MANAGEMENT & STRATEGY
A.C. Buehler Professor in Hospital & Health Services Management
Prof. of Strategic Management.& Managerial Economics
Chair of the Management & Strategy Department
Satterthwaite is a microeconomic theorist who has a keen applied interest in how health care markets work. His theoretical work focuses on how market mechanisms, when the number of participants is large, induce individuals to reveal their valuations almost accurately and select almost optimal allocations. He has published his work in leading journals including Econometrica, the Journal of Political Economy, the Review of Economic Studies, the Journal of Economic Theory, and the Rand Journal of Economics. He is a fellow of the Econometric Society, a founding member of the Game Theory Society, a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and a recipient of the Tenth Annual Research Award from the National Institute for Health Care Management Foundation. The National Science Foundation has awarded him several research grants.
Within Kellogg Satterthwaite teaches the MBA course, “Microeconomic Analysis.” He has served both as associate dean for academic affairs and, at different times, as chair of the Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences Department and of the Management and Strategy Department.
Healthcare Management
Strategy
Voting Systems
- Recent Media Coverage
New York Times: The Pitfalls of Linking Doctors’ Pay to Performance - 9/8/2008
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Consider a decentralized, dynamic market with an infinite horizon and participation costs in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good. Time is discrete, each period has length δ, and, each unit of time, continuums of new buyers and sellers consider entry. Traders whose expected utility is negative choose not to enter. Within a period each buyer is matched anonymously with a seller and each seller is matched with zero, one, or more buyers. Every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and, if trade occurs, both the seller and the winning buyer exit the market with their realized utility. Traders who fail to trade continue in the market to be rematched. We characterize the steady-state equilibria that are perfect Bayesian. We show that, as δ converges to zero, equilibrium prices at which trades occur converge to the Walrasian price and the realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation. We also show the existence of equilibria for δ sufficiently small, provided the discount rate is small relative to the participation costs.
We call markets in which intermediaries sell networks of suppliers to consumers who are uncertain about their needs "option demand markets". In these markets, suppliers may grant the intermediaries discounts in order to be admitted to their networks. We derive a measure of each supplier’s market power within the network; the measure is based on the additional ex ante expected utility consumers obtain from the supplier’s inclusion. We empirically validate the WTP measure by considering managed care purchases of hospital services in the San Diego market. Finally, we present three applications, including an analysis of hospital mergers in San Diego.
Health care report cards may address important information asymmetries in markets for health care, but they may also give doctors and hospitals incentives to decline to treat more difficult, severely ill patients. Whether report cards are good for patients and for society depends on whether financial and health benefits outweigh their costs in terms of the quantity, quality, and appropriateness of medical treatment that they induce. Using national data on Medicare patients at risk fo cardiac surgery, we find that cardiac surgery report cards in New York and Pennsylvania led both to selection behavior by providres and to improved matching of patients with hospitals. On net, this led to higher levels of resource use and to worse health outcomes, particularly for sicker patients.
Strategic behavior in a finite market can cause inefficiency in the allocation, and market mechanisms differ in how successfully they limit this inefficiency. A method for ranking algorithms in computer science is adapted here to rank market mechanisms according to how quickly inefficiency diminishes as the size of the market increases. It is shown that trade at a single market-clearing price in the k-double auction is worst-case asymptotic optimal among all plausible mechanisms: evaluating mechanisms in their least favorable trading environments for each possible size of the market, the k-double auction is shown to force the worst-case inefficiency to zero at the fastest possible rate.
If a market is considered to be a social choice function, then the domain of admissible preferences is restricted and standard social choice theorems do not apply. A substantial body of analysis, however, strongly supports the notion that attractive strategy-proof social choice functions do not exist in market settings. Yet price theory, which implicitly assumes the strategy-proofness of markets, performs quite well in describing many real markets. This paper resolves this paradox in two steps. First, given that a market is not strategy-proof, it should be modeled as a Bayesian game of incomplete information. Second, a double auction market, which is perhaps the simplest operationalization of supply and demand as a Bayesian game, is approximately strategy-proof even when the number of traders on each side of the market is quite moderate.
Preferred provider organizations (PPOs) and other discount health care purchasers are injecting price competition into the hospital market, which has hitherto been insulated from price competition by comprehensive and generous insurance coverage. Providing the discounts demanded by PPOs thus poses unaccustomed and difficult problems for hospitals. We constructed a model to study the choices forced by PPOs on the hospital market. We predict that prices will fall, excess capacity will be reduced, and some hospitals may develop financial problems. In the extreme case, prices will fall substantially, some hospitals will go bankrupt, excess capacity will be eliminated, and an unprecedented price volatility will be introduced into the market.
The paper contains a unified development of Arrow's impossibility theorem for rational group decisions, Gibbard and Satterthwaite's impossibility theorem for strategy-proof group decisions, and the close reciprocal relationship that exists between these two theorems.
This paper shows that no nondictatorial voting procedure exists that induces each voter to choose his voting strategy solely on the basis of his preferences and independently of his beliefs concerning other voters' preferences. This necessary dependence between a voter's beliefs and his choice of strategy means that a voter can manipulate another voter's choice of strategy by misleading him into adopting inaccurate beliefs concerning other voters' beliefs.
Learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting have been shown to be important in a variety of industrial settings. This paper provides a general model of dynamic competition that accounts for these economic fundamentals and shows how they shape industry structure and dynamics. Previously obtained results regarding the dominance properties of firms' pricing behavior no longer hold in this more general setting. We show that organizational forgetting does not simply negate learning-by-doing. Rather, learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting are distinct economic forces. In particular, a model with both learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting can give rise to aggressive pricing behavior, market dominance, and multiple equilibria, whereas a model with learning-by-doing alone cannot
We adapt the bargaining model of Stole and Zweibel (S/Z) to study selective contracting between hospitals and managed care purchasers. A main feature of the S/Z model is what we call "level N" rationality. Specifically, if there are N suppliers bargaining with one purchaser then all players consider outcomes if each successive level of bargaining breaks down. We solve the S/Z model for all levels of rationality; for example, at level 1 rationality, bargainers only consider the consequences if one level of bargaining breaks down. We estimate the model using data from several markets in California. By comparing theoretical bargaining solutions to actual outcomes, we establish the level of rationality among bargainers in each market.
The case first describes Nintendo's rise to dominance in the home video game industry in the late 1980s. It then presents the challenges Nintendo faced in 1990 as 16-bit processors entered the market against the 8-bit Nintendo Entertainment System.
This course counts toward the following majors: Managerial Economics.
Among the topics this core course addresses are economic analysis and optimal decisions, consumer choice and the demand for products, production functions and cost curves, market structures and strategic interactions, and pricing and non-price concepts. Cases and problems are used to understand economic tools and their potential for solving real-world problems.
Prerequisite: DECS-434, or concurrent registration.
Competitive Strategy and Industrial Structure (MECN-441-0)
This course counts toward the following majors: Analytical Consulting, Management & Strategy, Managerial Economics.
The course studies the determinants nature of competitive strategy in a variety of industry structures. The course considers how the structure of a firm's industry affects its strategic choices and performance. Topics include the dynamic aspects of pricing, entry and predation in concentrated industries, and product differentiation, product proliferation and innovation as competitive strategies.
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