FINANCE
Associate Professor of Finance
Annette Vissing-Jorgensen is an associate professor at Kellogg School of Management and a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). She holds a PhD from MIT and was a faculty at the University of Chicago's Department of Economics prior to joining Kellogg.
She works on household finance and its asset pricing implications. Her work centers on the impact of limited stock market participation on equilibrium returns and inference from returns, and on the returns to entrepreneurship and private equity. She is also doing work on corporate governance focusing on the value of mandated information disclosure. Her work has been published in leading economics and finance journals such as the Journal of Political Economy, American Economic Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics and Journal of Finance and she was awarded the Journal of Finance Brattle Prize (Distinguished Paper) in 2005.
Professor Vissing-Jorgensen teaches the core finance class for MBA students.
Entrepreneurship
Equity Markets (Stock Market) (Includes: Asset Pricing, Investments and Portfolio Choice)
Investments and Portfolio Choice (Includes: Asset Pricing, Equity Markets/Stock Market)
Regulation of Financial Markets
Small Business Management
- Recent Media Coverage
Washington Post: Waiting for Deep Pockets to Open - 9/9/2009
Los Angeles Times: Getting the affluent to spend again is a puzzle for luxury retailers - 9/9/2009
New York Times: Rise of the Super-Rich Hits a Sobering Wall - 8/21/2009
New York Times (Economix blog): What About the Upper Middle Class? - 8/21/2009
See all Kellogg in the Media
We evaluate the net benefits of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) for shareholders by studying the lobbying behavior of investors and corporate insiders to affect the final implemented rules under the Act. Investors lobbied overwhelmingly in favor of strict implementation of SOX, while corporate insiders and business groups lobbied against strict implementation. We identify the firms most affected by the law as those whose insiders lobbied against strict implementation. Lobbying firms appear likely to be characterized by agency problems, rather than primarily motivated by concerns over high compliance costs. We compare the returns of lobbying firms to the returns of less affected firms. Cumulative returns during the five and a half months leading up to passage of SOX were approximately 7 percent higher for corporations whose insiders lobbied against one or more of the SOX disclosure-related provisions than for similar non-lobbying firms. Analysis of returns in the post-passage implementation period indicates that investors’ positive expectations with regards to the effects of these provisions of the law were warranted.
The 1964 Securities Acts Amendments extended the mandatory disclosure requirements that had applied to listed firms since 1934 to large firms traded Over-the-Counter (OTC). We find several pieces of evidence indicating that investors valued these disclosure requirements, two of which are particularly striking. First, a firm-level event study reveals that the OTC firms most affected by the 1964 Amendments had abnormal excess returns of about 3.5 percent in the weeks immediately surrounding the announcement that they had begun to comply with the new requirements. Second, we estimate that the most affected OTC firms had abnormal excess returns ranging between 11.5 and 22.1 percent in the period between when the legislation was initially proposed and when it went into force. These returns are adjusted for the standard four factors and are relative to NYSE/AMEX firms, matched on size and book-to-market equity, that were unaffected by the legislation. While we cannot determine how much of shareholders’ gains were a transfer from insiders of these same companies, our results suggest that mandatory disclosure causes managers to focus more narrowly on maximizing shareholder value.
We develop a principal-agent model in an entrepreneurial setting and test the model's predictions using unique data on entrepreneurial effort and wealth in privately held firms. Accounting for unobserved firm heterogeneity using instrumental-variable techniques, we find that entrepreneurial ownership shares increase with outside wealth and decrease with firm risk; effort increases with ownership; and effort increases firm performance, supporting the model's predictions. The magnitude of the effects in the cross-section of firms suggests that agency theory may help explain why entrepreneurs concentrate large fractions of their wealth in firm equity.
The paper discusses the current state of the behavioral finance literature. I argue that more direct evidence on investors' actions and expectations would make existing theories more convincing to outsiders and would help sort among behavioral theories for a given asset pricing phenomenon. Furthermore, evidence on the dependence of a given bias on investor wealth/sophistication would be useful for determining if the bias could be due to (fixed) information or transactions costs or is likely to require a behavioral explanation, and for determining which biases are likely to be most important for asset prices. I analyze a novel data set on investor expectations and actions obtained from UBS PaineWebber/Gallup. The data suggest that, even for high wealth investors, expected returns were high at the peak of the market, many investors thought the market was overvalued but would not correct quickly, and investors' beliefs depend strongly on their own investment experience. I then review evidence on the dependence of a series of "irrational" investor behaviors on investor wealth and conclude that many such behaviors diminish substantially with wealth. As an example of the cost needed to explain a particular type of "irrational" behavior, I consider the cost needed to rationalize why many households do not invest in the stock market.
The paper presents empirical evidence based on the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey that accounting for limited asset market participation is important for estimating the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Differences in estimates of the EIS between asset holders and non-asset holders are large and statistically significant. The is the case whether estimating the EIS on the basis of the Euler equation for stock index returns or the Euler equation for Treasury bills, in eash case distringuishing between asset holders and non-asset holders as best possible. Estimates of the EIS are around 0.3-0.4 for stockholders and around 0.8-1 for bondholders and are larger households with larger asset holdings within these two groups.
We document the return to investing in U.S. nonpublicly traded equity. Entrepreneurial investment is extremely concentrated, yet despite its poor diversificaiton, we find that the returns to private equity are no higher than the returns to public equity. Given the large public equity premium, it is puzzling why households willingly invest substantial amounts in a single privately held firm with a seemingly far worse risk-return trade-off. We briefly discuss how large nonpecuniary benfits, a preference for skewness, or overestimates of the probability of survival could potentially explain investment in private equity despite these findings.
We show that the US Debt/GDP ratio is negatively correlated with the spread between corporate bond yields and Treasury bond yields. The result holds even when controlling for the default risk on corporate bonds. We argue that the corporate bond spread reflects a convenience yield that investors attribute to Treasury debt. Changes in the supply of Treasury debt trace out the demand for convenience by investors. We show that the aggregate demand curve for the convenience provided by Treasury debt is downward sloping and provide estimates of the elasticity of demand. We analyze disaggregated data from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve and show that individual groups of Treasury holders also have downward sloping demand curves. Groups for whom the liquidity of Treasuries is likely to be more important have steeper demand curves. The results have bearing for important questions in finance and macroeconomics. We discuss implications for the behavior of corporate bond spreads, interest rate swap spreads, the riskless interest rate, and the value of aggregate liquidity. We also discuss the implications of our results for the financing of the US deficit, Ricardian equivalence, and the effects of foreign central bank demand on Treasury yields.
We provide new evidence on the success of long-run risks in asset pricing by focusing on the risks borne by stockholders. Exploiting micro-level household consumption data, we show that long-run stockholder consumption risk better captures cross-sectional variation in average asset returns than aggregate or non-stockholder consumption risk, and provides more plausible economic magnitudes. We find that risk aversion estimates around 10 can match observed risk premia for the wealthiest stockholders across sets of test assets that include the 25 Fama and French size and value portfolios, the market portfolio, bond portfolios, and the entire cross-section of stocks.
The paper uses a novel Danish data set on labor incomes and educational choices to document that the time-series risk of individual labor incomes has a significant effect on individuals' educational choices. We classify the full set of post-high school educations into 50 groups based on admissions requirements, length, and topic studied. Income processes are estimated for each education group and the estimates are used in an empirical choice model. The estimated choice model suggests a preference for educations with higher mean incomes and lower risk, with a high variance of permanent income shocks seen as particularly undesirable. Using a structural model of life-time utility maximization we conclude that the parameter estimates of the empirical choice model imply a relative risk aversion coefficient around 5.
This course counts toward the following majors: Analytical Finance, Finance
This course studies the effects of time and uncertainty on decision making. Topics include discounted cash flow valuation, stock and bond valuation, the term structure of interest rates, bond duration, capital budgeting under certainty and uncertainty, portfolio theory, asset pricing models and efficient markets.
Prerequisites: Knowledge of (a) probability and statistics through linear regression and (b) financial accounting. Requirement (a) may be satisfied with prior or concurrent registration in DECS-434, sufficient previous course work in statistics or attending Finance I statistics tutorials (available fall quarter only). Requirement (b) may be satisfied with prior or concurrent registration in ACCT 430 or sufficient previous course work in financial accounting. MECN-430 is recommended.
To qualify for a Finance I (FINC-430) waiver, you must have passed a comparable course with a grade of A. The type and level of material covered in the course are represented by chapters 1-13 and 23 of the text by Brealey and Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance. You need not request a Finance I waiver to enroll in FINC-440 (Turbo). To help you decide whether you should waive Finance I, take the self-assessment test online at www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/finance/curriculum/finance1waiver.htm.
PHONE: 847-467-6171
FAX: 847-491-5719
Jacobs Center Room 441