

## **Curriculum Vitae**

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### **Office**

Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences  
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### **Education**

1993. Ph.D. in political science from the University of Rochester. Concentrations: positive political theory, Congress and political parties.

1985. BA in mathematics from Indiana University.

### **Employment**

May 1998-present. Professor, MEDS, Northwestern University, Kellogg Graduate School of Management.

1995-May 1998. Assistant Professor, MEDS, Northwestern University, Kellogg Graduate School of Management.

1992-95. Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University.

### **Teaching and Research**

Positive political theory, strategic voting in large elections, political parties, legislative institutions and coalition formation, democratic institutions online and strategic management in non-market environments.

### **Papers**

“Moral Bias in Large Elections” (joint with Sean Gailmard and Alvaro Sandroni). *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 103, No. 2, May 2009.

“Information Aggregation and Communication in Committees” (joint with David Austen-Smith). *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society*, Vol. 364, No. 1518, pp: 763-769. March 2009.

“In Response to Jurg Steiner’s “Concept Stretching: The Case of Deliberation”” (joint with David Austen-Smith) 2008 in *European Political Science*.

“Strategic Voting” 2008 in the *New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*.

“The Calculus of Ethical Voting” (joint with Alvaro Sandroni), *International Journal of Game Theory*, 2006, vol. 35, no. 1, pages 1-25.

"A Theory of Participation in Elections with Ethical Voters" (joint with Alvaro Sandroni). *American Economic Review*, 2006, vol. 96, issue 4, pages 1271-1282.

“Deliberation, Preference Uncertainty, and Voting Rules” (joint with David Austen-Smith). *American Political Science Review*, 2006, vol. 100, issue 2, pages 209-217.

“Ethical Voters and Costly Information Acquisition,” (joint with Alvaro Sandroni), *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 2006, vol. 1, no. 3, pages 287-311.

“Deliberation and Voting Rules” (with David Austen-Smith) in *Social Choice and Strategic Decisions: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks*. Ed by David Austen-Smith and John Duggan. Springer-Verlag, 2005.

“Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Voting”, *Journal of Economic Perspectives* Volume, 18 Issue, 1, Winter 2004.

“Saints and Markets: Activists and the Supply of Credence Goods” (with Tom Gilligan). *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy*, Volume 10, Number 1, Spring 2001, 149-71.

"Strategic Voting and the Unanimity Rule." 1999. (with Wolfgang Pesendorfer). *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*.

"A Theory of Congressional Hearings." 1999. (with Daniel Diermeier). *American Journal of Political Science*.

“Institutions, Rules, and the Lawmaking Process.” 1999. *Congress & the Presidency*, Spring99, Vol. 26 Issue 1, p89. (book review).

"Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences." 1999. Joint work with Wolfgang Pesendorfer. *American Political Science Review*.

Book Review of "Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems. By Gary Cox". 1998. *Journal of Economic Literature*, Vol. XXXVI (December 1998).

“Comparing Constitutions: Cohesion and Distribution in Legislatures” (with Daniel Diermeier). 1998. *European Economic Review*, 42, 665-672.

"Cohesion in Legislatures: The Vote of Confidence Procedure" (with Daniel Diermeier). 1998. *American Political Science Review*, Vol 92, No. 3, 611-622.

“Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts” (with Wolfgang Pesendorfer). 1998. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 92, No. 1, 23-35.

“Information Aggregation and Voting Behavior in Elections” (with Wolfgang Pesendorfer). 1997. *Econometrica*, Vol. 65, No.5, 1029-1058.

“The Swing Voter’s Curse” (with Wolfgang Pesendorfer). 1996. *American Economic Review*, Vol. 86, No. 3, 408-424.

”A Voting Model Implying Duverger's Law and Positive Turnout.” 1992. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 36, No. 4, 938-62.

“Rational Voting and Candidate Entry Under Plurality Rule” (with Itai Sened and Stephen G. Wright). 1990. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 34, No. 4, 1005-16.

### **Working Papers**

“Revealed Preferences and Aspirations in Warm Glow Theory” (joint with Vadim Cherepanov and Alvaro Sandroni). 2011.

“Rationalization” (joint with Vadim Cherepanov and Alvaro Sandroni). 2011.

“Public Disclosure, Private Revelation or Silence: Whistleblowing Incentives and Managerial Policy.” (joint with David Austen-Smith). 2009.

“A Note on Preference Uncertainty and Communication in Committee.” (joint with David Austen-Smith). 2008.

"Cohesion in Legislatures: Procedural and Policy Coalitions (joint with Daniel Diermeier)." 1996. Unpublished manuscript.

“Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria in a Model of Costly Voting Under Plurality Rule.”  
1993. Unpublished manuscript.

### **Refereeing**

I have served as a referee for all the major political science and economics journals including: *Econometrica*, *American Economic Review*, *Journal of Economic Theory*, *Games and Economic Behavior*, *American Political Science Review*, *American Journal of Political Science*, *Economics and Politics*, and *Public Choice*.

Editorial board of *Political Analysis*.