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Alvaro Sandroni
Alvaro Sandroni

MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS & DECISION SCIENCES
E.D. Howard Professor of Political Economy

Print Overview
Alvaro Sandroni is the E.D. Howard Professor in Political Economy at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, where he has taught since 1996. He received his PhD in economics in 1996 from the University of Pennsylvania, his PhD in mathematics in 1994 from the Instituto de Matematica Pura e Aplicada (Brazil) and his B.Sc. in mathematics in 1986 from the Pontifica Universidade Catolica economics (Brazil). Sandroni has also taught at the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Rochester.

Sandroni has received grants from the Institute of Aging, the Bi-National Science Foundation and Bergmann Memorial Research as well as four National Science Foundation grants for behavioral science research. He served as a panelist for the National Science Foundation and was invited Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences. He has also received the 2003 Stanley Reiter Best Paper Award, the University of Pennsylvania’s William Polk Carey Prize in Economics for Best Ph. D. Dissertation and the Hiram C. Haney Fellowship Award in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania.

Sandroni is on the editorial boards of Economic Theory and the International Journal of Game Theory.

Sandroni’s research is in the areas of behavioral sciences, strategic forecasting, economic theory, game theory, political science, and general equilibrium theory. He has published numerous journal articles in economics, political science and game theory journals, including the American Political Science Review, American Economic Review, Econometrica, Annals of Statistics, Review of Economic Studies, Mathematics of Operations Research, Theoretical Economics, International Journal of Game Theory, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Economic Theory, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, and Journal of Economic Theory.

Sandroni is the author (along with Peter Klibanoff, Boaz Moselle and Brett Saraniti) of Managerial Statistics: A Case-Based Approach (2005, Cengage Learning). He has also published his work in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

Areas of Expertise
Behavioral Economics
Economic Theory
Game Theory
Voting Systems
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Print Vita
Education
PhD, 1996, Economics, University of Pennsylvania
PhD, 1994, Mathematics, Instituto de Matematica Pura e Aplicada, Brazil
BSc, 1986, Mathematics, Pontificia Universidade Catolica, Brazil

Academic Positions
E.D. Howard Chair of Political Economy, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2009-present
Professor, Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 2005-2009
Mechthild Esser Nemmers Professor, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2003-2007
Mechthild Esser Nemmers Associate Professor, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001-2002
Associate Professor, Economics, University of Rochester, 2000-2001
Associate Professor, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 1999-2001
Assistant Professor, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 1996-1998

 
Print Research
Research Interests
Behavioral Science; Strategic Forecasting; Political Science; Economic Theory; Game Theory


Articles
Sandroni, Alvaro and Wojciech Olszewski. Forthcoming. Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests. Mathematics of Operations Research.
Al-Najjar, Nabil, Alvaro Sandroni, Rann Smorodinsky and Jonathan Lewis Weinstein. 2010. Testing Theories with Learnable and Predictive Representations. Journal of Economic Theory.(145): 2203–2217.
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Sandroni, Alvaro and Wojciech Olszewski. 2009. A Nonmanipulable Test. Annals of Statistics. 37(2): 1013-1039.
Sandroni, Alvaro and Wojciech Olszewski. 2009. Moral Bias in Large Elections. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 106: 5029-5034.
Feddersen, Timothy, Sean Gailmard and Alvaro Sandroni. 2009. Moral Bias in Large Elections: Theory and Experimental Evidence. American Political Science Review. 103(2): 175-192.
Abstract
Sandroni, Alvaro and Wojciech Olszewski. 2008. Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests. Econometrica. 76: 1437-1466.
Sandroni, Alvaro, Larry Epstein and Jawwad Noor. 2008. Non-Bayesian Updating: A Theoretical Framework. Theoretical Economics. 3(2): 193-229.
Sandroni, Alvaro and Wojciech Olszewski. 2007. Contracts and Uncertainty. Theoretical Economics. 2(1): 1-13.
Sandroni, Alvaro and Francesco Squintani. 2007. Overconfidence, Insurance and Paternalism. American Economic Review. 97(5): 1271-1282.
Feddersen, Timothy and Alvaro Sandroni. 2006. A Theory of Participation in Elections. American Economic Review. 96(4): 1271-1282.
Abstract
Feddersen, Timothy and Alvaro Sandroni. 2006. Ethical Voters and Costly Information Acquisition. Quarterly Journal of Political Science. 1(3)
Abstract
Feddersen, Timothy and Alvaro Sandroni. 2006. The Calculus of Ethical Voting. International Journal of Game Theory. 35(1): 1-25.
Abstract
Sandroni, Alvaro. 2005. Efficient Markets and Bayes' Rule. Economic Theory. 26(4): 741-765.
Sandroni, Alvaro. 2005. Market Selection when Markets are Incomplete. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 41(91-104)
Sandroni, Alvaro and Rann Smorodinsky. 2004. Belief-Based Equilibrium. Games and Economic Behavior. 47(1): 157-171.
Smorodinsky, Rann, Rakesh Vohra and Alvaro Sandroni. 2003. Calibration with Many Checking Rules. Mathematics of Operations Research. 28(1): 141-153.
AbstractLink
Sandroni, Alvaro and George Mailath. 2003. Market Selection and Asymmetric Information. Review of Economic Studies. 70(2): 343-369.
Sandroni, Alvaro. 2003. Speculative Trade, Asset Prices and Investment Levels. Economic Theory. 21(2-3): 423-433.
Sandroni, Alvaro. 2003. The Reproducible Properties of Correct Forecasts. International Journal of Game Theory. 32(1): 151-159.
Sandroni, Alvaro. 2000. Do Markets Favor Agents Able to Make Accurate Predictions?. Econometrica. 68(6): 1303-1341.
Sandroni, Alvaro. 2000. Reciprocity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Principled-Player Approach. Games and Economic Behavior. 32: 157-182.
Sandroni, Alvaro. 1999. Asset Prices and the Distribution of Wealth. Economics Letters. 64: 203-207.
Sandroni, Alvaro and Aloisio Araujo. 1999. On the Convergence to Rational Expectations Under Complete Markets. Econometrica. 67(3): 663-672.
Sandroni, Alvaro and Rann Smorodinsky. 1999. The Speed of Rational Learning. International Journal of Game Theory. 28: 199-210.
Sandroni, Alvaro. 1998. Does Rational Learning Lead to Nash Equilibrium in Finitely Repeated Games. Journal of Economic Theory. 78(1): 195-218.
Sandroni, Alvaro. 1998. Learning Rare Events and Recurrent Market Crashes in Frictionless Economies Without Intrinsic Uncertainty. Journal of Economic Theory. 82(1): 1-18.
Sandroni, Alvaro. 1998. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergence to Nash Equilibrium: The Absolute Continuity Hypothesis. Games and Economic Behavior. 22: 121-147.
Working Papers
Feddersen, Timothy, Vadim Cherepanov and Alvaro Sandroni. Rationalization.
Feddersen, Timothy, Vadim Cherepanov and Alvaro Sandroni. Warm Glow.
Books
Klibanoff, Peter, Boaz Moselle, Brett Saraniti and Alvaro Sandroni. 2006. Managerial Statistics: A Case-Based Approach. Mason, OH: Cengage Learning (formerly Thomson South-Western).
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Print Teaching
Doctoral
Contract Theory and Mechanism Design (MECS-465-1)
This course covers the theory of contracts and other economic mechanisms whose purpose is to overcome problems of asymmetric information. Topics include revelation principle and mechanism design, static and dynamic moral hazard and adverse selection, principal-agent models, nonlinear pricing, bargaining, optimal regulation, incomplete contracts, incentive contracts in general equilibrium, bidding, and the theory of organizations.

Selected Topics in Economic Theory (MECS-468-2)
Students are exposed to the classic and cutting-edge papers in the area of repeated games with incomplete information, or more commonly known as reputation models. The course begins with the classic papers (Kreps, Wilson, Milgrom and Roberts) with further study focusing on Fudenberg and Levine's model, bargaining games (Abreu and Gul), and the recent developments in repeated games equally patient players. The first half of the class consists of lectures; the second half shifts to student presentations, drawing from applied or theory papers. Grading is based on student presentations and class participation.

Full-Time / Part-Time MBA
Values-Based Leadership (SEEK-460-0)

This course counts toward the following majors: Management & Organizations, Social Enterprise.

The first issue a leader in the role of manager, entrepreneur, investor or stakeholder must address about an organization concerns its "value proposition," whether deciding to enter an industry or to begin an undertaking. However, this analysis is incomplete if leaders fail to consider the wider impact of the organization's actions on its own employees and on society. This course focuses on the problem of incorporating a wide variety of value perspectives into decision-making. Values-based leadership involves the ability to take the disparate value propositions of various stakeholders and integrate them into a coherent vision. We explore how recognizing and incorporating competing values claims throughout the organization is often facilitated and hindered by a number of psychological, organizational and cultural processes. Students will come to understand the variety of underlying mechanisms managers of organizations typically have at their disposal to successfully implement values objectives and select among different approaches, while anticipating the constraints placed on choice by the organization's market and non-market environments.