MANAGEMENT & STRATEGY; INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & MARKETS
Assistant Professor of Management and Strategy
Another example is that of an international cartel which, to save on transport costs and boost cartel profits, allocates geographic markets to cartel members with nearby facilities, thus reducing quantities traded across markets. An observer who concludes from these low (or zero) trade flows that markets are not integrated would be making a mistake, given the multimarket nature of the cartel agreement.
The bigger picture is that the cross-border movement of goods, capital and tasks alone might understate the extent of world integration.
Professor Salvo is also studying the rising middle class in countries that are fast-integrating into the world economy. In particular, the arrival of price-sensitive consumers to the market can have a profound impact on the competitive landscape, including entry by players focused on this segment and prices changes by incumbents.
Professor Salvo consults for government on Antitrust Policy and has worked in the consumer goods industry.
Globalization
Industrial Economics
International Business
International Economics
International Trade
Strategy
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This paper considers a setting where import competition, in the form of threatened rather than actual trade flows, restrains a domestic oligopoly's prices in a subset of realized markets, say temporal markets in which the domestic currency is strong. I show that not modeling the entry threat may lead researchers to underestimate the true degree of market power, as the threat blunts incumbents' price responses to demand shocks in a way that resembles the pricing behavior of more competitive market structures. In the Brazilian cement industry, institutional and econometric evidence point to an important role for imports in determining the domestic price of cement, despite the near absence of imports. On assuming autarky, models with market power are rejected in favor of perfect competition among incumbents. However, making an allowance for the role of imports leads to the rejection of the autarky assumption and precludes one from rejecting the presence of market power.
Oligopoly theory suggests that anti-competitive mergers may be held up because firms outside the merger stand to increase profits at the expense of the merging firms (Stigler 1950). Against this backdrop, I examine the profitability of cross-border mergers by embedding a class of oligopoly models -- where mergers are anti-competitive and firms' actions are strategic substitutes -- in the sequential merger game of Nilssen and Sørgard (1998), cast in a two-country setting. The solution to the cross-border merger game is robust across this class of oligopoly models and is such that (i) cross-border mergers are held up only when "international differences" tend to zero; (ii) cross-border mergers happen in clusters, not in isolation; and (iii) for certain parameterisations an equilibrium can be supported where cross-border mergers are interdependent. I provide two standard examples that fall in this class of oligopoly models: one based on Sutton (1991), where cross-border mergers are a means to transfer technology, and another based on Perry and Porter (1985), where cross-border mergers are a means to pool capital together. Interpreting international trade costs as a form of horizontal differentiation suggests that the hold-up of mergers may be less pervasive in an open-economy context. In a more abstract sense, the paper exploits commonalities across oligopoly models.
This paper argues that large distance and border effects on trade flows in some industries might be a result of the (explicitly or tacitly) collusive division of geographic markets. A simple spatial oligopoly setting demonstrates how goods can travel shorter distances, or trade between regions can be more limited, in the joint profit maximizing outcome relative to the less collusive Cournot outcome. The Brazilian cement industry provides a clear-cut example. Traditional gravity equations fit the data well, yet the limited regional flows that I observe are due to firms' strategic behavior. Thanks to a unique institutional setting and an unusually rich dataset, I am able to directly control for trade costs which---in spite of their importance---cannot account for the observed segmentation of local markets at current prices. The paper highlights how collusive behavior can magnify the effects of distance, as firms can use geography to coordinate on more profitable outcomes, sustaining higher prices and avoiding trade costs.
Brazil's established soft-drink firms recently lost ground to multiple low-price entrants, with small-scale operations and minimal advertising. While incumbents attributed such undercutting to entrants' lower costs from non-compliance with the law, "generics" counterargued that incumbents' high prices stemmed from unilateral market power rather than cost heterogeneity. By estimating a structural model, I can single-handedly explain established brands' high prices through low equilibrium price elasticities of demand. Tax evasion in the fringe, while plausible, appears to be offset by higher procurement costs or less efficient scale. More generally, a competitive informal sector can alleviate the allocative distortions in certain concentrated industries.
This policy note evaluates the inferrence of market power using a technique which rests on a very particular class of behavioral models of firm pricing. I document the specific context for which the pioneering framework of Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) was designed. I then consider alternative, though well-established, behavioral models under which the framework yields inconsistent estimates. In view of its low testing power, use of the framework demands caution.
The case examines the remarkable international expansion strategy of Cemex, a company that began as a local firm in a developing economy and rose to the top ranks of the global cement industry. Cemex offers a striking example of how a company can take leadership of the process of globalization. The case considers how Cemex took advantage of shifting distribution and communications technologies to establish itself as a market maker in the nascent international trading market for cement. The ability to arbitrage across its many buyer and seller markets, achieved through the acquisition of pivotal assets and investment in superior information technology, has become a key source of competitive advantage for the company. The case illustrates several features of international business, including the design of strategy to meet global competition, modes of entry into international markets, and – more generally – how the forces of globalization are reshaping the general run of industries.
That collusion among sellers is detrimental to buyers is a central tenet in economics. In the context of trade, we provide an oligopoly model, using only standard ingredients, in which collusion is beneficial for society and can be beneficial for consumers. A differentiated-product duopoly operates in two geographically-separate markets. Each market is home to a single firm, but can import from the foreign firm. Since shipping across markets is costly, every firm has a cost advantage in its home market. Consumers treat the two goods as horizontally-differentiated substitutes and their preferences are identical in both markets. Under oligopolistic competition, each firm has a smaller market share and margin in the away market. The asymmetric margin leads to a market distortion, with more consumers than is socially optimal purchasing the imported variety. Collusion between the two firms partially mitigates this distortion by reducing cross-hauling, raising not only total welfare but also, for sufficiently high trade costs, consumer surplus. "Anti-dumping" regulation induces the socially-optimal allocation.
This note applies a variant of Deltas, Salvo and Vasconcelos (2009) to a spatial setting in which retailers compete by issuing coupons. Coupons induce an excessive number of shoppers to travel to stores that are located at a distance from their residence, leading to an inefficient outcome. Were the retailers to collude, or merge to monopoly, couponing would be reduced, total welfare would increase and, for a sufficiently high travel cost, even consumers (in aggregate) would benefit.
The United States and Brazil both have many local consumer markets which imported cement can access by waterway. Despite this similarity, the degree of import penetration is strikingly different. While imports from around the world account for as much as 30% of U.S. cement consumption, Brazil hardly imports cement. U.S. cement producers, facing lower inbound trade costs and higher marginal costs compared to their Brazilian counterparts, not only compete (on the margin) with foreign capacity but actually welcome it (on the inframargin) as an extension of their own capacity. This paper provides evidence to support that import competition in Brazil, though latent, is already present in the form of an entry threat which sets a price ceiling that binds on domestic outcomes. In explaining domestic prices, I show that mixture models that allow for an imports price ceiling outperform models where a foreign sector is absent. The unique institutional setting vividly illustrates how actual trade flows may represent only the "tip of the iceberg" when it comes to inferring the extent of trade integration: only in the U.S. does one see imports, but the threat of foreign entry in Brazil already restricts the exercise of market power, if not entirely. Such latent international competition is not captured by traditional models of comparative advantage, and helps explain why product prices and wages appear to be increasingly determined by global forces of demand and supply.
As much of the world goes searching for alternative sources of energy to oil, Brazil's three-decade experience in developing a successful substitute for gasoline merits attention. Brazil is the only sizable economy to date to have developed a ubiquitously distributed alternative to oil-based fuels in road transportation: ethanol from sugar cane. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the uptake of flexible-fuel (dual-fuel) vehicle technology has been tremendous. We provide a stylized model of the vertical sugar industry which incorporates arbitrage by producers, across domestic and export markets for ethanol and sugar, and arbitrage by consumers, across ethanol and gasoline at the pump. We show that the model stands up well to the empirical covariation in prices over 30 years. In particular, owing to the increasing penetration of flexible-fuel vehicles, consumer arbitrage is tying the retail price of ethanol to that of gasoline. Of relevance to the current "food-versus-fuel" debate, the outward shift of the ethanol demand curve, at price levels where traditional gasoline consumers arbitrage, may lead to higher sugar prices, thanks to substitution in demand (gasoline and ethanol) and in supply (sugar and ethanol).
This paper surveys structural empirical methods used in Industrial Organization and their applications to antitrust. It brings together applied microeconomic theory, estimation technique and considerations of a practical nature. Topics covered include demand estimation for homogeneous and differentiated products, where we compare continuous- and discrete-choice models. We include a comprehensive yet accessible treatment of identification. To the demand side we then add structural models of supply, and the challenges these pose when it comes to identification and estimation. We review the alternative empirical strategies for backing out cost and conduct. The methods discussed are then compared to parsimonious alternatives for merger simulation arising in the antitrust practice such as the PCAIDS and the ALM, used by some antitrust authorities. We end by devoting a section to the practical aspects one has to consider when implementing structural models, such as data requirements and aggregation, specification tests, estimation technique and strengths and weaknesses of the different models. Our hope is to draw the connection between academics and practitioners.
This course counts toward the following majors: International Business, Management & Strategy.
This course considers the objectives and strategies of international business in the context of global competition. It equips managers with a comprehensive framework to formulate strategies in the global marketplace. While accessible to students who have not yet taken Microeconomic Analysis, this course emphasizes economic analysis of the forces driving international business. The course covers competitive advantage, competitive strategies, alternative modes of market entry, including import and export through intermediaries, contracting with suppliers and distributors, and foreign direct investment (FDI). Case studies are used throughout to illustrate the basic principles of multinational business management and strategy.
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