This paper studies the impact of gender quotas for corporate board seats on corporate policy decisions. We examine the introduction of Norway’s 2006 quota, comparing affected firms to other Scandinavian companies, public and private, that were unaffected by the rule. Based on differences-in-differences and triple-difference models, we find that firms affected by the quota undertook fewer workforce reductions than comparison firms, increasing relative labor costs and employment levels and reducing short-term profits. The effects are strongest among firms that had no female board members before the quota was introduced and present even for boards with older and more experienced members. The boards appear to be affecting corporate strategy in part by selecting likeminded executives.

This case asks the student to take a stance on whether an portfolio manager should take a long or short position in the equity of Universal Display Corporation (PANL). The stock is polarizing, in that reasonable arguments could be made for both long and short positions. The case suggests a number of steps that an analyst might follow when valuing a company.

The U.S. Federal Reserve used the Term Auction Facility to provide term funding to eligible depository institutions from December 2007 to March 2010. According to the Fed, the purpose of the TAF was to inject term funds through a broader range of counterparties and against a broader range of collateral than open market operations. The overall goal of the TAF was to ensure that liquidity provisions could be disseminated efficiently even when the unsecured interbank markets were under stress. In this paper I use the TAF micro-level loan data and find that about 60 percent of TAF loans went to foreign banks that pledged asset-backed securities as collateral for these loans. The data and analysis illustrate the major role that foreign—in particular, European—banks currently play in the U.S. financial system and the resultant currency mismatch in their balance sheets. The data suggest that foreign banks had to borrow from the Federal Reserve Bank to meet their dollar-denominated liabilities.

We conjecture that the changes in economic activity from late 2008 to early 2009 is due to a drop in trust. We present new survey evidence consistent with this hypothesis.

Stylized facts suggest that most investors pay more attention to their asset holdings at the end of the tax year. The tax year ends in December in Japan and April in U.K. August is a relatively quiet period. Therefore we should expect more support for the consumption based capital asset pricing model during the period surrounding the end of the tax year, i.e., fourth and first quarters in Japan; first and second quarters in U.K. We should find least support in the third quarter in both countries. Our findings are consistent with those expectations as well as the patterns in the U.S. documented in the literature. The need to take into account deterministic seasonal patterns in investor behavior provides another rationale for the use of long horizon returns when measuring the consumption risk exposure of stocks.

This paper proposes a form of contingent capital for financial institutions that converts from debt to equity if two conditions are met: the firm's stock price is at or below a trigger value and the value of a financial institutions index is also at or below a trigger value. This structure protects financial firms during a crisis, when all are performing badly, but during normal times permits a bank performing badly to go bankrupt. I discuss a number of issues associated with the design of a contingent capital claim, including susceptibility to manipulation and whether conversion should be for a fixed dollar amount of shares or a fixed number of shares; the susceptibility of different contingent capital schemes to different kinds of errors (under and over-capitalization); and the losses likely to be incurred by shareholders upon the imposition of a requirement for contingent capital. I also present some illustrative pricing examples.

We examine whether private feedback about relative performance can mitigate moral hazard in competitive environments by modifying the agents’ self-esteem. In our experimental setting, people work harder and expect to rank better when told that they may learn their ranking, relative to cases when feedback will not be provided. Individuals who ranked better than expected decrease output but expect a better rank in the future, whereas those who ranked worse than expected increase output but lower their future rank expectations. Feedback helps create a ratcheting effect in productivity, mainly because of the fight for dominance at the top of the rank hierarchy. Our findings suggest that organizations can improve employee productivity by changing the likelihood of feedback, the reference group used to calculate relative performance, and the informativeness of the feedback message.

We present a model to study the dynamics of risk premia during crises in asset markets where the
marginal investor is a financial intermediary. Intermediaries face a constraint on raising equity capital.
When the constraint binds, so that intermediaries’ equity capital is scarce, risk premia rise to reflect the
capital scarcity. We calibrate the model and show that it does well in matching two aspects of crises:
the nonlinearity of risk premia during crisis episodes; and, the speed of adjustment in risk premia from a
crisis back to pre-crisis levels. We use the model to quantitatively evaluate the effectiveness of a variety
of central bank policies, including reducing intermediaries’ borrowing costs, infusing equity capital, and
directly intervening in distressed asset markets. All of these policies are effective in aiding the recovery
from a crisis. Infusing equity capital into intermediaries is particularly effective because it attacks the
equity capital constraint that is at the root of the crisis in our model.

The American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) significantly lowered U.S. firms’ tax cost when  accessing their unrepatriated foreign earnings. Using this temporary shock to the cost of  internal financing, we examine the role of capital constraints in firms’ investment decisions. Controlling for the capacity to repatriate foreign earnings under the AJCA, we find that a majority of the funds repatriated by capital-constrained firms were allocated to approved domestic investment. Although unconstrained firms account for a majority of repatriated funds, no increase in investment resulted. Contrary to other examinations of the AJCA, we find little change in leverage and equity payouts.

High-powered incentives may induce higher managerial effort, but they also expose managers to idiosyncratic risk. If managers are risk averse, they might underinvest when firm-specific uncertainty increases, leading to suboptimal investment decisions from the perspective of well-diversified shareholders. We empirically document that, when idiosyncratic risk rises, firm investment falls, and more so when managers own a larger fraction of the firm. This negative effect of managerial risk aversion on investment is mitigated if executives are compensated with options rather than with shares or if institutional investors form a large part of the shareholder base.

Organization capital is a production factor that is embodied in the firm's key talent and has an efficiency that is firm specific. As a result, both shareholders and management have a claim on the cash flows accruing from organization capital. Because the division of rents between shareholders and key talent can systematically vary over time, shareholders investing in organization capital are exposed to additional risks. In our model, key talent can transfer a fraction of the firm's organization capital to a new enterprise, and the benefits of this reallocation vary systematically. This outside option determines the division of cash flows from organization capital between shareholders and key talent, and renders firms with high organization capital riskier. We construct a measure of organization capital based on readily available accounting data and find that firms with more organization capital relative to their industry peers outperform firms with less organization capital by 4.7% per year. This dispersion in risk premia is not explained by the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993) or Carhart (1997) models. Our model offers additional testable implications that are supported by the data.

We investigate whether public opinion influences the level and structure of executive compensation. During 1992–2008, the negativity of press coverage of chief executive officer (CEO) pay varied significantly, with stock options being the most criticized pay component. We find that after more negative press coverage of CEO pay, firms reduce option grants and increase less contentious types of pay such as salary, although overall compensation does not change. The reduction in option pay after increased press negativity is more pronounced when firms, CEOs, and boards have stronger reputation concerns. Our within-firm, within-year identification shows the results cannot be explained by annual changes in accounting rules regarding executive compensation, stock market conditions, or pay mean reversion.

The aim of this paper is to conceptualize and design a risk topography that outlines a data acquisition and dissemination process that informs policy makers, researchers and market participants about systemic risk. Our approach emphasizes that systemic risk (i) typically builds up in the background before materializing in a crisis and (ii) is determined by market participants' response to various shocks. To this end we propose a two-step approach: First, regulators elicit from market participants their (partial equilibrium) risk as well as liquidity sensitivities with respect to major risk factors and liquidity scenarios. By doing so, one takes advantage of private sector internal risk models and over time an informative panel data set is obtained. Second, general equilibrium responses and economy-wide system effects are calibrated using this panel data set.

The case focuses on two major challenges in deal making in emerging market economies—deal sourcing and negotiation—by focusing on a real (but disguised) Indian private equity deal. In 2010 Surya Tutoring was a fast-growing tutoring academy for high school students aspiring to gain admission to the prestigious Indian Institute of Technology (IIT). Surya’s CEO, R. K. Sharma, wanted to expand its reach beyond Kota (a city of 1 million people in the northern state of Rajasthan), which had become the center of the IIT prep school industry and home to tens of thousands of students studying for the rigorous IIT entrance exam. Sharma knew there was vast untapped potential in the teeming Indian metropolises of Mumbai, Chennai, Delhi, and Bangalore, as well as in foreign markets such as Dubai and Australia.

Sharma had received term sheets from two private equity firms willing to finance Surya’s expansion. By the end of the month he needed to decide which to accept: the offer from big bulge bracket fund Blackgem, or the one from ZenCap, a small Indian firm based in Mumbai with which he had become intimately familiar during the past year.

We present evidence from an experiment in which groups select a leader to compete against the leaders of other groups in a real-effort task that they have all performed in the past. We find that women are selected much less often as leaders than is suggested by their individual past performance. We study three potential explanations for the underrepresentation of women, namely, gender differences in overconfidence concerning past performance, in the willingness to exaggerate past performance to the group, and in the reaction to monetary incentives. We find that men's overconfidence is the driving force behind the observed prevalence of male representation.

In 2010 Drive Property Solutions, a special servicing firm in Chicago, had partnered with Spiner Capital to win an FDIC auction of distressed debt. Included in that auction was the defaulted mortgage note on Northwinds Community Crossing, a retail strip mall in suburban Savannah, Georgia, which had been in default since November 2009. Sam Schey, an asset manager at Drive, needed to decide how to maximize recoveries from the nonperforming loan.

We develop a model in which the capital of the intermediary sector plays a critical role in
determining asset prices. The model is cast within a dynamic general equilibrium economy, and
the role for intermediation is derived endogenously based on optimal contracting considerations.
Low intermediary capital reduces the risk-bearing capacity of the marginal investor. We show
how this force helps to explain patterns during …nancial crises. The model replicates the observed
rise during crises in Sharpe ratios, conditional volatility, correlation in price movements of assets
held by the intermediary sector, and fall in riskless interest rates. In a dynamic context, we show
that aversion to drops in intermediary capital can generate a two-factor asset pricing model with
a role for both a market factor and a liquidity factor.

While many researchers and policymakers infer from correlations between eating out and body weight that restaurants are a leading cause of obesity, a basic identification problem challenges these conclusions. We design a natural experiment using highways in rural areas to exploit exogenous variation in the effective price of restaurants and examine the impact on body mass. We find no causal link between restaurant consumption and obesity. Analysis of food-intake micro-data suggests that consumers offset calories from restaurant meals by eating less at other times. We conclude that regulation targeting restaurants is unlikely to reduce obesity but could decrease consumer welfare.

Over the post-decimalization period, we find a predictable pattern of return continuation in equities. Stocks whose relative returns are high in a given half-hour interval today tend to exhibit similar outperformance in the same half-hour period on subsequent days. The effect is stronger at the beginning and end of the trading day, but exists throughout the day. Percentage changes in trading volume exhibit a similar pattern, but do not explain the return pattern. These results suggest that strategically shifting the timing of trades can significantly reduce execution costs for institutional traders.

This paper examines the role of women helping women in corporate America. Using a merged panel of directors and executives for large U.S. corporations between 1997 and 2009, we find a positive association between the female share of the board of directors in the previous year and the female share among current top executives. The relationship’s timing suggests that causality runs from boards to managers and not the reverse. This pattern of women helping women at the highest levels of firm leadership highlights the continued importance of a demand-side “glass ceiling” in explaining the slow progress of women in business.

This chapter reviews the recent debate about the role of social capital in economics. We argue that all the difficulties this concept has encountered in economics are due to a vague and excessively broad definition. For this reason, we restrict social capital to the set of values and beliefs that help cooperation, which for clarity we label civic capital. We argue that this definition differentiates social capital from human capital and satisfies the properties of the standard notion of capital. We then argue that civic capital can explain why differences in economic performance persist over centuries and discuss how the effect of civic capital can be distinguished empirically from other variables that affect economic performance and its persistence, including institutions and geography.

This paper analyzes the effect of competition on a supermarket firm’s incentive to provide product quality. In the supermarket industry, product availability is an important measure of quality. Using U.S. consumer price index microdata to track inventory shortfalls, I find that stores facing more intense competition have fewer shortfalls. Competition from Wal-Mart – the most significant shock to industry market structure in half a century – decreases shortfalls by about a third. The risk of customers switching stores appears to provide strong incentives for investments in product quality.

This paper introduces and studies the econometric properties of a general new class of models, which I refer to as jump-driven stochastic volatility models, in which the volatility is a moving average of past jumps. I focus attention on two particular semiparametric classes of jump-driven stochastic volatility models. In the first the price has a continuous component with time-varying volatility and time-homogenous jumps. The second jump-driven stochastic volatility model analyzed here has only jumps in the price, which have time-varying size. In the empirical application I model the memory of the stochastic variance with a CARMA(2,1) kernel and set the jumps in the variance to be proportional to the squared price jumps. The estimation, which is based on matching moments of certain realized power variation statistics calculated from high-frequency foreign exchange data, shows that the jump-driven stochastic volatility model containing continuous component in the price performs best. It outperforms a standard two-factor affine jump-diffusion model, but also the pure-jump jump-driven stochastic volatility model for the particular jump specification.

We propose a new and flexible non-parametric framework for estimating the jump tails of Itˆo semimartingale processes. The approach is based on a relatively simple-to-implement set of estimating equations associated with the compensator for the jump measure, or its “intensity”, that only utilizes the weak assumption of regular variation in the jump tails, along with in-fill asymptotic arguments for directly estimating the “large” jumps. The procedure assumes that the “large” sized jumps are identically distributed, but otherwise allows for very general dynamic dependencies in jump occurrences, and importantly does not restrict the behavior of the “small” jumps, nor the continuous part of the process and the temporal variation in the stochastic volatility. On implementing the new estimation procedure with actual high-frequency data for the S&P 500 aggregate market portfolio, we find strong evidence for richer and more complex dynamic dependencies in the jump tails than hitherto entertained in the literature.

Emerging findings imply that distinct neurobehavioral systems process gains and losses. This study investigated whether individual differences in gain learning and loss learning might contribute to different life financial outcomes (i.e., assets versus debt). In a community sample of healthy adults (n = 75), rapid learners had smaller debt-to-asset ratios overall. More specific analyses, however, revealed that those who learned rapidly about gains had more assets, while those who learned rapidly about losses had less debt. These distinct associations remained strong even after controlling for potential cognitive (e.g., intelligence, memory, and risk preferences) and socioeconomic (e.g., age, sex, ethnicity, income, education) confounds. Self-reported measures of assets and debtwere additionally validated with credit report data in a subset of subjects. These findings support the notion that different gain and loss learning systems may exert a cumulative influence on distinct life financial outcomes.

Aurelia Dimas had been sent to investigate the various properties being offered by the State of California in the form of a sale-leaseback agreement. The opportunity was perfect for her firm, Orrington Financial Partners, which had recently expanded its fixed-income portfolio to include real estate. The wide range of offerings in the Golden State Portfolio provided both diversification and stability over a period of decades. She had spent the last week walking the halls of each and every building to see the offering first hand. Now, the task of valuing the portfolio rested on her shoulders.

This paper analyzes the importance of agency conflicts arising from managers’ exposure to their firms’ risk. In particular, we study how a typical firm responds to an exogenous increase in legal liability arising from its workers’ exposure to newly identified carcinogens. We find that such firms, particularly those with weak balance sheets, tend to undertake aggressive growth through acquisitions. The acquired firms tend to be large, unrelated businesses with relatively high operating cash flows, recent growth, and total payouts. These deals are associated with high takeover premiums and negative abnormal returns. These findings support a managerial agency model: we find that firms with weak external governance, high management ownership, or low institutional ownership are most likely to grow. The results suggest that corporate governance can be particularly important when firms encounter a negative shock.

I explore the implications for asset prices and macroeconomic dynamics of shocks that improve real investment opportunities and thus affect the representative household's marginal utility. These investment shocks generate differences in risk premia due to their heterogeneous impact on firms: they benefit firms producing investment relative to firms producing consumption goods, and increase the value of growth opportunities relative to the value of existing assets. Using data on asset returns, I find that a positive investment shock leads to high marginal utility states. A general equilibrium model with investment shocks matches key features of macroeconomic quantities and asset prices.

I develop a dynamic model that nests the rational expectations (RE) and differences of opinion (DO) approaches to study how investors use prices to update their valuations. I show that when investors condition on prices (RE), investor disagreement is related positively to expected returns, return volatility and market beta, but negatively to return autocorrelation. When investors do not use prices (DO), these relationships are reversed. I test these predictions on the cross-section of stocks using analyst forecast dispersion and volume as proxies for disagreement, and find empirical evidence that is consistent with investors using prices on average.

We define a new concept termed the activity signature function, which is constructed from discrete observations of a process evolving continuously in time. Under quite general regularity conditions, we derive the asymptotic properties of the function as the sampling frequency increases and show that it is a useful device for making inferences about the activity level of an Ito semimartingale. Monte Carlo work confirms the theoretical results. One empirical application is from finance. It indicates that the classical model comprised of a continuous component plus jumps is more plausible than a pure-jump model for the spot $/DM exchange rate over 1986-1999. A second application pertains to internet traffic data at NASA servers. We find that a pure-jump model with no continuous component and paths of infinite variation is appropriate for modeling this data set. In both cases the evidence obtained from the signature functions is quite convincing, and these two very disparate empirical outcomes illustrate the discriminatory power of the methodology.

We examine the impact of mergers on default risk. Despite the potential for asset diversification, we find that, on average, a merger increases the default risk of the acquiring firm. This result cannot solely be explained by the tendency for generally safe acquirers to purchase riskier targets or by the tendency of acquiring firms to increase leverage post-merger. Our evidence suggests that manager-related issues may play an important role. In particular, we find larger merger-related increases in risk at firms where CEOs have large option-based compensation, where recent stock performance is poor, and where idiosyncratic equity volatility is high. These results suggest that the increased default risk may arise from aggressive managerial actions affecting risk enough to outweigh the strong risk-reducing asset diversification expected from a typical merger.

We develop an efficient and analytically tractable method for estimation of parametric volatility models that is robust to price-level jumps. The method entails first integrating intra-day data into the Realized Laplace Transform of volatility, which is model-free estimate of daily integrated empirical Laplace transform of the unobservable volatility. The estimation then is done by matching moments of the integrated joint Laplace transform with those implied by the parametric volatility model. In the empirical application, the best fitting volatility model is a non-diffusive two-factor model where low activity jumps drive its persistent component and more active jumps drive the transient one.

We extend the analytical results for reduced form realized volatility based forecasting in ABM (2004) to allow for market microstructure frictions in the observed high-frequency returns. Our results build on the eigenfunction representation of the general stochastic volatility class of models developed by Meddahi (2001). In addition to traditional realized volatility measures and the role of the underlying sampling frequencies, we also explore the forecasting performance of several alternative volatility measures designed to mitigate the impact of the microstructure noise. Our analysis is facilitated by a simple unified quadratic form representation for all these estimators. Our results suggest that the detrimental impact of the noise on forecast accuracy can be substantial. Moreover, the linear forecasts based on a simple-to-implement ‘average’ (or ‘subsampled’) estimator obtained by averaging standard sparsely sampled realized volatility measures generally perform on par with the best alternative robust measures.