Empirical corporate finance; risk management; corporate governance; corporate responses to government policy; market pricing of government liabilities
Joshua Rauh is Associate Professor of Finance at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University, and an NBER Faculty Research Fellow in the Corporate Finance and Public Economics programs. He studies corporate investment and financial structure, with an emphasis on the ways in which corporations respond to incentives that are put in place by government policies.
Dr. Rauh received his PhD in 2004 from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology with his dissertation, "Pensions, Corporate Finance and Public Policy," which won him the 2004 National Tax Association Dissertation Award. Prior to joining Kellogg, he held a faculty position at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, and he is a former Associate Economist for Goldman Sachs International in London.
Dr. Rauh was awarded the 2006 Brattle Prize given for the outstanding research paper on corporate finance published in the Journal of Finance, for his paper "Investment and Financing Constraints: Evidence from the Funding of Corporate Pension Plans." His research also includes "Earnings Manipulation, Pension Assumptions and Managerial Investment Decisions," which won the Barclays Global Investor Best Symposium Paper from the European Finance Association and appeared in the Quarterly Journal of Economics. His work has also been published in the Review of Financial Studies and the Journal of Financial Economics.
Corporate Capital Structure
Investment Banking
Pension Funds
Dr. Rauh received his PhD in 2004 from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology with his dissertation, "Pensions, Corporate Finance and Public Policy," which won him the 2004 National Tax Association Dissertation Award. Prior to joining Kellogg, he held a faculty position at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, and he is a former Associate Economist for Goldman Sachs International in London.
Dr. Rauh was awarded the 2006 Brattle Prize given for the outstanding research paper on corporate finance published in the Journal of Finance, for his paper "Investment and Financing Constraints: Evidence from the Funding of Corporate Pension Plans." His research also includes "Earnings Manipulation, Pension Assumptions and Managerial Investment Decisions," which won the Barclays Global Investor Best Symposium Paper from the European Finance Association and appeared in the Quarterly Journal of Economics. His work has also been published in the Review of Financial Studies and the Journal of Financial Economics.
Areas of Expertise
CorporateCorporate Capital Structure
Investment Banking
Pension Funds
- Recent Media Coverage
The Economist: Public-sector pensions: Unsatisfactory state - 7/9/2009
See all Kellogg in the Media
Education
PhD, 2004, Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, Dissertation: “Pensions, Corporate Finance and Public Policy.”BA, 1996, Economics, Yale University, New Haven, CT, magna cum laude with distinction
Academic Positions
Associate Professor of Finance, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, 2009-presentAssociate Professor of Finance, Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, 2008-2009Assistant Professor of Finance, Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, 2004-2008Research Interests
Articles
Rauh, Joshua. Forthcoming. The Liabilities and Risks of State Sponsored Pension Plans. Journal of Economic Perspectives.
We discuss the true economic funding status of state public pension plans and show that government accounting standards require states to use procedures that severely understate their liabilities. We analyze how state pension funds reached this state of affairs, present a distribution of future outcomes, and discuss why public pension funding and investment policy matter for taxpayers.
We discuss the true economic funding status of state public pension plans and show that government accounting standards require states to use procedures that severely understate their liabilities. We analyze how state pension funds reached this state of affairs, present a distribution of future outcomes, and discuss why public pension funding and investment policy matter for taxpayers.
Kaplan, Steve and Joshua Rauh. Forthcoming. Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to the Rise in the Highest Income. Review of Financial Studies.
We study how much of the top end of the income distribution is represented by four sectors—non-financial-firm top executives (Main Street); investment bankers and hedge, private equity, and mutual fund investors (Wall Street); corporate lawyers; and athletes and celebrities. Wall Street individuals comprise a higher percentage of the top income brackets than nonfinancial executives of public companies. While top executives’ representation in the top brackets has increased from 1994 to 2004, Wall Street's representation has likely increased even more. We discuss the implications of our findings for different explanations for the increased skewness at the highest income levels.
We study how much of the top end of the income distribution is represented by four sectors—non-financial-firm top executives (Main Street); investment bankers and hedge, private equity, and mutual fund investors (Wall Street); corporate lawyers; and athletes and celebrities. Wall Street individuals comprise a higher percentage of the top income brackets than nonfinancial executives of public companies. While top executives’ representation in the top brackets has increased from 1994 to 2004, Wall Street's representation has likely increased even more. We discuss the implications of our findings for different explanations for the increased skewness at the highest income levels.
Rauh, Joshua and Luigi Zingales. 2009. Bankruptcy is Best to Save GM. Economists Voice. 6(4)
Rauh, Joshua. 2009. Risk Shifting versus Risk Management: Investment Policy in Corporate Pension Plans. Review of Financial Studies. 22(7): 2687-2734.
The asset allocation of defined benefit pension plans is a setting where both risk-shifting and risk-management incentives are likely be present. Empirically, firms with poorly funded pension plans and weak credit ratings allocate a greater share of pension fund assets to safer securities such as government debt and cash, whereas firms with well-funded pension plans and strong credit ratings invest more heavily in equity. These relations hold both in pooled regressions and within firms and plans over time. The incentive to limit costly financial distress plays a considerably larger role than risk shifting in explaining variation in pension fund investment policy among firms in the United States.
The asset allocation of defined benefit pension plans is a setting where both risk-shifting and risk-management incentives are likely be present. Empirically, firms with poorly funded pension plans and weak credit ratings allocate a greater share of pension fund assets to safer securities such as government debt and cash, whereas firms with well-funded pension plans and strong credit ratings invest more heavily in equity. These relations hold both in pooled regressions and within firms and plans over time. The incentive to limit costly financial distress plays a considerably larger role than risk shifting in explaining variation in pension fund investment policy among firms in the United States.
Rauh, Joshua, James Poterba, Steven Venti and David Wise. 2007. Defined Contribution Plans Defined Benefit Plans and the Accumulation of Retirement Wealth. Journal of Public Economics. 91: 2062-2086.
This paper simulates the distribution of retirement wealth under representative Defined Benefit (DB) and Defined Contribution (DC) plans. It uses data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to explore how asset returns, earnings histories, and retirement plan characteristics contribute to the variation in retirement wealth outcomes. Average retirement wealth accruals under current DC plans exceed average accruals under private sector DB plans, although DC plans are also more likely to generate very low retirement wealth outcomes. The comparison of current DC plans with more generous public sector DB plans is less definitive, because public sector DB plans are more generous on average than their private sector DB counterparts.
This paper simulates the distribution of retirement wealth under representative Defined Benefit (DB) and Defined Contribution (DC) plans. It uses data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to explore how asset returns, earnings histories, and retirement plan characteristics contribute to the variation in retirement wealth outcomes. Average retirement wealth accruals under current DC plans exceed average accruals under private sector DB plans, although DC plans are also more likely to generate very low retirement wealth outcomes. The comparison of current DC plans with more generous public sector DB plans is less definitive, because public sector DB plans are more generous on average than their private sector DB counterparts.
Rauh, Joshua. 2006. Investment and Financing Constraints: Evidence from the Funding of Corporate Pension Plans. Journal of Finance. 61(1): 33-71.
I exploit sharply nonlinear funding rules for defined benefit pension plans in order to identify the dependence of corporate investment on internal financial resources in a large sample. Capital expenditures decline with mandatory contributions to DB pension plans, even when controlling for correlations between the pension funding status itself and the firm’s unobserved investment opportunities. The effect is particularly evident among firms that face financing constraints based on observable variables such as credit ratings. Investment also displays strong negative correlations with the part of mandatory contributions resulting solely from unexpected asset market movements.
I exploit sharply nonlinear funding rules for defined benefit pension plans in order to identify the dependence of corporate investment on internal financial resources in a large sample. Capital expenditures decline with mandatory contributions to DB pension plans, even when controlling for correlations between the pension funding status itself and the firm’s unobserved investment opportunities. The effect is particularly evident among firms that face financing constraints based on observable variables such as credit ratings. Investment also displays strong negative correlations with the part of mandatory contributions resulting solely from unexpected asset market movements.
Rauh, Joshua. 2006. Own Company Stock in Defined Contribution Pension Plans: A Takeover Defense. Journal of Financial Economics. 81(2): 379-410.
If managers induce employees to hold company stock in defined contribution pension plans as a form of takeover defense, then changes in state laws that enhance managerial protection should lead to a reduction in employer stock in 401(k) plans. Delaware's mid-1990s validation of the poison pill in conjunction with a staggered board was followed by a significant decline in employee ownership within defined contribution plans for firms incorporated in Delaware. Evidence using governance data suggests that this is due to responses of firms with staggered boards. Binary choice models confirm that employee ownership in defined contribution plans lowers takeover probabilities.
If managers induce employees to hold company stock in defined contribution pension plans as a form of takeover defense, then changes in state laws that enhance managerial protection should lead to a reduction in employer stock in 401(k) plans. Delaware's mid-1990s validation of the poison pill in conjunction with a staggered board was followed by a significant decline in employee ownership within defined contribution plans for firms incorporated in Delaware. Evidence using governance data suggests that this is due to responses of firms with staggered boards. Binary choice models confirm that employee ownership in defined contribution plans lowers takeover probabilities.
Working Papers
Rauh, Joshua and Amir Sufi. Capital Stricture and Debt Structure.
Using a novel data set that records individual debt issues on the balance sheet of a large sample of rated public firms, we show that recognition of debt heterogeneity leads to new insights into the determinants of corporate capital structure. We first demonstrate that traditional capital structure studies that ignore debt heterogeneity miss a substantial fraction of capital structure variation. We then show that relative to high credit quality firms, low credit quality firms are more likely to have a multi-tiered capital structure consisting of both secured bank debt with tight covenants and subordinated non-bank debt with loose covenants. Further, while high credit quality firms enjoy access to a variety of sources of discretionary flexible sources of finance, low credit quality firms rely on tightly monitored secured bank debt for liquidity. The findings are similar when we focus on plausibly exogenous credit quality variation in a sample of "fallen angels," which are firms that are downgraded from investment grade to speculative grade by Moody's Investors Services. We discuss the extent to which these findings are consistent with existing theoretical models of debt structure in which firms simultaneously use multiple debt types to reduce incentive conflicts
Using a novel data set that records individual debt issues on the balance sheet of a large sample of rated public firms, we show that recognition of debt heterogeneity leads to new insights into the determinants of corporate capital structure. We first demonstrate that traditional capital structure studies that ignore debt heterogeneity miss a substantial fraction of capital structure variation. We then show that relative to high credit quality firms, low credit quality firms are more likely to have a multi-tiered capital structure consisting of both secured bank debt with tight covenants and subordinated non-bank debt with loose covenants. Further, while high credit quality firms enjoy access to a variety of sources of discretionary flexible sources of finance, low credit quality firms rely on tightly monitored secured bank debt for liquidity. The findings are similar when we focus on plausibly exogenous credit quality variation in a sample of "fallen angels," which are firms that are downgraded from investment grade to speculative grade by Moody's Investors Services. We discuss the extent to which these findings are consistent with existing theoretical models of debt structure in which firms simultaneously use multiple debt types to reduce incentive conflicts
Rauh, Joshua. Public Pension Promises How Big Are They and What Are They Worth.
We calculate two present value measures of already-promised state pension liabilities using discount rates that reflect their risk. If benefits have the same default and recovery characteristics as general obligation debt, aggregate underfunding is $1.31 trillion. This represents a lower bound on the value of the liability to taxpayers, because pension promises typically have higher priority than state municipal debt. If states cannot default on pension benefits, underfunding is $3.23 trillion. The underfunding is even larger under broader concepts of accrued liabilities that account for projected salary growth and future service.
We calculate two present value measures of already-promised state pension liabilities using discount rates that reflect their risk. If benefits have the same default and recovery characteristics as general obligation debt, aggregate underfunding is $1.31 trillion. This represents a lower bound on the value of the liability to taxpayers, because pension promises typically have higher priority than state municipal debt. If states cannot default on pension benefits, underfunding is $3.23 trillion. The underfunding is even larger under broader concepts of accrued liabilities that account for projected salary growth and future service.
Teaching Interests
Corporate finance (valuation and capital structure)
CONTACT INFO:
PHONE: (847) 491-4462
FAX: (847) 491-5719
PHONE: (847) 491-4462
FAX: (847) 491-5719
OFFICE:
Jacobs Center Room 419
Jacobs Center Room 419