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Robert Weber
Robert Weber

MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS & DECISION SCIENCES
Frederic E. Nemmers Professor of Decision Sciences

Print Overview

Robert J. Weber is the Frederic E. Nemmers Distinguished Professor of Decision Sciences at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. Educated at Princeton and Cornell, he was a faculty member of the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale, and taught in the Yale School of Organization and Management, prior to joining the Kellogg faculty in 1979.

His general area of research is game theory, with a primary focus on the effects of private information in competitive settings. Much of his research has been centered on the theory and practice of competitive bidding and auction design. His 1982 paper, "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding" (Econometrica 50, co-authored with P.R. Milgrom), is considered a seminal work in the field. He served as an external consultant on a 1985 project leading to revisions in the procedures used to auction petroleum extraction leases on the U.S. outer continental shelf, and he co-organized (with representatives of the Federal Reserve Board and the U.S. Treasury) the 1992 public forum which led to changes in the way the Treasury auctions its debt issues. Since 1993, he has represented private clients during both the rule-making and bidding phases of the FCC's sale of licenses of spectrum for the provision of personal communications services.

In the early 1970s, Professor Weber proposed an alternative to the traditional "plurality rule" for elections involving more than two candidates. This alternative, "approval voting", has generated a substantial body of research, has been adopted by a number of professional organizations, and has been used in several public elections. Recent work in this area includes "A Theory of Voting Equilibria" (American Political Science Review 87, 1993, co-authored with R. Myerson), and "Approval Voting" (Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(1), 1995).

Professor Weber has also conducted research on negotiation and arbitration. Among his activities have been preparation of a research survey for the American Arbitration Association, and development of classroom materials for the National Institute for Dispute Resolution. He is a founding member of the Center for Research on Dispute Resolution at Northwestern University, and has served on the editorial board of the International Journal of Game Theory. In 1990 he was designated the outstanding professor of the year by the students in Kellogg's Managers' Program, and in 1998 he received the Sidney J. Levy Teaching Award. In 2008, he was chosen as Alumni Professor of the Year.

Print Vita
Education
PhD, 1974, Operations Research, Cornell University
MS, 1972, Operations Research, Cornell University
AB, 1969, Mathematics, Princeton University

 
Print Research
Research Interests
Game theory, auctions and bidding, voting systems

Articles
Weber, Robert. 2003. Auction Theory. Games and Economic Behavior. 45(2): 488-497.
Abstract
Ferguson, Thomas, Lloyd Shapley and Robert Weber. 2002. Notes on a Stochastic Game with Information Structure. International Journal of Game Theory. 31(2): 223-228.
Abstract
Weber, Robert. 1997. Making More From Less: Strategic Demand Reduction in the FCC Spectrum Auctions. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. 6(3): 529-548.
Forsythe, Robert, Roger B. Myerson, Thomas A. Rietz and Robert Weber. 1996. An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three-Candidate Elections. International Journal of Game Theory. 25(3): 335-383.
AbstractLink
Weber, Robert. 1995. Approval Voting. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 9(1): 39-49.
Weber, Robert. 1994. Equilibrium in Non-Partitioning Strategies. Games and Economic Behavior. 7(2): 286-294.
Myerson, Roger B. and Robert Weber. 1993. A Theory of Voting Equilibria. American Political Science Review. 87(1): 102-114.
Forsythe, Robert, Roger B. Myerson, Thomas A. Rietz and Robert Weber. 1993. An Experiment on Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories. Social Choice and Welfare. 10(3): 223-247.
AbstractLink
Chari, V.V. and Robert Weber. 1992. How the US Treasury should auction its debt. Quarterly Review.: 3-12.
Reprinted in:
The Handbook of Debt Management, edited by Gerald J. Miller, 825-834. New York: Marcel-Dekker, 1996.
AbstractLink
Milgrom, Paul R. and Robert Weber. 1985. Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information. Mathematics of Operations Research. 10(4): 619-632.
AbstractLink
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard and Robert Weber. 1983. A Sequential Auction Involving Asymmetrically-Informed Bidders. International Journal of Game Theory. 12(2): 123-127.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard, Paul R. Milgrom and Robert Weber. 1983. Competitive bidding and proprietary information. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 11(2): 161-169.
Milgrom, Paul R. and Robert Weber. 1982. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding. Econometrica. 50(5): 1089-1122.
AbstractLink
Weber, Robert. 1982. Distributive Solutions for Absolutely Stable Games. International Journal of Game Theory. 11(1): 53-56.
Milgrom, Paul R. and Robert Weber. 1982. The value of information in a sealed-bid auction. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 10(1): 105-114.
Reprinted in:
The Economic Theory of Auctions, edited by Paul Klemperer, Cheltenham Glos: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2000.
AbstractLink
Shubik, Martin and Robert Weber. 1981. Systems Defense Games: Colonel Blotto, Command and Control. Naval Research Logistics Quarterly. 28(2): 281-287.
Dubey, Pradeep, Abraham Neyman and Robert Weber. 1981. Value theory without efficiency. Mathematics of Operations Research. 6(1): 122-128.
AbstractLink
Weber, Robert. 1980. Social Choice Theory. UMAP Journal. 1
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard and Robert Weber. 1979. An Example of a Multi-Object Auction Game. Management Science. 25(12): 1272-1277.
Billera, Louis J. and Robert Weber. 1979. Dense families of low-complexity attainable sets of markets. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 6(1): 67-73.
AbstractLink
Weber, Robert. 1978. Attainable Sets of Quasiconcave Markets II: Convexifiable Sets. Mathematics of Operations Research. 3(3): 257-264.
AbstractLink
Weber, Robert. 1977. Attainable Sets of Quasiconcave Markets. Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society. 64(1): 104-111.
Weber, Robert. 1976. Absolutely Stable Games. Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society. 55(1): 116-118.
Working Papers
Gossner, Olivier, Ehud Kalai and Robert Weber. 2008. Information Independence and Common Knowledge.
Abstract
Weber, Robert. 2002. On Poker and Bluffing.
Milgrom, Paul R. and Robert Weber. 2000. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding.
Milgrom, Paul R. and Robert Weber. 1983. Exchangeable Affiliated Random Variables.
Weber, Robert. 1982. The Allais Paradox, Dutch auctions, and alpha-utility theory.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard and Robert Weber. 1981. Estimates and Information.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard and Robert Weber. 1979. On the Non-Existence of Multiplicative Equilibrium Bidding Strategies.
Weber, Robert. 1978. Comparison of Public Choice Systems.
Weber, Robert. 1978. Multiply-Weighted Voting Systems.
Weber, Robert. 1978. Reproducing Voting Systems.
Weber, Robert. 1974. Bargaining Solutions and Stationary Sets for n-Person Games.
Weber, Robert. 1973. A Decomposition Property of Partitions.
Weber, Robert. 1973. A Generalized Discriminatory Solution for a Class of n-Person Games.
Weber, Robert. 1973. Discriminatory Solutions for [n,n-2]-Games.
Weber, Robert. 1973. Symmetric simple games.
Book Chapters
Milgrom, Paul R. and Robert Weber. 2000. "A theory of auctions and competitive bidding II." In The Economic Theory of Auctions, edited by P. Klemperer, vol. 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
Milgrom, Paul R. and Robert Weber. 2000. "The value of information in a sealed-bid auction." In The Economic Theory of Auctions, edited by P. Klemperer, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd..
Chari, V. V. and Robert Weber. 1996. "How the U.S. Treasury should auction its debt." In The Handbook of Debt Management, Marcel-Dekker.
Weber, Robert. 1994. "Games in coalitional form." In Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edited by Robert Aumann and Sergiu Hart, vol. 2, Elsevier.
Weber, Robert. 1991. "The (constructive) role of conflict." In Teaching Notes in Dispute Resolution, National Institute of Dispute Resolution.
Weber, Robert. 1988. "Probabilistic values for games." In The Shapley Value: Essays in Hornor of Lloyd S. Shapley, edited by Alvin E. Roth, 101-119. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
AbstractLink
Weber, Robert. 1987. "Games with incomplete information." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, edited by L. Blume and S. Durlauf, Palgrave Macmillan.
Weber, Robert. 1985. "Negotiation and arbitration: A game-theoretic perspective." In The Manager as Negotiator and Dispute Resolver, edited by Jeanne M. Brett, National Institute for Dispute Resolution.
Weber, Robert. 1985. "Negotiation and arbitration: A game-theoretic perspective." In The Manager as Dispute Resolver: Curriculum Modules in Negotiation and Dispute Resolution, edited by Jeanne M. Brett and Deborah M. Kolb, Washington, DC: National Institute of Dispute Resolution.
Weber, Robert. 1983. "Multiple-choice testing." In Discrete and System Models, edited by William F. Lucas, Fred S. Roberts, Robert M. Thrall, Springer-Verlag.
Weber, Robert. 1983. "Multiple-Object Auctions." In Competitive Bidding, Auctions, and Procurement, edited by R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R.M. Stark, M. Shubik, New York University Press.
Weber, Robert. 1982. "Noncooperative games." In Game Theory and its Applications, edited by William F. Lucas, American Mathematical Society.
Weber, Robert. 1981. "Attainable sets of markets: An overview." In Generalized Concavity in Optimization and Economics, edited by M. Avriel, S. Schaible, and W.T. Ziemba, Academic Press.
Milgrom, Paul R. and Robert Weber. 1981. "Topologies on information and strategies in games with incomplete information." In Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, edited by O. Moeschlin and D. Pallaschke, Elsevier.
Weber, Robert. 1979. "Gleichgewichtspunkte (Equilibrium points)." In Handwerterbuch der Mathematischen Wirtschafts-wissenschaften, Gabler Verlag.
Weber, Robert. 1979. "Subjectivity in the valuation of games." In Game Theory and Related Topics, edited by O. Moeschlin and D. Pallaschke, Elsevier.
Other
Littlechild, Stephen C., Robert Weber and H. Peyton Young. "Strategic Models of World Food Production and Trade.".
Cases
Weber, Robert. 1991. The (Constructive) Role of Conflict. Washington, DC: National Institute of Dispute Resolution.

 
Print Teaching
Teaching Interests
Probability, statistics, strategic decision-making (game theory)
Full-Time / Part-Time MBA
Decision Making Under Uncertainty (DECS-433-0)

This course counts toward the following majors: Decision Sciences.

Provides frameworks for reasoning about decisions in uncertain environments. Case studies and experiments are used to motivate the importance of probabilistic reasoning to avoid the systematic biases that cloud managers' decision making. Formal probabilistic tools are introduced and their relevance to modern business issues is conveyed via cases, exercises, and class experiments. Some of the applications include: inventory management with uncertain demand, principal-agent models, herd behavior, selection bias, rare events, real options and risk. The course is self-contained, and should be of value to all students, including those with prior exposure to formal probability models.

Managerial Decision Analysis (DECS-438-A)
This course presents the standard approach taken in all Kellogg courses in dealing with risk and uncertainty. The principal focus is on the language of probability, random variables, decision trees and commonly encountered probability distributions. A number of applications are explored, with most analysis performed using spreadsheets.

Statistical Decision Analysis (DECS-439-B)
The study of statistics at Kellogg has two complementary goals: The first is to master the two languages of statistics: How to measure how much an estimate can be trusted and how to measure the weight of evidence with respect to a claim that has been made. The objective is to become knowledgeable consumers of statistical reports, effective managers of those doing the statistical "dirty work" and confident critics of statistics done badly. The other goal is to become facile at performing regression analysis, a tool for understanding the types of relationships all managers must deal with. A spreadsheet-based statistical analysis package is provided to all students.

Game Theory and Strategic Decision (formerly Strategic Decision Making) (DECS-452-0)

This course counts toward the following majors: Decision Sciences, Managerial Analytics.

Decision makers face two types of uncertainty: uncertainty about the state of nature (how much oil is on a tract of land) and uncertainty about the strategic behavior of other decision makers (what pricing strategy a competitor will follow). This course focuses on strategic uncertainty and the uses decision makers can make of the concepts of game theory to guide their decisions. Topics include bargaining and arbitration, collusion and competition, joint cost allocation, market entry and product differentiation, and competitive bidding. Role-playing exercises and case analysis are used.

Executive MBA
Statistical Decision Analysis (DECSX-434-0)
Statistical Decision Analysis explores the use of sample data for estimating,predicting, forecasting and making business decisions.

Game Theory (MECSX-460-0)
Game Theory studies strategic interaction and conflict resolution in competitive and cooperative environments. Principles of strategic reasoning and related mathematical formulas are taught through real-life examples and in-class games, giving students an edge in external business competition and in internal organization management.