Good Capital is ready to make its first growth equity investment in a for-profit social enterprise and Selke is considering Better World Books as the firm’s primary target.

Selke must evaluate whether or not the firm is a financially sound investment, and if its social and environmental mission can be preserved upon a liquidation event. If Good Capital proceeds with the investment, Selke must also rework some of Better World Books’ current procedures, which includes fine-tuning the philanthropic giving strategy that is the main component of its social mission.

The purpose of this case is to introduce the topic of socially responsible investing from both the investor and investee perspective. The students will walk away with an understanding of: 1) how to evaluate a portfolio company on a social/environmental mission as well as on traditional financial criteria and 2) what considerations should be top of mind for a social venture considering accepting an equity investment.

Wes Selke is a portfolio manager at Good Capital, an investment fund created to increase the flow of capital to innovative non- and for-profit social ventures that are using market-based solutions to solve problems of poverty, illiteracy, and inequality. In 2007, Good Capital is ready to make its first growth equity investment in a for-profit social enterprise and Selke is considering Better World Books as the firm’s primary target.

Selke must evaluate whether or not the firm is a financially sound investment, and if its social and environmental mission can be preserved upon a liquidation event. If Good Capital proceeds with the investment, Selke must also rework some of Better World Books’ current procedures, which includes fine-tuning the philanthropic giving strategy that is the main component of its social mission.

Rede Alta Velocidade, SA RAVE, the state-owned company responsible for planning and developing a major high-speed rail project in Portugal, must persuade both public officials and lenders that the project is worth undertaking. It must also make a recommendation on the appropriate organizational form for the enterprise. Specifically it must determine the role of the Portuguese government in financing and operating the high-speed rail network, with options ranging from full development and management of the project by the public sector to completely private development and management. Lying in between these two polar cases were a variety of hybrid models often referred to as public-private partnerships (PPPs). Using data in the case, students have the opportunity to perform a benefit-cost analysis of the project. They also must think carefully about the optimal role of the government in a major new infrastructure project.

Learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting have been shown to be important in a variety of industrial settings. This paper provides a general model of dynamic competition that accounts for these economic fundamentals and shows how they shape industry structure and dynamics. Previously obtained results regarding the dominance properties of firms' pricing behavior no longer hold in this more general setting. We show that organizational forgetting does not simply negate learning-by-doing. Rather, learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting are distinct economic forces. In particular, a model with both learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting can give rise to aggressive pricing behavior, market dominance, and multiple equilibria, whereas a model with learning-by-doing alone cannot

Capacity addition and withdrawal decisions are among the most important strategic decisions made by firms in oligopolistic industries. In this paper, we develop and analyze a fully dynamic model of an oligopolistic industry with lumpy capacity and lumpy investment/disinvestment. We use our model to answer two questions. First, what economic factors facilitate preemption races? Second, what economic factors facilitate capacity coordination? We show that low product differentiation, low investment sunkness, and high depreciation promote preemption races. We also show that low product differentiation and low investment sunkness promote capacity coordination. Although depreciation removes capacity, it may impede capacity coordination. Finally, we show that, at least over some range of parameter values, firms' expectation plays a key role in determining whether or not industry dynamics are characterized by preemption races and capacity coordination. Taken together, our results suggest that preemption races and excess capacity in the short run often go hand-in-hand with capacity coordination in the long run.